Despite being (IMO) a philosophy blog, many Less Wrongers tend to disparage mainstream philosophy and emphasize the divergence between our beliefs and theirs. But, how different are we really? My intention with this post is to quantify this difference.

The questions I will post as comments to this article are from the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. If you answer "other" on any of the questions, then please reply to that comment in order to elaborate your answer. Later, I'll post another article comparing the answers I obtain from Less Wrongers with those given by the professional philosophers. This should give us some indication about the differences in belief between Less Wrong and mainstream philosophy.

Glossary

analytic-synthetic distinction, A-theory and B-theory, atheism, compatibilism, consequentialism, contextualism, correspondence theory of truth, deontology, egalitarianism, empiricism, Humeanism, libertarianism, mental content externalism, moral realism, moral motivation internalism and externalism, naturalism, nominalism, Newcomb's problem, physicalism, Platonism, rationalism, relativism, scientific realism, trolley problem, theism, virtue ethics

Note

Thanks pragmatist, for attaching short (mostly accurate) descriptions of the philosophical positions under the poll comments.

Post Script

The polls stopped rendering correctly after the migration to LW 2.0, but the raw data can be found in this repo.

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One respect in which Less Wrongers resemble mainstream philosophers is that many mainstream philosophers disparage mainstream philosophers and emphasize the divergence between their beliefs and those of rival mainstream philosophers. Indeed, that is something of a tradition in Western philosophy.

I've posted brief explanations for some of the questions as replies to those questions. I haven't posted explanations for those questions that I believe the vast majority of LW users will understand. If you don't understand a question, I'm fairly certain that if you scroll down far enough you'll find a comment from me with an attempt at explication.

Thanks for the clarifications, without them the questions made little sense to me. (Well, with them most polls appear poorly defined false dichotomy, but at least this unfortunate fact becomes clear).

2komponisto12y
Unfortunately, I didn't on the libertarianism/egalitarianism one. (I had a plausible guess, but I wanted to be sure that guess was right.)
2Document12y
While that improves the situation, we're still trusting that the PhilPapers respondents' beliefs about the terms perfectly match the definitions you posted. Too bad we can't survey both groups ourselves (or something).

Beware that some words might mean different things to different communities. For example, if a philosopher calls himself/herself an "anti-reductive naturalist," there's a good chance they are a strict reductionist in the LW sense. It may help to read the "thoughts on specific questions" section of this page of the PhilPapers Survey site.

7Jayson_Virissimo12y
Excellent point. I'll add a glossary to the article sometime within the next 24 hours in order to diminish some of the confusion.

I've tried to do that already, adding comments below each question that I think might be confusing.

3Jayson_Virissimo12y
Thanks for that.
[-][anonymous]12y190

Stop saying these questions are false dichotomies! None of them are, because they all have an 'other' option!

It would be interesting to have "how well do you think you understand the question?" parallel to each question. I'd imagine less consistency on questions where most participants had to look up the terms on Wikipedia prior to answering.

3Jayson_Virissimo12y
I won't object to people attaching polls to my poll comments, but I won't make a precommitment to making use of them in my analysis of the results.

Normative ethics: consequentialism, deontology or virtue ethics?

[pollid:86]

Consequentialism: The morality of actions depends only on their consequences.

Deontology: There are moral principles that forbid certain actions and encourage other actions purely based on the nature of the action itself, not on its consequences.

Virtue ethics: Ethical theory should not be in the business of evaluating actions. It should be in the business of evaluating character traits. The fundamental question of ethics is not "What makes an action right or wrong?" It is "What makes a person good or bad?"

All three in weighted combination, with consequentialism scaling such that it becomes dominant in high-stakes scenarios but is not dominant elsewhere. I believe that consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics are mutually reducible and mutually justifying, but that flattening them into any one of the three is bad because it raises the error rate, by making some values much harder to describe and eliminating redundancy in values that would have protected them from corruption.

Thinking about this...

So, yes, in many cases I make decisions based on moral principles, because the alternatives are computationally intractable. And in a few cases I judge character traits as a proxy for doing either. And I endorse all of that, under the circumstances. Which sounds like what you're describing.

But if I discovered that one of my moral principles was causing me to act in ways that had consequences I anti-value, I would endorse discarding that principle. Which seems to me like I'm a consequentialist who sometimes uses moral principles as a processing shortcut.

Were I actually a deontologist, as described here, presumably I would shrug my shoulders, perhaps regret the negative consequences of my moral principle (perhaps not), and go on using it.

Admittedly, I'm not sure I have a crisp understanding of the distinction between moral principles (which consequentialism on this account ignores) and values (on which it depends).

0Matt_Simpson12y
I voted "other" for the same reason, though I'm less certain about virtue ethics being being equivalent to the other two.

I lean toward Consequentialism but I support something like deontology/virtue ethics for reasons of personal computability.

8drnickbone12y
How should we vote for "rule consequentialism"? I went for "Lean toward consequentialism" though it is arguably a form of deontology. "Other" is not very precise.
2thomblake12y
Rule consequentialism is either consequentialism or deontology (or just inconsistent). What makes it the case that you should follow the rules? If it is that the following the rules maximizes expected utility, then it's ultimately consequentialism. Otherwise, it's most likely deontology.
0drnickbone12y
A common formulation is that the "rules" are the ones which if generally adopted as a moral code would maximize expected utility: i.e. there is a form of "best" or "ideal" moral code. However, this can lead to cases where an act which would (by itself) maximize expected utility would also be in violation of the ideal moral code. So the act would be "right" from an act utilitarian point of view, but "wrong" from a rule utilitarian point of view. Relevant examples here could include torturing someone "for a greater good" (such as to stop the infamous ticking time bomb). The logic for torture in such cases seems very sound from an act utilitarian perspective; however, an ideal moral code would have a rule of the form "Don't torture anyone, ever, for any reason, no matter if it appears to lead to a greater good". This, incidentally, is one resolution to Torture vs Dust Specks.
0thomblake12y
Right, but if the moral code is really ideal on consequentialist grounds and following the rules really leads to better expected outcomes for humans than not doing so, even when it appears otherwise, then the act consequentialist should also agree that you should follow the rule even when it appears to be sub-optimal. On the other hand, if the claim is that an ideal reasoner with full knowledge should follow the rule even when it provably does not maximize expected utility, then that's a form of deontology and a consequentialist should disagree.
3drnickbone12y
There is a recognized distinction here between a moral decision procedure and the criterion for an action to be right or wrong. Pretty much all serious act utilitarians approve a rule-utilitarian decision procedure i.e. they recommend moral agents to follow the usual moral rules (or heuristics) even in those cases where the agent believes that departing from the rules would lead to better consequences. The justification for such a decision procedure is of course that humans are not ideal reasoners, we can not predict and evaluate all consequences of our actions (including others imitating us), we do not have an ideal, impartial conception of the good, and we tend to get things horribly wrong when we depart from the rules with the best of intentions. Yet still, from an act utilitarian criterion for "right" and "wrong" a rule-violating action which maximizes expected utility is "right". This leads to some odd situations, whereby the act utilitarian would have to (privately) classify such a rule-violating action as right, but publically condemn it, call it the "wrong choice", quite possibly punish it, and generally discourage people from following it!
0thomblake12y
Yes, I was (improperly) ignoring the typically backward-looking nature of act utilitarianism. I kept saying "maximize expected utility" rather than "maximize utility" which resulted in true statements that did not reflect what act utilitarians really say. I blame the principle of charity. EDIT: And if I were being really careful, I'd make sure to phrase "maximize expected utility" in such a way that it's clear that you're maximizing the utility according to your expectations, not maximizing your expectations of utility (wireheading).
7magfrump12y
I accept consequentialism but I also believe that "acting like I'm following virtue ethics" tends to have the best consequences.
5A1987dM12y
Voted for "lean toward consequentialism". As someone once put, I consider the “fundamental” rules to be consequentialist¹, but some of the approximations I use because the fundamental rules are infeasible to calculate from scratch every time resemble deontology or virtue ethics, much like QFT and GR are time-reversal symmetric but thermodynamics isn't. Also, ethical injunctions (i.e. fudge factors in my prior probability that certain behaviours will harm someone to compensate for cognitive biases) and TDT-like game-/decision-theoretical considerations make some of my choices resemble deontology, and a term in my utility function for how awesome I am make some of my choices resemble virtue ethics. 1. I assume that, despite the name, people here don't take consequentialism to imply strictly CDT. I still think that in the True Prisoner's Dilemma against a paperclip maximizer known to use the same decision algorithms as ourselves it's immoral to defect.
0A1987dM12y
May the reason why so many philosophers don't vote for consquentialism is that they're thinking about pure CDTical act consequentialism?
4komponisto12y
Depends again on the level of discourse. Ultimately consequentialism, but a whole lot of deontology and virtue ethics in "real life".
4pragmatist12y
Moral particularism
4lukeprog12y
For the record, I consider myself a consequentialist who is also a moral particularist.
1pragmatist12y
Fair enough. I should have been more specific. I'm a particularist who thinks consequentialist reasoning is appropriate in certain contexts, but deontological reasoning is appropriate in other contexts. So I'm pretty sure "Other" is the right pick for me.
0[anonymous]12y
Is that possible? Can you both think a) that one should in general act so as to maximise happiness/utility/whatever, and b) there are no general moral rules? I think that's a contradiction.
4pragmatist12y
Consequentialism doesn't require a commitment to maximization of any particular variable. It's the claim that only the consequences of actions are relevant to moral evaluation of the actions. I think that's a weak enough claim that you can't really call it a general moral principle. So one could believe that only consequences are morally relevant, but the way in which one evaluates actions based on their consequences does not conform to any general principle. If Luke had said that he's a utilitarian who is also a particularist, that would have been a contradiction.
2[anonymous]12y
That's a good point. So I should take from Luke's claim that he does not believe one should (as a moral rule) maximise expected utility, or anything like that? And that he would say that it's possible (if perhaps unlikely) for an action to be good even if it minimizes expected utility?
0pragmatist12y
I probably shouldn't speak for Luke, but I'm guessing the answer to this is yes. If it isn't, then I don't understand how he's a particularist. I don't see why he should be committed to this claim.
0Manfred12y
I took it to mean that Luke is requiring an agent to be at least somewhat consequentialist before he even thinks of it in terms of a morality.

I don't know the definition of any of the "-ism"s. Should I not answer the questions? I imagine that others will be in the same position as I am.

EDIT: Thanks to pragmatist for the explanations!

1Jayson_Virissimo12y
If you can spare the time, then read pragmatists excellent summaries or click on the link of the term you don't understand in my glossary. Otherwise, only answer the ones you understand.

Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?

[pollid:84]

[EDIT: The way I had initially described the distinction was misleading, as pointed out by thomblake. I apologize for potentially skewing the results of the poll, although I don't think my revised version is that far off from the earlier version. Still, I should have been more careful.]

Moral realism: There are objective moral facts, i.e. there are facts about what is right and wrong (or good and bad) that are not constituted by a subject's beliefs and desires.

Moral anti-realism: The denial of moral realism.

