Related toShut up and multiplyPolitics is the mind-killerPascal's MuggingThe two party swindleThe American system and misleading labelsPolicy Tug-of-War 

Jane is a connoisseur of imported cheeses and Homo Economicus in good standing, using a causal decision theory that two-boxes on Newcomb's problem. Unfortunately for her, the politically well-organized dairy farmers in her country have managed to get an initiative for increased dairy tariffs on the ballot, which will cost her $20,000. Should she take an hour to vote against the initiative on election day? 

She estimates that she has a 1 in 1,000,000 chance of casting the deciding vote, for an expected value of $0.02 from improved policy. However, while Jane may be willing to give her two cents on the subject, the opportunity cost of her time far exceeds the policy benefit, and so it seems she has no reason to vote.

Jane's dilemma is just the standard Paradox of Voting in political science and public choice theory. Voters may still engage in expressive voting to affiliate with certain groups or to signal traits insofar as politics is not about policy, but the instrumental rationality of voting to bring about selfishly preferred policy outcomes starts to look dubious. Thus many of those who say that we rationally ought to vote in hopes of affecting policy focus on altruistic preferences: faced with a tiny probability of casting a decisive vote, but large impacts on enormous numbers of people in the event that we are decisive, we should shut up and multiply, voting if the expected value of benefit to others sufficiently exceeds the cost to ourselves.

Meanwhile, at the Experimental Philosophy blog, Eric Schwitzgebel reports that philosophers overwhelmingly rate voting as very morally good (on a scale of 1 to 9), with voting placing right around donating 10% of one's income to charity. He offers the following explanation:

Now is it just crazy to say that voting is as morally good as giving 10% of one's income to charity? That was my first reaction. Giving that much to charity seems uncommon to me and highly admirable, while voting... yeah, it's good to do, of course, but not that good. One thought, however -- adapted from Derek Parfit -- gives me pause about that easy assessment. In the U.S. 2008 Presidential election, I'd have said the world would be in the ballpark of $10 trillion better off with one of the candidates than the other. (Just consider the financial and human costs at stake in the Iraq war and the U.S. bank bailouts, for starters.) Although my vote, being only one of about 100,000,000 cast, probably had only about a 1/100,000,000 chance of tilting the election, multiplying that tiny probability by a round trillion leaves a $10,000 expected public benefit from my voting -- not so far from 10% of my salary.
Of course, that calculation is incredibly problematic in any number of ways. I don't stand behind it, but it helps loosen the grip of my previous intuition that of course it's morally better to donate 10% to charity than to vote.

[Disclaimer: the above $10 trillion estimate is not mine. Bush did not kill 10 billion current people (at $1,000 per life) and he massively increased health-oriented foreign aid to Africa, which can expiate many sins in the GWWC calculus. Politics is the mind-killer, this is not about blue and green, etc.] So we have a model of politics as charity, on which it is more plausible that voting on policy could be rational. But why stop there? If voting (wisely) is a charitable activity, then spending money on political contributions to convince or mobilize others to vote (wisely) could be as well. For those who don't have moral objections to politics as charity (see the comments in this discussion for examples of such objections) political influence affect the voting behavior of others can be as well (provided compared to spending on tuberculosis treatment. We can attempt to remedy or analyze the "incredibly problematic" components to make better and better estimates. When thinking about effective philanthropy, would the marginal dollar do more good as a political campaign contribution or as a charitable donation for tuberculosis treatment?

Politics as effective charity?

This is not a new question for those interested in optimizing the impact of their charity. Giving What We Can (GWWC), founded by Future of Humanity Institute associate Toby Ord, is a group of people who have pledged to give at least ten percent of their incomes "to whichever organizations can most effectively use it to fight poverty in developing countries." GWWC notes that political advocacy may have high expected value, but has not recommended any organizations in that category, mentioning the difficulties of analysis as well as hope that it will be done in the future. 

While those who care about future generations and existential risk might not choose to focus their charitable efforts on the task of GWWC, thinking about how political activity relates to it can still provide them a good example for a Fermi calculation. For instance, charity evaluator GiveWell, which posts its analysis online, estimates the cost of saving the life of a poor person alive today via their recommended charities as on the order of $3,000, giving a reasonably clear benchmark for political activity to exceed. 

This post and its successors will lay some further groundwork for that Fermi calculation.

Are votes worth buying?

To make the comparison between political activity and GiveWell-style anti-poverty organizations as clear as possible we focus solely on money spent to convince or mobilize the votes of others (as opposed to one's own vote, which may be easy enough to exercise to be worthwhile, even if efforts to influence others are not). 

