Epistemic status: metaphysics
I was reading Factored Space Models (previously, Finite Factored Sets) and was trying to understand in what sense it was a Theory of Time.
Scott Garrabrant says "[The Pearlian Theory of Time] ... is the best thing to happen to our understanding of time since Einstein". I read Pearl's book on Causality[1], and while there's math, this metaphysical connection that Scott seems to make isn't really explicated. Timeless Causality and Timeless Physics is the only place I saw this view explained explicitly, but not at the level of math / language used in Pearl's book.
Here is my attempt at explicitly writing down what all of these views are pointing at (in a more rigorous language)—the core of the Pearlian Theory of Time, and in what sense FSM shares the same structure.
Causality leave a shadow of conditional independence relationships over the observational distribution. Here's an explanation providing the core intuition:
The metaphysical claim is that, this direction is the definition of time[5], morally so, based on the intuition provided by the example above.
So, the Pearlian Theory of Time is the claim that Time is the partial order over the variables of a Bayes Net corresponding to the perfect map of a distribution.
Abstracting away, the structure of any Theory of Time is then to:
This is exactly what Factored Space Model does:
... thus justifying calling FSM a Theory of Time in the same spirit that Pearlian Causal Discovery is a Theory of Time.
Chapter 2, specifically, which is about Causal Discovery. All the other chapters are mostly irrelevant for this purpose.
By (1) making a graph with edge direction corresponding to equation assignment direction, (2) pushforwarding uncertainties to endogenous variables, and (3) letting interventional distributions be defined by the truncated factorization formula.
By (1) forgetting the causal semantics, i.e. no longer associating the graph with all the interventional distributions, and only the no intervention observational distribution.
This shortform answers this question I had.
Pearl comes very close. In his Temporal Bias Conjecture (2.8.2):
"In most natural phenomenon, the physical time coincides with at least one statistical time."
(where statistical time refers to the aforementioned direction.)
But doesn't go as far as this ought to be the definition of Time.
Ah yes, the fork asymmetry. I think Pearl believes that correlations reduce to causations, so this is probably why he wouldn't particularly try to, conversely, reduce causal structure to a set of (in)dependencies. I'm not sure whether the latter reduction is ultimately possible in the universe. Are the correlations present in the universe, e.g. defined via the Albert/Loewer Mentaculus probability distribution, sufficient to recover the familiar causal structure of the universe?