4thomblake12y
Is that right? I've understood that you can be a realist about subject-sensitive objective moral facts. Is that different from saying that the facts are "agent-relative"?
2pragmatist12y
You're right, my potted descriptions here are misleading. Certain forms of relativism are appropriately classified as realist. I'll edit my descriptions.
0thomblake12y
Thanks! I was concerned I had it wrong.
0komponisto12y
Other : depends on the level of the desires (object-level, meta-level, etc.)
6lukeprog12y
My 'Other' answer is "Depends what you mean."
2[anonymous]12y
From that article: But this is orthogonal to the question of moral realism: you can have realism just as well with or without moral universalism. So I think you're just a moral realist.
3Nisan12y
I've never seen a completely satisfying reduction of moral facts, and I don't know whether such a successful reduction would be a vindicative or an eliminative one. Am I a moral realist or an anti-realist?
0EricHerboso12y
That sounds like "undecided" to me.
3asparisi12y
Other: While there are objective "moral facts" this is because we are implying various subjective human values into the word 'moral.' Given the word 'moral' there are certain facts about what that behavior is like, but they are not "out there in the world" and are highly contextual.
2Rob Bensinger11y
Lean toward: moral realism. My leanings are semantic. There is not one unified object or semantic value that all members of our linguistic community intend by 'moral.' So we must either choose one of the semantic values in advance, or leave all moral statements underdetermined. I think choosing a semantic value that naturalizes morality (e.g., 'morality is behaving in accord with a decision procedure that optimizes for the overall preference satisfaction of all preference-bearers') is much more useful and conducive to our goals than choosing one that forfeits all moral convictions to the Dark Side. If we want to win, we have to convince people in general to move toward a LessWrongier perspective; and convincing people without making any appeal to words like 'good,' 'bad,' 'right,' 'wrong,' 'moral,' or 'immoral' is a hell of a handicap.
0[anonymous]12y
Other: There is only one right morality criteria, but it is not written into the fabric of the universe or anything. It is the idealized criteria that humans refer to as "right". It is not relative to belief or individual preferences. What I care about (my utility function) includes this abstract morality, but also very relative things like "I like human females" and "I'm more important than you". I'd say accept moral antirealism except that that is too easily construed as relativism or some other philosophy.
0Matt_Simpson12y
Other: I think I'm a realist, but it really depends on the definition of "desires."
0RobertLumley12y
For the record, I misread pragmatist's definition. My answer, which was Lean toward moral realism, should have been lean toward moral anti-realism. (I missed the "that are not agent-relative" part.)
0thomblake12y
Yeah, I'm not sure that part is correct, or it needs clarification.
0William_Quixote12y
I tend to view game strategies that lead to the best stable equilibrium as moral injunctions ( tit for tat, cooperate first) These are provable ( under certain assumptions) so I lean towards saying they are "real"
0Jayson_Virissimo12y
Yeah, I have similar ideas. On the other hand, rules that are Nash equilibria in the current "environment" are in some ways determined by the preferences of the (by now, long dead) agents (and even their initial bargaining positions). I'm having a hard time deciding how to categorize this kind of "morality" (if it can, in truth, be called such a thing). I ended up going with "Lean toward: moral anti-realism".

Meta:

IAWYC but it is slightly problematic that the Philpapers survey polls the opinions of all philosophers, rather than those in a specific field. I am unsure if the opinions on current debates in metaphysics held but political philosophers will be much better than an average college graduate's. It might be interesting to contrast the 'lesswrong position' on question X with the position of 'mainstream philosophers' who study the relevant sub-field.

You can filter the survey results by specialization. Use the AOS (Area of Specialization) drop down menu.

[-]gwern12y100

All I can say is that you're not going to be happy with the 'philosophy of religion' statistics.

Hopefully some of these questions will be folded into Yvain's yearly survey.

It's too late now, but if you put all the questions in the same comment then it's less work to vote in all of them and you can see correlations between answers to the different questions.

2Jayson_Virissimo12y
Yes, but then how would you handle the "Other" options?
1jimrandomh12y
They'd end up less organized, buy you could still ask people to comment; they'd just have to say which answer went with which 'Other' option.
6TheOtherDave12y
I prefer the current approach; I am not answering the questions all at once.

Science: scientific anti-realism or scientific realism?

[pollid:88]

Scientific anti-realism: While there may be strong reasons to believe in the empirical predictions of our best scientific theories, there are no strong reasons to believe in their theoretical claims about unobservable entities (such as quarks).

Scientific realism: There are strong reasons to believe in the theoretical claims about unobservable entities made by our best scientific theories.

0DanArmak12y
What is and isn't observable changes over time. Quarks are not in principle unobservable. Conversely, we couldn't observe Neptune before we had telescopes or spaceships, but surely no philosophers would argue that the scientists who predicted its existence due to gravitational influences on Uranus's orbit should have disbelieved in the theory's unobservable predictions.
5pragmatist12y
Most scientific anti-realists acknowledge this. If quarks become observable then there would be good reason to believe in them. But the mere fact that they are part of an empirically successful theory is not sufficient reason. Of course, it's unclear whether the observable/unobservable distinction makes sense. Does seeing something through a microscope count as observing it? How about an electron microscope? How about tracks in a bubble chamber?
0DanArmak12y
I hope you mean "if they are actually observed". But, if we didn't believe (to a degree) in theoretical predictions before making observations to confirm them, then we wouldn't know what observations to attempt, and would almost never actually observe something useful! Anchoring on what most humans can observe unaided is just silly. I have acute myopia since age 6; without modern glasses I wouldn't be able to observe the moon in the sky - or to read about any scientific theories. Should I discount them on that account? Or if someone were born with unusually fine eyesight, making them the only person able to observe a tiny mote of dust - should everyone else disbelieve them? If a trained dog barks when he smells explosives, which humans can't smell, should we ignore the dog?
5pragmatist12y
Yeah, that's it. The anti-realist doesn't say that we don't believe in theoretical entities. She says that we don't have strong reason to believe in them. I suspect most of us believe in things we don't have strong reason to believe in. It might be an anthropological fact that scientists tend to believe in theoretical entities and use these beliefs as guides to future research. Anti-realists don't want to deny this fact, they want to deny that the scientists' epistemic attitude (prior to making the requisite observations) is justified. I agree. This is what I was trying to say when I said the distinction between observable and unobservable doesn't make sense. It would be silly to construe "observable" as "observable without technological aids", but once one allows technological aids, where do you draw the line? We have experimental verification of quantum chromodynamics. Why doesn't this count as (extremely indirect and mediated) observation of quarks?
0RichardHughes12y
I felt this was a confused question for the reasons you've defined and so I've voted other.
3prase12y
Other: the distinction between scientific realism and anti-realism is mostly meaningless. If a scientific theory makes claims about "unobservable entities" (not sure what exactly it means), either these claims are logically entangled with testable claims that have been experimentally verified and then the reasons to believe in them are as good as the reasons to believe the verified claims (supposedly about "observable objects") or these claims are independent of the rest of the theory and presumably untestable, which means that the theory is un-Occamian and shouldn't be considered good scientific theory.
2[anonymous]12y
I think that's just realism.
1Protagoras12y
I think you've given a good example of why this question is so problematic, because what prase said sounds more like anti-realism to me. Though mostly my view is that the more you try to figure out what "realism" could mean, the less sure you will be about it; I picked "lean anti-realism" myself because I think "realism" is shorthand for a huge bundle of claims that really should be unbundled and evaluated separately.
0[anonymous]12y
As befits your handle! I took Prase to be a realist because he said that when a good scientific theory posits an unobservable entity which has such and such observable effects on observable entities, we have as much reason to believe in the unobservable entities as we do in the observable effects. That struck me as realism because it's a view on which the unobservable apparatus of scientific theoryies are taken to be real (in whatever sense observable things are so taken).
1[anonymous]12y
Voted lean toward Scientific Realism, but possibly confused. There's no difference between "observed" and "inferred". Also, some parts of our models "exist" others are just parts of models.

God: theism or atheism?

[pollid:83]

Note: I don't think most theistic philosophers would consider the simulation hypothesis to be a variant of theism.

That's because they say "theism" but they mean "traditional religion". They probably wouldn't accept a reification of Azathoth either, or the Flying Spaghetti Monster.

4drnickbone12y
This is because the folks who take the simulation hypothesis as a serious possibility (like Bostrom) also believe we are in a non-interventionist simulation (one without a creator/controller who regularly intervenes to answer prayers, reward worship and so on). They don't seem to care too much about whether there are other simulations somewhere whose creators do intervene. Generally they'd concede the point if pressed (OK, somewhere in the universe of simulations and simulators there are gods, but not around here. Happy?) and then move on. The main point about "theism" (as opposed to "deism" say) is that God or the gods really affect us. They don't just exist as an abstract debating point: it actually matters to us that they exist.
3asparisi12y
If the being(s) running the simulation are all-knowing and all-powerful with respect to the simulation, I think most philosophers would go there, even theistic ones. Hell, if Spinoza's God counts as a theistic position, then the simulation hypothesis is practically golden.

"Gods are ontologically distinct from creatures, or they're not worth the paper they're written on." -- Damien Broderick.

Can anyone exhibit an actual theist who says that a Matrix Lord composed of non-mental, non-mysterious parts counts as a God? So far as I know this position is held solely by people who want to mock the Simulation Hypothesis.

Pretty sure the Mormons qualify. I'm not one myself, but I used to live next door to a few, and this looks like a fair representation of their beliefs. The money quote:

Mormons believe that human beings are children of God, and as such, have within them the potential to become like God. Got it? Let me say it more clearly. We believe that we can become Gods....Here’s shocker #2–we believe God used to be a man, just like us.

4adamisom12y
... which explains why there is actually a Mormon Transhumanist group, and why there was even a conference on the subject in April where I live (Salt Lake City; unfortunately couldn't attend)

Hi, I'm a simulation-theist. Nice to meet you.

8arundelo12y
If someone asks you whether you believe in a god, how likely are you to say "yes" versus "it's complicated"? (Or versus "no"?)
5Jayson_Virissimo12y
I'm quite likely to answer in the affirmative in most contexts. On the other hand, "are you religious?" would tend to get some version of the "it's complicated" answer.
3komponisto12y
I hold it in order to mock theism. Physicalist reductionism is such a fundamental part of my belief system that I think charity requires that theism be interpreted as the SH. I appeal to the popular perception of the absurdity of the SH in order to undermine professions of belief in theism.
0adamisom12y
How (do you use it to mock/undermine theism)?
-2komponisto12y
2adamisom12y
Cool. I should have specified 'I'm intrigued; can you move down a level of specificity (as to how)?'
2komponisto12y
Most people seem to believe that it's absurd to suppose we're living in the Matrix; I point out that theism is not significantly different from this.
1Jayson_Virissimo12y
According to my informal experiments with presenting the SA to friends, the absurdity reaction is highly sensitive to framing-effects and especially the particular sequence in which I present the premises.
2A1987dM12y
If the non-mental parts they are composed of are unlike the non-mental parts we are composed of, I would. I am made of quarks and leptons and things in Life are made of dead cells and live cells, and IMO that's more than enough for us to be ontologically distinct from us. The same would apply to the next level up (if there's one).
2asparisi12y
Well, hence the confusion about Spinoza's God. It's not really ontologically distinct for him, since his God 'is' the universe. (His God is also just mental-stuff, but Spinoza was an idealist, so to him all stuff was mental-stuff.) Now, Spinoza's might not count as a 'Matrix Lord' since he denies that God 'chooses' anything in our sense (he holds to a very strong version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason) so it's not like God is 'running' the simulation, as it were: God just is the simulation according to Spinoza. Likewise, most theistic philosophers are comitted to God being omniscient, omnipotent, and (usually) omnibenevolent. But some put that in 'absolute' terms while some put it in terms of this world: omnipotent regarding this world, etc. For the latter group, there is no clear philosophical dilemma in saying that a Matrix Lord counts as God, especially if that Matrix Lord is also the "First Cause." In fact, assuming that such a Matrix Lord exists, most theistic philosophers would be required to say it counts as God.