We can then break up the initial analysis into three parts.

  1. How much political spending is required to elicit a vote for a candidate under various conditions?

  2. What is the relationship between purchased votes and policy outcomes?

  3. What is our probability distribution over the value (in lives of the poor saved, for this example) of those policies?

We could then delve deeper into questions of decision theory, value, signaling and bias that are raised by the basic empirical picture. Today's post will focus on the first prong, the cost per vote elicited via political spending (in the context of a two-boxing decision theory, for the moment).

How much do votes sell for?

To begin the analysis, we can consider as our example contests for the most powerful elected office today: President of the United States. Three lines of American evidence stand out as relevant to assessing the cost per vote of campaign spending: the revealed behavior of politicians, correlational studies of spending and electoral outcomes, and experimental evidence from randomized trials. The first and third indicate relatively low cost per vote, while the second suggests higher costs. For the causal judgments we wish to draw, randomized experiments offer the most powerful evidence, and this analysis will lean heavily on them. 

Revealed preference

In the United States, politicians dedicate an enormous proportion of their time to fundraising. Prima facie, this suggests that politicians, experts in getting elected, believe that fundraising will be at least as helpful to their election as other activities like personal appearances or actual governance. This is made more plausible by the tendency of politicians to spend more time fundraising and raise more money when facing serious challengers in their next election. Politicians might have been tricked by an initial baseless belief in the efficacy of campaign spending, with the most popular candidates also raising the most money and creating a spurious self-fulfilling correlation. However, selection over time would be expected to wear away at such mistaken beliefs.

Correlation studies

A number of correlational studies have been cited to advance the idea that 'campaigns don't matter' in U.S. presidential elections. Using information such as party identification, unemployment, economic growth, and the approval rating of the incumbent, political scientists can predict election outcomes surprisingly well before campaigning even begins. These correlations are only weak evidence of causation, however, since the fundamentals also predict fundraising capacity (more popular candidates do better at raising money from the public, and organized interests are more interested in buying influence with a candidate who looks likely to win). To be confident that additional spending will buy votes, one would ideally want robust randomized experiments capable of clearly indicating causal relationships.

Randomized experiments

Fortunately, the last several decades have seen a proliferation of randomized experiments and scientific methods in political campaigning. In these experiments, parties and political organizations randomly apply particular campaigning methods, often with the supervision of political scientists or other academics, and record the votes thus secured.  One reference is Donald Green and Alan Gerber's Get Out the Vote, which reviews dozens of experiments bearing on the cost-effectiveness of get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts.

The key results are summarized in a table on page 139 (viewable on the Google Books preview). The strongest well-confirmed effect is for door-to-door GOTV drives, which average 14 voters contacted to induce one vote (plus spillover effects), with a cost per vote of $29 (including spillover effects) assuming that staff time costs $16/hour for staff. Phone banks require more contacts per vote, but are cheaper per contact, with Green and Gerber estimating the cost per vote at $38 for campaign volunteer callers, and $90 for untrained commercial callers.

In recent years, the U.S. political parties have adjusted their GOTV strategy in line with these experiments, and turnout has increased. For instance, in 2004 Green and Gerber predicted predicted that the parties would increase GOTV spending by some $200 million using methods averaging $50 per vote, for an increase in turnout of 4 million, and the turnout data seems consistent with that. This money was concentrated in swing states, and in 2004 turnout increased 9% to 63% in the twelve most competitive states, while increasing 2% to 53% in the twelve least competitive states (while clearly leaving many potential voters home).

However, publication biases likely inflate the cost-effectiveness estimates here, perhaps drastically, and to get a solid (likely worse) estimate would require a detailed investigation of such biases. Many of these studies are weakly significant, inconsistent across circumstances, or involve degrees of freedom. The true cost per vote could easily be $1,000+.

Diminishing returns

But how finely targeted can GOTV efforts be? Adding n votes to both candidates in a two-candidate race is a disappointing result for those interested in affecting who wins in elections. A GOTV which mobilizes 1000 votes at the margin, but has 250 of them go to the non-preferred candidate, will be only half as effective as one that solely mobilized supporters of the preferred candidate. Fortunately for electoral campaigners, the candidate citizens will vote for (if mobilized) is often easy to determine. Voting behavior is highly predictable from rural vs urban location, ethnicity, age, past party registration, neighborhood, etc. With increasing spending on GOTV, increasingly less selected populations would need to be contacted. Depending on how much money is available (and accompanying diminishing returns as less polarized populations are approached) this might easily double or triple the cost per vote at the margin.

