I think it's plausible that for several years in the late 2020s/early 2030s, we will have AI that is vastly superhuman at formal domains including math, but still underperforms humans at most white-collar jobs (and so world GDP growth remains below 10%/year, say – still enough room for AI to be extraordinarily productive compared to today).
Of course, if there were to be an intelligence explosion on that timescale, then superhuman math AI would be unsurprising. My main point is that superhuman math AI still seems plausible even disregarding feedback loops from automation of AI R&D. On the flip side, a major catastrophe and/or coordinated slowdown could prevent both superhuman math AI and broad automation. Since both of these possibilities are widely discussed elsewhere, I will disregard both AI R&D feedback loops and catastrophe for the purposes of this forecast. (I think this is a very salient possibility on the relevant timescale, but won't justify that here.)
My basic reasons for thinking vastly superhuman math AI is a serious possibility in the next 4–8 years (even absent AI R&D feedback loops and/or catastrophe):
Superhuman math AI looks within reach without enormous expense: reaching superhuman ability in a domain requires verifying solutions beyond a human's ability to produce them, and so a static dataset produced by humans isn't enough. (In fact, a temporary slowdown in math progress in the near future seems possible because of this, although I wouldn't bet on it.) But the following two ingredients (plus sufficient scale) seem sufficient for superhuman math AI, and within reach:
Note I'm not claiming that there will be discontinuous progress once these ingredients "click into place". Instead, I expect math progress to continue on a fast but relatively continuous trajectory (perhaps with local breakthroughs/temporary slowdowns on the order of a year or two). The above two ingredients don't seem especially responsible for current math capabilities, but could become increasingly relevant as we move towards and into the superhuman regime.
By contrast, some reasons to be skeptical that AI will be automating more than a few percent of the economy by 2033 (still absent AI R&D feedback loops and/or catastrophe):
What would a world with vastly superhuman math AI, but relatively little broad automation, look like? Some possibilities:
Such a scenario is probably poor as an all-things-considered conditional forecast, since I've deliberately focused on a very specific technological change, but it hopefully adds some useful color to my prediction.
Finally, some thoughts on whether pursuing superhuman math AI specifically is a beneficial research direction:
Overall, pursuing superhuman math AI seems mildly preferable to working on other capabilities, but not that dissimilar in its effects. It wouldn't be my first choice for most people with the relevant skillset, unless they were committed to working on capabilities anyway.
Couldn't agree more!
One of the saddest ways we would die is if we fail to actually deploy enough theory/math people to work on prompting AIs to solve alignment in the next two-three years, even if it would be totally possible to solve alignment this way.
P.S. Please get into contact if you are interested in this.
You can give an AI a math problem, and it will respond within e.g. a couple of hours with a formal proof or disproof, as long as a human mathematician could have found an informal version of the proof in say 10 years.
Suppose you had a machine like this right now, and it cost $1 per query. How would you use it to improve things?
However, in most of the experimental sciences, formal results are not the main bottleneck, so speed-ups would be more dependent on progress on coding, fuzzier tasks, robotics, and so on
One difficulty with predicting the impact of "solving math" on the world is the Jevons effect (or a kind of generalization of it). If posing a problem formally becomes equivalent to solving it, it would have effects beyond just speeding up existing fully formal endeavors. It might potentially create qualitatively new industries/approaches relying on cranking out such solutions by the dozens.
E. g., perhaps there are some industries which we already can fully formalize, but which still work in the applied-science regime, because building the thing and testing it empirically is cheaper than hiring a mathematician and waiting ten years. But once math is solved, you'd be able to effectively go through dozens of prototypes per day for, say, $1000, while previously, each one would've taken six months and $50,000.
Are there such industries? What are they? I don't know, but I think there's a decent possibility that merely solving formal math would immediately make things go crazy.
Reliable informal-to-formal translation: solution verifiers need to be robust enough to avoid too much reward hacking, which probably requires natural language problems and solutions to be formalized to some degree (a variety of arrangements seem possible here, but it's hard to see how something purely informal can provide sufficiently scalable supervision, and it's hard to see how something purely formal can capture mathematicians' intuitions about what problems are interesting).
Do you think OpenAI and GDM's recent results on IMO are driven by formalization in training (e.g. the AI formalizes and checks the proof) or some other verification strategy? I'd pretty strongly guess some other verification strategy that involves getting AIs to be able to (more) robustly check informal proofs. (Though maybe this verification ability was partially trained using formalization? I currently suspect not.) This also has the advantage of allowing for (massive amounts of) runtime search that operates purely using informal proofs.
I think an important alternative to informal-to-formal translation is instead just getting very robust AI verification of informal proofs that scales sufficiently with capabilities. This is mostly how humans have gotten increasingly good at proving things in mathematics and I don't see a strong reason to think this is infeasible.
