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What could we do if we have a way to train AIs to safely do tasks where success can be verified by a slightly weaker model than itself? Could we automate alignment from there? This seems like what we'd get from middling but not great success in scalable oversight during training.
My guess is that:
If we have AGI that can do fuzzy tasks in an aligned way, we're probably OK to proceed with automated alignment.
If we have AGI that can do tasks where success is legible to a slightly weaker model than itself, ???
To be more concrete, I'm wondering what elements of alignment (and downstream applications of ASI like curing aging) can be done if:
We can force the agent to do a task in a way that is legible to the slightly weaker model, even if the most natural way is illegible. (Legible = weaker model can determine whether the solution is real or not)
We don't trust agents with anything that cannot be done in this form.
Agents are not scheming but they bullshit all the time
Model N generalizes OK but not perfectly to judging model N+1's outputs. Let's say FPR and FNR at recognizing bullshit are both 5%.
This is still kind of underspecified, because naively, if model N can only do things legible to N-1, then model N's task of verifying model N+1 can be itself verified by N-1, which can be verified by N-2 all the way down to humans. Let's say that this doesn't work in practice, and the situation is that model N+1 has a research output, model N thinks it's correct but can't explain to us or model N-1 why, and model N-1 trusts model N to be trying its best.
The idea of "use version N to secure version N+1/ensure N+1's decisions can be judged by N" appears to be the same basic plan for scalable oversight, which is also OpenAI's self-professed "RSI safety" strategy. I'm not sure what new material is added, since the word "legible" is extremely vague as it stands. Does legible mean "can explain activations in the manner of natural language autoencoders", or "can give a confidence interval about harmlessness/instruction following that is useful", "has a good set of heuristics for when N+1 is dishonest"...?
On the proposal as stated:
[...]
The classic arguments for danger from optimisation pressure would suggest that at one rung in the inductive ladder, a model M learns to exploit the gap between "OK" and "perfect" to do unaligned actions that cannot be detected by M-1, and that the likelihood of exploitation grows as the models grow more powerful and develop longer planning horizons.
3Thomas Kwa
I know about scalable oversight. Will make the post more well-specified.
The question I'm curious about is something like, "What level of fuzzy task solving ability is sufficient for automated alignment research?" Then hoping to operationalize this in terms of strength of verifier.