Changelog:
6/14 criteria met so far.
I can't give you a perfect answer, but given that this is a novel illness on the front page of a major newspaper, it looks like it's time to pull out the checklist. Monkeypox currently meets 6/14 criteria for being in the approach phase for a possible pandemic. Note that many of the unmet factors are just reflective of the fact that it has not reached pandemic or proto-pandemic-level spread.
For comparison, Sars-CoV2 met 13/14 criteria by Feb. 20, 2020, about 2 months after it was first reported and just before the stock market crashed.
Qualitatively, we have effective and approved vaccine technology. Probably most importantly, despite it being over a month since we had 100 cases, nearly 4 weeks since we had 200 cases, and with over 4,000 cases now, only one person has died.
The disease (as we have seen it in the past) does not appear to may not probably does sometimes spread asymptomatically or with hard-to-detect/interpret symptoms. There is no guarantee that our vaccines will be effective against any possible changes in this monkeypox.
My interpretation is that this is a disease almost exclusively spreading within a highly promiscuous sexual network of men who have sex with men. Because this community is small, this high-infection pathway for transmission is probably contained by demography and poses little risk of spread into other demographics. Fortunately, it does not appear to be particularly life-threatening with access to modern medical care. I think this is a disease that people inside of the community most affected should treat with caution, but that those not having sex with promiscuous men who have sex with promiscuous men can probably safely ignore from a practical perspective.
Forecast from 25 June 2022:
What is the chance of this disease attaining 13/14 criteria, comparable to COVID-19? I have made some forecasts for individiual criteria. The interdependencies are complex. total deaths is dependent on CFR and infection counts. Spread to new demographics and vaccine escape are probably dependent on sheer number of cases. Hospital overwhelm, quarantines, pharmaceutical company efforts, and newspaper coverage are probably dependent on number of cases at a given time. However, under a perhaps dubious simplifying assumption that the chance of each criteria is independent, my raw Monte Carlo-based forecast is as follows:
We can try "seeding this with uncertainty" to address the many modeling shortcomings and remaining questions. One way we can do this is by assigning each remaining serious possibility (5/14-12/14) equal probabilities of 12.5%, then addressing the "complete uncertainty" model in which all criteria could change somehow with equal probabilities of 7%, and then weighting the Monte Carlo model vs. the equal probabilities model (say a 70%/27%/3% weighted split). This gives probabilities as follows:
It therefore seems vanishingly unlikely that monkeypox will become comparable to COVID-19 in terms of the number of deaths or economic devastation that will be attributable to it in the long run.
Transmissibility: efficiency, intra-community spread, inter-community spread, outside view
Danger: case fatality rates, overwhelm, economic impacts, treatment
Spread limitations: demographics, geography
Social effects: communications, shutdown, research, deaths
Great info, thanks!
I note that this particular checklist results in an alarm bell which basically cannot go off until a pandemic is already well under way. Like, the "3 continents" item or the "medical supply shortages" or "quarantine of a city" or "front page news" are essentially hindsight indicators; by that point the pandemic has already reached significant scale. In hindsight, February 20 2020 was very late to start paying attention to covid.
Why would a country share of global GDP have anything to do with a disease being on trace to become pandemic ? Do you think 10 000 000 cases in India are intrinsically less worrying than 1 000 000 in China ? Or 200 000 in the USA ?
I was gonna comment somewhere on this page "Too long, didn't read, what options should I buy?", but now we have a checklist for that. Thanks!
“Does the disease heavily affect career-age people (age 25-65), or frequently leave survivors with lasting disability?”
This is rightly ticked off as “No”, but I think it morally counts as “Yes” if there is more danger to young children. That’s scarier in itself, and from COVID it seems people are also more likely to accept very extreme NPIs to protect children, meaning there might well be a large economic impact.
One possible frame from which to examine the question is "Since we have no functioning public system that competently fights infectious diseases, is this a reason to short the stock market and stockpile food and so on?"
This frame is just looking mostly at a biological entity as a biological entitiy. If "sweeping through our population unresisted" is biologically what it would naturally do (since it probably will be unresisted) then... it might do that?
But if not, not. It depends on the biology the epidemiology and also maybe the responses from institutions to try to predict that. I'm pretty blackpilled on institutions at this point, but maybe we'll get lucky and the disease itself will not have the oomph within itself to actually hurt the herd?
So given its positively known biological capacities, and currently not have strong evidence that this is decisively what's going to happen.
Thus, I'm not gonna short the stock markets yet (and so on). Not for now anyway? I'm not yet allocating many resources to it myself, so my own answer practical here so far is like: "No, don't start prepping... (yet)?"
Another possible frame is: "Imagining that one is setting policy for a hypothetical competent public health system that generically prevents all reasonably possible very bad infectious diseases (aiming to eradicate many of them, of course), by always taking preventive actions that would stop every disease (based on each one's worst possible disease properties that have not been ruled out), so that by following the policy it would be the case that no actual disease ever got through, but also the system didn't waste a lot of money achieving this outcome... in that case, have observables been in fact observed that should trigger some of these generic policies?"