A further problem is that, since the forecast likelihood of a vote making the difference in an election varies widely across the country, other donors will also apply their resources disproportionately to closely contested elections. For instance, Gelman et al find that a U.S. presidential election vote in New Hampshire is around a hundred times as likely to make a difference as one in California. National presidential campaigns can efficiently allocate their resources in order of priority, with additional dollars going to relatively marginal regions. In non-national elections candidates may call in favors and tap war chests to deal with particularly close races, and empirical data do indicate increased spending in tight races. We can sanity-check an estimate of the cost per vote against total spending by national campaigns, e.g. the 2008 U.S. presidential race:

Candidate (Party)

Amount raised

Amount spent


Average spent per vote

Barack Obama (D)





John McCain (R)





Ralph Nader (I)





Bob Barr (L)





Chuck Baldwin (C)





Cynthia McKinney (G)





Excludes spending by independent expenditure concerns.
Source: Federal Election Commission

These amounts are surprisingly small (relative to, e.g. the U.S. federal budget), and also include all non-GOTV interventions. Negative campaigning which reduces turnout for an opposing candidate is just as effective in winning elections (per vote) as increasing turnout for one's preferred side. Interventions which push 'swing voters' to vote for one candidate rather than the other are twice as effective as either per voter influenced.

Some ballpark VOI guesstimates

Much more analysis can obviously be done here, but as a first-pass estimate, it seems likely that the marginal cost per vote from spending on U.S. presidential general elections is higher than the $50 per vote Green and Gerber estimate for GOTV efforts, so consider a range of $50-$5000. Note that these are after-tax dollars if contributed directly to political campaigns, and non-profit efforts are constrained in their ability to back particular candidates and coordinate with their campaigns (although many activities can be funneled through non-profit vehicles).

What would that be worth? For those considering how to spend their effectiveness-focused philanthropy budget, we could use Eric's quick guesstimate of a 1 in 100,000,000 probability of a marginal vote swaying a presidential election. But if we consider ex ante close elections the number might be one in tens of millions (if one holds one's donations for close elections, although Gelman's figure of 1 in 10 million was for a specific election, using polls from immediately prior to election day, exaggerating the degree of certainty). Say we take 1 in 25 million as our number, assuming one waits for close elections to donate, but can't wait until just before election day.

Then in order for campaign spending to outperform the Against Malaria Foundation saving one child from death by malaria for ~$3,000+, the victory of the preferred candidate would need to be expected (given extensive uncertainty about candidates' future behavior, future conditions, and the effectiveness of various policies) to do good equivalent to preventing over 400 thousand to over 40 million extra malaria deaths, with higher numbers more likely.

With higher estimates of the campaign spending cost per vote, political donations would look less attractive, but voting oneself has potentially lower cost, the opportunity cost of reliably informing oneself (an essential cost) and voting. So carefully voting oneself might be useful volunteering, even if political donations are not worthwhile in this framework. One might think of it as spending a gift of political power from the state.

Continued in: Probability and Politics

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I can think of one big advantage of charity over politics: Giving to politics is rent-seeking behavior. If you give money to support politicians against/for dairy tariffs, then you encourage the other side to give money to their politicians who are for/against dairy tariffs. In this game matrix, "cooperate" is don't give money.

I have a hard time swallowing the ten trillion dollar figure. I don't think the two parties are really that different, and there's good, game theory for them to be that way.

I think there is a market for some sort of organization by which a person who wants to donate $50 to the Democrats can contact a person who wants to donate $50 to the Republicans and mutually agree to donate their collective $100 to some third-party cause like world hunger instead.

I like this idea, but how do you verify that the donation would have gone to the political party? If I'm inclined to give $50 to a non-political-party charity, then there's incentive for me to claim it would go to the party I prefer in order to get one of my political opponents to divert money from the Bad Guys to another cause.


I would like to come up with aways to prevent gaming this sort of system. If we could get past this sort of hurdle, I would be interested in implementing a website facilitating this.

Perhaps the matched donors have to agree on a charity and an amount: you pay into the system, and if you get matched, then the non-political charity gets your money, and if you don't (after some waiting period), then the political charity does. This means you have to at least not mind the money going to the political charity, or be willing to gamble.

