I found this comment while wandering the archives and was surprised, in that context, that it didn't have more upvotes. Clicking through, I see that the playing field was relatively level and many upvotes would have been contextually unnecessary.
(Part of my personal enjoyment grew from the implicit dynamics between this copy of Quirinus and the most likely host of this copy of Quirinus. Too bad Clippy posts so rarely... it would be interesting to see that set of answers as well.)
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?
Once I say that I consider zombies to be metaphysically impossible, saying whether or not I consider them "inconceivable" says more about how I interpret the word "inconceivable" than anything I think about zombies. I am just not sure if that word means what I think it does.
A priori knowledge: You can get knowledge of something by interacting with it or by being descended from ancestors who were selected by it. If you raised a human brain in a vat with no sensory input, it would not eventually discover arithmetic.
Abstract objects: Is this seriously still a thing in philosophy? Anyway, nominalism.
Aesthetic value: Subjectively objective.
Analytic-synthetic distinction: Yes, I suppose. There are things that are true by definition (but not a priori).
Epistemic justification: Seriously, they still actually classify their positions along these lines?
External world: There is one.
Free will: Shut up. (Or: my long answer, in response to the "Dissolving the Question" assignment. I still mostly agree with that comment even though I wrote it over three months ago.)
God: Atheism. Also, shut up.
Knowledge: Bayesian. (I don't think the old-timey "rationalism" vs. "empiricism" distinction is useful enough to keep around.)
Knowledge claims: I'm not going to bother trying to understand what this argument thinks it's about.
Laws of nature: This one too.
Logic: Classical logic (with all words removed) seems to be the most broadly useful, because you can make a logic gate that implements the AND and NOT operators, but not one that implements the modal "necessarily" operator (etc.).
Meta-ethics: Non-magical cognitivism.
Metaphilosophy: Naturalism.
Mind: Physicalism.
Moral judgment: A bit of both (moral assertions usually convey a mixture of both factual claims and emotional expression).
Moral motivation: Moral beliefs are obviously not universally automatically compelling. The degree to which they tend to be compelling to humans is a question for cognitive science.
Newcomb's problem: One box.
Normative ethics: Consequentialism.
Perceptual experience: I've not been able to determine exactly what all of these positions are after a few minutes of searching, but I predict that none of them is both true and non-trivial.
Personal identity: Patternism (best rescues the 'personal identity' intuition from uselessness).
Politics: Working on deleting all political views from my brain so I can start over with better epistemology now.
Proper names: As with many debates, the very premise of this one seems to be predicated on mind projection.
Science: Realist.
Teletransporter (new matter): Survival.
Time: B-theory seems trivially true.
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): Switch.
Truth: Correspondence.
Zombies: Inconceivable!
What I'm finding particularly interesting here: There are lots of people here who respond "yes" to a priori knowledge, but "no" to analytic-synthetic distinction.
Yet, on the philpapers correlation site, it says this: "Analytic-synthetic distinction:yes A priori knowledge:yes 0.456". This is one of the highest correlations on that site.
0.456 isn't a terribly high correlation coefficient. It's not that surprising to find lots of people giving different answers to the two.
Ooh I did that. I assign ~70% to the statement that all knowledge could be derived without making observations, if one was sufficiently intelligent. Something Tegmarkish could be one way of making that statement true for example. However, I think it is more likely that the Tegmarkian stuff is wrong, but there is another way of deriving such knowledge.
I assign ~70% to the statement that all knowledge could be derived without making observations, if one was sufficiently intelligent. Something Tegmarkish
Makes sense, but in order to locate yourself within the Tegmark totality you'll have to open your eyes.
