If I understand the basic idea correctly, it's that a convex set can be represented by its maxima for all linear functions on the vector space containing that set, and under these assumptions, that amounts to "the set of achievable outcome distributions can be represented by its maximal attainable utility for all utility functions".
I'm curious what changes when looking at games of imperfect recall (general background discussed in this section; see also this paper for a connection between CDT+GT and KKT conditions).
For example, in the absent-minded driver problem, there are 2 intersections, and 3 different destinations; if you turn at the first, you get to A; if you go straight on first and turn on second, you get to B; if you go straight twice, you get C. Your policy is your probability of turning (since due to amnesia, there is no way to distinguish between the intersections). The set of achievable outcome distributions is not convex, since 100% A and 100% C are achievable, but 50% A, 50% C is not achievable. So we can't describe the feasible region with utility attainment, as in the convex case.
Making a 'finite number of time steps' assumption, we can describe the outcome distribution as a polynomial of the policy probabilities; the policy space can be described as a product of simplices. When running a product of simplices through a polynomial, we get a non convex shape. To apply linear algebra, we could consider representing a degree-d polynomial on a vector space
The set of achievable outcome distributions is not convex, since 100% A and 100% C are achievable, but 50% A, 50% C is not achievable.
This makes me wonder about reflective consistency. Say I'm a UDT agent and anticipate being faced with self-coordination problems in the future. Then maybe I should generate a bunch of random numbers today and store them in my mind, so that future copies of me can use them for randomized but self-correlated play. Maybe it can even deal with Wichardt-like examples where the UDT player is faced with other players, if we assume that other players can't read the random numbers from the UDT player's mind and can only respond to the "use random numbers" policy in general. Though yeah, I'm not sure how much sense these assumptions make.
Thanks for the observation! I fully agree that the convex assumption is not trivial at all.
Interesting!
When considering a trajectory of environmental states
, the effect of the policy is described by probabilities given by .
Nitpick: The example below indicates that
I'd not be surprised if it has been discussed before.
Indeed: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YAa4qcMyoucRS2Ykr/basic-inframeasure-theory#Legendre_Fenchel_Duality
So, (bounded)-infradistributions are isomorphic to concave monotone normalized Lipschitz/uniformly continuous functions
. This is the LF-Duality. We can freely translate concepts back and forth between "sets of sa-measures that fulfill some conditions" and "concave functionals on that fulfill some conditions". In particular, actual probability distributions correspond to a: linear, monotone, 1-Lipschitz, normalized functional
. So, in the other half of the LF-duality, probability distributions and infradistributions are very nearly the same sort of thing, the only difference between them is that the former is linear and the latter is concave! This is the essential reason why so many probability theory concepts have analogues for infradistributions.
The nitpicking is appreciated, I just fixed the typo there. Thanks also for the comprehensive reference!
What you described here is a simple special case of the LF-duality of ambidistributions. Ambidistributions describe a situation where the agent has some control over the environment, but also has ambiguous beliefs (i.e. the environment behavior can be described with credal sets, not necessarily probability distributions). They have two dual descriptions: as a convex geometry object we called "cramble sets" (a generalization of credal set) and as functionals with specific properties over the space of utility functions. You are describing the special case in which there is no ambiguity, which makes the cramble set degenerate into an ordinary closed convex set.
Btw, ambidistributions have another duality (a De Morgan involution) which exchanges capability and ambiguity, so your special case is De Morgan dual to the special case where the agent has no freedom to choose anything but does have ambiguous beliefs (and then the closed convex set becomes just an ordinary credal set).
Interesting! I expect this duality would be useful for loosening either side's consistency conditions in order to get notions of 'epistemic probabilities approximately implied by some utility function' and 'utility functions approximately implied by some set of probabilities', one version of which is your half-space progressive resolution idea.
On the other hand, it feel like the generality of this construction illustrates a descriptive shortfall of utility functions considered in the vnm sense - if we take utility functions to be equivalence-classed by inducing the same implied probabilities, this elides the intuitively-real distinction between "my agent has mediocre epistemics but is definitely using them to optimize U" and "my agent has perfect epistemics but I'm not quite sure what U it is optimizing". To the extent that we can make these mathematically analogous, this feels like a 'one man's modus ponens...' against this conception of utility - but perhaps if it enables a nice 'loosening' in the sense I said above then it could be a step forward.
I wanted to sand off the sharp corners of
Then define:
i.e. we take the policy of maximum entropy that gives a particular point
So
So, in conclusion, this framework where
This is a really cool idea! Would it be ok to add it into the post, with a note clarifying that came from you?
Sure!
Just noting a math fact here that I think is helpful for gaining intuition about the functions
So we find that
The observation that I think is helpful but not immediately clear here is that it is perfectly typical for
TLDR: In recent work, Roy Fox proposes to understand an agent's capabilities in terms of the set of environment dynamics it can bring about.[1] This leads to an intriguing duality between probabilities and utilities via the Legendre-Fenchel transform.
