If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post (even in Discussion), then it goes here.


Notes for future OT posters:

1. Please add the 'open_thread' tag.

2. Check if there is an active Open Thread before posting a new one.

3. Open Threads should be posted in Discussion, and not Main.

4. Open Threads should start on Monday, and end on Sunday.

Open thread, August 4 - 10, 2014
New Comment
309 comments, sorted by Click to highlight new comments since:
Some comments are truncated due to high volume. (⌘F to expand all)Change truncation settings
[-]Bakkot290

I wrote a userscript / Chrome extension / zero-installation bookmarklet to make finding recent comments over at Slate Star Codex a lot easier. Observe screenshots. I'll also post this next time SSC has a new open thread (unless Yvain happens to notice this).

1Creutzer
Great idea and nicely done! It also had the additional benefit of constituting my very first interaction with javascript because I needed to modify somethings. (Specifically, avoid the use of localStorage.)
0Bakkot
I'm curious what you used instead (cookies?), or did you just make a historyless version? Also, why did you need that? localStorage isn't exactly a new feature (hell, IE has supported it since version 8, I think).
1Creutzer
It appears that my Firefox profile has some security features that mess with localStorage in a way that I don't understand. I used Greasemonkey's GM_[sg]etValue instead. (Important and maybe obvious, but not to me: their use has to be desclared with @grant in the UserScript preamble.)
1Risto_Saarelma
This looks excellent.
0NancyLebovitz
I tried downloading it by clicking on "install the extension", but it doesn't seem to get to my browser (Chrome). Am I missing something?.
5Bakkot
"Install the extension" is a link bringing you to the chrome web store, where you can install it by clicking in the upper-right. The link is this, in case it's Github giving you trouble somehow. If the Chrome web store isn't recognizing that you're running Chrome, that's probably not a thing I can fix, though you could try saving this link as something.user.js, opening chrome://extensions, and dragging the file onto the window.
2NancyLebovitz
Thank you. That worked. I never would have guessed that an icon which simply had the word "free" on it was the download button. Would it be worth your while to do this for LW? It makes me crazy that the purple edges for new comments are irretrievably lost if the page is downloaded again.
6Bakkot
Sure. Remarkably little effort required, it turned out. (Chrome extension is here.) I guess I'll make a post about this too, since it's directly relevant to LW.
1Risto_Saarelma
This doesn't seem to handle stuff deep enough in the reply chain to be behind "continue this thread" links. On the massive threads where you most need the thing, a lot of the discussion is going to end up beyond those.
0Bakkot
It seems to work for me. "Continue this thread" brings you to a new page, so you'll have to set the time again, is all. Comments under a "Load more" won't be properly highlighted until you click in and out of the time textbox after loading them.
1Risto_Saarelma
The use case is that I go to the top page of a huge thread, the only new messages are under a "Continue this thread" link, and I want the widget to tell me that there are new messages and help me find them. I don't want to have to open every "Continue" link to see if there are new messages under one of them.
0Bakkot
Ah. That's much more work, since there's no way of knowing if there's new comments in such a situation without fetching all of those pages. I might make that happen at some point, but not tonight.
2NancyLebovitz
Thanks very much. I think there's an "unpack the whole page" program somewhere. Anyone remember it?
0A1987dM
Thanks a million!

In your open thread inbox, less wrong comments have the options "context" and "report" (in that order), whereas private messages have "report" and "reply" (in that order). Many times I've accidentally pressed "report" on a private message, and fortunately caught myself before continuing.

I'd suggest reversing the order of "report" and "reply", so that they fit with the comments options.

Right, that's my tiny suggestion for this month :-)

[-]Bakkot210

I wrote a userscript to add a delay and checkbox reading "I swear by all I hold sacred that this comment supports the collective search for truth to the very best of my abilities." before allowing you to comment on LW. Done in response to a comment by army1987 here.

Edit: per NancyLebovitz and ChristianKl below, solicitations for alternative default messages are welcomed.

9NancyLebovitz
"To the very best of my abilities" seems excessive to me, or at least I seem to do reasonably well with "according to the amount of work I'm willing to put in, and based on pretty good habits". I'm not even sure what I could do to improve my posting much. I could be more careful to not post when I'm tired or angry, and that probably makes sense to institute as a habit. On the other hand, that's getting rid of some of the dubious posting, which is not the same thing as improving the average or the best posts.
2satt
Even when I'd only been here a few weeks, your posting had already caught my eye as unusually mindful & civil, and nothing since has changed my impression that you're far better than most of us at conversing in good faith and with equanimity.
3ChristianKl
Given the recent discussion about how rituals can give the appearance of cultishness, it's probably not good time to bring that up at the moment ;)
1A1987dM
Testing this...
0A1987dM
Nope, doesn't seem to work. (I am probably doing something wrong as I never used Greasemonkey before.)
1Bakkot
Just tested this on a clean FF profile, so it's almost certainly something on your end. Did you successfully install the script? You should've gotten an image which looks something like this, and if you go to Greasemonkey's menu while on a LW thread, you should be able to see it in the list of scripts run for that page. Also, note that you have to refresh/load a new page for it to show up after installation. Oh, and it only works for new comments, not new posts. It should look something like this, and similarly for replies. ETA: helpful debugging info: if you can, let me know what page it's not working on, and let me know if there's any errors in the developer console (shift-control-K or command-option-K for windows and Mac respectively).
0A1987dM
I had interpreted “Save this file as” in an embarrassingly wrong way. It works now! (Maybe editing the comment should automatically uncheck the box, otherwise I can hit “Reply”, check the box straight away, then start typing my comment.)

Does anyone know if something urgent has been going on with MIRI, other than the Effective Altruism Summit? I am a job application candidate -- I have no idea about my status as one. But I was promised a chat today, days ago, and nothing was arranged regarding time or medium. Now it is the end of the day. I sent my application weeks ago and have been in contact with 3 of the employees who seem to work on the management side of things. This is a bit frustrating. Ironically, I applied as Office Manager, and hope that (if hired) I would be doing my best to take care of these things -- putting things on a calendar, working to help create a protocol for 'rejecting' or 'accepting' or 'deferring' employee applications, etc. Have other people had similar, disorganized correspondences with MIRI? Or have they mostly been organized, suggesting that I take this experience as a sure sign of rejection?

[-][anonymous]180

Have other people had similar, disorganized correspondences with MIRI?

Yes.