I just hit "Accept: Theism" by accident. Yes, accident, not divine providence, thank you very much. Is there a way to revote?

6jimrandomh12y
Currently no, there's no option to revote. I have a todo list which this is on, but it may be awhile as that todo list has way-cooler things on it like split-test polls, and I might not even get to any of it at all.
1adamisom12y
I nearly did too, which makes me wonder if a few people did; the only difference is an 'a' and I guess I assumed atheism would be at the top
1[anonymous]12y
I think it is not obviously wrong that we live in some slices of "all possible worlds", and within all possible worlds there are beings with fancy super powers or perfect moral authority. At the same time I recognize that the religious awe and devotion I have felt at times are quirks of my brain and not a result of causal interaction with those possible-world-thingies. But I'm not sure whether or not to label those thingies as gods / deities, in addition to calling them weird aliens to whom religion has no access. Finding out whether some of those thingies are simulating me wouldn't have any influence on my choice of label.

Laws of nature: Humeanism or non-Humeanism?

[pollid:80]

Humeanism: The laws of nature are compressed descriptions of salient patterns in the distribution of physical events.

Non-Humeanism: The laws of nature are not mere descriptions. They determine the distribution of physical events.

5DanArmak12y
Leaving aside any putative True Theory of Everything which we don't know yet, the laws we actually know and use today are definitely Humean. We should know, we made them that way.
0RobertLumley12y
I assumed the question was referring to the fundamental laws of the universe, which would be a theory of everything.
4DanArmak12y
A true theory of everything is by definition never wrong. In which case there's no observable difference between Humeanism and non-Humeanism, and it makes no sense to talk about the theory "determining" events or merely "describing" them. Define: theory of everything: maximally compressed, true and complete description of the physical evolution of the universe over time.
1RobertLumley12y
This was a point of some confusion to me. But "The laws of nature" to me means the fundamental laws of the universe, not the models we come up with. I dismissed my confusion as "oh, this must be another obnoxious thing that mainstream philosophy thinks."
0A1987dM12y
And “determine” too.
1Rob Bensinger11y
This wording suggests that a major distinction between Humeans and non-Humeans is that the former consider laws of nature 'descriptions' (i.e., linguistic/conceptual entities) while the latter consider laws of nature mind-independent. But we could frame the distinction either linguistically or metaphysically. Metaphysically, Humeans think that Nature's patterns are ultimately just coincidental recurrences, while non-Humeans think that observed patterns have some cause or explanation in a deeper unifying structure. I suspect that a lot of the support for Humeanism in the above poll can be explained by people pattern-matching 'laws of nature are... descriptions' to 'positivism / metaphysical humility,' whereas in reality Humeanism is just as substantive and speculative a metaphysical thesis as is non-Humeanism. As an aside, it should be noted that Hume himself was not a 'Humean' in the above sense. So the modern terminology is historically misleading here.
2pragmatist11y
I think contemporary Humeans would disagree with your characterization. They distinguish between accidentally true generalizations (like the fact that no human is over 10 feet tall) and law-like generalizations. Not all patterns count as laws, hence the use of "salient" in my definition. So a law is not merely a coincidental recurrence. Many Humeans believe that any particular instance of a salient pattern of recurrences is explained by the existence and salience of the pattern, so laws are explanatory. Also, a number of Humeans do cite metaphysical humility as an advantage of their account of laws. Unlike non-Humeans, who need an additional fundamental metaphysical kind besides spatio-temporally distributed properties (i.e. laws of nature), Humeans purport to make do with just the properties themselves, reducing the laws to the properties. If this works, then it does seem like a more metaphysically parsimonious account, at least according to some accounts of parsimony. Of course, the Humean account is still a metaphysical account, so it wouldn't be congenial to the strict positivist, I suppose.
2Rob Bensinger11y
Out of curiosity, do you have on hand any good articles on how Humeans (metaphysically, epistemically, etc.) distinguish 'mere patterns' from 'capital-p Patterns'? (Aside from anthropocentric concepts like explanatory reducibility.) 'Salience' is usually an anthropocentric / psychological concept. What is meant by it here? I ask because we have to be careful not to allow non-Humean 'salience-making' properties. If salience is something metaphysical that makes certain patterns objectively 'special' and 'lawful' and 'regular', then I'd normally think of salience as non-Humean. On the other hand, if 'salience' is a non-unifying brute fact ('brute correlation,' 'unexplainable recurrence', 'irreducible coincidence', etc.), or is somehow relative to our human projects and interests and standards, then I'd normally think of it as Humean. Does this jibe with your experience? Yes. And 'metaphysical humility' here means 'metaphysical commitment to a smaller domain of entities or kinds'. My point was just to hammer home that it doesn't mean 'avoiding doing difficult speculative metaphysics' or 'skeptically withholding judgment' or 'treating lawfulness as a human construct' or 'positivistically denying that non-Humean laws are intelligible'; the latter four options preclude Humeanism as much as they preclude anti-Humeanism, and my worry was that some positivism-friendly LessWrongers would misconstrue Humeanism as somehow unmetaphysical, rather than just as metaphysically sparse. (Though, again, this is complicated; non-Humeans claim that Humeanism is metaphysically profligate, say, because brute correlations that continue to recur, and recur, and recur are more startling than unitarily 'law-governed' recurrences. Cf. Eliezer's concerns with treating our universe as metaphysically first-order.) A side-note, since it hasn't come up: A lot of people in the Humeanism debate unpack the dispute modally. On this conception, Humeans consider the laws and regularities of nature cont
0pragmatist11y
The classic neo-Humean account is David Lewis's. It's described in the SEP here. I also wrote a post about it here. The account does appeal to the simplicity of descriptions, which is arguably a somewhat anthropocentric concept, but I see that as a feature, not a bug. The laws are ways of efficiently organizing our understanding of the universe, not fundamental mind-independent entities (see the last section of my post). I don't think Lewis would agree with my characterization in this regard, I should say.
8maia12y
Other: What's the difference?
7AlexMennen12y
Other: there are high-level laws of nature that are compressed descriptions, and low-level laws of nature that determine events.
[-][anonymous]12y110

That's non-Humeanism.

2AlexMennen12y
That makes sense. Non-Humeanism it is, then.
4Jayson_Virissimo12y
"Lean toward: non-Humeanism", because given that we are in a simulation, it should be possible to recover "laws" that are isomorphic to constants in the source code via reverse engineering (natural science). Whether Humeanism holds outside of our own "world" seems like a separate question.
1[anonymous]12y
Other: Both. Our laws are compressions of the distribution of physical events. There is some underlying rule set that determines the distribution of physical events.
1magfrump12y
If I believe that the reason we get nicely compressed descriptions of salient patterns, because the mathematical abstractions have concrete realizations in the symmetries at the basis of physics, is that Non-Humeanism? And if I further hold the propositional belief that using the words "The laws of nature are not mere descriptions." is likely to make me too attached to current beliefs about physics (or more likely evolutionary psych) and the belief that one can never have perfect knowledge, so any conception of natural laws I (or anyone) will ever have will be Humean, should I have hit "other"?

Time: B-theory or A-theory?

[pollid:79]

B-theory: Specifying the temporal ordering of all events in space-time exhausts all the objective temporal facts about those events.

A-theory: Specifying the temporal ordering of all events in space-time does not exhaust all the objective temporal facts about them. There is a further temporal fact about a given event: whether it is in the past, in the present or in the future. These are objective facts that are not fixed by merely specifying which events happen earlier or later.

