You're describing costly signaling. Contrary to your opening statement,
The word 'signalling' is often used in Less Wrong, and often used wrongly.
people on LessWrong are usually using the term "signalling" consistently with its standard meaning in economics and evolutionary biology. From Wikipedia,
In economics, more precisely in contract theory, signalling is the idea that one party credibly conveys some information about itself to another party
Within evolutionary biology, signalling theory is a body of theoretical work examining communication between individuals. The central question is when organisms with conflicting interests should be expected to communicate "honestly".
In particular, the ev bio article even includes a section on dishonest signalling, which seems to be what you're complaining about here:
Seriously though, "signalling" is being used to mean "tricking people in to thinking that you are".
This post is still interesting as a highlight reel of different examples of signalling, and shows that the term is, in its standard usage, rather non-specific. It's just not an illustration that people here are using it wrongly.
You've basically come up with four criteria that describe the use of the word "signal" in a highly specific context - traits that exist for pure signalling purposes in evolution or game theory - and then decided, arbitrarily, that this is the one true meaning of "signal." I do not think you have provided adequate evidence or argument to back this claim up.
If everyone around me is a Republican and I am not, it might make sense that I would do things that would signal that I am a Republican, even if these are very cheap and have obvious positive returns. Your definition would not allow this - if it is cheap and has obvious positive returns, it is not "signaling" to you. What you're saying is that if I send a birthday card to a coworker I hate, then I am not "signaling" that I like that person because it's too cheap to send the card.
It may make sense to speak of weak or strong signals, or reliable or unreliable or misleading signals. But you've arbitrarily said that the word applies only when a certain arbitrary threshold is crossed (your 2 and 4).
Incidentally, your theory might actually work if 4 were eliminated and 2 read "the behaviour...
It may be possible to rescue the word "signal", but it's going to take an equally evocative word that covers what people think they mean by "signal". "Stealing associations" isn't going to work because it's not one word. Robin covers a lot of mileage with "affiliate" but many times when people say "signal" they don't mean "costly-signal" or "affiliate".
mental note: Always check the byline
If you never make a proofreading mistake you are doing too much proofreading.
Aren't you arguing over definitions here?
You did realize that the OP is an argument about definitions, and thus a response that continues that argument is spot-on, right?
On this site, rube generally means 'red cube', and I had to look up the word to figure out what you meant here. Though this still makes a bit of sense--you can't signal to red cubes either.
I have a hard time telling whether you're trying to say that 'signaling' models are inaccurate, or just that calling them 'signaling' is misleading. I agree with the latter insofar as 'signaling' means this specific economic model, because the behaviors in question aren't directed at economically rational agents. I also can't tell if you dislike models that postulate stupidity (the strong status connotations of the word "rube" make me suspicious).
If you mean the former: I think you greatly overestimate median rationality in your take on the manager and butcher examples. All positive traits get conflated with each other by default. People can and do override their affective impressions with explicit reasoning, but more often than not they don't, especially when evaluating performance is difficult — and it's almost always more difficult than evaluating "does this person look like a winner?".
I also used to think that simple non-costly signaling couldn't possibly stably work, but experience (often with my own irrationality) changed my mind. This is less confusing if I think of it as social-primate (rather than general-intelligence) behavior; liking things/people oth...
The word 'signalling' is often used in Less Wrong, and often used wrongly.
I recommend that people do not use this post as a guide to how to use the term 'signalling'. It presents false claims with authority and confidence.
These activities seem completely pointless, costly and difficult. Paradoxically, it is probably this very difficulty that serves to explain why they are done at all. Take the peacock’s tail. A peacock that has to struggle to survive while dragging around a conspicuous tail is clearly at a disadvantage. But if he can continue to survive, then clearly he must be pretty strong! So the peahens may choose to mate with him rather than the peacocks with less conspicuous tails, whose survival is thus a less impressive feat.
This is misleading. It idealizes and trivializes the signal given conveying the impression that it is 'strength' or (non-inclusive) fitness that must be signaled. However the peackock's tail is the go to example of Fisherian runaway. Even without considering strength-signalling implications the tails are signalling "if you mate with me your male offspring (and later generation male descendants) will likely also have enormous tails and be ch...
It seems logically rude to create your own definition, declare it the one "true" definition, and then complain that others are using their own terms. The term "signalling" has been used consistently, judging by your examples of so-called misuse, and it is you who is refusing to interpret them correctly.
Furthermore, is it really that hard to postulate that people may associate certain traits with signals that do not require said traits to produce?
A peacock that has to struggle to survive while dragging around a conspicuous tail is clearly at a disadvantage. But if he can continue to survive, then clearly he must be pretty strong! So the peahens may choose to mate with him rather than the peacocks with less conspicuous tails, whose survival is thus a less impressive feat.