A priori: kinda, but it's not clear that "knowledge" is the right word. Abstracta: nominalism. Aesthetics: subjective. Analytic-synthetic: it's a useful approximation. Epistemic justification: externalism, if I've understood the distinction correctly. External world: non-skeptical realism. Free will: depends on definitions; at any rate, incompatibilist free will doesn't exist and may not even be a coherent notion. God: atheism. Knowledge: empiricism. Knowledge claims: contextualism, I guess. Laws of nature: tentatively non-Humean. Logic: classical. Mental content: internalism about the beliefs/attitudes themselves, but how we describe them, what we do with them, etc., have to engage with the external world. Meta-ethics: anti-realism. Metaphilosophy: naturalism. Mind: physicalism, kinda. (Minds are physical in the same sort of sense as computer programs are.) Moral judgement: mixed (roughly, I think moral judgements originate non-cognitively but then we process them with a lot of the same mental machinery as we use for propositions about matters of fact). Moral motivation: internalism. Newcomb: one box. Normative ethics: consequentialism, with the proviso that various human mental limitations make it advisable (on consequentialist grounds!) not to behave as a pure consequentialist. Perceptual experience: representationalism, I think. Personal identity: psychological, with the proviso that there are imaginable-and-maybe-possible situations in which the notion of "identity" breaks down. Politics: mixed. Proper names: approximately Fregean. Science: realism. Teletransporter: survival, with the same proviso as above. Time: B-theory. Trolley: switch. Truth: correspondence or deflationary; would need to think more to decide whether it matters. Zombies: inconceivable or conceivable but impossible, depending on how you understand "conceivable"; I prefer the former.
Philosophers: Hume, Lewis, Mill, Quine, Russell most. Berkeley, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Rousseau least.
Wow! (So I checked what it is now. I'm relieved that you didn't change from subjective to objective on the grounds that my formatting was so Obviously Wrong that its wrongness had to be an objective reality :-).)
Note that (1) I had to find the meanings of many of the terms before answering the questions and so I am probably mistaken about actual meanings of few philosophical positions, and (2) even in many cases where I gave a unique answer I tend to think that the distinction between the positions lacks practical importance and mostly is a matter of formulation; who has better intuition pumps wins. The answers where these disclaimers don't apply (either because I think one side of the debate is much more elegant than the other, or because I can conceive practical implications of the choice) are in bold.
A priori knowledge: yes, but such knowledge is fallible. I know 2+2=4 without making observations, but it is possible that I am mistaken.
Abstract objects: nominalism at a glance, but I am unfamiliar with the issue
Aesthetic value: subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: no
Epistemic justification: don't know what this is about
External world: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism
God: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism are both valid ways of learning about things
Knowledge claims: don't know what this is about
Laws of nature: don't know what this is about
Logic: classical. Other systems of logic are not what is normally meant by the word.
Mental content: don't know what this is about
Meta-ethics: Yudkowskian moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism
Mind: physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism
Newcomb's problem: one box
Normative ethics: consequentialism
Perceptual experience: don't know enough about the different positions
Personal identity: meaningless
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? none of those
Proper names: Word should be defined in the most useful way for the purpose they're being used for.
Science: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival, but that's not really meaningful
Time: B-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch
Truth: correspondence or deflationary. I'm not sure of the distinction.
Zombies: conceivable but not metaphysically possible
===
Descartes for making people question things, Leibniz for the principle of sufficient reason, which I find probable, Mill for ethics, Quine for turning philosophy into cognitive science, Russell for turning it into math, and Wittgenstein for turning it into linguistics
A priori knowledge: Yes (in the restricted case of prior probabilities only, and knowledge about a statement has lesser status if it hasn't been updated on enough to minimize sensitivity to changes in prior.)
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? Reject both as confused
Aesthetic value: Subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? Insufficiently familiar with the issue (Too confused to determine whether this distinction maps onto a distinction that I actually draw)
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? The question is too unclear to answer
External world: Realism
Free will: The question is too unclear to answer (it depends on the definition of "free will"; but for most likely definitions Compatibilism works)
God: Atheism
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? Accept both (but for distinct subsets of the things that can be known)
Knowledge claims: Contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? Insufficiently familiar (Find Hume's writing too confusing to determine whether it maps to what I believe or not in broad terms)
Logic: Accept both
Mental content: internalism or externalism? The question is too unclear to answer
Meta-ethics: Anti-realism (IsMoral is a two-place predicate and there is a fact of the matter; uncertain whether I got the mapping to philosophical terminology right)
Metaphilosophy: Naturalism
Mind: Physicalism
Moral judgment: Cognitivism (with the caveat that most ethical sentences express propositions that are underspecified in that they require an agent, agent-pool or utility function to make them unambiguous).
Moral motivation: Reject all (both sides of this debate depend on broken theories of mind)
Newcomb's problem: One box
Normative ethics: Reject all (I favor a combination of all three, with bounded deontological and virtue-ethical terms, but consequentailist terms scaling without bound)
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? Reject all (these are all just approximations of behaviors of the brain, and are useful as simplified models but occasionally wrong, and not ontologically basic.)