4eggman
Apparently, in the days leading up to the Effective Altruism Summit, there was a conference on Artificial Intelligence keeping the research associates out of town. The source is my friend interning at the MIRI right now. So, anyway they might have been even busier than you thought. I hope this has cleared up now.
0BereczFereng
Still haven't heard anything back from them in any sort of way. But thanks for making their circumstances even more clear!
2BereczFereng
Heard back & talked with them. My personal issue is now resolved.

Oblique request made without any explanation: can anyone provide examples of beliefs that are incontrovertibly incorrect, but which intelligent people will nonetheless arrive at quite reasonably through armchair-theorising?

I am trying to think up non-politicised, non-controversial examples, yet every one I come up with is a reliable flame-war magnet.

ETA: I am trying to reason about disputes where on the one hand you have an intelligent, thoughtful person who has very expertly reasoned themselves into a naive but understandable position p, and on the other hand, you have an individual who possesses a body of knowledge that makes a strong case for the naivety of p.

What kind of ps exist, and do they have common characteristics? All I can come up with are politically controversial ps, but I'm starting my search from a politically-controversial starting point. The motivating example for this line of reasoning is so controversial that I'm not touching it with a shitty-stick.

Mathematical arguments happen all the time over whether 0.99999...=1 but I'm not sure if that's interesting enough to count for what you want.

-3ThisSpaceAvailable
That "0.99999...." represents a concept that evaluates to 1 is a question of notation, not mathematics. 0.99999... does not inherently equal 1; rather, by convention, it is understood to mean 1. The debate is not about the territory, it is about what the symbols on the map mean.
9KnaveOfAllTrades
Where does one draw the line, if at all? "1+1 does no inherently equal 2; rather, by convention, it is understood to mean 2. The debate is not about the territory, it is about what the symbols on the map mean." It seems to me like that--very 'mysteriously'--people who understand real analysis never complain "But 0.999... doesn't equal 1"; sufficient mathematical literacy seems to kill any such impulse, which seems very telling to me.
2tut
Yes, and that's a case of "you don't understand mathematics, you get used to it." Which applies exactly to notation and related conventions. Edit: More specifically, if we let a_k=9/10^k, and let s_n be the sum from k=1 to n of a_k, then the limit of s_n as n goes to infinity will be 1, but 1 won't be in {s_n|n in R}. When somebody who is used to calculus sees ".99..." What they are thinking of is the limit, which is 1. But before you get used to that, most likely what you think of is some member of {s_n|n in R} with an n that's large enough that you can't be bothered to write all the nines, but which is still finite.
1ThisSpaceAvailable
Exactly. The arguments about whether 0.99999.... = 1 are lacking a crucial item: a rigorous definition of what "0.9999..." refers to. The argument isn't "Is the limit as n goes to infinity of sum from 1 to n of 9*10^-n equal to 1?" It's "Here's a sequence of symbols. Should we assign this sequence of symbols the value of 1, or not?" Which is just a silly argument to have. If someone says "I don't believe that 0.9999.... = 1", the correct response (unless they have sufficient real analysis background) is not "Well, here's a proof that of that claim", it's "Well, there are various axioms and definitions that lead to that being treated as being equal to 1".
4KnaveOfAllTrades
It's not. The "0.999... doesn't equal 1" meme is largely crackpottery, and promotes amateur overconfidence and (arguably) mathematical illiteracy. Terms are precious real estate, and their interpretations really are valuable. Our thought processes and belief networks are sticky; if someone has a crap interpretation of a term, then it will at best cause unnecessary friction in using it (e.g. if you define the natural numbers to include -1,...,-10 and have to retranslate theorems because of this), and at worst one will lose track of the translation between interpretations and end up propagating false statements ("2^n can sometimes be less than 2 for n natural") It would be an accurate response (even if not the most pragmatic or tactful) to say, "Sorry, when you pin down what's meant precisely, it turns out to be a much more useful convention to define the proposition 0.999...=1 such that it is true, and you basically have to perform mental gymnastics to try to justify any usage where it's not true. There are technically alternative schemas where this could fail or be incoherent or whatever, but unless you go several years into studying math (and even then maybe only if you become a logician or model theorist or something), those are not what you'll be encountering." One could define 'marble' to mean 'nucleotide'. But I think that somebody who looked down on a geneticist for complaining about people using 'marble' as if it means 'nucleotide', and who said it was a silly argument as if the geneticist and the person who invented the new definition were Just As Bad As Each Other, would be mistaken, and I would suspect they were more interested in signalling their Cleverness via relativist metacontrarianism than getting their hands dirty figuring out the empirical question of which definitions are useful in which contexts.
3KnaveOfAllTrades
Actually, I could imagine you reading that comment and feeling it still misses your point that 0.999... is undefined or has different definitions or senses in amateur discussions. In that case, I would point to the idea that one can makes propositions about a primitive concept that turn out to be false about the mature form of it. One could make claims about evidence, causality, free will, knowledge, numbers, gravity, light, etc. that would be true under one primitive sense and false under another. Then minutes or days or month or years or centuries or millennia later it turns out that the claims were false about the correct definition. It would be a sin of rationality to assume that, since there was a controversy over definitions, and some definitions proved the claim and some disproved it, that no side was more right than another. One should study examples of where people made correct claims about fuzzy concepts, to see what we might learn in our own lives about how these things resolve. Were there hints that the people who turned out to be incorrect ignored? Did they fail to notice their confusion? Telltale features of the problem that favoured a different interpretation? etc.
0ThisSpaceAvailable
A lot (in fact, all of them that don't involve a rigorous treatment of infinite series) of the "proofs" that it does equal 1 are fallacious, and so the refusal to accept them is actually a reasonable response. You seem to making an assertion about me in your last paragraph, but doing so very obliquely. Your analogy is not very good, as people do not try to argue that one can logically prove that "marble" does not mean "nucleotide", they just say that it is defined otherwise. If we're analogizing ".9999... = 1" to "marble doesn't mean't nucleotide", then "
0KnaveOfAllTrades
Apologies for that. I don't think that that specific failure mode is particularly likely in your case, but it seems plausible to me that other people thinking in that way has shifted the terms of discourse such that that form of linguistic relativism is seen as high-status by a lot of smart people. I am more mentioning it to highlight the potential failure mode; if part of why you hold your position is that it seems like the kind of position that smart people would hold, but I can account for those smart people holding it in terms of metacontrarianism, then that partially screens off that reason for endorsing the smart people's argument. It looks like you submitted your comment before you meant to, so I shall probably await its completion before commenting on the rest.
2Adele_L
And yet I somehow doubt most of these people reject connectedness.
[-]satt190

I thought about this on & off over the last couple of days and came up with more candidates than you can shake a shitty stick at. Some of these are somewhat political or controversial, but I don't think any are reliable flame-war magnets. I expect some'll ring your cherries more than others, but since I can't tell which, I'll post 'em all and let you decide.

