Is this argument about determinism and moral judgment flawed?
If determinism is true, then whatever can be done actually is done. (Definition)
Whatever should be done, can be done. (Well-known "ought implies can" principle)
If determinism is true, then whatever ought to be done actually is done (from 1, 2).
The context is that it appears to me that people reject determinism largely because they're committed to certain moral positions that are incompatible with determinism. Perhaps I will write a longer post about this.
Partly for the reasons outlined in my comment here. Mainly the following section:
Even under the most hardcore determinism and assuming immutable agents, they can be classified into those that would and those that wouldn't have performed that act and so there is definitely some sort of distinction to be made.
In another comment (that I'm not finding after some minutes of search) I outline why this distinction is one that should be (and is) called moral culpability for all practical and most philosophical purposes. The few exceptions aren't relevant her... (read more)
I don't think this premise is as intuitive. For example, if someone said that a quadriplegic should have saved a nearby drowning child, then the objection appears immediately that it wouldn't have been possible and so the "should" claim isn't reasonable. On the other hand, if you say that the quadriplegic should avoid intentionally drowning the child, I don't think that's clearly nonsensical or false.