I don't know the answer, but here's two potentially related pieces of information from differential psychology:
For your last question - I think there are very few, if any, implications. Humans arguably occupy an extremely tiny region in the space of possible intelligent agent designs, while the orthogonality thesis applies to the space as a whole. If it was the case that goals and intelligence were correlated in humans, I'd expect it would be more reflective of how humans happen to be distributed in that space of possible designs, and not telling us much about the properties of the space itself.
ImE, obviously not? I don't have data, but general social interactions strongly suggest that smart people are nicer.
My model of how this works also suggests they would be nicer. Like, most people are nice to at least some people, so being not-nice is either due to a belief that being not-nice makes sense, or because of lack of self-control. Both of those are probably less common among smarter people. I don't think the correlation is super strong, but it's there.
Also, I don't think you defined the orthogonality thesis correctly. Afaik, Bostrom said that any combination of intelligence and goals is possible; this is not the same as saying that they're not correlated.
AFAIK there isn’t enough correlation between intelligence and goals in humans to disprove the orthogonality thesis, or even offer significant evidence against it.
However, there’s at least one dynamic in humans that should lead to some degree of value convergence in smarter humans that wouldn’t be present in AIs: a lot of human values are the result of failure to reflect on our actual desires and model of the world. Thus, smarter people are likely to suffer less from conditions like blind faith. Blind faith and tribal ideology have more degrees of freedom than optimization of the baseline desires evolution gave us, therefore one would expect more similarity in values among smarter humans (or perhaps more rational humans? It’s a known phenomenon that there can be incredibly intelligent people with massive blind spots; Robert Aumann is the traditional example here.)
Obviously that wouldn’t be the case among AIs, as they’re not all drawn from the same distribution the way humans largely are.
There is definitely a correlation! I have a handicapped child. His goals involve snacks and entertainments. His neurotypical brother's goals involve friends and getting schoolwork done (and snacks and entertainments). My goals involve making the world a better place, relating to God, loving my family, and -- snacks and entertainments. :)
And a more severely mentally handicapped person may have a goal simply of "I don't like to be upset." I'm thinking of a particular person, but I don't know her that well.
Having a handicapped family member helps me break through some ways of thinking that seem reasonable if I assume everyone's like me.
Basically, the Orthogonality Thesis is arguing that intelligence and goals do not correlate, at least in the limit of infinite compute and data. That is, minds and goals are very separate.
Now the question is, is the Orthogonality Thesis at least approximately true in humans?
Specifically, are behaviors and goals systematically correlated with intelligence, or is there very little correlation between goals/behavior and intelligence?
Also, what implications does the Orthogonality Thesis being true or false in humans imply about X-risk and technology?