Personal identity: There is no fact of the matter (reduces to a statement about utility functions)
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? Reject all (these positions all reduce to decision theoretic heurestics and no more)
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? Reject both (confused beyond repair)
Science: Scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): Survival, with caveats (subject to empirical test that has non-transferrable evidence)
Time: A-theory or B-theory? There is no fact of the matter (looks like an argument over the definition of the word "real")
Trolley problem: Switch
Truth: Correspondence
Zombies: Inconceivable
And... which of the following philosophers do you identify with? None of the above.
Here are mine:
A priori knowledge: yes or no? Probably, leaning towards yes (edited)
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? nominalism
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? No
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? Externalism
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? Non-skeptical realism (but sometimes I secretly hope for skepticism)
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? Split between no free will and compatibilism.
God: theism or atheism? Atheism
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? Empiricism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? Contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? Humean
Logic: classical or non-classical? Non-classical (<3 fuzzy logic and modal logic)
Mental content: internalism or externalism? Externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? Moral anti-realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? Naturalism
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? Physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? Non-cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? Externalism
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? One box
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? Consequentialism
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? Probably representationalism
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? Probably psychological, but it has its flaws
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? Libertarianism
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? Fregean
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? Scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? Death
Time: A-theory or B-theory? Leaning towards B-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? Switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? Correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? conceivable but not metaphysically possible
===
And for philosophers I identify with: Probably Nietzsche, Hume, and Russell.
(I wrote a little summary of my answers to the survey on my site, but they are somewhat outdated and partially confused. I'm in the process of reworking them, just as the rest of the site. These answers in particular have changed quite a lot over time already.)
A priori knowledge: no
Abstract objects: neither / invalid question
Aesthetic value: subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: no
Epistemic justification: invalid question; "external" is only true if you already know something external exists, so it's question begging
External world: skepticism, with pragmatic realism
Free will: no free will
God: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism, with doubts
Knowledge claims: invalid / depends on what you mean by "true"
Laws of nature: Humean, i.e. like Hume
Logic: strongly non-classical
Mental content: invalid / externalism
Meta-ethics: moral nihilism (in the sense that there are agent-dependent preferences and that's it)
Metaphilosophy: naturalism, i.e. "there is no magic"
Mind: I am completely confused and have no idea, pragmatically computationalism
Moral judgment: non-cognitivism (see above)
Moral motivation: neither (see above)
Newcomb's problem: one box, duh
Normative ethics: none (see above), pragmatically whatever feels nice (lots of consequentialism and recently deontology)
Perceptual experience: no idea (see above)
Personal identity: neither - I am my experience; I do not identify with my psychology, thoughts or biology, except in a pragmatic sense
Politics: no idea / neither, lean towards autocracy, but whatever works is fine by me
Proper names: not familiar enough, Frege seems sensible
Science: technically anti-realism, pragmatically realism
Teletransporter (new matter): probably death, but I'm currently confused
Time: strongly lean towards A-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do): lean towards switch, pragmatically probably freeze
Truth: neither / invalid / horribly confused
Zombies: currently very confused; I'm working on a complete mapping of the argument and intuitively currently lean towards "conceivable, but not possible in this universe"
There were many commenters who did not bother to look up what the B-theory of Time is:
B-theorists maintain that the fact that we know much less about the future simply reflects an epistemological difference between the future and the past: the future is no less real than the past; we just know less about it. -- Wikipedia
I think it is good to learn this phrase, because many LWers have strong opinions about this idea without knowing its proper name in philosophy. Personally, I very strongly feel that B-theory is a legitimate and extremely fruitful way of looking at the world. I don't really care whether it is the only proper way of looking at it.
The time-symmetry of (most?) fundamental (non-statistical) laws of nature seems to (weakly) encourage B-theory, as does (much more strongly) the relativity of simultaneity to the observer's velocity in special relativity. I'm not sure how A-theory is even tenable after Einstein.
A priori knowledge: yes or no?
Yes, given axioms.
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?
Don't know.
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?
Both.
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?
Don't know.
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?
Um. Don't know,
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?
Non-skeptical realism. If it means what it sounds like it means.
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?
It's a stupid term. 'Compatibilism' probably.
God: theism or atheism?
a-
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?
