If you are the world's richest man, what sort of anthropic reasoning should you do?
You might think that, well, there's about 2^33 humans, so relative to other people I should assign about 33 more bits towards the simulation hypothesis, since if there's no simulation I'd be one of those randos. If random philosophers think it's some 1%-50% kind of chance, from my perspective it should be a total lock, right?
But in most simulations, all humans are simulated at about the same level of fidelity. You could try to juggle real-ish humans interacting with simple-toy-model humans, but it would require huge amounts of skillful puppeteering to hide the charade, the compute budget would be lower but the computational complexity would be exorbitant.
It's these rarer "everyone else is a puppet of some vast alien puppeteer who wanted to simulate specifically the human with the most green pieces of paper circa 2026, even though they can already predict everyone else well enough to inhabit their skin" type simulations that you should bump up by the full 33 (?) bits of evidence[1], not the general sort of simulation where the randos are just as simulated as you are.
What you think after considering the evidence is between you and your prior, but personally I don't have those hypotheses within 33-bit striking distance of plausibility, and so even if I was the world's richest man I would continue to find them implausible.
EDIT: Whoops, off by a thousand. Also, added a footnote expressing additional important confusion.
Thinking through what Solomonoff induction says about the actual amount of evidence is tricky, because I don't actually know how the best self-centered theories of the world encode your location. If the best hypotheses all look like "Consider a universe [or simulation] with physical laws P, and initial state I, and zoom into the planet Earth and look for human # 4,512,905,154", then the number of humans on earth does go straight into the number of bits.
But maybe the best hypothesis looks like "Consider a universe with physical laws P such that someone living on a planet had life experiences with the same hash value as my own experiences." In which case the number of other humans still matters for avoiding hash collisions, but it might matter only log as much for the description length (i.e. rather than adding 33 bits, you only need log(33) bits.)
Or maybe some other description with totally different scaling is best!
surely it's not that hard to hide the charade. there are entire countries that you could simulate with relatively cheap economic models if your goal is to simulate Elon's experience.
I'm not sure where "not that hard" is supposed to go in an argument. I agree it's "not that hard" in some sense to have your simulation call a vast alien intelligence who can wear the skin of everyone Elon talks to and invent plausible and consistent stories about having visited those countries and had economic interactions with them.
Also I've just realized I didn't actually talk about anthropic reasoning and probably made a wrong implicit argument, prb gotta edit the parent.