If superhuman math is most easily achieved by getting robust verification and this robust verification strategy generalizes to other non-formal but relatively easy to check domains (e.g. various software engineering tasks), then we'll also see high levels of capability in these other domains, including domains which are more relevant to AI R&D and the economy.
Agree about recent results not being driven by formalization, but I'd also guess having ground truth (e.g. numeric answers or reference solutions) remains pretty important, which doesn't scale to the superhuman regime.
Agree that evidence from humans means reaching superhuman capability through purely informal proof is possible in principle. But ML is less robust than humans by default, and AI is already more proficient with formal proof systems than most mathematicians. So informal-to-formal seems like a natural consequence of increased tool use. Not confident in this of course.
I expect easy-to-check software engineering tasks (and tasks that are conceptually similar to easy-to-check tasks) to be pretty close to math, and harder-to-check/fuzzier tasks to lag. Most tasks in the broad economy seem like they fall in the latter category. The economy will likely adapt to make lots of tasks better suited to AI, but that process may be slower than the capability lag anyway. AI R&D might be a different story, but I will leave that to another discussion.
By contrast, some reasons to be skeptical that AI will be automating more than a few percent of the economy by 2033 (still absent AI R&D feedback loops and/or catastrophe):
I currently expect substantial AI R&D acceleration from AIs which are capable of cheap and fast superhuman performance at arbitrary easy-and-cheap-to-check domains (especially if these AIs are very superhuman). Correspondingly I think "absent AI R&D feedback loops" might be doing a lot of the work here. Minimally, I think full automation of research engineering would yield a large acceleration (e.g. 3x faster AI progress), though this requires high performance on (some) non-formal domains. I think if AIs were (very) superhuman at easy (and cheap) to check stuff, you'd probably be able to use them to do a lot of coding tasks, some small scale research tasks that might transfer well enough, and there would be a decent chance of enough transfer to extend substantially beyond this.
I think I still agree with the bottom line "it's plausible that for several years in the late 2020s/early 2030s, we will have AI that is vastly superhuman at formal domains including math, but still underperforms humans at most white-collar jobs". And I agree more strongly if you change "underperforms humans at most white-collar jobs" to "can't yet fully automate AI R&D".
I think one can make a stronger claim that the Curry-Howard isomorphism mean a superhuman (constructive?) mathematician would near-definitionally be a superhuman (functional?) programmer as well.
Performance in formal domains is verifiable
This is a VERY important factor, possibly the only one that really matters. Along with "no harm, just retry or defer failed/unverifiable attempts", which applies to lots of math, and very few real-world uses.
Noticeable speed-up of applied sciences: it's not clear that such a dramatic speed-up in the formal sciences would have that dramatic consequences for the rest of the world, given how abstract much of it is. Cryptography, formal verification and programming languages might be the most consequential areas, followed by areas like experimental physics and computational chemistry. However, in most of the experimental sciences, formal results are not the main bottleneck, so speed-ups would be more dependent on progress on coding, fuzzier tasks, robotics, and so on. Math-heavy theoretical AI alignment research would be significantly sped up, but may still face philosophical hurdles.
Its not clear that the primary bottleneck to formal sciences are proofs either. I get the impression from some mathematicians that the big bottlenecks are in new ideas, so in the "what do you want to prove?" question, rather than the "can you prove x?" question. That seems much less formally verifiable.
This reminds me of L Rudolf L's A history of the future scenario-forecasting how math might get solved first, published all the way back in February (which now feels like an eternity ago):
A compressed version of what happened to programming in 2023-26 happens in maths in 2025-2026. The biggest news story is that GDM solves a Millennium Prize problem in an almost-entirely-AI way, with a huge amount of compute for searching through proof trees, some clever uses of foundation models for heuristics, and a few very domain-specific tricks specific to that area of maths. However, this has little immediate impact beyond maths PhDs having even more existential crises than usual.
The more general thing happening is that COT RL and good scaffolding actually is a big maths breakthrough, especially as there is no data quality bottleneck here because there’s an easy ground truth to evaluate against—you can just check the proof. AIs trivially win gold in the International Mathematical Olympiad. More general AI systems (including increasingly just the basic versions of Claude 4 or o5) generally have a somewhat-spotty version of excellent-STEM-postgrad-level performance at grinding through self-contained maths, physics, or engineering problems. Some undergrad/postgrad students who pay for the expensive models from OpenAI report having had o3 or o5 entirely or almost entirely do sensible (but basic) “research” projects for them in 2025.
Mostly by 2026 and almost entirely by 2027, the mathematical or theoretical part of almost any science project is now something you hand over to the AI, even in specialised or niche fields. ...