Stupid question. But the latter to the extent that there is a difference and possibly the former if their is some implied definition of 'rationalism' that somehow excludes empiricism.
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?
Don't know.
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?
Don't know.
Logic: classical or non-classical?
I like logic.
Mental content: internalism or externalism?
Still not terms with which I construct my intellectual identity.
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?
Realism - but quite probably closer to naive anti-realism than naive realism.
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?
Naturalism.
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?
Physicalism.
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?
Cognitivism.
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?
Internal, at a guess.
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?
Oooh, a question that actually refers to an actual (counterfactual) decision instead of annoying 'isms' that I don't care about. One!
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?
Consequentialism. Mostly.
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?
Death to qualia theory. That is all.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?
Hmm... I'm guessing the further fact view. Not because I know what it is but because the other two options aren't quite sufficient.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?
Hmmm.... closer to the libertarianism than the other two. But certainly not enough to identify as libertarian.
Proper names: Fregean or Millian?
No idea.
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?
Survival.
Time: A-theory or B-theory?
Oh come one... at least word length labels give me a chance at guessing which philosophical position resolves to sane. A and B give me almost nothing!
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?
Switch.
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?
Epistemic?
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?
Inconceivable (although I can conceive of the mental state of a philosopher who professes belief in zombies.)
===
And... which of the following philosophers do you identify with?
None of them. I don't identify as a philosopher. I'm told that Quine thought sane things though so I wouldn't be insulted by the comparison. Many of those names have an aversive association to me due to the way they quoted by 'intellectuals'.
My takeaway from this post: Lesswrong is not an offshoot of mainstream philosophy. If it was I wouldn't be able to understand everything on it while at the same time being unfamiliar with the countless isms that make up 'philosophy'.
Time: A-theory or B-theory?
Oh come one... at least word length labels give me a chance at guessing which philosophical position resolves to sane. A and B give me almost nothing!
The A-theory is identified with the view that "becoming" is somehow fundamental to the nature of the universe, and that it's not just an illusion created by, say, our only having memories of times t < t0 at time t0. A-theorists hold that, in some ultimate sense, points in time change their ontological status as they transition from the future, to the present, and into the past. To say "The event E will happen in the future" is not just to say that the time of E's occurrence has a larger coordinate than the time of the utterance. It is just to say that E will happen in the future, full stop. The process of becoming that is the universe just hasn't gotten to E yet. As this process of becoming unfolds, the truth-value of the statement will change.
At least, those are the kinds of things that A-theorists say. I have a heard time of making sense of it beyond its being a denial of the B-theory.
B-theorists subscribe to the "block-universe" view of time. All points in time have the same ontological status. All statements about the timing of events are really relative statements, perhaps about the relative timing of the statement's utterance and some event. Properly understood, the truth values of these statements are the same at all points of time. There is no becoming; this is an illusion, created perhaps by the physical state that our brains have at different points in time.
A priori knowledge: yes or no?
Yes, if we're talking about extrasensory perceptions. I am pretty sure some of what we know is genetically programmed and therefore not a direct result of sensory perceptions. I guess a Boltzmann brain would have to agree.
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?
I think this is asking if the Mathematical universe hypothesis is true/false. I can't answer that, I would have to think about it. If someone would force me to answer then I'd pick Platonism (objects such as numbers and points exist naturally), because that sounds cool I guess.
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?
Both.
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?
Huh?
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?
Whatever.
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?
"...non-skeptical realism is the philosophical understanding that things exist independent of the mind and that it is possible to say something meaningful about them." Hell, if I answer Yes to Platonism I can hardly deny reality now? I actually don't think it makes much sense asking such questions except if you enjoy philosophy for the sake of it.
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?
Bring me a good definition of what is meant by "free will" and I will attempt to answer this question. I wish people would just drop that term.
God: theism or atheism?
Given only those choices I pick atheism of course. I first wanted to write "Probabilism" until I noticed it is a real philosophical doctrine that I don't agree with.
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?
I don't understand?
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?
I think none of those.
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?
...?
Logic: classical or non-classical?
Dunno.
Mental content: internalism or externalism?
Couldn't bother to read up on it.
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?
Some sort of agent-dependent realism. My beliefs and knowledge of the associated terminology are too vague.
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?
Naturalism means "the idea or belief that only natural (as opposed to supernatural or spiritual) laws and forces operate in the world" and "the idea or belief that nothing exists beyond the natural world." People who doubt this must be really confused.