  1. The answer to the Sleeping Beauty puzzle is obviously 1/2.

  2. Rational behaviour, being rational, entails Pareto optimal results.

  3. Food availability sets a hard limit on the number of kids people can have, so when people have more food they have more kids.

  4. Truth is an absolute defence against a libel accusation.

  5. If a statistical effect is so small that a sample of several thousand is insufficient to reliably observe it, the effect's too small to matter.

  6. Controlling for an auxiliary variable, or matching on that variable, never worsens the bias of an estimate of a causal effect.

  7. Human nature being as brutish as it is, most people are quite willing to be violent, and their attempts at violence are usually competent.

  8. In the increasingly fast-paced and tightly connected United States, residential mobility is higher than eve

... (read more)
3pragmatist
Thanks for that list. I believed (or at least, assigned a probability greater than 0.5 to) about five of those.
3sixes_and_sevens
Thanks for this. These are all really good.
3satt
Now I just need to think of another 21 and I'll have enough for a philosophy article!
0bramflakes
... don't they? (in the long run)
2Lumifer
No, they don't -- look at contemporary Western countries and their birth rates.
0bramflakes
Oh yes I know that, I just meant in the long-long run. This voluntary limiting of birth rates can't last for obvious evolutionary reasons.
0Lumifer
I have no idea about the "long-long" run :-) The limiting of birth rates can last for a very long time as long as you stay at replacement rates. I don't think "obvious evolutionary reasons" apply to humans any more, it's not likely another species will outcompete us by breeding faster.
0bramflakes
Any genes that make people defect by having more children are going to be (and are currently being) positively selected. Besides, reducing birthrates to replacement isn't anything near a universal phenomenon, see the Mormons and Amish. It's got nothing to do with another species out-competing us - competition between humans is more than enough.
0Lumifer
This observation should be true throughout the history of the human race, and yet the birth rates in the developed countries did fall off the cliff...
2bramflakes
And animals don't breed well in captivity. Until they do.
0Azathoth123
This happened barely half a generational cycle ago. Give evolution time.
2Lumifer
So what's your prediction for what will happen when?
0satt
In the "long-long run", given ad hoc reproductive patterns, yeah, I'd expect evolution to ratchet average human fertility higher & higher until much of humanity slammed into the Malthusian limit, at which point "when people have more food they have more kids" would become true. Nonetheless, it isn't true today, it's unlikely to be true for the next few centuries unless WWIII kicks off, and may never come to pass (humanity might snuff itself out of existence before we go Malthusian, or the threat of Malthusian Assured Destruction might compel humanity to enforce involuntary fertility limits). So here in 2014 I rate the idea incontrovertibly false.

That's a tall order. I'll try:

Noticing that people who are the best in any sport practice the most and concluding that being good at a sport is simply a matter of practice and determination. Tabula Rasa in general.

The supply-demand model of minimum wage? Is this political? I'm not saying minimum wage is good or bad, just that the supply-demand model can't settle the question yet people learning about economics tend to be easily convinced by the simple explanation.

That thermodynamics proves that weight loss + maintenance is simply a matter of diet and exercise (this is more Yudkowsky's fight than mine).

I doubt it is possible to find non-controversial examples of anything, and especially of things plausible enough to be believed by intelligent non-experts, outside of the hard sciences.

If this is true, the only plausible examples would be such as "an infinity cannot be larger than another infinity", "time flows uniformly regardless of the observer", "biological species have unchanging essences", and other intuitively plausible statements unquestionably contradicted by modern hard sciences.

Most drug new drugs fail clinical trials.

Intelligent people make theories about how a drug is supposed to work and think it would help to cure some illness. Then when the drug is brought into clinical trials more than 90% of new drugs still fail to live up to the theoretical promise that the drug held.

[-]gwern270

A fun one which came up recently on IRC: everyone thinks that how your parents raise you is incredibly important, this is so obvious it doesn't need any proof and is universal common sense (how could influencing and teaching a person from scratch to 18 years old not have deep and profound effects on them?), and you can find extended discussions of the best way to raise kids from Plato's Republic to Rousseau's Emile to Spock.

Except twin studies consistently estimate that the influence of 'shared environment' (the home) is small or near-zero for many traits compared to genetics and randomness/nonshared-environment.

If you want to predict whether someone will be a smoker or smart, it doesn't matter whether they're raised by smokers or not (to borrow an example from The Nurture Assumption*); it just matters whether their biological parents were smokers and whether they get unlucky.

This is so deeply counterintuitive and unexpected that even people who are generally familiar with the relevant topics like IQ or twin studies typically don't know about this or disbelieve it.

(Another example is probably folk physics: Newtonian motion is true, experimentally confirmed, mathematically logical, ... (read more)

A fun one which came up recently on IRC: everyone thinks that how your parents raise you is incredibly important, this is so obvious it doesn't need any proof and is universal common sense, and you can find extended discussions of the best way to raise kids from Plato's Republic to Rousseau's Emile to Spock.

Except twin studies consistently estimate that the influence of 'shared environment' (the home) is small or near-zero for many traits compared to genetics and randomness/nonshared-environment.

This is quite possibly the most comforting scientific result ever for me as a parent, by the way.

Whereas for me, it's horrifying, given that my ex-spouse turned out to be an astonishingly horrible person.

I seem to recall Yvain posting a link to something he referred to as the beginnings of a possible rebuttal to The Nurture Assumption; I suppose I shall have to hang my hopes on that.

7gjm
It may or may not be comforting to reflect that your ex-spouse is probably less horrible than s/he seems to you. (Just on general outside-view principles; I have no knowledge of your situation or your ex.)
[-]gwern100

You feared more than you hoped, eh?

5IlyaShpitser
Old epi jungle saying: "the causal null is generally true."
[-]gwern110

'Shh, kemo sabe - you hear that?' 'No; the jungle is silent tonight.' 'Yes. The silence of the p-values. A wild publication bias stalks us. We must be cautious'.

4Torello
What is IRC?

