Every now and then in discussions of animal welfare, I see the idea that the "amount" of their subjective experience should be weighted by something like their total amount of neurons. Is there a writeup somewhere of what the reasoning behind that intuition is? Because it doesn't seem intuitive to me at all.
From something like a functionalist perspective, where pleasure and pain exist because they have particular functions in the brain, I would not expect pleasure and pain to become more intense merely because the brain happens to have more neurons. Rather I would expect that having more neurons may 1) give the capability to experience anything like pleasure and pain at all 2) make a broader scale of pleasure and pain possible, if that happens to be useful for evolutionary purposes.
For a comparison, consider the sharpness of our senses. Humans have pretty big brains (though our brains are not the biggest), but that doesn't mean that all of our senses are better than those of all the animals with smaller brains. Eagles have sharper vision, bats have better hearing, dogs have better smell, etc..
Humans would rank quite well if you took the average of all of our senses - we're elite generalists while lots of the animals that beat us on a particular sense are specialized to that sense in particular - but still, it's not straightforwardly the case that bigger brain = sharper experience. Eagles have sharper vision because they are specialized into a particular niche that makes use of that sharper vision.
On a similar basis, I would expect that even if a bigger brain makes a broader scale of pain/pleasure possible in principle, evolution will only make use of that potential if there is a functional need for it. (Just as it invests neural capacity in a particular sense if the organism is in a niche where that's useful.) And I would expect a relatively limited scale to already be sufficient for most purposes. It doesn't seem to take that much pain before something becomes a clear DO NOT WANT (whether for a human or an animal), and past that the only clear benefit for a wider scale is if you regularly need to have multiple sources of strong pain so that the organism has to choose the lesser pain.
What I think is the case is that more intelligent animals - especially more social animals - have more distinct sources of pleasure and pain (we can feel a broad range of social emotions, both good and bad, that solitary animals lack). And possibly extra neural capacity would be useful for that broader spectrum of types. But I would think that the broader spectrum of potential sources for pleasure and pain would still not require a greater spectrum of intensity.
Of course, the human scale for pleasure and pain seems to be much wider than you'd intuitively think necessary, so it's probably not that our spectrum of intensity has been selected for being exactly the necessary one. But most people's day-to-day experience does not make use of such a broad scale. In fact, most people are outright incapable of even imagining what the extreme ends of the scale are like. That would seem to suggests to me that the existence of the extremes is more of an evolutionary spandrel than anything truly necessary for guiding daily behavior, so that the "typical useful human day-to-day range" and the "typical useful animal day-to-day range" would be similar. And I don't see why the typical useful range would require a particularly high neuron count, past the point where you can have it at all.
(In the above, I've for simplicity assumed that pain and suffering are the same. I don't actually believe that they are the same, but I'm very unsure of which animals I expect to be capable of suffering on top of just feeling pain/pleasure. In any case, you could apply basically all the same reasoning to the question of suffering.)
Is there a writeup somewhere of what the reasoning behind that intuition is?
I was surprised to find out Luke's 2017 Report on Consciousness and Moral Patienthood didn't at least sketch why, I misremembered and thought it did. Rethink's report did recap 4 arguments for this but ends up landing against them all FWIW.
There are several practical advantages to using neuron counts as a proxy for moral weight. Neuron counts are quantifiable, they are in-principle measurable, they correlate at least to some extent with cognitive abilities that are plausibly relev... (read more)
Similar to other people's shortform feeds, short stuff that people on LW might be interested in, but which doesn't feel like it's worth a separate post. (Will probably be mostly cross-posted from my Facebook wall.)