Some subset of those who agree that 'when two people disagree, only one of them can be right' and the people who agree that A : A := 'when two people disagree, they can both be right' such that A ≈ A' and A' := 'when two people "disagree," they might not disagree, and they can both be right', do not have a disagreement that cashes out as differences in anticipated experiences, and therefor may only superficially disagree.

Note 1: in order for this to be unambiguously true, 'anticipated experiences' necessarily includes anticipated experiences given counterfactual conditions.

Note 1.1: Counterfactuals are not contrary to facts; they have attributes which facts can also share, and, under varying circumstances, the ratio of [the set of relevant shared attributes] to [the set of relevant unshared attributes] between a counterfactual situation and known situation may be sufficiently large that it becomes misleading to characterize the situations as [opposite] or [mostly disagreeing, as opposed to mostly agreeing]. A more fitting word would be 'laterofactual'.

Note 1.1.1: When people say that B : B := 'C and D disagree', the set of non-excluded non-[stupidly interpretable] implicatures of the statement B includes that E : E := 'C and D mostly disagree', and not only F : F := 'C and D have any amount of disagreement'.