Get off my lawn

6Kaj_Sotala
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_relay_chat
0Viliam_Bur
So... does it mean that it's completely irrelevant who adopted Harry Potter, because the results would be the same anyway? Or is the correct model something like: abuse can change things to worse, but any non-abusive parenting simply means the child will grow up determined by their genes? That is, we have a biologically set "destiny", and all the environment can do is either help us reach this destiny or somehow cripple us halfway (by abuse, by lack of nutrition, etc.).
8gwern
In an home environment within the normal range for a population, the home environment will matter little in a predictable sense on many traits compared to the genetic legacy, and random events/choices/biological-events/accidents/etc. There are some traits it will matter a lot on, and in a causal sense, the home environment may determine various important outcomes but not in a way that is predictable or easily measured. The other category of 'nonshared environment' is often bigger than the genetic legacy, so speaking of a biologically set destiny is misleading: biologically influenced would be a better phrase.
2banx
Has this been demonstrated for home environments in the developing world or sub-middle class home environments in the developed world? My prior understanding was that it had not been.
2Douglas_Knight
There are serious restriction of range problems with the literature. I believe that there is one small French adoption study with unrestricted range which produced 1 sigma IQ difference between the bottom and top buckets (deciles?) of adopting families. I wonder if this what Shalizi alludes to when he says that IQ is closer to that of the adoptive parents than that of the biological parents.
4satt
* Christiane Capron & Michel Duyme (1989), "Assessment of effects of socio-economic status on IQ in a full cross-fostering study", Nature, 340, 552-554 * Christiane Capron & Michel Duyme (1996), "Effect of Socioeconomic Status of Biological and Adoptive Parents on WISC-R Subtest Scores of their French Adopted Children", Intelligence, 22, 259-275 (Both references describe the same study.) Capron & Duyme found 38 French children placed for adoption before age 2, 20 of them to parents with very high socioeconomic status (operationalized as having 14-23 years of education and working a profession) and 18 to parents with very low socioeconomic status (unskilled & semi-skilled labourers or farmers, with 5-8 years of education). When the kids took the WISC-R IQ test, those adopted into the high-SES families had a mean IQ of 111.6, while those in the low-SES families had a mean IQ of 100.0, for a difference of 0.77 sigma.
2Douglas_Knight
Thanks!
2satt
In the context of IQ I've seen it claimed that normal variation in parenting doesn't do much, but extreme abuse can still have a substantial effect. So parenting quality would only make a difference at the tails of the parenting quality distribution, but there it would make quite a difference.
1drethelin
In "No Two Alike" Harris argues that the biggest non-shared environment personality determinant is peer group. So Harry Potter style "Lock him up in a closet with no friends" would actually have a huge effect.
9[anonymous]
And it should be noted that parents do have control over peer group: where to live, public school vs. private school vs. homeschooling, getting children to join things, etc. So parenting still matters even if it's all down to genetics and non-shared environment. Also, has anyone investigated whether the proper response to publicized social-science answers/theories/whatever you want to call them is to assume they're true or just wait for them to be rejected? That is: how many publicized social-science answers [the same question could be asked for diet-advice answers conflicting with pre-nutrition-studies received wisdom, etc.] were later rejected? It could well be that the right thing to do in general is stick with common sense...

And it should be noted that parents do have control over peer group: where to live, public school vs. private school vs. homeschooling, getting children to join things, etc.

Exactly! If you have something to protect as a parent, then after hearing "parents are unimportant, the important stuff is some non-genetic X" the obvious reaction is: "Okay, so how can I influence X?" (Instead of saying: "Okay, then it's not my fault, whatever.")

For example, if I want my children to be non-smokers, and I learn that whether I am smoking or not has much smaller impact than whether my children's friends are smoking... the obvious next question is: What can I do to increase the probability that my children's friends will be non-smokers? There are many indirect methods like choosing the place to live, choosing the school, choosing free-time activities, etc. I would just like to have more data on what smoking correlates with; where should I send my children and where should I prevent them from going, so that even if they "naturally" pick their peer group in that place, they will more likely pick non-smokers. (Replace non-smoking with whatever is your parenting goal.)

Shortly, when I read "parenting" in a study, I mentally translate it as: "what an average, non-strategic parent does". That's not the same as: "what a parent could do".

0[anonymous]
Fictional evidence, etc. Also, HPMOR has confounders, like a differing mechanism for Horcruxes.
0Azathoth123
As Protagoras points out here there are systematic problems with twin studies.
[-]gwern110

There are problems, but I don't think they are large, I think they are brought up mostly for ideological reasons (Shalizi is not an unbiased source and has a very big axe to grind), and a lot of the problems also cut the other way. For example, measurement error can reduce estimates of heritability a great deal, as we see in twin studies which correct for it and as predicted get higher heritability estimates, like "Not by Twins Alone: Using the Extended Family Design to Investigate Genetic Influence on Political Beliefs", Hatemi et al 2010 (this study, incidentally, also addresses the claim that twins may have special environments compared to their non-twin siblings and that will bias results, which has been claimed by people who dislike twin studies; there's no a priori reason to think this, and Hatemi finds no evidence for it, yet they had claimed it).

