Relevantly, this means that "bad faith" must be intentional.
I don't think the person acting in bad faith must intend to act in bad faith for it to be bad faith. It's possible for someone to be taught to act in a way that is dishonest, but not realize that they are being dishonest themselves. For example, a common tactic of ideologies is to create special meanings for ordinary words, so that their followers essentially lie to those around them without understanding they are lying. Thus you will hear Christians talk about having a "witness" of the Holy Spirit, even though it is not even close to what an ordinary person would classify as witnessing something.
This is absolutely bad faith discourse. Being the last person on the exterior of an organization which sells a lie does not change the fact that you are lying, nor does it stop this lie from being intentional if that intention is spread among many people, or even just an evolved meme.
Nevertheless, you can still act in good faith if you are in the position of a Christian talking about a "witness" of the Holy Spirit. The way to do this is to report what you know personally and state where inferred information comes from, instead of claiming such knowledge as your own. So, you could say, "I had a vivid dream, which people at church tell me was a witness of the Holy Spirit." Religions, however, push their adherents to only say, "I had a witness of the Holy Spirit," because it sounds more convincing. It sounds more convincing because it is more convincing. It's stronger evidence to have had a personal witness of the Holy Spirit, than just a vivid dream which other people told you was a witness of the Holy Spirit. Turning a dream into a witness dishonest, but most people saying it don't even realize that it's dishonest, because they have been taught to speak that way.
I disagree. As I understand the situation here, the person in question genuinely believes in this incorrect meaning. If they use it in a way that they believe is correct, this is not intentional deception. I think that just follows directly from what "intentional" means, its a property of the agent in question, not of their social context. On the other hand, people in the group who are teaching the wrong meaning could definitely be acting in bad faith, and within a legal context if the group is some type of legal entity (like a corporation) that entity could be acting in bad faith.
As I mentioned on another comment, not all bad conduct in discourse is bad faith. I think part of the why this confusion exists is due to the temptation to apply a label for bad conduct to other conduct that doesn't strictly meet the definition but is in some way analagous. I generally think it is good to resist this urge. It is good to maintain distinction and clarity about what is being claimed, and doing so doesn't mean we have to endorse bad conduct that doesn't fall under "bad faith".
As I understand the situation here, the person in question genuinely believes in this incorrect meaning. If they use it in a way that they believe is correct, this is not intentional deception.
You might not buy this particular example, but even if you think these particular people are sincere, that doesn't mean that everyone who is lying is lying on purpose.
We often aren't aware of what we're doing, or why we're doing it. People who lie aren't aiming at misrepresenting their beliefs. They're aiming at convincing someone of something. That this thing happens to be untrue isn't the point -- the kid claiming to not have taken the cookie from the cookie jar wouldn't say anything different in the case where he actually didn't.
There are many different ways that one could respond to being called out for this dishonesty
It's only really the last one that is technically "intentionally misrepresenting", and no one does that. The middle pair is intentionally doing a thing which includes dishonesty -- which wouldn't be there if they were aiming to maintain honesty -- but the dishonesty isn't the intent.
So what do you mean by "intentionally misrepresent one's beliefs"? Are you letting all the accidental liars off the hook, so long as they'll happily self correct once they notice their dishonesty? So long as they make sure to not notice their dishonesty? Or persuasively lie that they don't?
It's easy enough to avoid common knowledge of "I was fully aware that I was lying, and choosing to lie anyway" that this is nearly unenforceable. The central case of lying involves someone who looks like they might actually believe it, or not know they don't believe it, because the incentives are for them to obscure the fact that they know. And the harm comes from the dishonesty itself, even if the person is genuinely trying to be honest.
We need to be able to distinguish between meta good faith and object level bad faith, such that we can say things like "I think you were accidentally bad faithing there, what do you think?". Because if we can't do that, then we can't credit people for their meta-honesty, can't punish people for their object level dishonesty as long as they keep doubling and tripling down, and generally set up terrible incentive structures.
"Accidentally on purpose" is the best possibility for what could be behind a lie, and until we can even represent that possibility we have no hope of orienting to the problem well.
You seem to have a somewhat idiosyncratic interpretation of "lying' (or I do - might be a cultural thing). My understanding of lying is "saying something you know to be untrue". Which sort of is intentionally misrepresenting what they believe? Whether they do it instrumentally or terminally is besides the point?