Applying this filter, over my personal state of knowledge, right now, for this second question, the result I get is:
YES, if a competent public health system existed with my current beliefs (which include huge error bars, and highly limited data right now) then a hypothetically competent public health system would already be acting very fast right now.
Note that I'm not in charge of US Public Medicine (yet?) and if I was then it would be responsible to learn a lot more, very fast, and then use that knowledge to make a detailed and positive case for why action or worry is not justified. I would be pulling all-nighters based on this if I had that responsibility, but I don't, so I'm not.
Instead I'm just going to drop a few bits of evidence that seem relevant to me.
Question #1: Is the disease horrifically shitty?
Answer #1: Yes. It has some body horror (with pustules and scars and stuff) and a mortality of probably ~1%. Higher mortality in children. This mostly from priors about monkeypox, which we know about from decades of study. (It could be a mortality rate of 0.1% all in by the end, but it also could be 2%. If you get it, and you're still alive 5 weeks after symptom onset, I think... maybe you lived? This means it could take 5 weeks to get a good idea of the mortality rate for really real.)
Question #2: How does it transmit?
Answer #2: Assume aerosol. Versions of monkeypox can transmit by aerosol, and so everyone working with it (running quarantines, doing medical care, etc) should make that assumption and wear anti-aerosol PPE like they were dealing with measles or covid. This might change with more data.
Question #3: Versions of it? What about THIS version?
Answer #3: I was going to say that maybe no one has sequenced this thing yet... but then my google-fu kicked in, and more searching turned up a preliminary sequencing report for a draft genome that has 92% coverage, and enough data to align against known strains.
This one falls clearly among "the versions with mortality more like 1%" and is not similar to "the example with a 10% mortality" so that's nice.
That said, it has more SNPs of edit distance away from the normal ones than might be expected? So maybe it has some tricks up its sleeve that are worthy of study? Looking at the phylogentic tree built using the draft sequence (see paper linked above for details and full image, this is a zoom in), OUTBREAK_2022 clearly clusters with other light blues (that is: the west africa strain with lower mortality) BUT is farthest to the right because it has the most mutations.
Question #4: Is the R0 greater than 1?
Answer #4: Probably yes. Looking at the situation in Spain suggests GROWTH inside of localized communities. This article seems to be gleaning numbers from relatively direct reports that include: a sense of time, with few early patients, and then, later in time, more patients.
Quotes that give this suggestion include Portugal:
Portugal has confirmed the presence of the virus in five patients and has another 20 under study
Madrid:
The Community of Madrid, for its part, has put the number of patients whose symptoms suggest that they have contracted the disease at 22 , in addition to the seven already confirmed by PCR.
Then a geographic distribution that suggests that travel is occurring, with bigger (earlier seeded?) places away from the capital having more than smaller (later seeded?) places:
Four hospital sources consulted by EL PAÍS raise the number of patients treated in the last two days in hospitals in the region to "between 40 and 50". There are 16 patients from the Clinical Hospital pending confirmation of results, a dozen from the Twelve of October and several cases in the Gregorio Marañón, Ramón y Cajal and Fundación Jiménez Díaz hospitals.
These are enough OBSERVATIONS to allow me to infer a mechanistic process (of a really icky disease) that was able to generate viable human-to-human transmission via exponential growth.
Does the R0=1.1 here, or does R0=3?
I have no idea.
In the absence of knowing, it it correct policy (facing a possible exponentially growing monster that is currently small and weak but which might become large and strong in naively surprising ways to people who don't know what an exponential function is) to assume the number is higher until competently and swiftly determined to be lower and less worrisome.
But even R0=1.1 is worrisome.
The correct policy is to CAUSE the number be LOWER (if active causation is needed to achieve this), like R0=0.8 or even less than that, and then persist in that policy until the number of cases is zero... otherwise you're just dragging out the big sadness (all the individual, ad hoc, confused coping of many individuals, damaging the economy, while trapped in the fog of a hypothetically avoidable battle against mere biology) over a longer period of time.
The costs of ad hoc individual avoidance is where the huge costs pile up on the members of the public who Public Medicine officials have a duty to serve (in Lawful Good countries, anyway).
The US I think is maybe currently Chaotic Neutral? The US seems to mostly not believe in policies or causation anymore? Or to generally give a fuck, because the bureaucrats are immune from voter backlash and hold the voters in contempt and basically seem to lie to us by default while being incapable of reasoning about object level mechanisms, risks, costs, benefits, etc... For now?
I kind of hope that the 2022 and 2024 election cycles deliver new leaders who win on infectious disease policy and then clean things up... but that doesn't necessarily help us until 2023 or 2025.
Question #5: Can we effectively test for it?
Answer #5: I don't know. Everything I've heard so far is PCR testing of obviously symptomatic people, which has all kinds of slowness built into it.
I'm not sure what body compartments contain the virus and how far into the incubation period one has to get before various tests work on it.
If there are no tests, and no knowledge of test/incubation interactions then the only way TO BE SURE to prevent it from getting into a country and spreading in the community would be to shut down air travel from infected countries to my country.
Absent more detailed information, and going just from "a horrific infectious disease with R0>1 has started showing up among international travelers" I would be shutting down flights from infected countries, and putting the burden of proof on individual travelers to show positively that they are not infected during the "early confusion" period.
