How do you (we?) plan to contend with the general superior status of AI companies when it comes to presenting evidence to e.g. policymakers? If Arcadia Impact puts out a piece of research suggesting some alignment technique doesn't work, and an AI company puts out a heavily redacted and fluffy but very pretty report[1] saying that it does, why would policymakers believe Arcadia?
For example:
Or:
So far, Arcadia has leant towards correctly-shaped problems, and traded that off against correctly-flavoured problems. How do you plan to solve the comms problem towards policymakers who might not have the technical context to see the shape-flavour mismatch here?
If the lobbying strategies of AI companies were tightly coupled to the opinions of their technical researchers then a two-pronged approach might work, in which Arcadia's research persuades AI company MTSs that a technique doesn't work, and then that company doesn't claim to policymakers that the technique does work.[2] Then the field is cleared for Arcadia to explain it to policymakers without interference. The influence of MTSs over the political actions of AI companies is not zero but it's also not very high,[3] and I expect that, in extremis,[4] the lobbying arms of AI companies will produce whichever syllables they expect to get policymakers on their side, without regard to other considerations.
I still think it's possible that truth can be an asymmetric weapon in this case, but comms under adversarial lobbying seems like a pretty big unsolved problem.
I can share that Arcadia has at least two employees who are deeply emotionally invested in improving the presentation of Arcadia's graphs, so this problem is already being worked on
As an example, imagine a counterfactual world in which the midtraining paper came out 9 months ago, before the point at which Anthropic higher-ups were allegedly going around telling policymakers that alignment was basically solved, and those Anthropic higher-ups did not do that so much
For example, Greg Brockman has allegedly stopped donating to Leading The Future because of backlash from OpenAI employees.
E.g. if threatened with a pause
Good points! Agree that adversarial comms is a problem. But I think we can trust decisionmakers not to take claims at face value, but instead demand evidence.
If we produce evidence that alignment is hard, this puts the onus on labs to produce equivalently good evidence that alignment is solvable. This in itself is a win considering that labs are highly opaque right now; it moves us closer to total research transparency and enables subsequent rounds of red-teaming.
Okay, but you might ask: won’t the labs win such a debate by default? I think not; the labs have less manpower and less resources than the collective third-party external community.
If we demonstrate problems that the labs cannot solve then this generates strong consensus for a pause / shutdown.
the labs have less manpower and less resources than the collective third-party external community.
In what sense is this true? They have revenues in the tens of billions. How broad are you casting "the collective third-party external community" here; I assume you mean some set of people larger than {Arcadia, Redwood, METR, Apollo, MIRI} but smaller than all the people in the world?
I think it’s more reasonable to compare (portion of lab manpower, resources devoted to safety) vs (manpower, resources of external safety orgs).
Under this metric it’s not implausible to me that the third party community is larger than the median lab. Eg CG has a budget of 1 billion for AIS this year, a lot of which is going to TAIS; OpenAI reports 50 billion ARR. It seems unlikely to me that OpenAI spent at least 2% of this revenue on safety and alignment research (note i do not include ‘product alignment’ here.)
Now it’s true that labs can change their spending allocation, and one possible outcome of our work is that labs spend a relatively larger fraction of revenue on safety research (in order to demonstrate that they can make progress on solving the hard problem of alignment). This is a good outcome!
Laypeople distrust corporations by default and see their calls for regulation as dishonest; this motivates them to find alternative explanations.[4]
Are you not? You should be motivated to find alternative explanations because they are also prosaic corporations who have $100 billions of investments from investors who trust them to always be shoring up their enormous, unproven shareholder value.
I see a figure like Dario in particular as someone unifying two factions who should completely and utterly hate each other, namely AIS/rats/EA and investors, or more basically, talent v investors. Each side believes they're playing the other and Dario's job is make it take as long as possible for one of the two sides to capture everything. The "it's just a word predictor" detractor seems to be unwittingly loaning themselves to investors by lowballing how powerful these things are. Meanwhile rats often see this all as just mistake theory not conflict theory, like shepherding investments is some inert obligation that doesn't much matter beyond the general mandate to go forward.
But actually they, or Dario especially, were hired specifically because of their talent in lying to the rationalist / safety community. Every word they say has as one of its intended purposes, to get an AIS community member to read it, and conclude they should direct their labor toward producing toward shareholder value for the labs. Aka, they outsource writing safety benchmarks to us. We have begun doing politics work for them as well. Whether AIS or investors or doom win from this situation, we won't know yet, and the better strongmen manage it so you never even find out who got played.