"Accidentally bad faithing" doesn't make sense (hence the "I like people who obey the law (here meaning never committing a social faux pas)" example). If you misrepresent the truth - or even outright lie - but but didn't intend to, then that's not bad faith. Bad faith is when you intentionally set out to deceive someone. The intentions here are important. It's like the difference between manslaughter and cold blooded planned murder. Both result in a corpse, but the later set out to intentionally kill someone.
The Christian talking about the witness of the Holy Spirit is not setting out to deceive you. They truly believe in their position. It might not be true, it might leave you with a totally different understanding than they're thinking of, they might even be aware that they're using "witness" in a somewhat unusual manner ("open your heart to Jesus"...) etc., but it's not explicitly intended to deceive you, and so is not in bad faith.
"Cynical" seems to often be used as an incorrect synonym for what bad faith is pointing at, e.g. "cynically mention the witness of the Holy Spirit as evidence".
You seem to have a somewhat idiosyncratic interpretation of "lying' (or I do - might be a cultural thing). My understanding of lying is "saying something you know to be untrue".
Your definition of lying is exactly my own. The difference is that I take "knowing to be untrue" as enough, without requiring that they also narrate "This is a lie, teehee!" as they do it. People rarely do that when saying things they know to be untrue. Because that behavior is conditioned against for obvious reasons.
Far more often, people will say thing they know to be true without admitting to themselves that they know it to be true. They'll even narrate to themselves the opposite. Because that way, people will conflate "Hasn't admitted to themselves, against their own interests, that they know that what they're saying is untrue" with "Doesn't know that what they're saying is untrue", and run defense for them.
You have to distinguish between beliefs and metabeliefs, lies and meta lies, intent and meta intent, or else you end up running defense for people who intentionally choose to say things they know to be untrue, because they would rather mislead in self serving ways than speak the truth, and they know you won't hold them accountable.
Wait, I'm confused. What is the difference between not admitting to themselves and not knowing? Do you mean something like subconsciously knowing? Or maybe cognitive dissonance?
So, you could say, "I had a vivid dream, which people at church tell me was a witness of the Holy Spirit." Religions, however, push their adherents to only say, "I had a witness of the Holy Spirit,"... Turning a dream into a witness dishonest
This distinction is not coherent. If they said "I had a vivid dream, which I understand to be a witness of the Holy Spirit", that would also be good faith, for they do believe what the people at church tell them about their dream. Surely it cannot become bad faith to elide the evidence and shorten the statement to "I had what I understand to be a witness of the Holy Spirit", because people state their conclusions without explaining the evidence all the time and it is not generally considered bad faith. But it also can't be bad faith to further shorten that to "I had a witness of the Holy Spirit", what do you think that means other than "I had what I understand to be a witness of the Holy Spirit"? Surely one doesn't need to include the "what I understand" caveat on every assertion, because not doing that is the default mode of communication and it is not considered bad faith.
If it's not bad faith to present conclusions without explaining the evidence, and it's not bad faith to skip caveats, what is left of your distinction but "It is bad faith to state an earnestly held mistaken belief?"
What I'm trying to point out is that the intention to deceive can be divorced from the person doing the misrepresenting. I consider this also bad faith, because it behaves very similarly to the kind of bad faith in which the person doing the misrepresenting is aware that they are doing so. It sure sucks to be the guy getting flack for acting in bad faith when you really think you are being earnest, but from the perspective of people on the outside of your organization, you are just another in a long line of people peddling lies your organization knows is false. Maybe the right way to say this is that the organization as a whole is acting in bad faith, and you are its representative.
Surely one doesn't need to include the "what I understand" caveat on every assertion...
Yes, you really do if you are going to use a special definition for a word invented by your ideology. There is an important difference between asserting "According to my definition of 'witness'..." and "According to the usual definition of 'witness'...". Just because it's common practice to not distinguish between these two (or just because your ideology taught you that you don't need to distinguish between them...) doesn't stop it from being dishonest. You know what is also common practice? Lying to get what you want.
Being earnest is not sufficient to avoid bad faith when you have been trained to be dishonest.
What I'm trying to point out is that the intention to deceive can be divorced from the person doing the misrepresenting. I consider this also bad faith
If Alice lies persuasively to Bob that X is true, and Bob goes on to tell Charlie that X is true, then two people have said something misleading but one of them did so sincerely believing it to be true, and that's what acting in good faith is. If you want to throw extra bad words at Bob for some reason you might call him an accessory to Alice's deception of Charlie, but if you're going to say he acted in bad faith you might as well just say he lied. That's not what the words mean!