A thought: Charity popularity probably isn't evenly distributed between political parties. This could limit the ability of some charities to be matched, but it would allow (for example) a Republican who supports Planned Parenthood to have little or no risk of their donation defaulting to the GOP. A Republican who didn't want to donate to the Republican Party and did want to donate to Planned Parenthood would take very little risk, while one who wanted to donate to the NRA might have more trouble.

Charity itself isn't evenly distributed: Republicans give more dollars to charity, period. If everyone in the US signed up for this site, it would guarantee a Republican win. But, of course, not everyone will, so it may not be that bad.

Yes, that should reduce the gaming of the system. It involves more secrecy that in my original conception of the website (which would display graphs of the matching money available for different charities), but I don't think that can be helped.

how do you verify that the donation would have gone to the political party?

It is probably impossible to become extremely confident about that, but past contributions to a party are a good predictor of future contributions, and I believe that Federal campaigns are required to disclose the names and amounts of any contributions to the Federal Election Commission, which publishes them.

Those published disclosures can be used to qualify a counterparty (a person one is considering making a deal with) and then to verify that the counterparty carried out his end of the deal.

The deal should be that a Republican promises to contribute X dollars less this election cycle than he did last cycle if a Democrat will do the same.

The deal reduces (direct) contributions to campaigns even without the requirement that the Republican and the Democrat agree on a charity to donate 2 * X dollars to. In particular, it reduces (direct) contributions even if the two "sides" of the deal just keep that money.

There are indirect ways to make contributions that do not require disclosure, however, and IIUC these indirect ways are heavily used because they allow individuals to get around the dollar limits on direct contributions. So that consideration brings back the idea that the $X each "side" saves in the deal should go to charity (but I see no need to require that each "side" donate their $X to the same charity, just that the donations can be verified) because it gives some assurance that the $X will not become indirect contributions to a political party, since the total amount an individual is willing to spend on altruism tend to stay relatively constant year over year. But that takes out of the stream of money going to campaigns and parties mostly altruistic money, leaving mostly unaffected the money that expects to profit from the contributions, which might have a bad effect on the political process.

Also, credible arguments have been made that past experience with the dollar-limit laws shows that it is futile to keep money out of politics because the people who make their living from that money have so much influence on the law-making process and because there is so much smart money that wants to contribute to candidates and to parties. Carl's analysis in the OP of the efficacy of "buying" a vote is evidence for that last point.

Providing there are roughly equal levels of cheating on both sides this sounds like a feature rather than a bug.

The problem is that if the potential participants expect this type of cheating, that their donations will be diverted by someone who would not have donated to their political opponents anyways, they will not want to participate.

Even if that is the case, they're still getting twice* the leverage they'd get elsewhere.

*Minus the small finder's fee.

I think you have to just eat this problem. The whole point of the system is that it allows a donation to do double duty as a political force and as a standard charitable donation. It will appeal to anyone who likes both, whichever one is more important to them.

Maybe this should be handled at a different level: the two parties get together and agree to each take a large amount of their donation funds and redirect it to a third-party charity. This seems less game-able.

If the parties could get on board with this, they could provide a separate donation option for something like this. Both parties would then commit to give an amount worth the smaller of the sums gathered into charity. Now for the funders not to donate to the charity option would mean a smaller charity sum for their party and more campaign funds for the opposing party if their party ended up with the smaller charity sum.

It's not in the interests of the individuals employed by the parties to reduce their budgets, so I can't see them getting on board with this.

What's the advantage of either over the other?

For one, it eliminates the problem Alicorn suggests: we already know the money would go to the respective party because it has been donated already. Also, it would be easier to manage, because it would be a single public trade with a large amount of money involved, not many private $100 agreements.

Good points, both. But how would you convince them to do it?

I was thinking that a charity might propose this to each party individually and get them to agree to it. But upon reflection, a better way would be to run a charity (or meta-charity) that works like this: when you donate money, you specify your affiliation, and the charity takes care of donating the difference to the appropriate party.

Perhaps it's not even necessary to specify a single neutral charity option. You give money to the meta-charity and specify your party affiliation and preferred charity. Then we donate the difference to the party's campaign fund as usual, and split up the remaining money between charities in proportion to how much was meant to be donated to each.

Vote. Up.

If any other LWers want to start this website, I'll pull my weight with the marketing.

Wow, I expect this kind of naivete from normal people, but not from LWers. This is exactly the sort of bias-influenced human behavior that LW should be teaching you to understand. It's more Hansonian than Yudkowskian, but still.

Politics is not about policy. Donors are signaling affiliation. No one will use this service.