6DanArmak12y
In the past, present or future of what? Of me, who is saying it? But that is merely a temporal fact of the first kind: the given event is in the past/future of the event of my saying whether it is in my past/future.
9pragmatist12y
The point of A-theory is that past, present and future are non-relational. There is an objective fact of the matter about which slice of the space-time manifold is the present, although this fact keeps changing, of course. So yeah, one way to think of the difference between A-theory and B-theory is that the B-theorist thinks of past, present and future as relational terms. Just saying "past" isn't enough, you need to specify what it is in the past of. But the A-theorist thinks it makes sense to talk of past, present and future simpliciter.
4DanArmak12y
An event (a point in spacetime) is really objective wrt time: that is, it is outside of time. The ordering of two events is also objective. The matter of where we are in time - and therefore, whether an event is in our past or in our future - is constantly changing as time flows. It is not a time-objective fact about an event that it is in our future, for tomorrow it will be a fact about the same event that it is in our past. So these facts about an event are subjective: they depend on when in time you are when you are making the judgement. Disagreeing with this seems like saying the word "objective" should mean two different things in the two above paragraphs. Which is apparently what almost all big philosophical arguments reduce to. Sigh.
2pragmatist12y
You're describing a B-theoretical perspective. An A-theorist will disagree with this characterization. Many A-theorists believe that the only objects that exist are present objects. So time isn't like space, where "here" is "here" rather than "there" simply because you happen to be "here" and not "there". You could have been "there", in which case "there" would have been "here" for you. Time, A-theorists claim, is different, because you couldn't be located anywhere (anywhen) else except in the present. It's not that the present is the present for you because you happen to be there; it's that the only time at which objects exist (and, by extension, you could exist) is the present. So it's not like there are other people who exist at other times, for whom the present is different. Don't ask me to defend this view, though, because I think it's nuts. A-theory vs. B-theory is one of those philosophical debates which should be declared closed. B-theory has clearly won.
0drnickbone12y
I don't think anyone's made A-theory consistent with special relativity. But you can bodge general relativity/cosmological models a bit to get something that looks a bit like A-theory by insisting on a preferred foliation (e.g. look at spacelike surfaces with constant proper time since the Big Bang, and count everything on one such surface as the "real now")
1crazy8812y
See Craig Borne "A Future for Presentism" for someone who claims to have made an A-theory consistent with special relativity.
1pragmatist12y
Bourne, from what I recall, makes A-theory consistent with special relativity by positing that there is an (undetectable) privileged reference frame. Is this correct? If it is, I wouldn't really call that "consistent with special relativity", more like "flying in the face of the central lesson of special relativity".
1crazy8812y
Yeah, that's basically right but I'm not sure that you're being entirely fair to Bourne. First, I think under standard definitions of consistent, he does show that an A-theory is consistent with SR (ie. they can both be true at once). Second, I'm not sure it's fair to say that he is "flying in the face of the central lesson of SR" - he may be flying in the face of the standard way of interpreting this lesson but his claim is precisely that this way of intrepreting the lesson isn't the only way. The lesson can also be interpretted as "no privileged reference frame can be detected." I agree with the basic anti-Bourne sentiment but wonder whether the wording of your response undermines his claims more than they deserve - I don't think they are inconsistent nor that they fly in the face of the central lesson. I guess I more just think that postulating undetectable physical features of the world in order to make a metaphysical thesis - that is based on intuition (the "present" intuition) that can be explained away - come out to be true is undesirable. Though it should be noted that Bourne's conclusion is mostly that presentism is the only sensible A-theory but that it's not possible to decide between presentism and a B-theory (that is, he doesn't argue that presentism must be true).
0drnickbone12y
So this is just like the "bodge" I described for general relativity/cosmology, but with even less justification? The preferred foliation has no physical motivation at all, and is plucked entirely out of the aether (so to speak). I'm not sure I'd count that as consistent with special relativity. Though in principle it would give the same predictions as special relativity.
3drnickbone12y
Here's maybe another way of thinking about it ... A theory: The English sentence "Today is a Thursday" has the same meaning on all days when it is spoken, but its truth-value varies depending on when it is spoken. (The sentence always corresponds to the same proposition, but that proposition has variable truth value). B theory: The English sentence "Today is a Thursday" means something different when it is spoken on different occasions. Each specific utterance has a truth value which never changes. (Again, each utterance corresponds to a different proposition, but any one such proposition always has the same truth value.) If you can live with propositions whose truth value changes with time, then you're probably an A-theorist. If something smells fishy about that, and you think that in any given possible world, a proposition is either true or false and never changes its truth value, you're probably a B-theorist.
2A1987dM12y
If put this way, definitely B. "Now" is a deictic, meaning 'at the time when I'm speaking', much like 'here' is a deictic meaning 'in the place where I'm speaking'.
2faul_sname12y
What happens when you throw relativity into the mix? How do you specify the order of events in space-time when it varies based on the location of the observer?
8pragmatist12y
In relativity you still have temporal ordering of events, but it is not a total order. In a Newtonian world, every event is either earlier than, later than or simultaneous with every other event. In relativity, some events can still be unambiguously described as earlier than or later than others. Event A is earlier than event B if it is in B's past light cone. There is no longer a relationship of simultaneity, however, and some pairs of events are not related by the earlier than/later than relation. The temporal order is a partial order.
0faul_sname12y
That makes sense. Although it looks like you either have all information regarding where/when all events occurred relative to each other (which would necessarily give information about where/when all events happened in relation to an observer) or you have a partial ordering, which means you don't have all the information. The more I think about this, the more confused I get. How exactly does A differ from the information of what is in the observer's past light cone and what isn't? Or is this based on the idea of there being a single, consistent "present time" throughout the universe?
4pragmatist12y
The partial ordering actually encodes a surprising amount of information about space-time. Specifying the temporal ordering relationship between space-time points also fixes the topological structure of space-time, its differential structure, and the metric up to a conformal factor. It doesn't let you reconstruct the full metric, and maybe you think that certain metrical facts count as "temporal facts" (which seems right), in which case the definition of B-theory I gave above should be modified to include the claim that those metrical facts are provided as well. I don't want to make the definitions too technical though, and I think the current version gets the essential idea across, so I'm going to leave it as is.
6AlexMennen12y
Partial ordering.
0[anonymous]12y
What? since when can you specify a global order of events?
0pragmatist12y
See here. Of course, we have to assume that our space-time meets certain causal conditions (it doesn't have closed timelike curves, for instance).
[-]prase12y100

Lean toward B-theory if pushed to answer, but I wonder what cognitive algorithm even generated this as a possibly interesting question.

Also, who the hell has invented the names for that?

7A1987dM12y
I hate names likes that (incl. System 1 vs. System 2 thinking, Type I vs Type II errors, etc.). I can never remember which name stands for which thing.
5[anonymous]12y
J. M. E. McTaggart.
6Alicorn12y
And he didn't mean to name competing theories about time; he was trying to dismiss the both of them.
1[anonymous]12y
I think he was just a B-theorist (though he thought the self-contradictory A-theory was an ineliminable part of our thoughts about time).
5Alicorn12y
Wikipedia appears to confirm my memory of it ("McTaggart argued that the A series was a necessary component of any full theory of time, but that it was also self-contradictory and that our perception of time was, therefore, ultimately an incoherent illusion.")
0[anonymous]12y
Does it say he rejected the B-Theory?
4Alicorn12y
It seems like the sentence I quoted indicates that he didn't consider it a "full theory of time". I don't feel like rereading the actual paper, though.
7[anonymous]12y
Looking at the paper, I find that you're right.
1crazy8812y
From memory, McTaggart argues that change is a necessary part of our concept of time. That B-theories can't account for change and that A-theories are incoherent. Consequently, time does not exist (but presumably something with some similarities to time does)
2Rob Bensinger11y
Philosophy trivia: "J.M.E. McTaggart" stands for "John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart".
8Oscar_Cunningham12y
"Other": The nature of physics has a strong possibility of being such that the question makes no sense.
2[anonymous]12y
Same other, but with the nuance that there is probably a refinement of the question that does make sense. A rough, likely wrong attempt at a refinement: 1. B'-time: as before, but with a partial order of events; 2. A'-time: as before, but with the extra data coming from any observer who can specify those events that conclusively are in their past or future.
1magfrump12y
Sort of lean toward B-theory, but I suspect other temporal facts may exist. However, they are not of the form "X is in the present/future/past." Also, the nature of time may make these the wrong questions to ask as noted below.
0diegocaleiro12y
Other: Events might not be ordered, yet time exists. This would be the case with the Timeless Barbourian Physics Yudkowsky discusses in the sequences. Also could be the case if some variety of many worlds of quantum style, or all possible worlds of Lewis style is the case. The Anthopic folk, like me, Katja, Bostrom and several others, might also amuse themselves by inquiring: Could in one of the many infinite universe (or Big universe) theories be the case that all time-like facts are some form of indexical fact?
0asparisi12y
Other. I think the most fundamental aspect of time is local quantum instability, rather than relationships such as "earlier than/later than" or "past-present-future" between events.
0NoSignalNoNoise12y
Other: I don't know. Poll: Should these polls have an "I don't know" / neutral option? [pollid:95] Note: I haven't included "I don't know" on this poll because its purpose is to get the balance of opinion for/against. The other polls in the comments on this article are intended to get an overall picture of the local population, so it would be interesting if a question had a high percentage of "I don't know" responses.
-8shminux12y

Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?

[pollid:105]

9pragmatist12y
Disjunctivism: In normal cases, when a person is perceiving something, the object of their perception is a mind-independent object. The character of the person's phenomenal experience is explained by the properties of the object (for instance, a person perceiving an apple has an experience of redness because the object of their perception -- the apple -- is red). However, when a person is hallucinating or experiencing an illusion, the object of their perception is some sort of mind-dependent entity (perhaps sense-data; see below). So hallucination and veridical perception are substantially different kinds of mental processes. Representationalism: Perceptual experience is representational. It represents our immediate environment as being a certain way. Since representations can be both accurate and inaccurate, we can understand both veridical perception and hallucination as the same kind of process. The difference is merely in the success of the representation. To be perceiving is to be representing one's immediate environment in certain ways (visually, aurally, etc.), and perception is accurate to the extent that this representation corresponds to reality. Sense-datum theory: The objects of our perception are not mind-independent entities, they are mind-dependent objects called sense-data. These are objects like "a red spot at such-and-such position in my visual field". We infer the existence of mind-independent objects from patterns in the sense-data we perceive. Qualia theory: [I don't think I fully understand the claims of qualia theory. I have tried to describe the kinds of things qualia theorists say, but if it appears confused that's because I am confused.] The phenomenal character of our perceptual experience (the particular way our experience feels) is non-representational. We don't infer information about the external world from the particular feel of our conscious experience; rather, our conscious experience is simply what it feels like (from the inside
4Swimmy12y
I wonder how many disjunctivists have actually taken hallucinatory drugs?
3TheOtherDave12y
Just to be clear: sense-datum theory is not asserting that distal stimuli don't exist or that we're unjustified in inferring their existence or otherwise making a claim about existence. It is merely asserting that we infer their existence from sense data, as opposed to, um.... doing something other than that. Yes?
2pragmatist12y
Yes, the claim is that mind-independent objects are not the direct objects of perception, sense-data are. In so far as perception gives us information about distal objects, that information is inferred from patterns in sense data.
2arborealhominid11y
I'm not totally clear on the distinction between representationalism and sense-datum theory. Do you think you could explain it in a bit more detail?
0Peterdjones12y
I think qualia theory is quite othogonal to (in)direct realism. Different qualia tbeorists hold qualia to be direct perceptions of external properties, or to be qualitites of sense data, or to be adverbial. Etc.
0pragmatist12y
Then in what sense is it a distinct view about perception? Are the poll options just poorly formulated?
1Peterdjones12y
Yes. Sense dataum theory barely differs from representationalism, direct relaism isn't mentioned, and qualia theory is orthogonal.
1pragmatist12y
I'm not sure I agree with your assessment. Sense datum theory is significantly different from representationalism, since sense data aren't supposed to intentional objects. Disjunctivism is the only form of direct realism anyone takes seriously any more, as far as I'm aware. You may be right about qualia theory, but I have heard people use the term as a stand-in for adverbialism. I suspect that's what it's supposed to represent in the poll.
0Peterdjones12y
It looks like the list of options was cribbed from the The SEP article , but without much context.
0torekp12y
For someone who isn't confident of understanding qualia theory, you stated it quite well. Near the end it could use a tweak, I think: "my conscious experience in its entirety isn't essential to my knowing that the apple is red. The phenomenal quality of the experience is just an effect ..." This leaves the verbal issue open, of whether perceived facts as well as phenomenal qualities count as part of "conscious experience".
-2diegocaleiro12y
I don't mean to be rude to the fellow, but my current understanding of why Chalmers (main Qualia theorist) says qualia are what he says they are is isomorphic to Lee Smolin's critique of string theorists. They become string theorists because of sociological reasons. It is the part of physics in which high intelligence is recompensated faster. Chalmers took a polarized view so that the rest of what he defends became visible. It worked fantastically well. http://lesswrong.com/lw/58d/how_not_to_be_a_na%C3%AFve_computationalist/ EDIT: in the link above I suggest a reading of the article "The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief" by Chalmers. It is the one in which this possible case is most easily visible. It is the case in which inconsistencies in the Chalmerian definition are most visible.
3ModusPonies12y
Other: all of these seem like plausible models with a nonzero amount of predictive power. I don't see how the truth of one of these implies that the others are false. Representationalism and sense-datum theory seem the most useful, I guess, but my real answer is "I don't know, ask a neurologist."
1BrassLion12y
I'm not sure how you would even create a test to distingush these models. I'm not sure if my understanding is incomplete or if that's a warning sign that they aren't different or aren't coherent.
2Eugine_Nier12y
Other: These are all true for different meanings of "the object of one's perception".
0Peterdjones12y
Ill-formed question. See my other comment.