The difference between your example and my example is whether or not misrepresentation of beliefs occurs. In your example, Bob isn't misrepresenting his belief because he actually believes X. In my example, though, the Christian is misrepresenting her belief. She is telling others that she saw the Holy Spirit in front of her, when she really just had a dream about it. The Christian doesn't realize that this is what she is telling others, because she has been taught to speak that way about vivid dreams, but it is nevertheless a misrepresentation of her beliefs.
I don't think misrepresentation of beliefs on its own is enough to call something bad faith; I think it also takes an intention to deceive. But, importantly, in my view of bad faith, the entity with the intention to deceive doesn't need to be the same as the entity misrepresenting its beliefs.
The thing is that in her world model, she did see the Holy Spirit. That's how she understands "seeing the Holy Spirit". It very much is a valid representation of her beliefs. Whether her model is correct (or even good) is a different matter. Christianity has a bunch of jargon, as any such group with a history of thought does (I yesterday had a bit of a confusing discussion before I realised that the meaning of "world model" is not obvious). It seems fair to say that it's worth first establishing that all phrases being used are understood in the same way by everyone, but that also requires noticing when a given phrase is non obvious or even counter-intuitive.
The entity with the intention to deceive doesn't have to be the same as the entity misrepresenting its (which?) beliefs, true. But in that case it's better to say that "Christianity is acting in bad faith", rather than "this Christian over here is acting in bad faith". Saying that someone is acting in bad faith is a statement about their intentions, not their actions.
If a "bad faith" negotiator is one who (wrongly) represents themselves as willing to compromise, then surely we could call a debater who (wrongly) represents themselves as willing to change their mind a "bad faith" debater.
Correct, but they would have to actually make such a representation somehow, not just do something where other people think you should be willing to change your mind if you do it. So if you say "I am willing to change my mind" but you actually aren't, that is bad faith. If you participate in an intellectual discussion even though you aren't willing to change your mind, that isn't sufficient in my view. Basically, debating while not being willing to change your mind isn't sufficient to be a bad faith debater. Similarly, if you come into a negotiation and say "I'm not willing to move at all, its my way or the highway" and that is in fact true, you haven't negotiated in bad faith. It would only be bad faith if you claim to be willing to compromise but actually aren't.
Thanks! You're correct about the standard usage. In "Assume Bad Faith", I'm arguing that the standard conception of good faith as the norm relative to which bad faith can be detected and punished fails to carve reality at the joints, because a lot of things that are usually considered unintentional should be considered relevantly intentional in a functionalist sense. I wasn't confused about the standard meaning of the term; I'm explicitly making a weird philosophical argument that the standard meaning embeds confusions about human psychology and the nature of rationality.
Thanks for the clarification! I confess that this is how read your post, and part of my desire here was to get comments like this. I kind of expected that when I wrote a comment on Habryka's post but I figured I should write the OP when my comment didn't quite bring that out. Not sure if Habryka would also be of the same mind or if he feels that I'm wrong that this is the "standard" usage.
On the question of whether the standard concept embads a confusion, I don't think it does but I get why you do. I think part of the problem is that "assume good faith" is subject to multiple interpretations. One can read it as rounding off to saying that you should assume people are generally good/truthful/rational, which I think is what you are getting at. I agree that this is wrong as is a danger of people leaning into "assume good faith" too heavily. On the other hand, I think there is a meaning of "assume good faith" that is more like "have a rebutable presumption of good faith analgous to the presumption of innocence", that is in fact helpful for similar reasons as Richard Ngo mentions in the comments on that post.
I am generally of the view that following this "rebutable presumption of good faith" idea/norm actually is one of the primary things that helps actually implement your "stick to the object level" advice (which I agree is very good advice). The thing that throws people out of an equlibrium at the object level is often accusations of some type of bad conduct during the discussion, bad faith being a common example. Having a presumption of good faith can create a dynamic that discourages this, and in particulardiscourages the common occurrence where one person making a kind-of accusation quickly escalates as the other person joins in. I give my version of "stick to the object level" type advice here.
There are other sorts of "bad faith" arguments besides misrepresenting one's own beliefs.
For instance, an arguer may attempt to provoke you to outrage to make you look foolish in front of an audience, without ever misrepresenting their own beliefs.
Or an arguer may record the argument, and use phrasing intended to get you to speak specific words, then later edit the recording to make you sound wrong, evil, or stupid. Their goal in arguing was something other than to arrive at the truth: it was to produce a recording that could be manipulated to tell a lie. Therefore, the argument itself was in bad faith because of their intentions, even if they never in the argument misrepresented their own beliefs.
I think its worth noting that not all bad things you can do in an argument are bad faith. With that in mind, your first example I think straightforwardly isn't bad faith, its just a bad thing to do. Bad faith needs intentional deception. For the second one, I think it meets what I call the "general meaning" of bad faith in the OP, so I'm not opposed necesarily to people calling that bad faith. I do think there is a more specific meaning that I note under "good faith discourse" that covers a specific thing that gets called "bad faith" very often but I think the general meaning and this more specific meaning kind of blend together and I agree it reasonable to all something that meets the general meaning "bad faith". I just think the more specific meaning really hits upon the "vibe" so to speak that is often being refered to when people use "bad faith" vs just deception or dishonesty.
For instance, an arguer may attempt to provoke you to outrage to make you look foolish in front of an audience, without ever misrepresenting their own beliefs.
What element of good faith forbids provoking someone to outrage or making them look foolish?
Opportunity cost is some sort of cost. There are interactions that result in people predictably ending up with less accurate beliefs than was feasible otherwise. This doesn't necessarily involve saying or implying things you are aware to be untrue. Instead, it might involve encouraging cognitive processes that are less good for arriving at truth, systematically and predictably leading to the same result of ending up with false beliefs, on average or in the long run.
So there's knowably professing untruths, and knowably professing or provoking processes of thinking that lead people to arrive at untruths (anti-epistemology). The latter is more fundamental and occasionally more impactful, at least in the long run. The distinction is still meaningful, so maybe it would be good to coin a term distinct from "bad faith", that gestures primarily at being misleading about which epistemic methodologies you endorse, rather than at being misleading about which object level beliefs or motivations you have.
I agree that the natural solution seems to be having a new term/phrase so that both can be pointed to while maintaining clarity.
If there is a commonly understood meaning of the phrase “good faith,“ it’s nowhere near as clear as the distinction between a faux pas and a broken law.
Also, I’m not clear Habryka’s definition is incompatible with the one you’re offering. Serious discussions, almost by definition, do have the pretense of being about mutual truth seeking. If serious discussions usually aren’t actually about that, then they’re not in good faith by your definition as well as Habryka’s.
Also, I’m not clear Habryka’s definition is incompatible with the one you’re offering. Serious discussions, almost by definition, do have the pretense of being about mutual truth seeking. If serious discussions usually aren’t actually about that, then they’re not in good faith by your definition as well as Habryka’s.
I think in order to be an intentional misrepresentation, this would have to be a case where someone literally says "I am engaging in this discussion primarily for purposes of truth-seeking" when that isn't true, to qualify under my definition. I agree that would then be in bad faith. On the other hand, I don't think someone seriously discussing a topic when their primary motivation is something like persuading other or increasing their own status would qualify under my definition. I don't think that is intentional misrepresentation. Can you explain more why you think that would qualify perhaps?
If there is a commonly understood meaning of the phrase “good faith,“ it’s nowhere near as clear as the distinction between a faux pas and a broken law.
My example might be a bit hyperbolic but I don't think its that far off. My primary difference with other posts on this is the idea that there needs to be intentional (as opposed to accidental etc.) deception. Some of the definitions I quote and all the Wiki examples make the need for intentionality pretty clear in my view. The faux pas vs law analogy is more obvious/uncontroversial which is why I use it, in the hopes that that helps people understand my own view. For clarity, I'm not saying that my position is as obviously correct as that analogy may make it seem, just that from my point of view it isn't really a close call on the intent question.
The confusion
I recently came upon a comment which I believe reflects a persistent confusion among rationalist/EA types. I was reading this post which contains ideas that the other has but doesn't have time to write posts about. One of those relates to the concept of "good faith", labelled "most arguments are not in good faith, of course":
The definition given for "good faith discourse" seems incorrect to me, and it's not a close call in my opinion. The level of incorrectness in my view is something like saying "I like people who obey the law (here meaning never committing a social faux pas)". This isn't the first time I have seen someone in this community advance a similar view on the meaning of good/bad faith. For example, this post.
I thought it might be useful to bring this apparent disagreement to the foreground, so I will lay out my belief about what this concept means. I suspect this disagreement may also involve an underlying about what good norms are/should be related topics, but here I will attempt to put the prescriptive aspects aside and focus simply on the question of what the phrase means in "general" usage (i.e. beyond the rationalist/EA community).
My definition
"Good faith" has a general usage and also a more specific one as in "good faith discourse", both of which are highly related and consistent with each other. I go over my understanding of both here:
General meaning
I propose that "good faith" in its general meaning simply means acting genuinely or sincerely, acting without deceit.
