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hendrycks recently published a paper introducing a new moral theory. the paper contains this insane table, which claims that you should value a foreign stranger at 3e-12 times the value you assign to yourself. even setting aside the fact that this is apparently supposed to be a prescriptive theory, even as a descriptive theory, i think this is utter madness.
the core problem is that it assumes if x% of your total caring is assigned to people other than yourself, then you must give away x% of your wealth to be consistent.
the argument goes that since most people don't give away more than say 50% of their wealth, then if there are 1e-10 people then each one can only get a tiny sliver of your caring.
but this is wrong, because there is no simple relationship between the % of your caring to be about other people and the % of your money you should give away. i think you should care about random strangers closer to 1e-3 than 1e-12. if you care about each stranger x times as much as yourself, you should keep giving away money to the person who is most in need until each marginal $ helps them more than x times as much as each marginal $ helps you.
if x = 1e-12, then you're saying you won't give a single dollar to charity until you have so much money that a dollar helps the stranger more than a trillion times more than it helps you; or, because a trillion dollars is always worth less than a trillion times the value of a dollar due to convexity, you won't give a single dollar to charity until it would help them more than giving you a trillion dollars, which probably won't be true until you are absurdly wealthy.
modus tollens Parfit's ideas about personal identity. I think that's a worthwhile angle, and more practically useful these days than using Reasons and Persons to dissuade people of egocentricity, which afaict is closer to Parfit's original goals.
I think partially motivated reasoning but a lot of it is a defense mechanism. Like if somebody you've never met before tells you to donate half your money to charity, you might (correctly!) infer that they do not have your best interests at heart. Regardless of whether they're a fancy-sounding Oxford academic, a carpenter's stepson from the Middle East, or your local internet philosophy & rationality blogger.
So I'm not at all surprised that people aren't convinced by these arguments, nor do I (at a sufficiently high level of abstraction) believe that they ought to be.
2Seth Herd
Motivated reasoning is a defense mechanism.
Motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, and AI risk theory
When I say motivated reasoning, do you think that means it's conscious and strategic? I worry it's used that way more than the academic and IMO more important usage.