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a lot of people are scared to have more correct beliefs about ethics because those beliefs might imply needing to make immense sacrifices. and then you might no longer get to think of yourself as an ethical person. indeed you might even become a hypocrite! how terrible. better not to contemplate it at all, and to make fun of anyone who does contemplate it, so that you can let your ironic detachment shield you from ever even considering it seriously.
i think this is a huge mistake. if this is the alternative, we should simply accept hypocrisy. ceteris paribus, it should always be morally better to have more correct moral beliefs, even if that makes us more hypocritical. at least if you know what is right, you have the possibility of doing better, but if you delude yourself, you are just screwed.
my guess is a problem like this is also the root cause of the Copenhagen interpretation of ethics.
I guess it's a matter of how far we're talking about taking the logic. Arguably if it's a case of "think a bit through one small, local contradiction in beliefs" then I agree this might happen. If you take the thinking as far in trying to unravel the entire edifice of morality into perfect consistency to get to any one of various possible "repugnant conclusions" then I believe at some point it leads more to proving the absurdity of your premises or method. There's only so many moral intuitions you can run against before it stops making sense to even call your beliefs a moral system.
Curious whether you agree with this (supposed) generalization @leogao.
3Vladimir_Nesov
I don't disagree that this happens, I'm discussing what could be done to improve this situation in one's own mind. So I'm not sure in what way I'm missing the point, other than the fact that I didn't acknowledge that this is descriptively reasonable (I didn't signal that I didn't miss this point and didn't disagree, if that is the point you are talking about) and instead went on to talk about ways of solving this problem where it's more feasible to solve in practice (in one's own mind rather than in others).
The self-evident argument example is interesting in that it illustrates how an argument external to one's mind can be both self-evident and systematically ignored. So by analogy I'm suggesting that a nontrivial argument can be studied in one's own mind, made self-evident within one's own mind (after sufficient study), and then similarly systematically ignored afterwards. This sets up a motivational system that makes it feasible to study the potentially threatening arguments, without making them more threatening than the external self-evident arguments that we can already observe being ignored, but at least this way the choice is informed.