I'm not sure that's true. Wikipedia lists several competing theories:
Now, how would one test this? Especially considering that some theories mostly differ in their explanations of the evolutionary history leading to the present; they all match the present birds. I do know that real-life biologists sometime claim peacocks as archetypical evidence for sexual selection, and others claim it as evidence for costly signalling of fitness.
A good way of remembering this criterion is the slogan "You can't signal to rubes."
This doesn't seem like it describes your fourth criterion; it reads more like "Rubes can't signal."
I do think that the claim "you can't signal to rubes" is a good one to keep in mind, but like Psychohistorian points out, that limits you to a narrow component of signalling, which I might characterize as spending resources on authority, which is only worthwhile if the audience can recognize authority. If a moviemaker decides to actually use an Bald Eagle cry instead of a Red-tailed Hawk cry, most movie-goers will think (TVTropes link) they got it wrong, and only ornithologists will notice it's correct.
Isn't signalling just the practice of having non-obvious characteristic A and then exhibiting obvious characteristic B because P(A|B) > P(A) && P(B|A) > P(B) ? Which means that B gives information of A.
Intelligence is non-obvious, a degree in classics is. Peacock strength and cunning is non-obvious to peahens, but big tails are. Having intercontinental missiles is classified information, but moon landings are sensational news.
Batesian mimicry is a form of signaling in which dishonest signaling is, in fact, worth it - and it is absolutely still considered a signal.
Upvoted for opening discussion on a concept way too carelessly used. Another such concept I would like to see scrutinized here is social status.
Dishonest signalling isn’t worth it. By dishonest signalling, I mean enaging in a signalling behaviour when you don’t possess the quality you wish others to think you have. A weak peacock who grows a conspicuous tale will be eaten by predators. A stupid person who tries to get a degree in classics will fail his subjects. Faking the moon landing carries the risk that the conspiracy will be exposed and the American government would become a laughing stock. A good way of remembering this criterion is the slogan "You can't signal to rubes."
This se...
Why do peacocks grow such large, conspicuous tails? Why do people take degrees in subjects like Philosophy or Classics, despite these subjects having no obvious practical value? Why do people take pains to avoid splitting infinitives, even though everyone can understand split infinitives perfectly well?
The second example seems to fit in worse than the two others, given that plenty of people take degrees in such subjects due to a love of learning and due to being genuinely interested in them.
I don't understand the link between intelligence and signalling. It implies that only human beings signal, which contradicts the purpose of using the peacock as an example of real signalling.
Or maybe evolution really is smarter than us...
The rule that you mustn't split infinitives derives from Latin where splitting infinitives was impossible. So a person who doesn’t split infinitives is more likely to be a Latin scholar
Are you being serious?
4 Dishonest signalling isn’t worth it.
I seem to recall seeing some game theoretic signaling models with wasteful pooling equilibria, where everyone sends the same costly signal and the receiver can't distinguish between the senders of different qualities. Can't find a specific model now, but here is a slide that mentions this fact on page 20.
-Edit it looks like Academian said most of this already, I need to stop going afk mid-comment. I see several problems with this article. The most obvious is that it is arguing about definitions, and doing so in a situation were the majority of the participants seem to understand each other well enough that I don't think the argument is necessary for clarifying communications. The next is that I feel like the phrase "you can't signal to rubes" is confusing, and certainly not a good slogan. Lastly, to extent its meaningful to argue about the mea...
Dishonest signalling isn’t worth it.
There are career criminals, so dishinesty can work. Dishonesty is not guaranteed to work, but "worth it" is statistical. BTW, many nations have been caught out in all kinds of bullcrap -- the Zinoviev Letter, Iran-Contra, etc.. It tends to get forgotten about. It's not like people have high expectations of politicians.
The word 'signalling' is often used in Less Wrong, and often used wrongly. This post is intended to call out our community on its wrongful use, as well as serve as an introduction to the correct concept of signalling as contrast.
"We choose to go to the moon. We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard.."
- John F. Kennedy
Why do peacocks grow such large, conspicuous tails? Why do people take degrees in subjects like Philosophy or Classics, despite these subjects having no obvious practical value? Why do people take pains to avoid splitting infinitives, even though everyone can understand split infinitives perfectly well?
These activities seem completely pointless, costly and difficult. Paradoxically, it is probably this very difficulty that serves to explain why they are done at all. Take the peacock’s tail. A peacock that has to struggle to survive while dragging around a conspicuous tail is clearly at a disadvantage. But if he can continue to survive, then clearly he must be pretty strong! So the peahens may choose to mate with him rather than the peacocks with less conspicuous tails, whose survival is thus a less impressive feat.
As for classics, getting a degree in classics may be pointless, but it’s also difficult. It requires one to read and memorize vast chunks of text, and to translate these texts between Greek, Latin and English precisely. So a person who has a degree in classics and got a good mark must be a person with a good memory who is able to execute tasks precisely. Qualities extremely useful in a civil servant, the occupation where many budding classicists find themselves. The rule that you mustn't split infinitives derives from Latin where splitting infinitives was impossible. So a person who doesn’t split infinitives is more likely to be a Latin scholar, with the qualities of class and intelligence that such a thing implies.