Moral judgment: externalism or internalism?

[pollid:85]

Externalism: It is possible for a person to sincerely hold a moral belief (or make a moral judgment) without feeling any motivation to adhere to that belief/judgment. The claim is not just that the motivation might be trumped by other motivations, it is that it is possible for there to be no motivation at all.

Internalism: It is impossible to sincerely make a moral judgment without being motivated to act in accordance with it, although it may be the case that the motivation is trumped by other countervailing motivations.

Other: This is a not-very-interesting definitional question as to exactly which kind of mental states should be counted as "sincerely making a moral judgement".

General defense of the above type of reply: Voting "Other" on questions that seem to you confused or seem to turn on irrelevant matters of small definitions, rather than making up a definition and running with it, etcetera, is probably a good barometer of LW-vs.-philosophy opinion.

The subject matter of humanity::morality is a mathematical object which Clippy could calculate, if it ever had any reason to do so, which it wouldn't, but it could, without being at all motivated to do anything about that. However, if "morality" is being given an agent relative definition then no, whatever you're not motivated to do anything about, even in the slightest, doesn't seem like it should be called Alejandro::morality.

7thomblake12y
I doubt it. In my experience, if you allow a "Please specify" answer, philosophers will pick that for practically any distinction.
7[anonymous]12y
It is, at any rate, if you have some evidence that philosophers (professional? historical? what?) make up definitions and run with them when they don't understand a question. Otherwise, it's probably a very, very bad barometer.
0Nisan12y
I agree with this, even though I voted "externalism".
3drnickbone12y
Don't psychopaths count as evidence for "externalism"? (They know what they're doing is wrong but don't care.)
5TheOtherDave12y
Not in and of itself. Suppose a psychopath says "I know killing people is wrong but I don't care" and kills someone. Wearing an externalist hat, I say "See? They made a moral judgment, but it doesn't constrain their behavior." Wearing an internalist hat, I say either "Maybe it did constrain their behavior, just not enough to prevent them from killing someone, because other factors motivated their behavior that aren't present in non-psychopaths" or "Maybe it wasn't a sincere moral judgment, they were just echoing what they've been told, like a blind person saying stop signs are red." That said, I can imagine well-designed experiments that would be evidence for one or the other. E.g., if we identify what parts of the brain are generally engaged during moral judgments, and what parts of the brain are engaged during recitation of memorized facts, and determine that when psychopaths say "killing people is wrong" the latter brain areas are engaged but the former are not, I would consider that evidence that psychopaths don't in fact make sincere moral judgments when they say that.
6Richard_Kennaway12y
We know from the effects of morphine that it is possible to experience "pain" without it "hurting". (I wonder if any philosopher foresaw that this is even possible?) Given that, it is quite conceivable to me that a psychopath might experience the feeling of "moral wrongness" without the motivation "I shouldn't do this". Maybe that isn't what's going on, but no process of reasoning about morality can rule it out. Philosophers, even materialist ones, are apt to think of the mind as being some sort of logical entity, about which they can prove that certain mental behaviours are impossible. But when the brain goes funny, all of those arguments fail. Which implies that when the brain hasn't gone funny, the arguments still don't prove anything, because how do we know that even a normal brain doesn't do other "absurd" things? Only by observing how it actually works, not by any process of pure reason. Compare "akrasia". How can you want to do a thing, have the ability, and yet not do it, all the while bemoaning the fact that you aren't doing it? Obviously absurd, impossible, a contradiction. But the fact that people do go funny in this way is so familiar to everyone that philosophers can't get far by arguing that it can't happen.
2TheOtherDave12y
I certainly agree that we can discover things about the world that make us realize that some phenomenon P that we naively thought was indivisible in fact turns out to have internal structure, such that an event can demonstrate some-but-not-all-of P. I'm mostly of the opinion that when that sort of thing happens, the best move is to get very clear about what level of abstraction we're talking about, what concepts apply at that level, and how we refer to those concepts. Sometimes it's useful to talk about "cells", but if I'm interested in how mitochondria interact with the endoplasmic reticulum the concept to which "cell" refers isn't useful to me; I need new concepts (and it's probably best if I don't assign them homophonic labels). Are people on morphine actually experiencing pain? Yes, they are. No, they aren't. It's mostly not a helpful question. They are experiencing some properties of pain and not others, and what we've discovered is that our normal experience of pain has separable internal structure. So far, so good. And, sure, when an actor playing Oedipus screams and yells about how painful having his eyes plucked out is, he's experiencing some of the properties of pain, and it can be interesting to consider which properties those are. But I can also jump up a level and ask whether the actor is really experiencing pain, and on balance my answer is pretty unambiguously "no." (Though I'm prepared to make exceptions for certain actors and performances, given enough counterevidence.) Similarly, if I experience akrasia, that tells me that motivation has internal structure, and I can experience some of its components (e.g., the belief that I want to do something) without others (e.g., the actually-doing-it). At a lower level, I can usefully consider the relationship between those components. At a higher level, I can ask whether I'm really motivated to do it. (My usual answer is "no." I understand that judgments vary on this one.) So, OK. I agree that moral jud
5drnickbone12y
But a blind person can still sincerely say that "stop signs are red". Their justification for saying so may be different from a sighted person's, but the statement is still sincere (the blind person really believes it). Is it part of the internalist claim that it is just impossible to acquire moral knowledge by such third-party means? For instance, simply observing what other people say about "right" and "wrong" and building an inductive concept about what actions the words describe, but without any emotional preference for "right" over "wrong"?
2TheOtherDave12y
I can't speak for internalism, but it certainly seems to me that what I'm doing when I say that it's wrong for me to eat pork by the standards of Judaism is different from what i would be doing, were I an observant Jew, if I said it was wrong for me to eat pork.
3drnickbone12y
But still, how does this break the analogy with "red" for a blind person? For instance, a blind person could sincerely believe all of the following: "Stop signs are red" "My evidence for believing that stop signs are red is that sighted people have told me so" "Red things aren't red just because people say they are. Rather they have some inherent property to do with the way light reflects off them which causes people to describe them as red" "Some religious sects call certain signs red which everyone else calls orange, but these sects are wrong; the signs are in fact orange. Members of the sects have been brought up that way, and are sincere in their beliefs, but they are still wrong" "If I were a member of such a sect, I'd probably also believe that the orange signs are red" In short it seems possible to have a complete and sincere set of beliefs in "red" as an objective world property, without ever seeing red yourself or ever having any emotional response to it. I don't immediately see why the same can't be true for moral beliefs.
2TheOtherDave12y
Fair enough. It's certainly true that there are two different things being done by psychopaths and nonpsychopaths in the original example, but it might be that both of those things count as genuine moral beliefs, just as the two different things involving a stop sign can count as genuine beliefs about color. OTOH, it might be that only one of them counts as a genuine moral belief, just as only one of the things involving a stop sign counts as a genuine perception of color.
3magfrump12y
I accept externalism on the part of some possible sentient creatures, but I think this question with respect to humans is a question of definitions, and even if you decide on a definition it becomes an empirical question I don't know the answer to.
2[anonymous]12y
Other: I was unable to resolve my thoughts on this at all, and am not sure to what degree hearing more arguments either way would help that.

Is there somewhere a glossary for all the questions? That would be very helpful (beyond this survey).

Also - there was already a similar thread:

http://lesswrong.com/lw/56q/how_would_you_respond_to_the_philpapers_what_are/

The comments have some answers (though not in a convenient machine readable form).

3Jayson_Virissimo12y
pragmatist has added comments with descriptions of the key terms to most of the poll question comments. Interesting; perhaps someone would be willing to check them against this newer data for changes in Less Wrongers' beliefs over time.

A few problems with this LW survey:

  1. Most of the interesting options in the original PhilPapers Survey are collapsed into 'Other'. This makes it needlessly tempting to side with one of the named positions in order to make one's answer usefully contentful. It also makes our comparisons to the original poll much cruder. The original survey provided (regularly used) options for: 'accept all', 'reject all', 'accept an intermediate view', 'accept an alternative', 'the question is too unclear to answer', 'there is no fact of the matter', 'insufficiently familiar

... (read more)

Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?

[pollid:109]

A zombie is physically identical to a human being but does not possess phenomenal experience. There is nothing it is like to be a zombie.

Inconceivable: We cannot fully conceive of a zombie. If you think you have a coherent conception of a zombie, it is because you haven't thought about your conception carefully enough. Sufficient thought will reveal that your conception is incoherent.

Conceivable but not metaphysically possible: One can arrive at a coherent conception of zombies, but objects that match this conception cannot possibly exist, not even in worlds with different laws of nature than ours.

Metaphysically possible: The existence of zombies is possible.

