Analytic metaphysics, as far as I can tell, mostly tacitly rejects ontological cluelessness.
To give some ~examples from the analytic tradition: As far as I understand them, Brian Cantwell Smith and Nancy Cartwright espouse(d[1]) a view somewhat adjacent to ontological cluelessness, albeit perhaps slightly stronger, in that, according to (my model of?) them, there is no final/fundamental basis of reality and it's not infinite regress either.
Somewhat more specifically, reading BCS's On the Origin of Objects (haven't read Cartwright yet) gave me the picture of a gunky-unknowable reality, where for a "part" of reality to even become a type of thing that can be known, it needs to be stabilized into a knowable object or something like that, and that process of stabilization involves parts/regions of the universe acting at a distance in a way that involves a primitive form of "aboutness" (?).
(There is some superficial semi-inconsistency in this way of talking about it, in that it describes [what it takes a not-yet-a-Thing to stabilize into a (knowable) "Thing"] in terms of knowable Things, so the growing Thing should also be knowable by transitivity or something (?). But I don't think I'm passing BCS's ITT.)
For another adjacent analyticist, Eric Schwitzgebel? https://faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzAbs/Weirdness.htm
Oh, and how could I forget The Guy Against Reality? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_D._Hoffman
I just saw that BCS died 18 days ago :(.
Good examples, thank you! I guess my analytic metaphysics knowledge isn't big enough. The references look great, I'll take a look.
Nitpick: This post alternates between using "ontological cluelessness" to mean a certain sort of state of ignorance ("Ontological cluenessness is a state of knowledge that humans could be in, in which they haven't yet discovered ..."), and using it to denote the belief that we are in that state of ignorance. ("Ontological cluelessness is distinct from radical skepticism, pyrrhonism, and mysticism".) I think it would be better not to do that.
Ontological cluelessness seems poorly defined to me.
The notion of "concept" or "knowledge" does not seem especially basic given that philosophers have tried to define them for thousands of years and several different answers are given today, so it doesn't make sense to declare we have ontological cluelessness if we're wrong about them. What about "five" or "sodium chloride"? These are known to be extremely useful concepts in making sense of the world around us, and often rediscovered by humans, neural nets, and other systems, so it seems highly unlikely they would need to be revised to get an "accurate understanding" of 5+2 or the chemical properties of salt.
However, if the criterion is "an extreme upending of what we thought the cosmos was made of, the basic principles by which it operated, and the ways to make sense of those principles.", it seems highly likely that we will have at least one extreme shift in what we think the cosmos is made of, given that relativity and QM have incompatible ontologies; there will also necessarily be new basic principles, given that physics steadily marches towards more and more general and abstruse math.
Note: This piece was entirely written by myself. Claude is credited as a co-author because of the extensive feedback they provided in the writing process. Kimi K2 also gave feedback, but wrote none of the text.
I'm pretty sure I'm ontologically clueless in the way you describe. There are some very fundamental things in my worldview that I suspect are misapprehensions but that I don't know how to confidently replace with anything better. The yet-unimagined right answer to any of them could potentially knock out the pillars holding up much of what I think I know. It's unsettling when I pause to think about it, but I muddle through.
Might be worth mentioning Kuhn's "paradigm shifts" as examples of branches of knowledge jumping from one local maximum to another one, and having to resort their conceptual categories thereafter.
Alasdair MacIntyre's histories of ethical philosophy also highlight how sometimes when a field jumps from one local maximum to another, it brings along old conceptual categories that no longer can find a place but they continue to haunt as weird, ghostly apparitions.
Yep, I think Kuhn is related but maybe doesn't quite go far enough, since the new paradigms are still sort of "within the fundamental ontology humanity uses"? I didn't know about MacIntyre's history, that sounds interesting. Sort of related to ontological crises and how they're sometimes in practice "not finished".
One distinction I notice I didn't make is that humanity can be ontologically clueless, and individual people can be ontologically clueless. Really any entity can be. It feels unsettling to think that humanity is on the ball with reality and I'm clueless over here, seems related to concept-shaped holes.
I think Daoism is an (attempt) at Ontological Cluing. Actually, that might be exactly the thing that Daoism is trying to do.
How does "ontological cluelessness" relate to the philosophical notion of naïve realism, meaning the belief that our perception provides direct awareness of objects as they really are?
How does "ontological cluing" relate to the Buddhist concept often translated as enlightenment or awakening?
I find myself suspicious of the claim that "the moves from animism to paganism to monotheistic religions" constitute an increase in clue, rather than a misstep or sidestep. Can you elaborate?
Not sure how it relates to direct/naïve realism. Even finding out that naïve realism is true wouldn't be an ontological cluing because it's sort of in the envelope of things people have considered?
How does "ontological cluing" relate to the Buddhist concept often translated as enlightenment or awakening?