3gjm
Do you mean more by this than that he has very strong opinions on this topic? I would guess you do -- that you mean there's something pushing him towards the opinions he has, that isn't the way it is because those opinions are right. But what?
3gwern
Shalizi is somewhere around Marxism in politics. This makes his writings on intelligence very frustrating, but on the other hand, it also means he can write very interesting things on economics at times - his essay on Red Plenty is the most interesting thing I've ever seen on economics & computational complexity. Horses for courses.
3gjm
Shalizi states at least part of his position as follows: and on the same page says these things: and I have to say that none of this sounds very Marxist to me. Shalizi apparently finds revolutions dishonourable; the most notable attempts at (nominally) Marxist states, the USSR and the PRC, he criticizes in very strong terms; he wants most prices to be set by markets (at least this is how I interpret what he says on that page and others it links to). Oh, here's another bit of evidence: followed in the next paragraph by which seems to me to imply, in particular, that Shalizi doesn't consider himself "a Marxist, even a revisionist one". He's certainly a leftist, certainly considers himself a socialist, but he seems quite some way from Marxism. (And further still from, e.g., any position taken by the USSR or the PRC.)
0Douglas_Knight
How about this? Not that I think pigeon-holing him is very useful for determining his views on economics or politics, let alone IQ.
2gjm
Suggests that Marxism is an idea Shalizi is "receptive to" but not (at least to me) that he's actually a Marxist as such.
2gjm
Does having political views that approximate Marxism imply irrationally-derived views on intelligence? I don't see why it should, but this may simply be a matter of ignorance or oversight on my part. I am not an expert on Marx but would be unsurprised to hear that he made a bunch of claims that are ill-supported by evidence and have strong implications about intelligence -- say, that The Proletariat is in no way inferior in capabilities, even statistically, to The Bourgeoisie. But to me "somewhere around Marxism in politics" doesn't mean any kind of commitment to believing everything Marx wrote. It isn't obvious to me why someone couldn't hold pretty much any halfway-reasonable opinions about intelligence, while still thinking that it is morally preferable for workers to own the businesses they work for and the equipment they use, that we would collectively be better off with much much more redistribution of wealth than we currently have (or even with the outright abolition of individual property), etc. In another comment I've given my reasons for doubting that Shalizi is even "somewhere around Marxism in politics". But even if I'm wrong about that, I'm not aware of prior commitments he has that would make him unable to think rationally about intelligence. Of course it needn't be a matter of prior commitments as such. It could, e.g., be that he is immersed in generally-very-leftist thought (this being either a cause or a consequence of his own leftishness), and that since for whatever reason there's substantial correlation between being a leftist and having one set of views about intelligence rather than another, Shalizi has just absorbed a typically-leftist position on intelligence by osmosis. But, again, the fact that he could have doesn't mean he actually has. I think the guts of what you're claiming is: Shalizi's views on intelligence are a consequence of his political views; either his political views are not arrived at rationally, or the way his political
7gwern
At least part of it was reading his 'Statistical Myth' essay, being skeptical of the apparent argument for some of the reasons Dalliard would lay out at length years later, reading all the positive discussions of it by people I was unsure understood either psychometrics or Shalizi's essay (which he helpfully links), and then reading a followup dialogue http://vserver1.cscs.lsa.umich.edu/~crshalizi/weblog/495.html where - at least, this is how it reads to me - he carefully covers his ass, walks back his claims, and quietly concedes a lot of key points. At that point, I started to seriously wonder if Shalizi could be trusted on this topic; his constant invocation of Stephen Jay Gould (who should be infamous by this point) and his gullible swallowing of 'deliberate practice' as more important than any other factor which since has been pretty convincingly debunked (both on display in the dialogue) merely reinforce my impression and the link to Gould (Shalizi's chief comment on Gould's Mismeasure of Man is apparently solely "I do not recommend this for the simple reason that I read it in 1988, when I was fourteen. I remember it as a very good book, for whatever that's worth."; no word on whether he is bothered by Gould's fraud) suggests it's partially ideological. Another revealing page: http://vserver1.cscs.lsa.umich.edu/~crshalizi/notebooks/iq.html I can understand disrecommending Rushton, but disrecommending Jensen who invented a lot of the field and whose foes even admire him? Recommending a journalist from 1922? Recommending some priming bullshit? (Where's the fierce methodologist statistician when you need him...?) There's one consistent criterion he applies: if it's against IQ and anything to do with it, he recommends it, and if it's for it, he disrecommends it. Apparently only foes of it ever have any of the truth.
0gjm
Informative. Thanks! Though I must admit that my reaction to the pages of Shalizi that you cite isn't the same as yours.
3Barry_Cotter
I believe his political views are somewhere between way to the left of the Democratic Party and socialism. He dislikes the entire field of intelligence research in psychology because it's ideologically inconvenient. He criticises anything that he can find to criticise about it. Think of him as Stephen Jay Gould, but much smarter and more honest.
2gjm
See, this is a place where the US is different from Europe. Because over here (at least in the bit of Europe I'm in), being "somewhere to the right of socialism" isn't thought of as the kind of crazy extremism that ipso facto makes someone dangerously biased and axe-grindy. Now, of course politics is what it is, and affiliation with even the most moderate and reasonable political position can make otherwise sensible people completely blind to what's obvious to others. So the fact that being almost (but not quite) a socialist looks to me like a perfectly normal and sensible position is perfectly compatible with Shalizi being made nuts by it. But to me "he's somewhere to the left of Barack Obama" doesn't look on its own like something that makes someone a biased source and explains what their problem is.

Being an extremist by local standards may be more relevant than actual beliefs.

4gjm
Yup, that's a good point. (Though it depends on what "local" means. I have the impression that academics in the US tend to be leftier than the population at large.)
8Barry_Cotter
Academia in the US is much leftier than the population at large. I believe it was Jonathan Haidt who went looking for examples of social conservatives in his field and people kept nomimating Philip Tetlock who would not describe himself thus. At a conference Dr.Haidt was looking for a show of hands for various political positions. Republicans were substantially less popular than Communists. Psychology is about as left wing as sociology and disciplines vary but academia is a great deal to the left of the US general population.
4satt
I'd generalize that to something like * collecting published results in medicine, psychology, epidemiology & economics journals gives an unbiased idea of the sizes of the effects they report which is wrong at least twice over (publication bias and correlation-causation confusion) but is, I suspect, an implicit assumption made by lots of people who only made it to the first stage of traditional rationality (and reason along the lines of "normal people are full of crap, scientists are smarter and do SCIENCE!, so all I need to do to be correct is regurgitate what I find in scientific journals").
1ChristianKl
Then don't. I point is more that if you only have theory and no empiric evidence, then it's likely that you are wrong. That doesn't mean that having a bit of empiric evidence automatically means that you are right. I also would put more emphasis on having empiric feedback loops than at scientific publications. Publications are just one way of feedback. There a lot to be learned about psychology by really paying attention on other people with whom you interact. If I interact with a person who has a phobia of spider and solve the issue and afterwards put a spider on his arm and the person doesn't freak out, I have my empiric feedback. I don't need a paper to tell me that the person doesn't have a phobia anymore.
2satt
Yes, I agree. To clarify, I was neither condoning the belief in my bullet point, nor accusing you of believing it. I just wanted to tip my hat to you for inspiring my example with yours.
0ChristianKl
Ah, okay.
[-][anonymous]130

If a plane is on a conveyor belt going at the same speed in the opposite direction, will it take off?

I remember reading this in other places I don't remember, and it seems to inspire furious arguments despite being non-political and not very controversial.