3TheOtherDave12y
Given these options, I think I have to reluctantly choose "metaphysically possible." A decent respect to the opinions of Less Wrong requires that I should declare the causes which impel me to this. I have never been able to conceive of a zombie and a physically identical non-zombie without subsequently concluding that my conception leads to positing causeless effects (e.g., a zombie spontaneously talking about its nonexistent phenomenal experience while using all and only the cognitive structures that the non-zombie uses to talk about actual phenomenal experience). But, well... causeless effects aren't incoherent, or metaphysically impossible, they're just vanishingly unlikely. . (Not even necessarily that. E.g., in a world where there are only a few possible utterances, one of which, X, is conventionally understood to be a reference to the speaker's phenomenal experience, it's not even all that unlikely for a zombie to just kind of coincidentally happen to utter X in exactly those circumstances that a non-zombie analog utters them due to phenomenal experience.) Further, nothing in these definitions asserts that humans do have phenomenal experience, which allows for Dennett's answer ("We're all zombies.") In which case cause and effect aren't even at issue... all of us zombies just happen to talk about phenomenal experience despite not having any, because our brains are wired to do so, presumably for signalling reasons but possibly because the Matrix Lords think it's funny, or for other reasons. This strikes me as implausible... I mean, it sure does seem to me that I have phenomenal experience, and I can't imagine being wrong about that. But that might just be a failure of my imagination. Which seems to add up to "zombies are metaphysically possible" on this account. I'm not quite sure.
4pragmatist12y
How did you answer the physicalism question? If you think any physical duplicate of our world must also be a mental duplicate then I think you're committed to the impossibility of zombies. Think about it this way: Do you think there can be a world where the distribution of micro-physical properties is identical to ours but which does not have tables? Presumably no, because you believe that once microscopic properties are distributed a certain way in some location, you can't avoid having a table in that location. But you don't think the same is true of phenomenal experience if you believe zombies are possible. You think that there needs to be something more than just the right distribution of physical properties for consciousness to appear. I suspect you're conflating epistemic and metaphysical possibility when you say causeless effects are vanishingly unlikely. Take the sentence "2 + 2 = 5". I think its metaphysically impossible for that to be true (assuming the meanings of the terms are kept constant) -- there is no possible world in which it is true -- but I don't assign it probability 0 because (as Eliezer has pointed out) I acknowledge that there is some possible sequence of experiences that might lead me to believe it (or increase my credence in it). Thinking something is impossible does not mean assigning it probability 0. Dennett doesn't think we're all zombies, BTW. He's skeptical of qualia as a coherent concept, but he doesn't deny that we have phenomenal experience.
2TheOtherDave12y
I don't believe mental events have nonphysical causes, which is precisely why I consider zombies to entail causeless effects. And yeah, perhaps I'm just reading too much into "metaphysically impossible" as distinct from "impossible"; the truth is I really don't know how to think cogently about what would be impossible if the laws of nature were different. The "we're all zombies" bit was intended with tongue in cheek; it's actually a direct quote of his from some book or another -- Consciousness Explained, probably -- that I read like 20 years ago and stuck with me. He isn't entirely serious when he says it, of course, and IIRC has a little footnote that says "To quote this phrase out of context would be the height of intellectual dishonesty." or words to that effect. EDIT: That said, another relevant Dennetism that stuck with me was his response to an undergrad at a seminar I was listening in on years back. The undergrad said, in effect, "But I don't feel like a merely computational process!" and he replied "How do you know? Maybe this is exactly what a merely computational process feels like!"
-1thomblake12y
On reflection I agree. "Metaphysically impossible" is a rather strong requirement if taken strictly, and I think strictly is the right way to take it when talking about metaphysical possibility. So if you think there's a possible world where human actions just happen by chance to line up with some mysterious experiences and zombie actions don't, then it's metaphysically possible. I'm not sure whether Dennett's answer should really be read as "zombies are metaphysically possible" but I'm now convinced this whole question is silly.
-1TheOtherDave12y
Well, yes.
1A1987dM11y
What is meant by “conception” exactly? Because that doesn't appear to make sense to me.
0Rob Bensinger11y
Went for "metaphysically possible". I think zombies exist, and we are they.
0[anonymous]12y
Other: I wouldn't say it's inconceivable exactly, but I think the thought experiment, in framing the possibility of a decoupling of phenomenal experience from cognitive architecture, primes for some intuitions that don't make a lot of sense to me.
0drnickbone12y
Went for "conceivable but not metaphysically possible". It seems pretty clear to me that we can and do "conceive" of zombies, or of other puzzles like inverted spectra (you see red while I see green, but we're both looking at the same tree, and both call the tree "green"). However, this is because of a mental trick in the way we conceive mental states. Basically, for normally-sighted people, it seems that when we imagine a physical object (like a tree), we imagine it from an external perspective. We induce in ourselves a mental state similar to the one we would get from looking at the object concerned (the tree). However, when we imagine a mental state itself (such as an experience of green), we do so sympathetically, or from an internal perspective, by inducing in ourselves the same or a similar mental state. So this allows us to "mix and match" brain states and mental states. For instance, I can imagine your brain while you are looking at a tree (I have a mental picture of grey matter with lots of neurons firing) while at the same time imagining the mental state of experiencing red. No problem at all... it seems perfectly conceivable that these could happen together; instant inverted spectrum. Or I can imagine the same brain state (same grey matter, same firings) while not imagining a mental state at all (it's all neurons firing in complicated chains, but no-one's at home)... again seems perfectly conceivable that these could happen together; instant p-zombie. But it's all just a dumb quirk of imagination. Because of the different imaginative techniques, we fool ourselves into conceiving apparent possibilities that aren't really possible after all. One way to debug the imagination is to ask ourselves this: "Suppose I were forced to imagine a mental state from the external perspective, the same way I imagine a tree. What would that look like?" And the short answer is "Well, without scientific evidence, I really don't have a clue. I have no intuition whatseover

Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?

[pollid:108]

9pragmatist12y
Correspondence: A proposition is true if and only if it bears some sort of congruence relation to a state of affairs that obtains. When I say that "P is true", where P is some proposition, I am saying that P stands in this relation to some portion of reality. Deflationary: Ascribing truth to a proposition amounts to no more than asserting the proposition. It does not mean you are attributing some further property to the proposition (such as congruence with some state of affairs). Saying "P is true" is the same as just saying "P'. Epistemic: To say that a proposition is true is just to say that it meets a high standard of epistemic warrant, and that we are thereby justified in asserting it. The search for truth and the search for justification are not separate goals. There is no more to truth than sufficiently powerful justification.
2Richard_Kennaway12y
"Deflationary" is not the same sort of thing as the other two theories, either of which one might believe while being a deflationist. In fact, I don't see a reason to think deflationism is false. What is actually meant by "just saying P" is not answered by deflationism, but by an actual theory of truth. And I still think that after consulting the Stanford Encyclopedia on the subject.
4pragmatist12y
The whole point of deflationism is that there is nothing further to be said about truth other than what I said in my description. They think of truth as a shallow notion that plays no significant explanatory role in our accounts of language and meaning. If you think that the deflationist claim needs to be backed up by a more substantive theory of truth then you are not a deflationist. So there you have it, a reason to think deflationism is false. You can think of deflationism as an anti-theory of truth rather than a theory of truth. The central claim is that no theory of truth is needed. The linguistic function of truth claims can be understood in terms of the formal disquotational scheme I outlined, and there isn't really any deeper metaphysical question about what Truth is. If you ask a deflationist, "What do you mean by 'just saying P'?", he might respond with a theory of meaning -- a theory that gives a systematic account of how sentences are assigned semantic content -- but he will not respond with a theory of truth.
2Richard_Kennaway12y
It seems to me that if a deflationist answers the question "when can you correctly say "snow is white"" with the answer "when snow is, in fact, white", then the deflationist is a correspondencist. If he says "when you have good enough evidence that snow is white", he is an epistemicist. Deflationism on its own is surely just a shallow concern with the word "truth". Of course asserting "it is true that P" is the same as asserting P, but that is not an interesting fact. Is deflationism historically a response to some obsolete idea about "truth" as an immaterial substance that adheres to true propositions, by virtue of which they are true? Neither of the other two theories assert such an idea.
0thomblake12y
I totally agree.
0Cthulhoo12y
I'm honestly confused about this definition. Does it mean that once we define what truth is, we can then assert if a proposition is true or not ( truth and "justification" are in this sense intertwined)? In this case, isn't this just a broader case of Correspondence, or better, isn't Correspondence just a particular subcase of Epistemic?
6pragmatist12y
Perhaps an example of an epistemic theory of truth will help. Suppose you have a scientific community grappling with a certain set of problems. As their inquiry proceeds, they solve some problems and uncover new ones. In the process, they also greatly refine their methods. Imagine they eventually come to a stage where all their problems have been solved according to their own standards of warrant, and no open problems remain. One theory of truth (due to Charles Peirce) says that their beliefs at this stage of inquiry are true by definition. Truth is just what a community will arrive at at the ideal end of inquiry. How is this different from a correspondence theory? Well, the correspondence theorist would say that even though the scientists have fully resolved their inquiry according to their own standards, and it seems like their beliefs are highly justified, it still might be the case that they got it wrong. It still might be the case that their beliefs don't correspond to reality, in which case their beliefs are false. For Peirce, this claim makes no sense. According to him, what it means for a belief to conform to reality (or to be true) is for it to be a belief held by a community at the ideal end of inquiry. If we allow that our beliefs can be as justified as we could possibly make them and still fail to be true, then truth becomes a potentially unattainable goal, and for Peirce this would make truth a philosophically useless concept. The epistemic theory of truth is generally held by philosophers who are skeptical of metaphysics, and who think metaphysical concepts are only valuable to the extent that they make a difference to our lives. If there is a metaphysical distinction that does not correspond to a distinction in what we observe or how we should behave, it should be discarded. This is why they think the theory of truth should be closely tied to our epistemic practices, the stuff we do when we are trying to find the truth.
0TheOtherDave12y
OK, so... suppose this community then encounters some new experiences at time T that cause them to reject the solution (S1) to a problem previously considered solved, which they then re-close (with a different solution S2). A correspondence theorist wasn't sure before T whether S1 was true or false, they're still not sure after T whether S1 is true or false, and the same goes for S2 (and, for that matter, anything else someone might assert). Presumably they will also make statements like S1 was justified before T and unjustified after T, that S2 is justified after T, and might disagree about whether S2 was justified before T. An epistemic theorist asserts that S1 was true before T and is false after T, that S2 is false after T, and might disagree about whether S2 was true before T. A deflationary theorist... um... is not committed to any particular position about the truth, falsehood, or indeterminacy of S1 or S2 at any time. Yes?
0pragmatist12y
For Peirce, an end to all problems (and therefore an end to inquiry) includes the claim that there are no reecalcitrant experiences. It isn't just a temporary end to problems, it's a permanent end. This is why he refers to this as the ideal limit of inquiry. So the situation in your first paragraph wouldn't apply. Peirce specifies things this way precisely to avoid the consequence that truth-values can change with time. I should say, though, that this is only one specific epistemic theory, and an early (and therefore kind of unsophisticated) one. I chose it for ease of exposition.
0TheOtherDave12y
Well, OK, but then it seems Peirce's conception of truth is just as potentially unattainable (and thus philosophically useless, by his own account) as the correspondence conception. Unless I've reached an ideal limit of inquiry -- which of course I can't really know I've done, and am unlikely to have done -- then it seems I don't actually have truth, even on Pierce's account. That aside, though, point taken about epistemicism != Peirce; presumably if I actually care about the latter I should just read Peirce. I'm just being intrigued by it. I do think I roughly understand the concept now; thanks for the explanation.
0Cthulhoo12y
Many thanks to you and Vaniver, I have a clearer picture now (though this mostly looks like a debate over definitions, that can basically be solved by tabooing the word "truth").
3thomblake12y
When you've reached this point, you understand a philosophical debate, for most 20th-century philosophical debates.
0pragmatist12y
Not sure what you mean by this. The three theories of truth are different attempts to taboo the word "truth".
1Cthulhoo12y
Isn't this the point? Tabooing "truth", one can see that the theories really speak about (slightly) different concepts. Going back to your previous example, if one theory claims the scientists have reached the truth and the second doesn't, how does it change the reality? You can easily define some new words to correspond to the different concepts, and refer to the appropriate label under the different circumstances.
6metaphysicist12y
Then, you would merely choose which of the concepts is the one needed for a particular theoretical purpose. Right? Wrong! The arguments go to the concepts' coherence. This is why it's philosophy, not lexicography. For example, a correspondence theorist generally argues that the notion of an epistemological limit to which scientific findings converge need not exist and can never be established empirically. If correspondence theory is true, you aren't allowed to use the Piercian limit. It's a vacuous concept. Or, the correspondence theorist argues that the epistemological limit of scientific investigation can't even be defined without assuming a correspondence variety of truth (which the Piercian, in turn, argues can't exist). The correspondentist argues that if you define truth at a limit, then you have to define the truth that science is converging as itself the result of a scientific investigation at an endpoint, and similarly for the concepts you use to define scientific investigation, etc. Thus, a Piercian view, it's contended, produces an infinite regress. It's possible that both concepts are coherent, but that too would require a philosophical argument--and it's an unlikely result here, at least in my opinion: it's probably more likely that both concepts are incoherent than that both are coherent. These kinds of conclusions, philosophical and lacking in direct application, help inform the priors one assigns to just about every scientific controversy.
1Cthulhoo12y
Ok, this starts to sound more interesting, thank you for the reply. I tried to briefly google for "Piercian limit", though and it didn't turn out anything relevant. Any quick reference?
2metaphysicist12y
Theories using Piercian concepts are today usually termed antirealist or instrumentalist.
0Cthulhoo12y
Thank you, this is turning out a lot of material that I will definitely read.
0TheOtherDave12y
(blink) If I accept acorrespondence theory of truth, it seems that correspondence theory is not the sort of thing that is allowed to have a truth value. And if I reject a correspondence theory of truth, then I ought not believe that correspondence theory is true. So it seems that "correspondence theory is true" is necessarily false. No?
1metaphysicist12y
That's an excellent argument if it's the case that correspondence theory is not the sort of thing allowed to have truth values under correspondence theory. Why do you say it's not?
0TheOtherDave12y
Well, using pragmatist's cited definition of correspondence theory, a proposition is true if and only if it bears some sort of congruence relation to a state of affairs that obtains. What state of affairs is "correspondence theory is true" congruent with? I can't think of any. If you can, I'll happily be convinced my argument doesn't hold, but basically it seems to me that correspondence theory lays out a framework for thinking about truth, just as governmental constitutions lay out a framework for thinking about law. Correspondence theory itself is no more true (or false) than constitutions are legal (or illegal).
1metaphysicist12y
The concept of scientific truth--the concept used by scientists--is the state of affairs some correspondence theories purport to be congruent with.
0TheOtherDave12y
I might still want to know which concept I'm using when I say something is true. I might also want to know which concept you're using when you say something is true. Sure, if I don't know that (or am not confident I know that) then we can taboo "truth," but that gets unwieldy; if we can agree on a shared referent then communication is more efficient. Tabooing key words is sort of like running code under a debugger... a great way of identifying points of failure, but not the way I want to live my life. If I know whether someone's conception of truth is correspondist or epistemic, they can say "X is true" and I know what they mean about X without having to taboo "truth".
0Cthulhoo12y
This is something I understand and I can agree with. But it's a very practical problem, like making Europeans and Americans agree on the meaning of the word "football". It's very likely that I'm still missing something, though (see metaphysicist reply).
3Vaniver12y
Typical examples of the difference between correspondence and epistemic have to do with people being right on accident. For example: Is Bob's statement true? Is it a justified true belief? Correspondence would say that Bob did tell the truth, but epistemic would say that Bob's statement, though true, was unjustified.
6fubarobfusco12y
The philosophers call these Gettier problems. This particular story introduces what seems like it should be an extraneous detail: Bob, in saying he doesn't carry cash, is intending to deceive. But our everyday concept of truth is related somehow to honesty; the truth is what a well-informed and honest person would say. Bob here is being dishonest (he wants the mugger to believe something Bob thinks is false) and misinformed, so his dishonesty fails at his goal of protecting his cash. This goal is already lost. Knowing that, the question "but is his statement true?" seems to be unneeded essentialism.
2Vaniver12y
My impression is that this is what the whole debate is about. What matters to Corresponders is whether or not statements describe reality. Bob's statement correctly predicts whether or not he has cash on him- and "correct prediction" is their standard for truth. They wouldn't care that his dishonesty and misinformation cancel each other out, but would agree that in general dishonesty and misinformation lead to less correct predictions.
1drnickbone12y
I think there might be a difference here between truth of a proposition and truth of a sentence. Ascribing truth to a proposition looks the same as just asserting the proposition (deflationary account). Ascribing truth to a sentence looks like a combination of mapping it onto a proposition (interpreting the sentence) and then asserting that proposition. Since I would regard propositions and states of affairs as either the same, or isomorphic, this looks like the correspondence theory of truth for sentences.
1Benjy Forstadt5y
I strongly agree. This has been discussed in the literature, I believe. For instance, it comes up in discussions of the semantic paradoxes. There is no paradox involved in “disquotation” for propositions: the proposition that p just is the proposition that it’s true that p. When you’re talking about sentences though, you run into the liar paradox if you say that “p” is true if and only if p.