As a doom-alarmed person I see this as more like a hostage negotiation with people with very maximalist goals toward extracting all economic value from the planet possible. If I admit I believe in doom, they use that to extract resources from me until I'm at subsistence level. This is predicted by basic game theory, it's not a conspiracy theory and it doesn't crux on denying doom, in fact the worse a problem doom is, the more they will extract surplus from everyone.
I don't trust any policy recommendation if you have not modeled the AI labs as maximalist power-seeking opponents. You have failed to grasp the power dynamic of the situation. Your mistakes aren't random or harmless at this point, they're adversarially poisoned, and the likely conclusion is you just moved up timelines and we'll be looking back in 3 or 12 months and wondering how we made that mistake again, yet again, yet another time, as reliable as salaried employees.
I think the worldview we outline is consistent with a very realpolitik / cynical view of labs’ motivations and behaviour. I also think that, even under this frame, it’s still important to contend with the object level claims made by labs and convince the good faith broader audience.
I don't think you went nearly hard enough on realpolitik. You modeled them as a self-interested actor, not your opponent, trying to win resources from you personally, while you assess their situation. This is about getting in their OODA loop if you want to disrupt acceleration, unfortunately I'm under the impression that LW have an unspoken rule that if they say something sort of doom-aligned, then we absolutely have to give them whatever resource they ask for next, as if they don't know we think that.
They do this formula now: make their scariest claims Friday evening to curry favor with AIS, then AIS blames the public for not just listening to them even though they're basically flooding the zone on the public. Every announcement is simultaneously capabilities marketing, a brazen threat to you and all your loved ones, signaling to Congress that they shouldn't even bother trying to keep up, and just a little too ridiculous to invite organizing around, and there's like, 3 of these a week. AIS doesn't notice because we're dogwhistled they told the truth about something at least, so we set to work taking them seriously on specifically the thing they said that produces capabilities artifacts just by working on it. (Mostly, benchmarks, and now some political organizing for their regulation plans.)
AIS resources haven proven many times over the past several years that we will reliably mobilize for the labs accelerationist purpose when signaled to do so. It is a tried and true talent formula for them and it has been this whole saga. So we do need to contend with their objective claims but the first priority is protecting our own resources from exploitation by the labs, then we try to do damage control with the public.
Like sorry this is blunt but I think the situation really has been that bad with safety/capabilities and we really just keep saying, well I guess any safety work can turn to capabilities but at least I'm being skeptical of the labs. I think the situation is that, we're getting played.
So if you want to break their OODA loop, the way you do it is you perform a prosaic power analysis, where doom is a prosaic concern. This works because it's the forbidden question, the one that investors ask but AIS is expected to never ask under Darioism, and you will find the things that don't crux on not-doom, and that they actually don't want to show up in our approach to safety.
I think any safety proposal needs something like an "OODA statement" at this point: here's how big of a break this is from the sorts of things the labs have expected us to do in the past, where the prior, strongly, is that AIS efforts go toward capabilities. Methodologically, "what if not doom?" would probably work, and I would claim "not-doom" evals any safety proposal because it models the thought-world of the people who want capabilities. I think that is necessary and sufficient to identify AIS that isn't capabilities and I just surmise we've missed it on LW because rational epistemics are a little blind to the possibility of a power imbalance changing the overall epistemic ecosystem (like we use immune analogy... this feels more like ecology.)
Sorry, I only skinmed. Noting that I’m skeptical that I personally need to model the labs as an entity with a special interest in winning resources from me and my team specifically.
Can you say more about what an OODA statement looks like?
Tl;dr: The frontier AI companies’ implicit alignment plans center on rushing towards RSI with something like current models. This plan is (at best) contentious, and many believe it will have catastrophic consequences. Nonetheless, it is the track we are on. It is therefore important to collect evidence which helps us anticipate how this will go.
—
Note: This post is based on conversations inside the Arcadia Impact alignment team, thinking about what constitutes “good” work in third-party alignment research.
What are the labs’ current alignment strategies?
In practice, the labs’ playbook for producing aligned models looks like the following:
This plan seems terrible
The above strategy appears deeply flawed.
To start, capabilities milestones continue to arrive faster than anticipated, and our alignment techniques are already unreliable. Recent events suggest that optimizing for task success seems to inherently come at the expense of alignment. Although the models are evaluated for how well the RL and alignment properties coexist, it’s unclear how to do these evaluations.