2NancyLebovitz
That reminds me of the question of whether hot water freezes faster than cold water.
1Shmi
That's a great example. If I recall, people who get worked up about it generally feel that the answer is obvious and the other side is stupid for not understanding the argument.
0A1987dM
Same speed with respect to what? This sound kind of like the tree-in-a-forest one.
2satt
As I remember the problem, the plane's wheels are supposed to be frictionless so that their rotation is uncoupled from the rest of the plane's motion. Hence the speed of the conveyor belt is irrelevant and the plane always takes off. Now, if you had a helicopter on a turntable...
0A1987dM
What I mean is, on hearing that I thought of a conveyor belt whose top surface was moving at a speed -x with respect to the air, and a plane on top of it moving at a speed x with respect to the top of the conveyor belt, i.e. the plane was stationary with respect to the air. But on reading the Snopes link what was actually meant was that the conveyor belt was moving at speed -x and the plane's engines were working as hard as needed to move at speed x on stationary ground with no wind.
0tut
While at the same time the rolling speed of the plane, which is the sum of it's forward movement and the speed of the treadmill, is supposed to be equal to the speed of the treadmill. Which is impossible if the plane moves forward.
0satt
I'm not sure what you mean by "rolling speed of the plane", "it's forward movement", and "speed of the treadmill". The phrase "rolling speed" sounds like it refers to the component of the plane's forward motion due to the turning of its wheels, but that's not a coherent thing to talk about if one accepts my assumption that the wheels are uncoupled from the plane.
0tut
Rolling speed = how fast the wheels turn, described in terms of forward speed. So it's the circumference of the wheels multiplied by their angular speed. And the wheels are not uncoupled from the plane they are driven by the plane. It was only assumed that the friction in the wheel bearings is irrelevant. Forward movement of the plane = speed of the plane relative to something not on the treadmill. I guess I should have called it airspeed, which it would be if there is no wind. Speed of the treadmill = how fast the surface of the treadmill moves. And that is more time than I wanted to spend rehashing this old nonsense. The grandparent was only meant to explain why the great grandparent would not have settled the issue, not to settle it on its own. The only further comment I have is the whole thing is based on an unrealistic setup, which becomes incoherent if you assume that it is about real planes and real treadmills.
0satt
Fair enough. I have to chip in with one last comment, but you'll be happy to hear it's a self-correction! My comments don't account for potential translational motion of the wheels, and they should've done. (The translational motion could matter if one assumes the wheels experience friction with the belt, even if there's no internal wheel bearing friction.)
0tut
That's different though. The Plane on a Treadmill started with somebody specifying some physically impossible conditions, and then the furious arguments were between people stating the implication of the stated conditions on one side and people talking about the real world on the other hand.
8solipsist
If your twin's going away for 20 years to fly around space at close to the speed of light, they'll be 20 years older when they come back. A spinning gyroscope, when pushed, will react in a way that makes sense. If another nation can't do anything as well as your nation, there is no self-serving reason to trade with them. You shouldn't bother switching in the Monty Hall problem The sun moves across the sky because it's moving. EDIT Corrected all statements to be false
0gjm
I think you may have expressed this one the wrong way around; the way you've phrased it ("can make you better off") is the surprising truth, not the surprising untruth.
0gjm
They will. I think you mean: If your twin flies through space at close to the speed of light and arrives back 20 years later, they'll be 20 years older when they come back. That one's false.
0solipsist
Reversed polarity on a few statements. Thanks.
0Gurkenglas
Your first statement is still correct.
2gjm
To be more explicit: What is needed to make the statement interestingly wrong is for the two 20-year figures to be in different reference frames. If your twin does something for 20 years, then they will be 20 years older; but if they do something for what you experience as 20 years they may not be.
0[anonymous]
Edited to more firmly attach "for 20 years" to the earth.
0solipsist
Rephrased to more explicitly place "for 20 years" in the earth's reference frame.
7Lumifer
Would wrong scientific theories qualify? E.g. phlogiston or aether.
6Manfred
Downwind faster than the wind. See seven pages of posts here for examples of people getting it wrong. Kant was famously wrong when he claimed that space had to be flat.
4[anonymous]
As discussed previously, this exact claim seems suspiciously absent from the first Critique.
1Manfred
I agree that Kant doesn't seem to have ever considered non-euclidean geometry, and thus can't really be said to be making an argument that space is flat. If we could drop an explanation of general relativity, he'd probably come to terms with it. On the other hand, he just assumes that two straight lines can only intersect once, and that this describes space, which seems pretty much what he was accused of.
2[anonymous]
I don't see this in the quoted passage. He's trying to illustrate the nature of propositions in geometry, and doesn't appear to be arguing that the parallel postulate is universally true. "Take, for example," is not exactly assertive. Also, have a care: those two paragraphs are not consecutive in the Critique.
5philh
This isn't very interesting, but I used to believe that the rules about checkmate didn't really change the nature of chess. Some of the forbidden moves - moving into check, or failing to move out if possible - are always a mistake, so if you just played until someone captured the king, the game would only be different in cases where someone made an obvious mistake. But if you can't move, the game ends in stalemate. So forbidding you to move into check means that some games end in draws, where capture-the-king would have a victor. (This is still armchair theorising on my part.)
5falenas108
Does it have to be something from the modern day? Because there are tons of historical examples.
7Jiro
There are many beliefs that people will arrive at through armchair theorizing, but only until they are corrected. If you came up with the idea that the Earth was flat a long time ago, nobody would correct you. If you did that today, someone would correct you; indeed, society is so full of round-Earth information that it's hard for anyone to not have heard of the refutation before coming up with the idea, unless they're a young child. Does that count as something arrived at through armchair theorizing? People would, after all, come up with it by armchair theorizing if they lived in a vacuum. They did come up with it through armchair theorizing back when they did live in a vacuum. That's why there are tons of historical examples and not so many modern examples. A modern example has to be something where the refutation is well known by experts, but the refutation hasn't made it down to the common person, because if the refutation did make it down to the common person that would inhibit them from coming up with the armchair theory in the first place. (For historical examples, 1. It's possible that the refutation is known by our experts, but not by contemporary experts, or 2. because of the bad state of mass communication in ancient times, the refutation simply hasn't spread enough to reach most armchair theorists.)
3sixes_and_sevens
Something from the modern day, yes. The people arriving at the naive belief, and the people with the ability to demonstrate its incorrect status, should coexist.
5falenas108
Sorry to keep going on this, but would looking at a historical example of a group of intelligent people arriving at a naive belief, even though there was plenty of evidence available at the time that this is a naive belief work?