Vote. Down.

So you predict also that no one used Nader Trader?
What is your detailed theory of politics that distinguishes them?

Politics is not about policy. Donors are signaling affiliation.

Probably true, but that isn't how donors see themselves. The idea here is to let them achieve the goals they proclaim, while still signaling their affiliation.

The idea here is to let them achieve the goals they proclaim, while still signaling their affiliation.

It would seem to be aimed at those with multiple signals they wish to send. (Political affiliation, charitable contribution, a general attitude along the lines of efficiency). It seems most likely to appeal to those who would otherwise be directly donating to charities but want a bit extra out of their contribution.

Politics is not about policy. Donors are signaling affiliation. No one will use this service.

Your conclusion doesn't follow from the premises (which are well understood by those involved).

What if you give every donor a profile page that shows what causes you've defunded? What if you linked your facebook to a chart showing how much you've kept away from pro-life/pro-choice lobbyists?

Correct me if I'm wrong, but this seems like an opportunity to signal tons of group affiliation, intelligence, and compassion.

I'd help with documentation/user support.

... yes, I happen to actually like the two most hated programming-related tasks. What of it?

Another potential issue:

If money is diverted from small political donations by lots of individuals, does that increase the influence of big corporate donors over politicians?

Could this effect be ammeliorated by getting politicians themselves to value the cancelling of a donation to their opponents as much as a donation to themselves?

Corporations reap some PR effects from donating to charity, so in theory, they'd be even more motivated than individuals to accept diverted matched donations.

I think public financing of elections is a good idea. If political donations are low it's much easier for a company to buy political influence through donating money. See Larry Lessig:

Trying to get people who make small donation to cancel out each other by donating to a third course has the opposite effect of creating public financing of elections.

Detail: the website takes donations in rounds that end on a specified date. Each donation has three parts: a political recipient (say, the DSCC), an offset recipient (say, the NRSC), and a backup charity (say, Village Reach). The backup charity must be scrupulously non-political. At the end of each round, the website finds all the donations which match, gives the political recipient who gets more money the difference in donations, and parcels out each side's remaining money (which will be equal) proportionately among their named charities.

A $100 DSCC/NRSC/VillageReach donation is thus guaranteed to cause the difference in donations between the DSCC and NRSC to go $100 in the DSCC's favour; I just don't know whether it will do so by increasing the money the DSCC gets, or reducing the money the NRSC gets. But either way, if there are donors on both sides then VillageReach will get at least some of the money, and if they're roughly evenly matched it'll get most of it.

So the big question is: how could this be made to seem attractive to people? It seems like very few would understand it. "No, give to the DSCC directly - that way they get all the money! Otherwise some Republican will put money in and take away your donation!"

I think this is exactly how to do this. I'm not sure how effective it could actually be, but I'd really like someone to make an honest go for it.

One note: I think there is a motivation for underdog supporters not to contribute, since presumably the less-well funded candidate needs funding more than the better funded candidate. I think this should be relatively small though, at least for races that are at all contentious.

Yes, this problem came up in my discussions.

In theory you could state with each donation how much you'd need to take off the other side in order not to give it to your side and look for matches in a process a little like betting markets, but it's hard to imagine that working out in practice, so maybe you just aim this tool at evenly matched races.

But politics is not about policy. Political donors want to signal their affiliation with their tribes, not spend their money efficiently to change the world. It's a modern potlatch. Otherwise they'd be giving to something else in the first place - it's extraordinarily unlikely that giving to the Democrats or Republicans is the maximal way to impact the world, so anyone who is doing it obviously doesn't have the goal of efficient charity.

I predict that such an organization would capture < 0.5% of donors by # and < 0.1% by $. That's a pretty small market - a few hundred thousand.

A brilliant idea.

I wonder which type of voter is more likely to think such a system is a good idea. I would be surprised if both sides were equally open minded regarding such things. (But aren't American so don't know which lot is least insane.)

Such a system would appeal to the type of voter who doesn't vote because he is rationally ignorant and/or calculates it isn't worth his time (b/c he is not a utilitarian and doesn't count common benefit as a reason to vote), and wouldn't donate to a political party because he knows there are far more efficient ways to transform money into changing the expected future of the world. He can see why the system is an efficiency gain using the same tools he can see why voting and donating to political parties is a waste of his time and money.

This creates somewhat of a problem for the proposal, if it is only appreciated by those who can't benefit from it...

