"Goodhart" is no longer part of my native ontology for considering alignment failures. When I hear "The AI goodharts on some proxy of human happiness", I start trying to fill in a concrete example mind design which fits that description and which is plausibly trainable. My mental events are something like: 

Condition on: AI with primary value shards oriented around spurious correlate of human happiness; AI exhibited deceptive alignment during training, breaking perceived behavioral invariants during its sharp-capabilities-gain 

Warning: No history defined. How did we get here? 

Execute search for plausible training histories which produced this inner cognition 

Proposal: Reward schedule around approval and making people laugh; historical designers had insufficient understanding of outer signal->inner cognition mapping; designers accidentally provided reinforcement which empowered smile-activation and manipulate-internal-human-state-to-high-pleasure shards 

Objection: Concepts too human, this story is suspicious. Even conditioning on outcome, how did we get here? Why are there not more value shards? How did shard negotiation dynamics play out? 

Meta-objection: Noted, but your interlocutor's point probably doesn't require figuring this out.

I think that Goodhart is usually describing how the AI "takes advantage of" some fixed outer objective. But in my ontology, there isn't an outer objective—just inner cognition. So I have to do more translation.