Ah, that's kind of a borderline case. Probably the closest thing we have, though it's on a personal level rather than a societal one. The Buddha attaining awakening (if he was the first being to do so) was definitely an ontological cluing (if it moved us closer to the true nature of the cosmos).
I find myself suspicious of the claim that "the moves from animism to paganism to monotheistic religions" constitute an increase in clue, rather than a misstep or sidestep. Can you elaborate?
Oops yeah that could've been clearer. I don't personally think this was an ontological cluing, so yeah I think it's a sidestep. I think it works best as an illustration of the magnitude of the shifts I'm thinking of. Maybe not quite large enough actually.
Humans may be in a state of total confusion as to the fundamental makeup of the cosmos and its rules, to the point where even extremely basic concepts would need to be revised for accurate understanding.
epistemic status: Philosophy
Content Warning: Philosophy
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There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy
—William Shakespeare, “Hamlet” I.5:159–167, 1600
I want to describe a philosophical stance and/or position that could be called "ontological cluelessness".
Ontological cluelessness is a state of knowledge that humans could be in, in which they haven't yet discovered the correct basic categories and frameworks for making sense of the cosmos[1] in which they find themselves.
That is, humans currently use some basic frameworks for making sense of the cosmos, which include several branches and flavours of science, mathematics, many religions, and many philosophical frameworks; they also use many basic categories like the notion of a physical law, consciousness, matter, God, substance, Being, moral facts, logical entailment, stories & myths, and so on.
These frameworks and categories may be utterly inadequate for making sense of the cosmos humans find themselves in, and instead represent a local maximum in the space of conceptual apparatūs that could be used to make sense of the cosmos. If that is indeed the case, humanity finds itself in a state of ontological cluelessness. I don't want make strong claims as to whether humanity is in a state of ontological cluelessness, but I believe that it is a hypothesis worth tracking.
Ontological cluelessness can be intepreted in multiple versions with differing strength, where weaker versions may retain some fundamental categories (such as the notion of a concept, or the notion of knowledge); the strongest version calls into question all current ways of knowing (as in inventing notions as basic as the concept of a concept). Leaving this latter kind of strong ontological cluelessness would entail an extreme upending of what we thought the cosmos was made of, the basic principles by which it operated, and the ways to make sense of those principles.
Ontological cluelessness is distinct from radical skepticism, pyrrhonism and mysticism:
Ontological cluelessness can be seen as a tacit pre-supposition for much foundational (mostly continental) metaphysical work (e.g. Heidegger, Deleuze, Whitehead, maybe Hegel?). That is, looking at Heidegger with his investigation of fundamental ontology and Dasein (and especially his later Kehre and aletheia) and Deleuze with his nomadic science, I feel like that's the kind of metaphysics one'd see that resolves ontological cluelessness. Analytic metaphysics, as far as I can tell, mostly tacitly rejects ontological cluelessness.
I will call the process of resolving/exiting ontological cluelessness "ontological cluing". Ontological cluing could take three different forms:
Ontological cluing can also be thought of along two other axes:
The secret third option is possible for both the recognizability and the communicability axis.
Superintelligences may help with ontological cluing if they are philosophically or metaphilosophically competent.
This post has been pretty abstract so far, partly due to the abstract nature of the topic at hand. I don't want to speculate or pretend that I can resolve ontological cluelessness if humanity is in that state, but I can give examples of intellectual advances that'd count as ontological cluing if humanity's ontological cluelessness lies in the past. Examples would include:
I personally think it's pretty likely that humanity is ontologically clueless, and if forced I'd put a 30% chance on it (though this number is obviously fraught, since resolving ontological cluelessness may upend the notion of probabilistic notion or probabilities, and after all may never be resolved by experiment).
Humans don't seem to have been selected very strongly for understanding the cosmos accurately, and also not selected very strongly to be competent at philosophy or metaphilosophy.
I don't think that believing in the option of being ontologically clueless has immediate practical implications. It may lead one to take an open stance towards new conceptual schemes and frameworks, and a receptivity to what could be encountered. It may turn out that our actions matter much more than we think, or much less; it may turn out that the cosmos is much larger than we think, or much smaller; it may be the case that the universe is much better and forgiving than we believe, or much more adversarial and unforgiving; and all of those notions could stop making sense if we understand what, so to speak, "is going on".
Whether or not we are in a state of ontological cluelessness is a crucial consideration, but a frustratingly vague one.
Nick Bostrom has been hinting at something adjacent to this in some recent interviews (which, maddeningly, I can't find), and I wildly extrapolated his subtle hints; all the mistakes and muddled thinking lie with me.
I will use the term "cosmos" a lot here because the entirety of existence may turn out to be much larger (think Tegmark IV) or much smaller (think solipsism) than what standard science considers to be the "universe". ↩︎