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?
Physicalism if non-physicalism means something like "supernatural"...I guess that if you doubt it even for a second it means that you have a bad philosophical cold. But ideas like Platonism just sound so cool that it makes me want to believe although it is probably not even wrong as there is no justification either logically or practically to believe such a thing. But if I accept Platonism, e.g. that there exist timeless mathematical patterns, then it is hard to see how they could be regarded as "physical".
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?
Cognitivism, there are moral statements that are objectively true or false. But I still think those objective facts are dependent on the existence of different agents and not some sort of "natural laws". For example, it is an objective fact that I assign moral value to non-human beings and it is an objective fact that a paperclip maximizer doesn't. Maybe I am confused here, don't know.
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?
I still don't know what this is supposed to mean. But I believe that our motivations to make moral statements are blurred between internal and external causations. Our moral intuitions are a fact about our genetic makeup, upbringing, education, culture and the circumstances.
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?
One box.
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?
Subjective consequentialism.
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?
I have no idea what all this means. The time I took to think about consciousness so far didn't allow me to wrap my mind around that topic.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?
Utility-function. We are what we want, our values and goals.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?
None of the above.
Proper names: Fregean or Millian?
I wouldn't name my child Fregean or Millian.
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?
Survival.
Time: A-theory or B-theory?
Hmm...
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?
Switch.
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?
Don't know.
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?
Inconceivable (for me at least).
A priori knowledge: yes for mathematics (and possibly priors) only.
Abstract objects: Platonism
Aesthetic value: subjectively objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes, math is analytic, everything else is synthetic
Epistemic justification: externalism
External world: it exists, I assume that's non-skeptical realism
Free will: leaning towards compatibilism
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? Both, for different types of knowledge.
Knowledge claims: invariantism (although contextualism may have some points)
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? I wasn't able to find a concise summary of what this means.
Logic: classical (with Baysean probability theory, which is derived from classical logic and mathematics, applicable in most cases dealing with non-mathematical objects)
Mental content: internalism or externalism? I can't figure out what this means.
Meta-ethics: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: probably naturalism
Mind: not sure
Moral judgment: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? I can't figure out what this means
Newcomb's problem: one box
Normative ethics: something like consequential virtue ethics
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? These all seem to be talking about different things.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? Probably further-fact view if it means what I'm guessing it means.
Politics: libertarianism
Proper names: Millian, to the extend this question is at all meaningful
Science: scientific realism (subject to the constrain that our current theories, at least, are as wrong as Newtonian physics)
Teletransporter (new matter): not sure
Time: A-theory or B-theory? This is at best a question of definitions and not a philosophical question.
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): probably switch but with strong caveats
Truth: probably correspondence
Zombies: conceivable possibly metaphysically possible
===
Philisophers: Locke, to a certain extent Mill and maybe Quine (I don't know enough about him to be sure).
A priori knowledge: yes or no? Yes
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? Unsure it makes sense as normally phrased, but probably nominalism.
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? Subjective.
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? No.
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? Externalism.
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? non-skeptical realism. (Although I'm not sure I fully understand this question enough to answer)
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? compatibilism
God: theism or atheism? atheism
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? both. Sorry, really. It isn't a good question.
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? Unsure.
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? Unsure
Logic: classical or non-classical? non-classical
Mental content: internalism or externalism? unsure
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? anti-realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? naturalism
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? unsure
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? one box
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? consequentialism
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? sense-datum
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? I don't know enough about the issue to comment
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? Don't know enough.
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? Don't know enough (my limited knowledge says Fregean)
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? scientific realism.
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? Ill-defined, but probably survival.
Time: A-theory or B-theory? Unsure.
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? switch.
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? conceivable but not metaphysically possible.
Philosopher identified with: Quine.
A priori knowledge: Yes
To ground epistemic justification of logical systems, or beliefs about the nature of mathematical objects (that is, not simply their presence and implications), is impossible because empirical analysis is constrained against other possible worlds.
Abstract objects: Platonism
To say that universals are but conceptual utilities is to be lazy and uninteresting. Universals are necessary to evade the problem of cosmic coincidence, and a world where common properties between objects is merely an arbitrary evaluation seems implausible.