External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?

[pollid:102]

Non-skeptical realism: A mind-independent reality exists, and we have epistemic access to its structure. We can acquire substantial knowledge about reality.

Skepticism: A mind-independent reality exists, but we lack epistemic access to it. We cannot know the nature of reality. We only have access to how things appear to us, and we should take seriously the possibility that this is very different from how things actually are.

Idealism: Reality is not mind-independent. It is either wholly or partly mentally constituted. We can know about reality because there is not much (or no) distance between how things appear to us and how things actually are.

4drnickbone12y
I'm not sure how well this fits with fallibilist accounts of knowledge (e.g. probabilism, Bayesianism). A Bayesian doesn't "rule out" possibilities when setting probabilities strictly between 0 or 1, so this technically looks like "skepticism". But if I claim that I'm 99.9999% certain that a mind-independent reality exists and I have substantial knowledge about it, that really doesn't sound very skeptical!
0pragmatist12y
You can read "rule out" as "no longer take seriously". The probability of a hypothesis doesn't have to go down all the way to 0 before I stop taking it seriously. I've edited the original description to reflect this.
1drnickbone12y
Thanks for this clarification. I was going for "lean towards non-skeptical realism" but would say "accept non-skeptical realism" under your new formulation. I don't rule out a simulation hypothesis, for instance, but can't say I give it serious probability weighting. (Bostrom considers it one of three disjuncts, and I can give reasons to assign the other disjuncts much higher probability.)
0A1987dM12y
Exactly what I was going to say.
2Rob Bensinger11y
Three problems: 1. This seems to entail the absurd proposition "p, but we have no way of knowing that p". I.e., it's not clear how to cash out 'epistemic access' in a way that allows us to know that there is a mind-independent world, without knowing anything further about that world. This uncharitably commits skepticism to an internal tension, if not an outright contradiction. 2. "We only have access to how things appear to us", inasmuch as it implies "We have access to how things appear to us", is itself a substantive doctrine about how reality breaks down, and one skepticism need not endorse. So this uncharitably assigns certain doctrinal commitments to skeptics as a group. 3. This reading assumes that skeptics are realists of some sort, or that they privilege realism as a hypothesis over idealism. The original question does not state this, so idealistic or neutral skeptics may be unfairly biased by this interpretation. 'Mentally constituted' is vague. If this just means that part of reality is mental (or irreducibly mental), then it seems to treat dualism as a form of idealism, which is very nonstandard.
0pragmatist11y
Fair enough. I should have said something like: "A mind-independent reality might exist, and if it does then we lack epistemic access to it."

Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching): straight or turn?

[pollid:93]

Trolley problem: There is a trolley traveling along a set of tracks. The driver has lost control of the trolley. On the track ahead of the trolley are five people who cannot get off the track in time and will all die if the trolley gets to them. You are standing next to a lever that can switch the track the trolley will take, preventing the deaths of the five people. On the other track is a single person who also cannot get away in time and so will die if you switch the track. Do you refrain from switching the track ("straight") or do you switch the track ("turn")?

3DanArmak12y
Addendum: you are not allowed to explicitly consider e.g. future reputational effects of your choice. (Most people will hate you for flipping the switch or just for being involved no matter what you do. The safest bet is to run away if you haven't been seen near the switch yet.)
3roystgnr12y
Interesting - I hadn't heard that added to the problem before. Are you allowed to explicitly consider other psychological effects of your choice? (e.g. presumably people would update their beliefs to account for "marked-as-currently-unused trolley tracks are more dangerous than I thought" and "in-active-use trolley tracks have another level of safety I hadn't considered")
-1Eugine_Nier12y
How is that different from choosing "straight"?
5DanArmak12y
Suppose the switch is stuck halfway between "straight" and "turn". It will take some effort to move it to either position. If you leave it alone, the trolley will take a path at random with equal probability. If you take the time to move the switch to either position, you will be seen. The survivors will thank you and the families of those you chose to kill will sue to put you in prison. Newspapers will print your photo and denigrade philosophers of ethics in deeply misguided editorials. Your unique and memorable name and face will be forever associated with the story. If you don't touch the switch and run away, nobody will know you were there. What do you choose?
-1komponisto12y
Other. The more relevant question is what kind of laws I would enact, rather than what I as an individual would do in the situation.
0thomblake12y
Relevant to what? It's usually brought up in discussion of ethics, not law.
1komponisto12y
If this situation actually arose, there is a substantial possibility that I would not switch the track, in order to avoid being prosecuted for murder. This isn't to say that I "endorse" that (in)action; I would prefer a legal code under which that wouldn't happen, and would vote for legislators who committed to changing the law in that way. Discussions of "law" aren't discussions of which laws to make; those are called discussions of "policy", and they are in my opinion the place where ethical considerations are most relevant.
4RichardHughes12y
Presuming I value the lives of all the people involved equally, I turn on to the side track. If I have a strong reason not to let the person on the side track die - they're a relative, I know them well, they owe me money, I'm in love with them, whatever - I let it go straight. This is a really easy problem if you accept that you're only a marginally good person at best.
2r_claypool12y
Oops, I meant to choose "Accept: turn" instead of "Accept: straight"

Too late, and now they're dead.

6TheOtherDave12y
As, to be fair, are their billions and billions of counterparts in hypothetical-experiment land who are tied to the tracks further from convenient switches.
1A1987dM12y
Is this about what I think would be normatively better to do or about what I predict I would actually do if personally faced with such a situation?
5TheOtherDave12y
Traditionally, trolley problems are asking about normative ethics. My prediction would be "Other: dither ineffectually."
-1Eugine_Nier12y
I voted "lead toward: straight", but thinking about it some more I think the correct answer is: "other, hypothetical isn't sufficiently detailed to determine correct choice".

Newcomb's problem: two boxes or one box?

[pollid:92]

Me: I didn't mean to two-box!

Omega: Why would you share an excuse with an omniscient agent?

Me: Because even if there is no causal connection between me giving an excuse, and me being excused, there may be a logical connection. Also, why would an omniscient agent ask a question?

Omega: Due to meta-level concerns. Obviously.

Abstract objects: nominalism or Platonism?

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An abstract object is an object that does not correspond to any pattern of matter and energy in space-time. Purported examples of abstract objects are numbers, properties, sets, etc. An object that does correspond to some concentration of matter/energy in space-time is called a concrete object.

Nominalism: Abstract objects do not exist.

Platonism: Abstract objects exist.

Still not sure what this means. Is there some sense in which this distinction pays rent in anticipated experience?

I voted other because of my confusion on this point. I think we need to taboo "exists".

Using my recent attempt at (partially) tabooing "exists" to translate:

Nominalism: We can't rationally care about abstract objects.

Platonism: We can rationally care about abstract objects.

So far Platonism appears to be "winning" according to this definition since UDT is Platonist in this sense, and there isn't really a "nominalist decision theory" that's equivalent or seems as promising.