3sixes_and_sevens
Possibly, yes. I'd love to hear whatever you've got in mind.
-8polymathwannabe
2pragmatist
Bell's spaceship paradox. According to Bell, he surveyed his colleagues at CERN (clearly a group of intelligent, qualified people) about this question, and most of them got it wrong. Although, to be fair, the conflict here is not between expert reasoning and domain knowledge, since the physicists at CERN presumably possessed all the knowledge you need (basic special relativity, really) to get the right answer.
1philh
When I was ~16, I came up with group selection to explain traits like altruism.
0KnaveOfAllTrades
Generalising from 'plane on a treadmill'; a lot of incorrect answers to physics problems and misconceptions of physics in general. For any given problem or phenomenon, one can guess a hundred different fake explanations, numbers, or outcomes using different combinations of passwords like 'because of Newton's Nth law', 'because of drag', 'because of air resistance', 'but this is unphysical so it must be false' etc. For the vast majority of people, the only way to narrow down which explanations could be correct is to already know the answer or perform physical experiments, since most people don't have a good enough physical intuition to know in advance what types of physical arguments go through, so should be in a state of epistemic learned helplessness with respect to physics.
2sixes_and_sevens
I have a strange request. Without consulting some external source, can you please briefly define "learned helplessness" as you've used it in this context, and (privately, if you like) share it with me? I promise I'll explain at some later date.
5KnaveOfAllTrades
There will probably be holes and not quite capture exactly what I mean, but I'll take a shot. Let me know if this is not rigorous or detailed enough and I'll take another stab, or if you have any other follow-up. I have answered this immediately, without changing tab, so the only contamination is saccading my LW inbox beforing clicking through to your comment, the titles of other tabs, etc. which look (as one would expect) to be irrelevant. Helplessness about topic X - One is not able to attain a knowably stable and confident opinion about X given the amount of effort one is prepared to put in or the limits of one's knowledge or expertise etc. One's lack of knowledge of X includes lack of knowledge about the kinds of arguments or methods that tend to work in X, lack of experience spotting crackpot or amateur claims about X, and lack of general knowledge of X that would allow one to notice one's confusion at false basic claims and reject them. One is unable to distinguish between ballsy amateurs and experts. Learned helplessness about X - The helplessness is learned from experience of X; much like the sheep in Animal Farm, one gets opinion whiplash on some matter of X that makes one realise that one knows so little about X that one can be argued into any opinion about it. (This has ended up more like a bunch of arbitrary properties pointing to the sense of learned helplessness rather than a slick definition. Is it suitable for your purposes, or should I try harder to cut to the essence?) Rant about learned helplessness in physics: Puzzles in physics, or challenges to predict the outcome of a situation or experiment, often seem like they have many different possible explanations leading to a variety of very different answers, with the merit of these explanations not being distinguishable except to those who have done lots of physics and seen lots of tricks, and maybe even then maybe you just need to already know the answer before you can pick the correct answer.
6sixes_and_sevens
Thanks for that. The whole response is interesting. I ask because up until quite recently I was labouring under a wonky definition of "learned helplessness" that revolved around strategic self-handicapping. An example would be people who foster a characteristic of technical incompetence, to the point where they refuse to click next-next-finish on a noddy software installer. Every time they exhibit their technical incompetence, they're reinforced in this behaviour by someone taking the "hard" task away from them. Hence their "helplessness" is "learned". It wasn't until recently that I came across an accurate definition in a book on reinforcement training. I'm pretty sure I've had "learned helplessness" in my lexicon for over a decade, and I've never seen it used in a context that challenged my definition, or used it in a way that aroused suspicion. It's worth noting that I probably picked up my definition through observing feminist discussions. Trying a mental find-and-replace on ten years' conversations is kind of weird. I am also now bereft of a term for what I thought "learned helplessness" was. Analogous ideas come up in game theory, but there's no snappy self-contained way available to me for expressing it.
3KnaveOfAllTrades
Good chance you've seen both of these before, but: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Learned_helplessness and http://squid314.livejournal.com/350090.html Damn, if only someone had created a thread for that, ho ho ho Strategic incompetence? I'm not sure if maybe Schelling uses a specific name (self-sabotage?) for that kind of thing?
4sixes_and_sevens
Schelling does talk about strategic self-sabotage, but it captures a lot of deliberated behaviour that isn't implied in my fake definition. Also interesting to note, I have read that Epistemic Learned Helplessness blog entry before, and my fake definition is sufficiently consistent with it that it doesn't stand out as obviously incorrect.
0satt
Now picturing a Venn diagram with three overlapping circles labelled "epistemic learned helplessness", "what psychologists call 'learned helplessness'", and "what sixes_and_sevens calls 'learned helplessness'"!
0satt
Making up a term for this..."reinforced helplessness"? (I dunno whether it'd generalize to cover the rest of what you formerly meant by "learned helplessness".)
0[anonymous]
The sun revolves around the earth.
6gwern
The earth revolving around the sun was also armchair reasoning, and refuted by empirical data like the lack of observable parallax of stars. Geocentrism is a pretty interesting historical example because of this: the Greeks reached the wrong conclusion with right arguments. Another example in the opposite direction: the Atomists were right about matter basically being divided up into very tiny discrete units moving in a void, but could you really say any of their armchair arguments about that were right?
0Douglas_Knight
It is not clear that the Greeks rejected heliocentrism at all, let alone any reason other than heresy. On the contrary, Hipparchus refused to choose, on the grounds of Galilean relativity. The atomists got the atomic theory from the Brownian motion of dust in a beam of light. the same way that Einstein convinced the final holdouts thousands of years later.
0gwern
Eh? I was under the impression that most of the Greeks accepted geocentrism, eg Aristotle. Double-checking https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heliocentrism#Greek_and_Hellenistic_world and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ancient_Greek_astronomy I don't see any support for your claim that heliocentrism was a respectable position and geocentrism wasn't overwhelmingly dominant. Cite? I don't recall anything like that in the fragments of the Pre-socratics, whereas Eleatic arguments about Being are prominent.
0Douglas_Knight
Lucretius talks about the motion of dust in light, but he doesn't claim that it is the origin of the theory. When I google "Leucippus dust light" I get lots of people making my claim and more respectable sources making weaker claims, like "According to traditional accounts the philosophical idea of simulacra is linked to Leucippus’ contemplation of a ray of light that made visible airborne dust," but I don't see any citations to where this tradition is recorded.
0Douglas_Knight