Aesthetic value: Objective
There are two senses that aesthetic judgements might be taken objective: (i) that judgements of intrinsic mental states (i.e. the private beholding of an aesthetic work) that are causally explained by external events cannot be called subjective, and are without error,, (ii) that aesthetic judgement should not be met with skepticism because it relies on the same internal mechanism that all non-aesthetic judgement relies on: the phenomenological force of appearances.
Analytic-synthetic distinction: Yes
Epistemic justification: Internalism
To establish an externalist theory is to assume internalist justification, in that trusting their judgement assumes the justifying power of what is based on: propositional attitudes. These theories are usually motivated by a confusion between truth and justification.
External world: Non-skeptical realism
Free will: Libertarianism
To imply that the propositional contents of our beliefs is determined by the contingent location of atoms is self-defeating.
God: Atheism
Theological realism requires alien and absurd metaphysical commitments, and the God concept is fundamentally dehumanizing.
Knowledge: Rationalism
Moral judgment: Cognitivism
Friege-Greige, introspection - enough said?
Moral motivation: Internalism
Zombies: Conceivable, but not metaphysically possible
Causal essentialism
Which philosophers do you identify with: G.E. Moore, Aristotle
I actually answered the survey and I think my responses are public somewhere. I'll have to see after if this matches up.
A priori knowledge: yes or no? Agnostic
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? Accept an intermediate view
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? Accept an intermediate view
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? Agnostic
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? Accept another alternative
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? Lean towards non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? Accept compatibilism
God: theism or atheism? Accept Atheism
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? Accept both
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? Lean towards contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? Agnostic
Logic: classical or non-classical? There is no fact of the matter
Mental content: internalism or externalism? Agnostic
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? Accept moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? Accept naturalism
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? Accept physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? Accept both
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? Accept both
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? Accept one box
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? Accept virtue ethics
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? Agnostic
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? Lean towards libertarianism
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? Accept an intermediate view
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? Agnostic
Time: A-theory or B-theory? Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? Accept another alternative
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? Accept deflationary
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? Accept inconceivable
===
And... which of the following philosophers do you identify with?
Aquinas Aristotle Nietzsche
I would have written in Dennett and Emerson were there an option.
Let's see... I'll try to answer as I would have when I was taking this, for consistency...
Abstract objects: Aristotelianism. Forms are always instantiated, but are not completely arbitrary categories as nominalism would suggest.
Aesthetic value: subject-sensitive objectivism. There is a fact about what you find beautiful regardless of your say-so, but beauty depends on the observer.
Epistemic justification: subject-sensitive invariantism / contextualism: There is an external fact about whether a belief is justified, but it depends upon the context of the question and/or the person being asked, so the distinction is flawed. (see "knowledge claims")
Science: Models necessarily leave out facets of reality, and science simply aims to provide good models, so science will never fully describe reality by design. Thus, it does not achieve realism. However, the models are not arbitrary and do refer to reality.
Trolley problem: The question about what one ought to do is ill-formed. Humans are not designed to make that sort of decision, and so an ethics that answers trolley problem questions will be ill-suited to everyday use. Thus, what one should do is be virtuous in all one's activities, and I expect such a person would still freeze and panic if faced with the trolley problem. Or to paraphrase one philosopher's take on it, if you find the answer to the trolley problem easily, then there's something wrong with you.
There you go. I'm just guessing on what I was thinking on "science" and a bit on some of the others. I'd have to rethink the whole thing to answer it again - I haven't been running in philosophy circles for a while.