Yes, I think this is a great line of thought (despite Alicorn's legitimate objection). In light of the fact that there's a fair amount of overlap in human values even among members of disparate groups, it seems like there's a substantial arbitrage opportunity attached to redirecting partisan efforts to efforts that are unambiguously good.

Re the Prisoner's Dilemma element in political competition, for this post I left it out (save the acknowledgement with respect to moral objections, and associated link to the Ezra Klein comments section). More on that to come.

Re the second point, the ten trillion dollar figure is not mine (my estimates and data are coming in subsequent posts). I have an upcoming post on the data regarding the applicability of median voter theorem style analysis in the U.S. (short answer: democratic competition constrains differences between candidates to a small fraction of the variation in outcomes with dictators, but different politicians representing the same electorate thanks to narrow wins, incumbency, etc show markedly different voting behavior; primaries and the need to motivate one's base to vote/volunteer/contribute the ideological lumpiness seem to play a large role in deviations from median voter type outcomes).

I'm assuming meta-political discussion isn't included in the ban on political discussion. Downvote me if I'm wrong, and I'll abandon this type of comment.

MVT very much applies to my model of U.S. politicians. I see them as having effectively similar policies but very different rhetoric. The similar policies are designed to woo the MV and the differing rhetoric chases the ideological fringes.

That's a fair description of many parts of U.S. politics (although that sounds more applicable to parties rather than individual politicians: note that foreign aid isn't a cleanly partisan issue, e.g. Bush massively increased anti-disease aid in Africa, and many Christian Republicans back such aid very strongly), but as I'll discuss in the relevant post the relevant sort of similarity depends on one's purpose: the variation among politicians (within, not just across parties) does seem to be enough for a narrowly-focused GWWC member (who can dismiss many standard political issues as trivial in terms of her objective function) to identify differences sufficient for politics to beat the direct effects of donations to the current GiveWell/GWWC charities.

Tangientially, this post assumes that there are only two reasons to vote: to affect policy directly, or to signal/express affiliation. But what about structural voting?

More important to me than any specific political issue is my desire to live in a country roughly like the US and the rest of the industrialized world: rich, relatively well-administered and safe, and not dictatorial. Of course there are relative strengths and weaknesses of different countries and different political factions, but these are all overshadowed by the fact that we all think it's pretty great not to be North Korea.

Civic engagement of various sorts probably helps keep that fate away. On the margin, your vote contributes practically nothing to preventing your home country from looking like North Korea. But a political/structural catastrophe would be so very bad that voting might be worth it on those grounds alone.

(This is related to Eliezer's point in "The American System and Misleading Labels" where he argues that the voter's real power is to threaten to throw the bums out, or even foment revolution. The vote doesn't give you a great deal of power to enact your favorite legislation; it does provide a rough sort of check against any politician doing something ridiculously, impossibly awful. Prevention of "ridiculously awful" behavior is much more important, in my view, than fine-scale policy manipulation.)

Of course there are relative strengths and weaknesses of different countries and different political factions, but these are all overshadowed by the fact that we all think it's pretty great not to be North Korea.

I think you're underestimating the potential difference in effect between two (or more) different political policies. For example, I think it's pretty great not to be Detroit.

I think there is a significant bias to overestimate the impact of who wins the Presidential election on policy. Look at how many of the Bush policies were continued by Obama. Normally that's used as a condemnation of Obama, but I think it's much better interpreted as evidence that the guy at the top doesn't matter that much - whoever wins is subject to almost the same set of pressures from interest groups, constraints based on who has what powers & goals, etc, which has a huge effect on policy.

In the tribe, you saw everyone, so you saw everyone with political influence. In the modern world, you only see a few politicians, and so you assume that's where the influence is, but you don't see the millions of unelected bureaucrats, and they also have power.

I'm inclined to agree with the first paragraph, but not so much with the second.

It's probably not just the bureaucrats, it's the special interest groups, the financial, imaginative, and technological limitations, and comparable inertia from other countries.

It also bears noting that humans are social creatures: even ignoring acausal considerations, you getting out to vote will increase the probability that people who know you will also get out to vote. E.g. researchers in one study visited two-person households and encouraged them to go out and vote. Afterwards, it was shown that the people the researchers talked to were 10 percent more likely to go out and vote (as compared to people in a control group who were encouraged to recycle, IIRC). But the other person in the household, who had not been spoken to, was also 6 percent more likely to vote.