Even the decision to go to the moon might be explained in this way. Carl Sagan made the point that a rocket capable of going to the moon is certainly capable of reaching Moscow. And it’s clear why Kennedy in the middle of a Cold War would want to demonstrate such a thing.
When we explain a behaviour in this way, we say that the behaviour is signalling. The agent does not perform a task for its own sake, but to show others that they possess some important quality such as strength, a good memory, or military supremacy. The key features that a behaviour must possess for signalling to be a good explanation are as follows.
Unfortunately, not all proposed explanations involving the word "signalling" take care to establish these four properties. Our community seems especially guilty of this. The main misunderstanding is that it uses ‘signalling’ merely to denote behaviours that trick rubes in to thinking you’re good. This raises the question of why there are rubes to trick in the first place. Why haven’t more savvy competitors eaten their lunch? Here is an example of someone thinking that you can signal to rubes:
In other words, it's all about signaling, isn't it? Managers will take actions that actively harm the continued progress of the project if that action makes them look "decisive" and "in charge". I've seen this on many projects I've been on, and it took me a while to realize that my managers weren't stupid or ignorant. It's just that the organization I was working in put a higher priority on process than on results. My managers, therefore quite rationally did things that maximized their apparent value in the eyes of their bosses, even if it meant that the project (and, as a result) the entire organization was hurt.
Here the rube is the managers bosses, why are they so stupid as to think that mismanagement is evidence of superior management qualities? Why haven’t these idiots been sacked? (This probably does occur in real life, but I don’t think "signalling" is the right term to describe it. I would describe it as "pandering to the prejudices of idiots".)
Another comment which falls in to the same trap:
Compare the skilled butcher, who, with no wasted movements, cuts his meat just where the joints are, and the flashy butcher, whose flourishes make for less skilful and efficient cutting but send a more impressive signal.
I agree that the flashy butcher could became engaged in his cutting and lose consciousness of the crowd and his impression on it without decreasing his signalling behaviour. If he did so, he might become more sincere, but his signalling behaviour would remain. For signaling is not a conscious addition to his art, which might strip away: skill at cutting and skill at signalling are woven confusedly together in it.
The trouble here is that it postulates stupid customers, just like the previous comment postulated stupid bosses. A much better test of butcher quality than flashiness is how good the meat tastes and how much is produced. An intelligent customer can probably test this fairly easily, and would not buy meat from the flashy butcher.
These uses of "signalling" at least have the advantage that they’re explanations along economic lines. The difference between signalling and pandering is the intelligence of your audience. What’s worse is that some people in our community use the word "signal" to mean "show" or "pretend".
An example:
I may have learned that signalling low status - to avoid intimidating outsiders - may be less of a good strategy than signalling that I know what I'm talking about.
A low status person that knows what they’re talking about? I suppose such things are possible... Seriously though, "signalling" is being used to mean "tricking people in to thinking that you are". Either you know what you’re talking about or you don’t. At least one of the two options given in the quote will result in you trying to trick someone. We’re signalling to rubes again.
Worst of all, some people use "signalling" as a version of ad hominem. "You just say that to signal." A comment to Overcoming Bias’s controversial post "Gentle, Silent Rape" reads:
“I'm sad but not at all surprised that so many of these comments are to the effect of "HOW DARE YOU EVEN THINK ABOUT THIS TOPIC?!!?!?"
I can only imagine how much more frustrating it must be for Professor Hanson have to deal with increasingly harsh anti-mind climate that envelopes the Western world. The all-encompassing ideology of political correctness is truly a fearsome juggernaut.
I think the status signaling arguments are right on the money, and the rest of the comments serve as the proof.”
Let’s go through the criteria again:
1. The behaviour seems pointless.
This clearly doesn’t apply. The behaviour is easily explicable. Comments might be made out of genuine disagreement, or (more cynically) to intimidate Hanson and others away from making arguments like these in the future.
2.The behaviour requires a certain quality.
The quality proposed was "status", but outrage is cheap. Any fool can be outraged at a blog post mentioning rape. It doesn’t require exceptional intelligence, charisma, wealth, or feminist credentials. You could be homeless and leave an outraged comment just by going to a public library. You don’t even have to read the post.
3. You want others to believe you have this quality.
Well this seemingly applies. People do want to be thought of as being against rape, and high status. The only trouble is that many of the comments are left anonymously.
4. Dishonest signalling isn’t worth it.
This does not apply at all. Even a convicted rapist could leave an outraged comment.
Clear thinking requires making distinctions. Using the word "signalling" to mean "pandering", "tricking people", "showing", or "toeing the party line" does nothing but lead to confusion and muddle. If you’re going to use jargon, use it in its precise sense. That’s what is jargon is for, communicating precisely. Next time you feel like using the word "signalling", ask yourself whether the four criteria apply. Remember: You can’t signal to rubes.