A priori knowledge: Yes. To ground epistemic justification of logical systems, or beliefs about the nature of mathematical objects (that is, not simply their presence and implications), is impossible because empirical analysis is constrained against other possible worlds. Abstract objects: Platonism. To say that universals are conceptual utilities is to be lazy and uninteresting. Universals are necessary to evade the problem of cosmic coincidence, and a world where common properties between objects is merely an arbitrary evaluation seems implausible. Aesthetic value: Objective. There are two senses that aesthetic judgements are objective: (i) that judgements of intrinsic mental states causally explained by external events are necessarily objective, (ii) that absolute aesthetic judgement should not be met with skepticism because it relies on the same internal mechanism that all non-aesthetic judgement relies on: the phenomenological force of appearances. Analytic-synthetic distinction: No. Epistemic justification: Internalism. To establish an externalist theory is to assume internalist justification, in that trusting their judgement assumes the justifying power of what is based on: propositional attitudes. These theories are usually motivated by a confusion between truth and justification. External world: Non-skeptical realism. Free will: Libertarianism. To imply that the propositional contents of our beliefs is determined by the contingent location of atoms is self-defeating. God: Atheism. Theological realism requires alien and absurd metaphysical commitments, and the God concept is fundamentally dehumanizing. Knowledge: Rationalism. Knowledge claims: Invariantism. Laws of nature: non-Humean. Logic: Classical. Mental content: Internalism. Meta-ethics: Moral realism. Metaphilosophy: Non-naturalism? Mind: Non-physicalism. Moral judgment: Non-cognitivism. Friege-Greige, introspection - enough said? Moral motivation: Internalism. Newcomb's problem: Two boxes. Normative ethics: Deontology. Perceptual experience: Non-disjunctive direct realism. Personal identity: Further-fact view. Politics: Libertarianism. Proper names: Millian. Science: Scientific anti-realism. Teletransporter (new matter): Death. Time: A-theory. Trolley problem: Don't switch. Truth: Correspondence. Zombies: Conceivable but not metaphysically possible. Which philosophers do you identify with: G.E. Moore, Aristotle.
A priori knowledge: yes or no?
Yes.
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?
Platonism. Full-fledged platonic realism.
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?
Objective. I use a theory of subject-*independent sense-data to justify my aesthetic theories.
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?
Yes.
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?
Internalism. Epistemic justificaiton is conferred in propositional attitudes.
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?
Idealism. Panprotoexperientialism combined with objective idealism; the external world is comprised of bits of latent phenomenal experience. Non-ideal independent universals inhere in the nature of reality, and are causally responsible for our innate capacity for properly rational thought or our a priori faculties in a quasi-Hegelian sense.
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?
Libertarianism.
God: theism or atheism?
Atheism.
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?
Rationalism.
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?
Invariantism.
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?
*There is no fact of the matter. Anti-realism about natural laws.
Logic: classical or non-classical?
Classical.
Mental content: internalism or externalism?
Internalism.
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?
Moral relaism.
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?
Non-naturalism.
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?
Non-physicalism.
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?
Cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?
Internalism.
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?
One box.
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?
Accept another alternative. *A quasi-utilitarian approach to normative ethics that takes into account virtue, duty, and consequence.
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?
Sense-datum theory.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?
Furhter-fact view.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?
Libertarianism.
Proper names: Fregean or Millian?
Accept another alternative**. A metalinguistic approach to descriptivism*.
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?
Scientific anti-realism.
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?
Death.
Time: A-theory or B-theory?
A-theory.
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?
Switch.
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?
Correspondence.
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?
Conceivable, but metaphysically impossible. Note that they would be metaphysically possible under a common-sense dualist ontology.
What philosopher do you identify with?
G.E. Moore.
A priori knowledge: yes or no?
Yes.
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?
Platonism. That is to say, not simply immanent realism; full-fledged platonic realism about abstract objects.
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?
Objective.
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?
Yes.
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?
Internalism.
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?
Non-skeptical realism.
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?
Libertarianism. AKA "contra-causal free will".
God: theism or atheism?
Atheism. That is, atheism asserted as the positive: there is certainly no God.
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?
Rationalism.
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?
Invariantism.
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?
Non-humean.
Logic: classical or non-classical?
Classical.
Mental content: internalism or externalism?
Internalism.
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?
Moral realism.
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?
Non-naturalism. Also a non-naturalist about meta-ethics, too.
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?
Non-physialism.
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?
Cognitivism.
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?
Internalism.
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?
Two boxes.
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?
Reject all. In reality, I would apply a mixture of deontology and consequentialism.
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?
Accept another alternative: direct realism.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?
Further-fact view.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?
Libertarianism.
Proper names: Fregean or Millian?
Millian.
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?
Scientific realism.
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?
Death.
Time: A-theory or B-theory?
A-theory.
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?
Switch.
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?
Correspondence.
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?
Metaphysically possible.
And... which of the following philosophers do you identify with?
G.E. Moore.
There are pairs of questions between which much stronger correlations than were actually found wouldn't have surprised me.
A priori knowledge: yes or no? no.
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? not Platonism. don't know if the other is simply the opposite or a separate claim.
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? leaning no based on a brief reading of the literature
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? don't know.
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? compatibilism, I guess.