3DanArmak12y
That just shifts the ground to disagreeing about what is "rational" when arguing about different epistemologies.
1[anonymous]12y
Shifting the ground to an easier, more tractable problem? Awesome.
2drnickbone12y
That seems a rather new argument for Platonism. But what about possibilist versions of Platonism as in "Abstract objects are ones which possibly exist"? It seems quite rational to care about things which might happen, or which might exist without conceding that they actually will happen or actually do exist.
1RichardHughes12y
I voted 'other' to the original question. I would vote 'accept platonism' to this question.
2pragmatist12y
My inclination is to say that it doesn't, and that the disagreement is really just about how to use the word "exist". But there are a couple of ways in which the distinction might have a bearing on anticipated experience. One prominent argument for Platonism is the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument, which says that our best strategy for ontological commitment is to believe in the existence of those objects over which our best scientific theories indispensably quantify. So if one cannot dispense with quantification over mathematical objects while maintaining the integrity of our best theories, then we should believe in the existence of those mathematical objects. If one accepts this criterion, then whether or not one believes in the existence of abstract objects depends on whether our best theories indispensably quantify over such objects, so the Platonism vs. nominalism debate depends on science. Hartry Field wrote a book where he tries to axiomatize Newtonian continuum mechanics without any quantification over real numbers. Also, it's plausible that Tegmark's Level IV multiverse hypothesis assumes Platonism, since it requires that mathematical structures have independent existence. So if you believe Tegmark's hypothesis constrains anticipation, then perhaps Platonism does as well.
0Manfred12y
Ah, that sounds a bit like coordinate-free physics.
0DanArmak12y
It's a prerequisite that a question must not pay rent in anticipated experience before it can be part of philosophy.
0diegocaleiro12y
Nope. The prerequisite is that it is uncertain whether it does or not pay rent. See Russell 'Problems of Philosophy" for a characterization of philosophy as "That which may eventually develop into science"...
0A1987dM12y
That reminds me of my aunt saying “philosophy is that thing with which or without which the world would stay the same” (the Italian words for ‘which’ and ‘same’ rhyme).
0DanArmak12y
As far as I can see, none of the questions in this survey have any relation to anticipated experience.
1pragmatist12y
I think a number of discoveries in psychology and neuroscience are relevant to the physicalism vs. anti-physicalism question. I think relativity basically destroys the case for A-theory. The idea of an "objective present" loses all attraction (for me at least) when you realize that there is no such thing as objective simultaneity. I think there's plenty of evidence that God does not exist (and there is plenty of potential evidence that would convince me that He does).
0crazy8812y
There's two things you could mean here. First, you could mean that the notion that their is no objective simultaneity removes your motivation to accept an A-theory. Second, you could mean that it makes an A-theory untenable. I take it you meant the first of these, but if not it might be worth checking out the second half of Craig Borne's book "A Future for Presentism".
-1DanArmak12y
In your examples, evidence from other disciplines has bearing on questions in philosophy. The problem is that information rarely flows the other way. All the philosophical debate on these (real) questions did not contribute significantly to our understanding. And then useful data came in from the relevant sciences and settled them, and would have done so even without the philosophical arguments in place.
1pragmatist12y
Yeah, I was responding to your original claim that none of the questions here have any link to anticipated experience. Your claim here -- that philosophy does not produce any knowledge of use to other disciplines -- is a different criticism, and one that my comment was not intended to address. I think this criticism is also false, by the way. Well, it may be true in the sense that as a matter of fact very few people in other disciplines pay much attention to contemporary philosophy, but it is false that there is nothing of value in philosophy for these other disciplines.
7shminux12y
Another false dichotomy. The word exist means different things to different people.
2komponisto12y
Yes, this is definitely a confused question. "Correspondence" is complicated. People shouldn't use "exists" to mean "corresponds to some pattern of matter and energy" (so apparently I'm a Platonist); yet they also shouldn't ignore the ontological distinction between numbers and atoms (so I guess I'm also kind of a nominalist).
0shminux12y
Life is so much easier for an instrumentalist, for whom "exist" is quite clearly defined.
0TheOtherDave12y
I agree with you that the distinction here gets at what people mean by "exists," but am not sure what makes that a false dichotomy. Personally, I lean towards nominalism precisely because "exist" isn't a verb I would apply to abstract objects... whatever it is that existence consists of, abstract objects don't do that thing.
-3shminux12y
Wikipedia: For example, abstract objects could be considered to exist in the minds of people imagining them, and consequently in some neuronal pattern, which may or may not match between different individuals, but considered to not exist as something independent of the conscious minds imagining them. While this is a version of nominalism, it is not nearly as clear-cut as "abstract objects do not exist".
2siodine12y
That would be conceptualism and is a moderate anti-realist position about universals (if you're a physicalist). Nominalism and Platonism are two poles of a continuum about realism of universals. So, you probably lean towards nominalism if you're a physicalist and conceptualist.
-3shminux12y
I only used the word "exist" in a sentence because TheOtherDave and I agree on the meaning of it, which I doubt that any of the -ists you mention (probably including you) would agree with.
0siodine12y
And what meaning is that?
1[anonymous]12y
That seems to me to be pretty straightforward nominalism to me. I'm having a hard time imagining a more strict nominalist who would call your view an intermediate between his view and platonism.
1TheOtherDave12y
OK, thanks for clarifying. I agree that if I don't have a crisp understanding of what it means for X to exist (such that maybe X implemented as a neuronal pattern exists, and maybe it doesn't, and no amount of data about the world could tell me which it is because I don't know how states of the world map to the existence or nonexistence of X in the first place ) then I can't clearly assert whether X exists or not. For my own part, I'm fairly comfortable refusing to use "exists" to refer to that which abstract objects are doing by virtue of being represented by a particular neuronal pattern, and I'm consequently fairly comfortable identifying as a nominalist (for purposes of this question). If I were instead comfortable using "exists" to refer to that act, I would identify as a Platonist (fpotq). If I was comfortable doing both, or neither, I would choose "Other."
5thomblake12y
Other: Aristotelianism. Abstract objects exist when instantiated. The "form of 2" does not exist in a world of forms somewhere, but 2 billiard balls is an instance of both '2' and 'billiard ball'.
0Rob Bensinger11y
I agree this is an 'Other' doctrine, and 'nominalism' is a bad name for the doctrine of concretism (i.e., everything is spatiotemporal). But isn't Aristotelianism a form of 'nominalism' as defined here? Doesn't your Aristotelianism deny, or refuse to affirm, any "object that does not correspond to any pattern of matter and energy in space-time"? Properties are not ordinarily thought of as objects, and even so if you think that all properties are instantiated, then they do seem to be spatiotemporal, though perhaps in an informational rather than 'matter/energy' sense. Hm.
0thomblake12y
I'm not sure if Aristotle actually believed an object could be an instance of two forms. That's pretty advanced polymorphism.
2[anonymous]12y
In the loose sense of 'form' (cf. Physics I.7), I think objects could: a rabbit has the form of a rabbit, and if it's white it has that form too. That's also consistant with the relationship between primary and secondary substances and non-substances from Categories. On the other hand, in Metaphysics, 'form' is pretty much restricted to the identity of a substance. Still I think Aristotle would be happy enough with polymorphism so long as you made a distinction between substance-forms and non-substance-forms.
0thomblake12y
Sounds about right to me.
1DanArmak12y
What do platonists say the word object means, if some objects are abstract? What is a property that is true of all objects? What are some categories of non-objects?
5pragmatist12y
For most Platonists, an object is something we quantify over. So, for instance, numbers are objects, because we say things like "There is one even prime" (existential quantification), and "All multiples of 6 are also multiples of 2" (universal quantification). Any domain over which we quantify is a domain of objects.
3DanArmak12y
Then what does it mean for an abstract object like 2 to "exist"?
0pragmatist12y
There are many different answers to this question. One common answer is that we should believe an object exists if a theory we accept quantifies over that object. If quantum field theory requires quantification over the integers then 2 (and other integers) exist. Since contemporary physics doesn't quantify over a domain containing phlogiston, phlogiston does not exist.
2DanArmak12y
There's something wrong when smart people argue and disagree over a question when there are many different ideas as to what the words in the question actually mean...
8jimrandomh12y
Other: I hold a Tegmark-style "all mathematical objects exist" view, but additionally hold that this requires promoting the type of the "exists" property from boolean-valued to real-valued, so that this becomes "all mathematical objects have nonzero degree of existence", and most ordinary usages of the word "exists" pick up an implied "as a substructure of" relation to some set of universes. This "as a substructure of" relation excludes platonic objects when present, so nominalism vs. platonism reduces to the word "exists" being a pair of homonyms.
0Rob Bensinger11y
Augustinian!!!!!! hssss
3crazy8812y
I think there's some truth in the claim that this is just a debate over the word "exists" but actually, in philosophy there's a fairly well-regarded meaning of the word and the debate tends to be about this meaning. I think that's one of the reasons comparisons of people from LW with philosophers will be misleading, philosophers use a lot of technical vocabulary that differs from the standard usage. So by "exists" philosophers tend to mean something like "is quantified over in our fundamental theory of the universe". So nominalists in mathematics tend to be arguing something like (and this is a dangerously rough approximate), "we can describe the universe without referring to numbers etc". See Hartry Field for an example. This is rough but actually, platonism begins to seem a lot more plausible when it's understood in the way that philosophers actually use it. I suspect, then, that those from LW and philosophers are just answering different questions here.
2Spinning_Sandwich12y
I think I'm more comfortable with the negation of Platonism than with the positive claim of nominalism, but I suppose in this context we have 'nominalism' = '~Platonism'. Whether what is usually meant by 'nominalism' is the same is as unclear to me as I am uncomfortable with the idea of making a positive claim about it.
2WrongBot12y
Other: Existence is a two-valued function, not one-valued.
1pragmatist12y
Could you elaborate, please?
0WrongBot12y
Sorry for the very belated reply, but I was struggling to find the words to describe exactly what I meant. Luckily, Eliezer has already done most of it for me in his latest post. Thing A exists with respect to Thing B iff Thing A and Thing B are both part of the same causal network. So ArisKatsaris was half-right, but things outside our past and future light cones can be said to exist with respect to us if they have a causal relationship with anything that is inside our past and future light cones.
0ArisKatsaris12y
Wrongbot's idea is probably that something "exists" only in relation to something else. So things beyond the Earth's past and future light-cones don't actually "exist" for us, though they exist for themselves, and similarly things in a mathematical model of a different universe exist in relation to each other, but not in relation to us...
1[anonymous]12y
Other: Abstract objects clearly have some kind of logical existence, but it is very different from concrete existence. Also, I'm confused on this one. Also, the answer doesn't matter, so who cares. Basically Taboo exists
0A1987dM12y
Tree-in-a-forest. I think that "exist" can have (at least) two different meanings and that abstract objects exist in one of those sense but not in the other.

Politics: libertarianism or egalitarianism?

[pollid:87]

Other: utilitarianism

2Manfred12y
Other utilitarianism: symmetrized_Manfred_utilitarianism :P