With all due respect to the first set of authors, I wouldn't argue with Charles Bennett on the subject of thermodynamics. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF02084158
Aestivation is not sound strategy, as both its assumptions are shaky: Heat death of the universe is not an inevitable outcome: Big Rip now seems more plausible, when growing acceleration will tear apart the universe in like 20 billion years of now. Moreover, the fate of the universe can't be known for sure until much larger scale physical experiments will be performed, like building galactic size accelerators.
This turns us to the second assumption: the need to maximise computations. Future AI may not just maximise computations, but it has to do it as soon as possible, as it may need the results of computations earlier in order to control the fate of the universe.
The computing resources in one star system are already huge and it's not clear to me that you need more than that to be certain for all practical purposes about both the fate of the universe and how best to control it.
Big Rip now seems more plausible
How so? I looked on the web for a defense of Big Rip being more plausible than heat death but couldn't immediately find it.
(Updated the posted date because Summer Solstice caused the team to be behind on frontpaging things, and this questions seems like it deserves a proper shot at the frontpage)
In this paper, Anders Sandberg, Stuart Armstrong and Milan M. Cirkovic argue that
If a civilization wants to maximize computation it appears rational to aestivate until the far future in order to exploit the low temperature environment: this can produce a 1030 multiplier of achievable computation.
Later Charles H. Bennett, Robin Hanson, C. Jess Riedel disagree, claiming
In fact, while this assumption may apply in the distant future, our universe today contains vast reservoirs and other physical systems in non-maximal entropy states, and computer-generated entropy can be transferred to them at the adiabatic conversion rate of one bit of negentropy to erase one bit of error. This can be done at any time, and is not improved by waiting for a low cosmic background temperature. Thus aliens need not wait to be active. As Sandberg et al. do not provide a concrete model of the effect they assert, we construct one and show where their informal argument goes wrong.
Who was right?