A much higher fraction of the benefits of prediction markets are public goods.
Most forms of insurance did took a good deal of time and effort before they were widely accepted. It's unclear whether there's a dramatic difference in the rate of adoption of prediction markets compared to insurance.
Insurance exists for a specific reason. People buy insurance contracts because they want to hedge some kind of risk. Insurance companies can diversify this risk across many uncorrelated bets. With prediction markets neither of these is necessarily true, so you are not guaranteed to have positive-sum trades. Even when there are theoretically trades to be made, pricing contracts on random propositions with poor reference classes is much more difficult than forecasting the probability of death, earthquakes, a golf hole-in-one, etc., so it may not be worthwhile.
If people enjoy gambling on random propositions like the fate of the king's mistresses, that's an entirely different business model.
And specifically, the risk they hedge against is usually some major risk to themselves. So insurance is similar to a social safety net in some sense. If there's a (totally made up) 1/100 lifetime chance of each person being severely injured in a car crash, and such an injury would both cost me a lot of money and a lot of earning power, then of course I'd want to insure against it. Even though the insurance company takes a cut, I'd much rather lose money on this insurance contract than collect on it. And we hope that market competition prevents the insurers...
Insurance is very different from a prediction market. There are competitive aspects, but the wager is between a professional oddsmaker and a consumer. Price (aka probability) discovery in insurance is performed by experts, not by buyers of the insurance.
So, from certain cynical perspective, that it is okay for a professional to bet against laymen and make lots of money in the process (and perhaps use a part of that for lobbying), but it would be highly irresponsible to let two laymen bet against each other.
Less cynically speaking, insurance mostly creates stability, other forms of betting mostly create instability. If the professional makes a wrong decision and loses a lot of money -- either he can take the cost because he made a lot of money from other bets, or he goes bankrupt.
The layman's losses from a...
I wrote about exactly this recently- https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/zLnHk9udC28D34GBB/prediction-markets-aren-t-magic
Actually, things that are effectively prediction markets - options, futures and other "derivative" contracts - are entirely mainstream for larger businesses (huge amounts of money are involved). It is quite easy and common to bet on the price of oil by purchasing an option to buy it at some future time, for example.
The only thing that isn't mainstream are the things labeled "prediction markets" and that is because the focus on questions people are curious about rather than things that a lot of money rides on (like oil prices or interest rates).
Reading this makes me suspect that increasing the scope (range of applicability) of insurance or of “derivative” contracts (e.g., options and futures) is a more potent way to improve the world than promoting prediction markets.
I wonder what influence the ability to pool risk for insurance but not in predictions (that I can see at least) might have on your observation.
Insurance is big business and is load-bearing for many industries. It has gained popular acceptance. Prediction markets have not. This is despite clear similarities between the two domains.
One can list similarities:
Or you can consider this extract from an official history of Lloyd's of London[1]:
It was possible to get a policy - which is a dignified way of saying a bet - on almost anything. You could get a policy on whether there would be a war with France or Spain, whether John Wilkes would be arrested or die in jail, or whether some Parliamentary candidate would be elected. Underwriters offered premiums of 25 per cent on George II's safe return from Dettingen; there were policies on whether this or that mistress of Louis XV would continue in favour or not.
One particularly grisly form of speculation, quoted by Thomas Mortimer in a book published in 1781 and engagingly entitled The Mystery and Iniquity of Stock Jobbing, was this:
> A practice likewise prevailed of insuring the lives of well-known personages as soon as a paragraph appeared in the newspapers, announcing them to be dangerously ill. The insurance rose in proportion as intelligence could be procured from the servants, or from any of the faculty attending, that the patient was in grave danger. This inhuman sport affected the minds of men depressed by long sickness; for when such persons, casting an eye over a newspaper for amusement, saw that their lives had been insured in the Alley at 90 per cent, they despaired of all hopes; and thus their dissolution was hastened.
It is possible that at Lloyd's such activities where limited to a few. Even so the reputation of the coffee house was endangered.
So, given the many and obvious similarities between insurance markets and prediction markets, why have insurance markets succeeded where prediction markets have not?
Taken from pages 26-28 of Hazard Unlimited by Anthony Brown.