Introduction
Some agents are more powerful than others. Indeed, some can yield a wider range of outcomes, maybe because they are capable long-term planners or because they have built rich world models. Being able to clearly delineate the capabilities of agents is an important challenge for AI alignment.
A natural place to start thinking about how to describe the capabilities of an agent is reinforcement learning (RL), or more generally, approaches that see behaviour as arising from the maximisation of expected utility. By taking this view, one can describe "capability" as the range of reward/utility functions that an agent can successfully maximise — as done e.g. in classic work by Legg & Hutter and also in more recent work.
Such a perspective is very useful, but I am not a big fan of rewards/utilities. Rewards are great in games and other settings where they come naturally, but real life often does not handle rewards on a silver plate. When absent, rewards are often defined artificially — but the design of rewards that give rise to desired behaviour without enabling Goodharting is extremely difficult. That said, reward-based frameworks are powerful,[2] and proposing alternative approaches that can compete with them is hard.[3]
Thus, while I am not a utility/reward fan, I am intrigued by situations where they arise naturally. One place where this happens is in the celebrated von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem (VNM), which states that preferences with specific properties can be described as if the agent is trying to maximise a specific utility function (see this great post for related discussions). Another interesting idea is the link between utility maximisation and description length minimisation presented by John Wentworth, which suggests a duality between utilities and probabilities.[4] A related perspective appears in Jeffrey–Bolker rotations as discussed by Abram Demski, where probability and value form vectors and certain linear transformations can move structure between them without changing the represented preferences.
I recently stumbled upon yet another way to see how utilities can naturally arise from probabilities, this time via the Legendre transform. In contrast with the settings discussed by VNM, Wentworth, and Demski, which assume a given preference or utility, here we simply start from achievable environmental dynamics to later derive utilities from them. The idea is simple and elegant — I'd not be surprised if it has been discussed before.[5] Moreover, I believe this perspective may be useful for various issues related to AI alignment, which is what pushed me to write about it here.
The rest of this post presents:
Defining capability space
Let's consider an agent that acts over an environment described by a variable over a time-window from . For simplicity, let us focus on scenarios where and the actions that an agent can implement are finite.
Denote by the set of possible policies that a particular agent can feasibly implement, perhaps subject to information, computation, memory, or training constraints. In general, we assume that by acting according to a policy , the agent influences the dynamics of the environment. When considering a trajectory of environmental states , the effect of the policy is described by probabilities given by .
Example: Controlled Markov processes
To make this more concrete, let us denote the actions of the agent by , and assume that the dynamics of the environment are Markovian conditioned on its previous state and the agent's action . Then, the probability of observing a given sequence of states and actions is
where is a Markov kernel. Then, we can define the dynamics of the environment when the agent acts according to simply as
In a recent paper, Roy Fox[6] defines the capability space of an agent as the collection of environment stochastic dynamics that are achievable via the various policies that the agent could adopt. This definition comes with three assumptions:
One can say that an agent's capability can be assessed via the size and shape of its capability space. This is a general definition that does not rely on utilities or rewards — instead, it uses a credal set as in imprecise probability.
The Legendre-Fenchel transform
Our next step will be to re-express the capability space using the Legendre Transform. But before doing that, let me provide an overview of what this transform is.[7]
The Legendre-Fenchel transform was first introduced by Legendre in 1787, and was later extended by Fenchel in 1949. People are often more familiar with the Fourier transform, which takes a function in time domain and returns an alternative representation of it in frequency domain . Note that the Fourier transform provides two things: a dual variable ( instead of ) and a dual function ( instead of ). The Legendre-Fenchel transform operates in a similar manner: it takes a convex function and delivers two things: (i) a dual coordinate and (ii) a dual function expressed in those coordinates.
Concretely, for a given convex function defined over a convex set , the Legendre transform delivers a convex dual given by
where the domain of is . For strictly convex functions that are differentiable, the expression of the convex dual reduces to
where is the inverse of . The motivations behind this definition can be understood algebraically or geometrically, as discussed below.
Algebraic interpretation of the Legendre transform
Consider a smooth and strictly convex function . Because of its convexity, the derivative is an increasing function of . Because of this, the function establishes a natural bijection between and . Let’s use as a shorthand notation.
Due to the bijection, is just a re-labeling of ; one can think of and as alternative "coordinates” from which to express . One can indeed rewrite in terms of , creating a new function . If happens to be convex, then one can play the game again noting that establishes a bijection between and . By doing this, one could build further coordinates for .
But there is another interesting question one can consider: would it be possible to build a function such that the dual coordinate of goes back to being ?
The obvious candidate, , doesn’t work, as and are usually not the same. Luckily, a small tweak does the magic:
where is established using the bijection discussed above (but in the opposite direction). A quick calculation shows that just as . This construction is equivalent to the Legendre-Fenchel transform when is strictly convex and differentiable.
Geometric interpretation of the Legendre transform
Consider a smooth and strictly convex function . At each point , the tangent to has a unique slope . Similarly, the intercept is also unique. By denoting the value of the intercept for a given slope as , one finds that
Thus, is the Legendre transform of , and are the slopes and intercepts of the tangents of .
Interestingly, thanks to the symmetry of the equation above, the intercept of the tangent of for a given slope is again .
This derivation shows that the information that constitutes a strictly convex function can be equally conveyed by a collection of slope-intercept pairs. This is closely related to the fact that the epigraph of ,
is closed and convex if is lower-semicontinuous and convex, and closed convex sets can be expressed as intersections of half-spaces[8]. Intuitively, this is like sculpting a block of marble into a convex shape by doing cuts of the block with a sharp knife.
For an epigraph, the above property takes the following form:
where is the set of slope-intercept pairs of the linear functions lying below the functions' graph.
Under what conditions is the Legendre-Fenchel transform a "proper" conjugation — i.e., an involution? The Fenchel-Moreau theorem states that if is the Legendre-Fenchel dual of , then if is a proper lower-semicontinuous convex function.
Utilities as Legendre duals of probabilities
We are now ready for the central idea. Consider describing the capability space via an indicator function given by
Note that is convex if is convex — thus, one can compute its Legendre-Fenchel transform. A quick calculation shows that the transform gives [9]
Thus, tells us the optimal performance that an agent with capability space can achieve on the task indexed by utility , being the convex dual of .
Moreover, the assumptions of convexity and closedness on make a proper lower-semicontinuous convex function; therefore, the Legendre-Fenchel transform of is again . This implies that all information in can be recovered from . Indeed, this alternative description leads to a dual characterisation of the capability space in terms of performance bounds:
This has various interesting implications: [10]
Bonus: how regularisation can turn into a non-standard expectation
For the fun of it,[11] let's also consider a more nuanced manner of describing the capability space using
where represents a preferred environmental dynamics and . Under this description, not only states if belongs to or not, but if it does it captures how far it is from as quantified by the Kullback–Leibler divergence . If is uniform then the KL term becomes entropy regularisation. The Legendre-Fenchel transform of can be found to be
Interestingly, if we replace the hard delineation of in terms of for a purely Kullback-Leibler assessment, i.e. , then the Legendre dual simplifies as follows:
Above, the second equality follows from the Donsker-Varadhan variational formula. Thus, for this setting becomes a quasi-arithmetic average, being structurally equivalent to a free senergy — being closely related to log-partition functions of exponential families and the ELBO in variational inference.
Conclusion
We have explored how the capability space of an agent can be defined in two alternative ways:
What I find most fascinating is how utilities naturally emerge as duals of probability via the Legendre-Fenchel formalism. In this context, utilities don't have the semantics that we normally attribute to them: they just highlight a dual domain that can be used to convey the same information regarding the dynamics of the environment that the agent can elicit. Mathematically, the duality is a consequence of the fact that convex sets of probabilities can be expressed as intersections of half-spaces, and utilities are a natural way to index such half-spaces.
Why this matters for alignment. A substantial portion of alignment is, in one way or another, about characterising what an agent could do rather than what it happens to do. The capability space turns comparing agents' capabilities into set inclusion, and a safety property ("the agent cannot steer the world into region ") becomes a geometric constraint on . On the dual side, the convex dual is exactly what evaluations measure: pick a task and see how well the agent does.
This suggests an interesting possibility: since determines completely, one could in principle reconstruct the full capability space — every dynamics the agent can elicit — purely from its performance on tasks. In practice, we can only evaluate finitely many tasks , and each evaluation yields a half-space
that must contain . Intersecting them gives a polytope that outer-approximates the capability space. For known parametric families of environments (e.g. finite MDPs with known transition structure), is a polytope with finitely many faces, so finitely many well-chosen tasks do recover it exactly.
I came across Roy's work during the Finding the Frame workshop at the RL Conference. I strongly recommend this workshop to anyone interested in the foundations of reinforcement learning.
In the context of RL, I very much recommend the series of six talks on the RL Debate Series, which exhibit various arguments for and against modelling behaviour in terms of reward maximisation.
I really like empowerment and other approaches to intrinsic motivation, but it is still early days.
This link between probabilities and utilities has been generalised in this recent paper, about which I'll write another post sometime soon.
If you have seen related ideas elsewhere, please let me know!
It would be great if Roy could write a blog here presenting this work.
Further discussions about the Legendre transform can be found in this paper and this paper.
See Theorem 11.5 in Rockafellar's book.
Below, the sup turns into a max because is a closed subset of a probability simplex (which is compact).
Another, perhaps more anecdotal implication is that inherits the structure of the von Neumann–Morgenstern theorem for free. It is direct to see that for any and
That is, carries the same information for and for any positive affine transformation of it. In VNM, utilities being "unique up to positive affine transformations" is a consequence of axioms on preferences. Here, the same invariance falls out of the geometry: affine rescalings of don't change which face of is selected, so they cannot be distinguished by what the agent can achieve. The dual coordinates are not just utility-like in name — they come with the equivalence classes that utilities have.
Big thanks to @DaemonicSigil for suggesting this really cool idea.