(there's more, but I don't want to quote everything. Also IMO gold already happened, so nice one Rudolf)
this is quite interesting, and I share the intuition that superhuman math is likely. I think go and other board games are indeed a good analogy, and we could see takeoff from self-play
even if super it relies on formalization and doesn't directly generalize to other fields, I still wonder if superhuman math wouldn't have bigger real consequences than Ryan thinks. Here is some speculation:
Current LLMs can actually help us speculate better on what would be possible, I'd be curious to see more people posting here on ways superhuman maths could be impactful.
I am willing to bet money on there existing superhuman AI mathematicians by the end of 2026 with atleast ... idk 50% probability. I want the bet to give me asymmetric upside if I'm right though.
Strong agree. Not to appeal to much to authority, but Terence Tao has already to move his main focus to worked on AI powered proof solving software. I don't have a formal survey, but talking to mathematicians I know, there's a feeling this is coming soon.
Okay, looking back over, "main focus", is a bit of an over statement, but it's definitely one of his big fields of interest at the moment. According to him frontier models are currently ~5x ish multiple time harder to get productive in helping you solve complex novel math than a grad student. (dependent on the grad student & the problem). Note: my original statement was based on recollection of conversations I've had with a mathematician I trust at CalTech who works in the same circles, take that as you will
I think is unreasonable to put non-trivial weight (e.g. > 5%) on a superexponential fit to METR's 50% time horizon measurements, or similar recently-collected measurements.
To be precise about what I am claiming and what I am not claiming:
Note that my argument has significant overlap with this critique of AI 2027, but is focused on what I think is a key crux rather than being a general critique. There has also been some more recent discussion of superexponential fits since the GPT-5 release here, although my points are based on METR's original data. I make no claims of originality and apologize if I missed similar points being made elsewhere.
METR's data (see Figure 1) exhibits a steeper exponential trend over the last year or so (which I'll call the "1-year trend") than over the last 5 years or so (which I'll call the "5-year trend"). A superexponential fit would extrapolate this to an increasingly steep trend over time. Here is my why I think such an extrapolation is unwarranted:
In the spirit of sticking my neck out rather than merely criticizing, I will make the following series of point forecasts which I expect to outperform a superexponential fit: just follow an exponential trend, with an appropriate weighting based on recency. If you want to forecast 1 year out, use data from the last year. If you want to forecast 5 years out, use data from the last 5 years. (No doubt it's better to use a decay rather than a cutoff, but you get the idea.) I obviously have very wide error bars on this, but probably not wide enough to include the superexponential fit more than a few years out.
As an important caveat, I'm not making a claim about the real-world impact of an AI that achieves a certain time horizon measurement. That is much harder to predict than the measurement itself, since you can't just follow straight lines on graphs.
Thanks for writing this up! I actually mostly agree with everything you say about how much evidence the historical data points provide for a superexponential-given-no-automation trend. I think I place a bit more weight on it than you but I think we're close enough that it's not worth getting into.
The reason we have a superexponential option isn't primarily because of the existing empirical data, it's because we think the underlying curve is plausibly superexponential for conceptual reasons (in our original timelines forecast we had equal weight on superexponential and exponential, though after more thinking I'm considering giving more weight to superexponential). I think the current empirical evidence doesn't distinguish much between the two hypotheses.
In our latest published model we had an option for it being exponential up until a certain point, then becoming superexponential afterward. Though this seems fairly ad hoc so we might remove that in our next version.
The main thing I disagree with is your skepticism of the meta-skills argument, which is driving much of my credence. It just seems extremely unintuitive to me to think that it would take as much effective compute to go from 1 million years to 10 million years as it takes to go from 1 hour to 10 hours, so seems like we mainly have a difference in intuitions here. I agree it would be nice to make the argument more carefully, I won't take the time to try to do that right now. but will spew some more intuitions.
"We might expect progress in chess ability to be superexponential, as AIs start to figure out the meta-skills (such as tactical ability) required to fully understand how chess pieces can interact. That is, we would expect it to require more new skills to go from an ELO of 2400 to 2500, than it does to go from an ELO of 3400 to 3500."
I don't think this analogy as stated makes sense. My impression is that going from 3400 to 3500 is likely starting to bump up against the limits of how good you can be at Chess, or a weaker claims is that it is very superhuman. While we're talking about "just" reaching the level of a top human.
To my mind an AI that can do tasks that take top humans 1 million years feels like it's essentially top human level. And the same for 10 milion years, but very slightly better. So I'd think the equivalent of this jump is more like 2799.99 to 2799.991 ELO (2800 is roughly top human ELO). While the earlier 1 to 10 hour jump would be more like a 100 point jump or something.
I guess I'm just restating my intuitions that at higher levels the jump is a smaller of a difference in skills. I'm not sure how to further convey that. It personally feels like when I do a 1 hour vs. 10 hour programming task the latter often but not always involves significantly more high-level planning, investigating subtle bugs and consistently error correcting, etc.. While if I imagine spending 1 million years on a coding task, there's not really any new agency skills needed to get to 10 million years, I already have the ability to consistently make steady progress on a very difficult problem.