God: theism or atheism? atheism
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? empiricism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? non-Humean (examples in favor of this were numerous on the page defining it), but it doesn't really matter. I'm not even sure the actual laws upon which the universe runs are expressible within it, we might only be able to asymptotically approach them.
Logic: classical or non-classical? classical
Mental content: internalism or externalism? externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? moral anti-realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? naturalism
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? don't know.
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? externalism
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? I am committed to one-boxing. (You hear that Omega!?)
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? consequentialism
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? Whichever one Dennet espouses. not sure which of these that is.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? I think it would be psychological view? If it thinks and acts indistinguishably from me, it is me.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? libertarianism kinda.
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? don't care.
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? scientific realism mostly
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? survival-see personal identity
Time: A-theory or B-theory? both of these are stupid. The jury's out on whether physics is timeless, but in the meantime, I understand and can utilize special relativity(and perhaps general soon), which is an entirely sufficient description.
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? switch. I take the consequentialist view(whichever action kills the least people) on all the trolley problems, despite some internal disquietude.
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? correspondence I think? not clear on the terms
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? inconcievable!
A priori knowledge: no
Abstract objects: nominalism
Aesthetic value: subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: lean no
Epistemic justification: not familiar with terms
External world: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism
God: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism (as I understand the distinction -- odd to be "against rationalism" here)
Knowledge claims: contextualism (as I understand the distinction)
Laws of nature: not familiar with terms
Logic: not familiar with the terms
Mental content: guessing externalism based on the implied meanings
Meta-ethics: leaning moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism
Mind: physicalism
Moral judgment: not familiar with distinction
Moral motivation: not familiar with terms
Newcomb's problem: one box
Normative ethics: lean consequentialism (can I factor in "acausal consequences"?)
Perceptual experience: don't know how my views map to these terms
Personal identity: don't seem to fit with any of these: I am all functions with my input/output dynamics
Politics: lean libertarianism
Proper names: not familiar with terms
Science: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): lean survival
Time: not familiar with terms, but endorse Drescher/Barbour timeless physics
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do): lean don't switch
Truth: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable
A priori knowledge: yes or no? Yes
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? Objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? Yes
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? Boils down to definitions
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? Non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? Compatibilism
God: theism or atheism? Atheism
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? Both
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? Not sure
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? non-Humean
Logic: classical or non-classical? Classical
Mental content: internalism or externalism? Externalism (but perhaps this boils down to definitions)
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? Realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? Not sure
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? Physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? Cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? Not sure
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? One box
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? Consequentialism
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? None of the above
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? The psychological view should guide practical decisions, as far as possible, but ultimately there's no 'fact of the matter'.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? Egalitarianism
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? Not sure
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? Realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? Question is wrong
Time: A-theory or B-theory? Either B-theory or question is wrong (depending on what picture of time emerges in quantum gravity)
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? Switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? Correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? Inconceivable
===
And... which of the following philosophers do you identify with?
The philosophers available to choose from for the "which philosophers do you identify with?" question were: (People will think I don't rate philosophers very highly unless I pick one so) Wittgenstein (but I have massive disagreements with him.)
The questions are at http://philpapers.org/surveys/oquestions.html. The correlations can be intensely interesting to those who understand philosophical jargon (http://philpapers.org/surveys/linear_most.pl) - it doesn't take too long to look them up as you go - and I actually found it to be a fun way to learn new philosophy. I know that there was a LW thread about this several months ago, but it didn't have a section for people here to respond to the survey. I would be very interested to see how people here would respond.
I'll repost the questions here:
===
Original Survey Questions | PhilPapers Surveys
A priori knowledge: yes or no?
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?
God: theism or atheism?
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?
Logic: classical or non-classical?
Mental content: internalism or externalism?
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?
Proper names: Fregean or Millian?
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?
Time: A-theory or B-theory?
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?
===
And... which of the following philosophers do you identify with?
The philosophers available to choose from for the "which philosophers do you identify with?" question were:
Anscombe
Aquinas
Aristotle
Augustine
Berkeley
Carnap
Davidson
Descartes
Frege
Hegel
Heidegger
Hobbes
Hume
Husserl
Kant
Kierkegaard
Leibniz
Lewis
Locke
Marx
Mill
Moore
Nietzsche
Plato
Quine
Rawls
Rousseau
Russell
Socrates
Spinoza
Wittgenstein