In general, influence in social networks obeys the three step rule: what you are and what you do influences your friends, the friends of your friends, and the friends of your friends' friends. (This applies not just to voting, but also things such as happiness, suicides and obesity.) Computer simulations suggest that you going out to vote will on average encourage three others to vote as well. Because people tend to befriend people with similar values, those extra votes are more likely to benefit your preferred candidate than opposing ones: of the three extra votes, an average of two will vote the same way you did. While three (two) is the average, depending on the structure of the social network and your position on it, you might cause as many as a hundred other people to go out and vote.

Obviously, to maximize this effect, you'll want to make sure as many of your friends as possible know that you voted and who you voted for.

Reference: Connected: The Surprising Power of Our Social Networks and How They Shape Our Lives.

But of course these outside view considerations don't matter if you know that, causally, no one's going to be affected by your decision to vote or not. And I haven't done a rigorous analysis but the acausal consequences seem rather minimal.

I'm not sure I follow you. Research indicates that your decision to vote does affect the decision of others (unless you're a complete hermit, I suppose). Note that I'm not talking about acausal effects here.

The research is great for calculations based on the outside view. It holds for people in general. But if I know that none of my friends care or could verify whether or not I voted, that screens off the outside view considerations. Take me, for instance. Unless I go post about it on Facebook, I'm not going to cause any of my friends to vote or not. I don't talk about such things. Maybe if my nature was sufficiently transparent they could infer my tendency to vote or not vote, but I'm not that transparent. So what causal process is stemming from my vote decision to theirs? In general, people yammer on about their voting decisions, but those trends don't apply to people like me. I wouldn't be surprised if my decision was correlated with the decisions of others, but I don't see causation, and so my action is only consequential via acausal means.

Right. So assuming you do care about the outcome of the vote, you should modify your behavior so that you do e.g. post about it on Facebook.

Or just post about it on Facebook without doing it, and thus get all but 1 vote of the benefit with almost none of the cost.

She estimates that she has a 1 in 1,000,000 chance of casting the deciding vote

Why is this not a confusion? It seems on the face of it that since voters' decisions are correlated, your decision accounts for behavior of other people as well, and so you are not only casting one vote with your decision, but many votes simultaneously.

Do you believe that my decision to vote is as like to acausally influence my opponents into voting as it is my supporters? If so, and if we can expect about equal amounts of both, doesn't that produce the same problem?

I feel genuinely guilty about prop 19's failure precisely because the reason for my failure to vote -- general procrastination and lack of organization resulting in my not registering in time -- was probably correlated with similar failures by others on my side of the issue.

That's probably a special case though.

(ETA for non-Californians: Prop 19 was a proposal to legalize the use of marijuana)

There are asymmetric versions, too: for instance, if you choose not to vote out of lack of enthusiasm, you cede the field to people who are more enthusiastic about their candidate. This effect would help candidates with special-interest appeal (a smaller base of more enthusiastic voters) against candidates with more general (but weaker) appeal.

Do you believe that my decision to vote is as like to acausally influence my opponents into voting as it is my supporters?

For example, if the reason you were considering not voting was bad weather on election day, and you managed to discard that reason as one you won't be moved by in a voting decision, this decision would be common to many people irrespective of their candidate. By deciding to vote anyway, you establish that people in similar situations do vote.

This additionally places into question one vote as a lower estimate of influence of your decision, making it an outright useless figure.

Right, I agree with that. But let's say I'm a Democrat. If I choose to go, maybe a thousand Democrats and a thousand Republicans all choose to go, for a net gain of zero. If I choose to stay home, a thousand Democrats and a thousand Republicans choose to stay home, for a net gain of zero.

Either way, the net gain is zero. So why bother voting?

If it's common knowledge that every eligible voter is using UDT I think the outcome might be that everyone chooses a mixed strategy: vote with probability p (for some fairly small p like < 0.1) and stay home with probability 1-p. This way, the outcome of the election is almost certainly the same as if everyone votes, but its cost is much smaller.

Caveats: I don't know how to derive this mathematically from the stated assumption, and I have little idea how to apply this type of reasoning to humans. Actually it still seems plausible to me that E(total number of votes | I vote) - E(total number of votes | I don't vote) is near 1 and therefore CDT-type ("deciding vote") reasoning is a good approximation for my actual situation.

I don't think privileging the hypothesis is the problem here. While it is unlikely that the acausal effects on Republicans and Democrats is exactly balanced (a hypothesis we should not be privileging), without assymetric information about them, we should assume that any probability of a given margin of more Republicans being influenced would be balanced by an equal probability of the same margin of more Democrats being influenced, so the expected influence on each group is still balanced.