- My understanding is that AI 2027's forecast is heavily driven by putting substantial weight on such a superexponential fit, in which case my claim may call into question the reliability of this forecast. However, I have not dug into AI 2027's forecast, and am happy to be corrected on this point. My primary concern is with the specific claim I am making rather than how it relates to any particular aggregated forecast.
You can see a sensitivity analysis for our latest published model here, though we're working on a new one which might change things (the benchmarks and gaps model relies a lot less on the time horizon extrapolation which is why the difference is much smaller; also "superexponential immediately" is more aggressive than "becomes superexponential at some point" would be, due to the transition to superexponential that I mentioned above):
I always thought the best argument for superexponentiality was that (even without AI progress feeding into AI) we’d expect AI to reach an infinite time horizon in a finite time once they were better than humans at everything. (And I thought the “meta skills” thing was reasonable as a story of how that could happen.) This is also mentioned in the original METR paper iirc.
But when AI futures project make that argument, they don’t seem to want to lean very much on it, due to something about the definition. I can’t tell whether the argument is still importantly driving their belief in superexponentiality and this is just a technicality, or whether they think this actually destroys the argument (which would be a major update towards non-superexponentiality to me).
“Another argument for eventually getting superexponentiality is that it seems like superhuman AGIs should have infinite time horizons. However, under the definition of time horizon adapted from the METR report above, it’s not clear if infinite time horizons will ever be reached. This is because AIs are graded on their absolute task success rate, not whether they have a higher success rate than humans. As long as there’s a decreasing trend in ability to accomplish tasks as the time horizon gets longer, the time horizon won’t be infinite. This is something that has been observed with human baseliners (see Figure 16 here). Even if infinite horizons are never reached, the time horizons might get extremely large which would still lend some support to superexponentiality. Even so, it’s unclear how much evidence this is for superexponentiality in the regime we are forecasting in.”
Time horizon is currently defined as the human task length it takes to get a 50% success rate, fit with a logistic curve that goes from 0 to 100%. But we just did that because it was a good fit to the data. If METR finds evidence of label noise or tasks that are inherently hard to complete with more than human reliability, we can just fit a different logistic curve or switch methodologies (likely at the same time we upgrade our benchmark) so that time horizon more accurately reflects how much intellectual labor the AI can replace before needing human intervention.
We're working on updating our timelines in a bunch of ways, and I've thought a bit more about this.
My current best guess, which isn't confident, is that if we took a version of the METR HCAST suite which didn't have any ambiguities or bugs, then the AGIs would have infinite time horizons. And that we should discuss this theoretical task suite rather than the literal HCAST in our timelines forecast, so therefore we should expect a finite time singularity. If we kept the ambiguities/bugs instead we'd have an asymptote and a non-infinite value, as would humans with inifinite time. In the paragraph you're quoting, I think that the main thing driving non-infinite values is that longer tasks are more likely to have ambiguities/bugs that make them unsolvable with full reliability.
I'm happy to talk about a theoretical HCAST suite with no bugs and infinitely many tasks of arbitrarily long time-horizon tasks, for the sake of argument (even though it is a little tricky to reason about and measuring human performance would be impractical).
I think the notion of an "infinite time horizon" system is a poor abstraction, because it implicitly assumes 100% reliability. Almost any practical, complex system has a small probability of error, even if this probability is too small to measure in practice. Once you stop using this abstraction, the argument doesn't seem to hold up: surely a system that has 99% reliability at million-year tasks has lower than 99% reliability at 10 million-year tasks? This seems true even if a 10 million-year task is nothing more than 10 consecutive million-year tasks, and that seems strictly easier than an average 10 million-year task.
Yeah this is the primary argument pushing me toward thinking there shouldn't be a finite-time singularity, as I mentioned I'm not confident. It does feel pretty crazy that a limits-of-intelligence ASI would have a (very large horizon) time horizon at which it has 0.00001% reliability though, which I think is unavoidable if we accept the trend.
I think how things behave might depend to some extent on how you define an achieved time horizon; if there is a cost/speed requirement, then it becomes more plausible that longer horizon lengths would either have ~the same or lower reliability / success rate as smaller ones, once the AI surpasses humans in long-horizon agency. Similar to how if we created a version of HCAST but flipped based on AI times, then at a fixed speed budget human "reliability" might increase at higher time horizons, because our advantage is in long horizon agency and not speed.
In general things seem potentially sensitive to definitional choices and I don't feel like I've got things fully figured out in terms of what the behavior in the limit should be.
I recently gave this talk at the Safety-Guaranteed LLMs workshop:
The talk is about ARC's work on low probability estimation (LPE), covering: