I feel a bit crazy in that the recent METR report is explicitly saying that the measured progress is on well-specified tasks and that they cannot tell how much of this transfers to ill-specified tasks; and now half the blogs in AI safety sphere seem to be taking this as "ASI is imminent", dropping the caveat. In METR's words:
Acceleration might be limited to well-specified tasks. Much of the evidence we looked at measures performance on well-specified tasks that are easy to grade automatically or with a language model. If recent models have been growing more quickly on “clean” tasks than on “messy” tasks (relative to historical relative growth rates), then we may be overstating the acceleration in real-world impact. For instance, recent progress may be overfitting to the types of tasks which are included in AECI.
If we assume that humans are capable of solving ill-specified tasks, then at least by a "better than humans at any cognitive task" definition of ASI, ASI would need to be capable of solving ill-specified tasks. And "progress on well-specified tasks is accelerating" does not automatically translate to "soon we will understand how to solve ill-specified tasks".
I do think that it makes sense to assume that progress on well-specified tasks increases the odds of making progress on the rest of them as well and that we can't necessarily assume that the acceleration stays restricted to well-specified tasks, but that isn't the same as "we can put this trend on a graph which tells us that ASI will be here in a year".
I enjoy your analyses, if it helps. What we want is to be right, and act on it. The Litany of Tarski still applies.
Similar to other people's shortform feeds, short stuff that people on LW might be interested in, but which doesn't feel like it's worth a separate post. (Will probably be mostly cross-posted from my Facebook wall.)