The problem is that assymetric information is being ignored.

Yes, see my reply to Larks. The problem was that Yvain's comment doesn't admit the interpretation of referring to zero expected effect. And having exactly balanced influences is a very narrow hypothesis with no support, hence unduly privileged.

The problem was that Yvain's comment doesn't admit the interpretation of referring to zero expected effect.

The fact that everyone else on the thread interpreted it that way shows that it does.

If that was the intended interpretation, mystery solved!

Because the distribution of Democrats and Republicans you acausally influence is symetric around 1:1

If, as in this hypothetical, Yvain is a Democrat, then he is more representative of Democrats than Republicans, and therefor is likely to acausally influence more Democrats.

I could see that as being true if my reason for not voting was "Obama just doesn't inspire me that much," but what about in the originally mentioned case where my reason is bad weather? Do you think Democrats and Republicans are different enough that their algorithms for dealing with bad weather differ in a consistent way?

"Obama just doesn't inspire me that much" and "bad weather" are simpified stories someone might tell to explain their behavior. But "Does Obama inspire me enough to deal with the bad weather?" is closer to how the decision is made.

Do you think Democrats and Republicans are different enough that their algorithms for dealing with bad weather differ in a consistent way?

I would not rule out their being some correlation with willingness to go out in bad weather.

I could imagine a world where Democrats and Rupublicans really run the same algorithm with different parameters pointing to different political entities that are close analogues of each other, in which case a Democrat would acausally influence Republicans as much as Democrats. But this does seem to be a highly specific hypothesis, that I would not favor, and does not fully fit in with actual assymetries that can be observed.

With a very big ceteris paribus in there somewhere. (The relevance Yvain being a Democrat is that we may expect other people with the same political affiliation to be more likely to also share voting technique. Apart from making that inference possible the similarity is not relevant.)

Yes, I realise this. But the difference between Republicans and Democrats is likely to be so small this is small consolation.

On the other hand, there is Democrats and Republicans arguable use different value systems.

These hypotheses are different: that you will have zero effect, and that you will have some effect of unknown sign and magnitude, with expected value of zero. I object to the former, not necessarily to the latter (note that the expected absolute value of the effect is bound to be non-zero in the latter case). To give an estimate of the nature of the effect, we need to consider specific reasons that moved your decision.

For example, if the reason you were considering not voting was bad weather on election day, and you managed to discard that reason as one you won't be moved by in a voting decision, this decision would be common to many people irrespective of their candidate. By deciding to vote anyway, you establish that people in similar situations do vote.

Could you please tell me what "to establish" means in the last sentence?

(Your comment made me spit out my tea. I know almost nothing about U/TDT.)

If my decision process uses UDT-type reasoning, do I have a chance of acausally influencing people who don't know about UDT-type reasoning?

This is actually a good question. Gary Drescher seems to think you can, but I think Eliezer is more skeptical.

How does one go about computing E(total number of votes | I vote) - E(total number of votes | I don't vote)?

But my vote doesn't even acausally affect others' votes: no one's thinking "I'll only vote if Will Newsome does", their algorithm is "I'll only vote if lots of other people do", and lots of other people will vote whether I do or not. Sure, if everyone had my decision theory it'd be a tragedy of the commons, but realistically the chance is still one in a million, or maybe very slightly better. Thus the notion of "deciding vote" is only a very little bit confused. Am I wrong?

Acausal influence stems from other processes similar to you. This can be a simulated version of you, on whose action the simulating agent's choices depend. Or it can just be someone else like you, who's likely to some degree to decide the same thing for some of the same reasons.

"Acausal influence" is superficially a contradiction, and this phrase deserves skeptical scrutiny.

The only sort of "influence" I can think of, that might defensibly be described as acausal, is the "influence" of an object (actual or possible) which is being imagined or otherwise represented in a non-perceptual way (i.e. the representation was not being caused by sense impressions ultimately caused by the object itself). But even then there may be a "causal" interpretation of where the representation's properties came from - it's just that these would be "logical causes". A representation of the Death Star has some of its properties because otherwise it wouldn't be a representation of the Death Star; it would be a representation of something else, or not a representation at all.

There seems to be a duality here. The physical properties of a physical symbol will have physical causes, while the semantic properties will have "logical" causes. I don't know how to think about these logical causes correctly - it doesn't seem right to say that they are caused by objects in other possible worlds, for example. But isn't the talk of acausal anything due simply to ignoring logical causes of properties at the semantic level?