Good faith discourse
As it relates to "good faith discourse" or "arguing in good faith", we can refine this to be more specific. In this context the phrase means genuinely representing one's own beliefs or intentions in the discussion. The opposite "bad faith" means to intentionally misrepresent one's beliefs or intentions. Relevantly, this means that "bad faith" must be intentional.
Evidence
I think two lines of evidence suggest my understanding of this phrase is correct. Common sources like dictionaries and Wikipedia, and prominent concepts that utilize the phrases or closely related phrases.
Sources
The second post that I link above quotes from the Wikipedia article on "bad faith":
What does that post conclude from this about the meaning of "bad faith"?
Now, we need to be precise with how we parse these terms. It is indeed true that bad faith is not the same as general bad intent. However, bad faith requires a specific bad intent. I think this is extremely clear from the examples listed in the Wikipedia article. All clearly involve intentional misrepresentation, not some type of accidental misrepresentation due to cognitive bias or some other mechanism. I think this is pretty clear if you read that section of the Wikipedia article:
The later three all use pretty unequivocal phrases indicating the relevance of intent ("no intent of compromise", "knows to be false", "deliberately misleading"), and the first example involves an action that unambiguously indicates a specific intention (raising a white flag). It seems pretty clear to me that bad faith requires intentional misrepresentation.
Merriam-Webster has good faith as follows:
with the example usage:
the legal definition as:
with example usages:
"Bad faith" from Merriam-Webster [is](lack of honesty in dealing with other people):
with the example usage:
Legal specific:
American Heritage "good faith":
And "bad faith":
The only one of these that seems debatable to me is the "she accused her landlord of bad faith..." one. That doesn't explicitly involve intent to deceive and one could infer that therefore intent isn't required. But you don't need to know for a fact someone did a thing to accuse them of it, and I definitely agree inconsistency alone can be a reason to suspect bad faith even if the intent is uncertain, so overall I think the balance of the evidence here is that "bad faith" does require intentional, rather than accidental or subconcious, misrepresentation.
Classic usage
I think some classic applications of the good faith concept also strongly suggest this interpretation:
Good faith errors or mistakes
A common application of the idea of good faith is that someone can still be operating in good faith even when they are mistaken. Although it is possible for this to happen even if bad faith doesn't require intent (the mistaken person straight-up lacks information), I think part of the reasoning behind the alternative meaning of "good faith" is that lot of "good faith mistakes" aren't actually in good faith. Take this for example:
This is a common thread I see between the posts that I have linked to expressing a contrary view of what constitutes "good faith". People think that you should "assume good faith" and think good faith discourse is common, but actually people engage in dirty conversational moves and rhetorical game playing all the time! So the argument goes. But in my view, this gets the logic backwards. Whether an agreement is "actual good faith" depends on the definition of good faith, not on whether the disagreement is epistemically or morally good. A person's conduct can be bad without being "bad faith", as the solider example from this post above makes clear. The fact that the definition of good faith which does not require intent substantially narrows the category of "actual good faith mistakes" and in fact that this seems to be a major purpose of adopting this definition, suggests to me that there is a genuine change in meaning going on here. My interpretation is that the more common/standard understanding of bad faith does require intent and doesn't include mistakes that come about through things like cognitive biases, and that the argument being put forward in this post is effectively arguing that people should adopt a new definition/standard.
Good faith negotiation
The idea of "good faith" is commonly applied in the context of negotiations or bargains. I think this effectively puts the "good faith is when you are trying to help everyone find the truth" interpretation in its grave. In the context of a negotiation, the idea that the participants would primarily be focused on discovering truth doesn't make much sense. One would naturally assume that they have their own goals in the negotiation (e.g. getting a good deal for their business) that makes up their primary purpose. Instead of speaking to a persons goals or primary intent, "good faith" is actually a constraint on this intent. A person may be pursuing their primary goal, but not the point of bad faith.
I hypothesize that this may explain why this confusion might come up among rationalists/EAs. Many in these communities I think would describe themselves as concerned with "truth-seeking", and believe that norms and epistemics should prioritize encouraging this. In contrast, what I view as the common meaning of "good faith" focuses on truth as a constraint rather than as a goal. There is nothing wrong with either perspective in my view (although I have my own opinions on how they can be productively discussed and leveraged), but I think it is worth having clarity about terms. One can agree that "good faith" as I have defined it isn't sufficient as an epistemic norm or isn't that high of a standard, while still agreeing that it is how the term is commonly used.
Conclusion
"Bad faith" requires intentional misrepresentation, as the phrase is typically used outside rationalist/EA circles.