A fully adequate thing is probably to have people test before the flight, get diverted to a 40 quarantine after the flight, and then test out of quarantine (with positive tests diverting to isolated medical care).
I have LOOKED and almost every virus has a shorter maximum incubation period than 40 days, so that would probably be adequate, unless dealing with a bioweapon or something that was someone designed to stretch out the incubation for the sake of making it harder to detect or stop or be sure.
If you don't want to put up with 40 days in quarantine... maybe you shouldn't be flying anywhere you can't drive at the possible beginning of a possibly terrible pandemic?
Covid was handled poorly in MANY ways. One of the ways it was handled poorly is that quarantines were 14 days long despite early evidence of 27 day incubation in some cases.
Summarizing:
This won't necessarily destroy the planet or even hurt that many people. Maybe 1000 total infections ever in the world and then somehow just... done? One can hope.
Don't personally worry about it IRL yet, probably?
But also another biological disaster is not RULED OUT by the things I know, and therefore I would personally be freaking the fuck out out if I worked at the CDC and it was my responsibility to respond to deal every similar potential problem with systematically adequate levels of caution to generate systematically acceptable outcomes over all similar categories of initially observable risk.
Obviously sane things to do (at a high policy level) include:
It probably costs little to start vaccinating critical people right now with "best bet" vaccines, including people in the transporation and medical industries.
Starting challenge trials with all the known plausible vaccines against this specific disease, plus quite a few control patients (assuming informed consent and high pay) with exposure and no vaccine, with daily testing and so on, to figure out which vaccines might be perfect, and how soon people test positive if they are going to test positive.
This is PROBABLY an OVERREACTION. However the whole point of having the capacity for abstract mechanistic reasoning in service of "getting good outcomes in the world using science and policies and stuff" is that you do cheap efficient "correct" overreactions every time, and it only costs millions to overreact on the little stuff, but it saves trillions of dollars to avoid the really bad pandemics, and therefore DOING IT RIGHT EVERY TIME probably comes out "worth it on average".
I agree that this is probably an overreaction.
I don't think challenge trials are warranted. There's real harm arising from doing challenge trials. They made sense for Covid because hundreds of millions of people caught it, thousands were dying every day, and getting an effective vaccine or treatment just one day sooner could save thousands of lives. So accepting a level of harm during testing is warranted. For a disease where R seems to be not much above 1, but CFR might be as high as 10%, I would say, even if we had a competent and well-funded pandemic prevention authority, they might pass on the challenge trials this time around.
Has anyone done any research that human connection density due to population growth, increased travel and crowded work areas has reached a tipping point? Should multiple pandemics simply be the result of global population and superspreading in practise crossing a tipping point ?
I am not optimistic.
I think the take up of vaccines for Smallpox will be high despite serious side effects. I have seen the severity of small pox scars in survivors in my grandparents' generation. Even with a low case fatality rate of 1% the fear of facial disfigurement will push people to take the vaccine.
My heuristic about this is that the public is currently oversensitive on zoonotic viruses - so I feel free to not following this one until there is some more serious info.
One thing to remember though is that disease crossing the barrier between species are common and most don't become global pandemic. In fact SARS was bad but locally contained, MERS was almost nothing, and fears of the avian and swine flues were vastly overblown for example. So the right attitude should probably be cautious rather than worried - for now.
From a superficial research pass, it sounds like smallpox vaccine confers cross-immunity, which sets a pretty low limit to how bad this can get.
We all remember in the first days of COVID-19, when public health institutions denied that there was human-to-human transmission, and it turned out that it not only had human-to-human transmission it also had a very large R0 and a short serial interval. But I think the belief that new diseases start out with low transmissibility is actually correct; COVID-19 was an exception not because of bad luck, but because it was a lab escape of a virus which had been pre-evolved to spread in hACE2 laboratory species. That factor is unlikely to apply to monkeypox in this case, since it has known animal reservoirs and at least one known prior zoonotic transmission.
Perhaps another question for the checklist should be: Has anyone been doing gain-of-function research on it?
Yeah, I was wondering that too, although I'm not sure where to find information on that. Just to get a good prior, one relevant question is: how quickly has the total amount of gain-of-function research worldwide been growing (or shrinking?) over time? Like, if the field has grown 10x over the last five years, then it's much less of a surprise to see another pandemic leak so soon after the last one.
Judging by a quick look at Twitter, this is going to be politically polarized right off the bat, with large swaths of the population immediately refusing vaccines or NPIs. So I think whether this turns into a serious pandemic is going to depend largely on the infectiousness of Monkeypox and not all that much else.
Is it a thing I should be allocating attention to?
Wikipedia tells me that human-to-human transmission of monkeypox is pretty rare/difficult. There has been some community spread recently at least in the UK, but that's been speculated to have been from sex. On the other hand, there's been a bunch of cases reported in Portugal and Spain recently as well. Is that just normal background rate being given more attention than usual by the news cycle? Or is this actually an unusually high number of cases? Most importantly, is the number of cases significant evidence of increased human-to-human transmission?