Prosaic RSI seems unlikely to close this gap. We have no evidence that RSI dynamics will differentially benefit alignment over capabilities and, indeed, we have reasons to believe that they won’t. On top of this, automated alignment research asks us to trust the outputs of models whose alignment we’re studying. Consequently, alignment may fall further behind as automation ramps up.
However, we may not notice future alignment failures. Under RSI, models will change quickly and dramatically. The intuition which has formed from today’s AIs may become antiquated, and we will likely understand even less about the alignment properties of the future systems being deployed. This is compounded by the fact that people will be removed from direct training, relying on other models to monitor and summarize the progress.
In either case, as we approach ASI, we will no longer have the luxury of finding out about models’ alignment properties via trial-and-error.
This is all made worse by the race dynamics, which allow labs to excuse poor safety practices in favor of rushing on capabilities. Regardless of whether prosaic RSI favors alignment or capabilities, it may compress timelines in ways we are ill-equipped to handle. In addition to this, the race encourages:
This default trajectory seems catastrophic.
And, unfortunately, the tools we have been developing to contain these catastrophes (monitoring and broader AI control frameworks) seem insufficient to handle the above issues.
Consensus-building is hard
People broadly believe the current plan is crazy. People inside the labs and those that have left say that this idea is crazy. Many are adamant that things have to slow down.
The fact that these statements coexist within organizations that are nonetheless pursuing RSI suggests—among other things—an absence of consensus around the risks. Some reasons this consensus has not been achieved could include:
We need better evidence
We think the most effective way to achieve consensus is to produce more legible evidence of misalignment under labs' current strategies. In particular, many of our current arguments about alignment and RSI are either speculative or insufficiently convincing. Labs have large incentives to believe that their alignment techniques work and our outputs must be able to stand up to that level of scrutiny.
It's important, though, that this evidence is not propaganda! Said otherwise, we should open-mindedly study the consequences of the labs' alignment strategies.
Such evidence would be directly useful for multiple parties:
How should alignment research change?
More concretely, we claim that future alignment research should embody the following principles:
It's easy to study alignment strategies under optimistic / easy conditions and come away with positive results. However, the same alignment strategies could fall apart under more stringent / suboptimal conditions. As we develop AGI, it is not sufficient to only show cleaned up, best-case examples of techniques working (like this, this, or this).[5]
Total research transparency is also a key component in Plan A from AI 2040.
Specific directions we're excited about
Given the above context, the Arcadia Impact alignment team is currently working on the following technical topics. We would appreciate feedback on whether people think other things should be a higher priority:
Studying how RL affects motivations. It seems like scaling up reinforcement learning leads to many of the failure modes we see in present-day models: reward hacking, motivated reasoning, metagaming, and perhaps instrumental convergence. We require a better understanding of whether these are resolvable issues, as well as a better understanding of how to differentiate principled solutions from patchwork ones.
Stress-testing scalable monitoring. The volume of work done by agents will grow by many orders of magnitude in the future. We'll increasingly rely on scalable monitoring protocols to tell us what's going on. It would be very bad if we were overconfident in how well these protocols work. This will become especially important once we start deploying models on tasks that lack an easily-verifiable ground truth.
Anticipating how prosaic RSI goes wrong. Eventually, models will be put into automated research harnesses even if they're misaligned, either by accident (misalignment was not detected) or intentionally (labs decide to compromise on safety). What are the ways this could play out? This is the least conceptually clear of our directions, due to high uncertainty about what research automation actually looks like. Still, we think it's valuable to do carefully designed experiments comparing aligned and misaligned models in order to surface some broad phenomena.
Thanks to Brandon Riggs, Joe Hardie, Sid Baines, Angel Martinez, Moritz Pfau, Francis Rhys Ward, Emma Mouliere, Jonathan Bostock and Alex Beat for comments/discussion.
We use the term prosaic RSI to refer to Recursive self-improvement via AI automating the existing AI development pipeline, rather than via direct self-modification.
For instance, it is unclear to us whether and how labs currently do alignment RL.
Members of the AIS community have already spent years internalizing the relevant evidence. They may find it personally easy to dismiss arguments . As a result they might think it not worth the effort to rebut in detail. We think this is a mistake; there is a vast inferential gap to be crossed, and repeating the old arguments ad nauseum is unlikely to be effective.
Some common objections to AI risk from RSI are:
This feels related to big(Θ) and big(O) notation in theoretical computer science, where you describe an algorithm’s runtime under average- and worst-case conditions. In our case, we should have a culture of evaluating alignment under modal and worst-case lab conditions.