The Greeks cover hundreds of years. They made progress! You linked to a post about the supposed rejection of Aristarchus's heliocentric theory. It's true that no one before Aristarchus was heliocentric. That includes Aristotle who died when Aristarchus was 12. Everyone agrees that the Hellenistic Greeks who followed Aristotle were much better at astronomy than the Classical Greeks. The question is whether the Hellenistic Greeks accepted Aristarchus's theory, particularly Archimedes, Apollonius, and Hipparchus. But while lots of writings of Aristotle remain, practically nothing of the later astronomers remain. It's true that secondary sources agree that Archimedes, Apollonius, and Hipparchus were geocentric. However, they give no evidence for this. Try the scholarly article cited in the post you linked. It's called "The Greek Heliocentric Theory and Its Abandonment" but it didn't convince me that there was an abandonment. That's where I got the claim about Hipparchus refusing to choose. I didn't claim that there was any evidence that it was respectable, let alone dominant, only that there was no evidence that it was rejected. The only solid evidence one way or the other is the only surviving Hellenistic astronomy paper, Archimedes's Sandreckoner, which uses Aristarchus's model. I don't claim that Archimedes was heliocentric, but that sure sounds to me like he respected heliocentrism. Maybe heliocentrism survived a century and was finally rejected by Hipparchus. That's a world of difference from saying that Seleucus was his only follower. Or maybe it was just the two of them, but we live in a state of profound ignorance. As for the ultimate trajectory of Greek science, that is a difficult problem. Lucio Russo suggests that Roman science is all mangled Greek science and proposes to extract the original. For example, Seneca claims that the retrograde motion of the planets is an illusion, which sounds like he's quoting someone who thinks the Earth moves, even if he d
0gwern
So, you just have an argument from silence that heliocentrism was not clearly rejected? I just read through the bits of Sand Reckoner referring to Aristarchus (Mendell's translation), and throughout Archimedes seems to be at pains to distance himself from Aristarchus's model, treating it as a minority view (emphasis added): Not language which suggests he takes it particularly seriously, much less endorses it. In fact, it seems that the only reason Archimedes brings up Aristarchus at all is as a form of 'worst-case analysis': some fools doubt the power of mathematics and numbers, but Archimedes will show that even under the most ludicrously inflated estimate of the size of the universe (one implied by Aristarchus's heliocentric model), he can still calculate & count the number of grains of sands it would take to fill it up; hence, he can certainly calculate & count the number for something smaller like the Earth. From the same chapter: And he triumphantly concludes in ch4:
0Douglas_Knight
All I have ever said is that you should stop telling fairy tales about why the Greeks rejected heliocenrism. If the Sandreckoner convinces you that Archimedes rejected heliocentrism, fine, whatever, but it sure doesn't talk about parallax. I listed several pieces of positive evidence, but I'm not interested in the argument.
1gwern
The Sand Reckoner implies the parallax objection when it uses an extremely large heliocentric universe! Lack of parallax is the only reason for such extravagance. Or was there some other reason Aristarchus's model had to imply a universe lightyears in extent...?
0Douglas_Knight
Aristarchus using a large universe is evidence that he thought about parallax. It is not evidence that his opponents thought about parallax. You are making a circular argument: you say that the Greeks rejected heliocentrism for a good reason because they invoked parallax, but you say that they invoked parallax because you assume that they had a good reason. There is a contemporary recorded reason for rejecting Aristarchus: heresy. There is also a (good) reason recorded by Ptolemy 400 years later, namely wind speed.
0gwern
Uh... why would the creator of the system consider parallax an issue, and the critics not consider parallax an issue? And you still haven't addressed my quotes from The Sand Reckoner indicating Archimedes considered heliocentrism dubious and a minority view, which should override your arguments from silence. No. I said parallax is why they rejected it in part because to save the model one has to make the universe large, then you said 'look! Archimedes uses a large universe!', and I pointed out this is 100% predicted by the parallax-rejection theory. So what? Where is your alternate explanation of why the large-universe - did Archimedes just make shit up? And how do these lead to a large universe...?
0Douglas_Knight
The very question is whether the critics made good arguments. You are assuming the conclusion. People make stupid arguments all the time. Anaxagoras was prosecuted for heresy and Aristarchus may have been. How many critics of Copernicus knew that he was talking about what happens over the course of a year, not what happens over the course of a day? Yes, Archimedes says that Aristarchus's position is a minority. Not dubious. I do not see that in the quotes at all. Yes, Archimedes probably uses Aristarchus's position for the purposes of worst-case analysis to get numbers as large as possible; indeed, they are larger than the numbers Ptolemy attributes to Aristarchus. As I said at the beginning, I do not claim that he endorsed heliocentrism, only that he considered it a live hypothesis. One mystery is what is the purpose of the Sandreckoner. Is it just about large numbers? Or is it also about astronomy? Is Archimedes using exotic astronomy to justify his interest in exotic mathematics? Or is he using his public venue to promote diversity in astronomy?
0gwern
It's assuming the conclusion to think critics agreed with Aristarchus's criticism of a naive heliocentric theory? I disagree strongly. I don't see how you could possibly read the parts I quoted, and italicized, and conclude otherwise. Like, how do you do that? How do you read those bits and read it as anything else? What exactly is going through your head when you read those bits from Sand Reckoner, how do you parse it? Gee, if only I had quoted the opening and ending bits of the Sand Reckoner where Archimedes explained his goal...
0Douglas_Knight
Many people object to Copernicus on the grounds that Joshua made the Sun stand still, or on grounds of wind, without seeming to realize that they object to the daily rotation of the Earth, not to his special suggestion of the yearly revolution of the Earth about the Sun. If Copernicus had such lousy critics, why assume Aristarchus had good critics who were aware of his arguments? Maybe they objected to heresy, like (maybe) Cleanthes. Archimedes was a smart guy who understood what Aristarchus was saying. He seems to accept Aristarchus's argument that heliocentrism implies a large universe. If (if!) he rejects the premise, that does not tell us why. Maybe because he rejects the conclusion. Or maybe he rejects the premise for completely different consequences, like wind. Or maybe he is not convinced by Aristarchus's main argument (whatever that was) and doesn't even bother to move on to the consequences. Ptolemy does give a reason: he says wind. He has the drawback of being hundreds of years late, so maybe he is not representative, but at least he gives a reason. If you extract any reason, that is the one to pick. The principal purpose of the Sandreckoner is to investigate infinity, to eliminate the realm of un-nameable numbers, thus to eliminate the confusion between un-nameably large and infinite. But there are many other choices that go into the contents, and they may be motivated by secondary purposes. Physical examples are good. Probably sand is a cliche. But why talk about astronomy at all? Why not stop at all the sand in the world? Or fill the sphere of the sun with sand, stopping at Aristarchus's non-controversial calculation of that distance? Such choices are rarely explained. I offered two possibilities and the text does not distinguish them.
0gwern
You have not explained why Aristarchus would make his universe so large if the criticisms were as bogus as some of Copernicus's critics. Shits and giggles? If he rejects heliocentrism, as he clearly does, it does not matter for your original argument why exactly. You still have not addressed the quotes from Sand Reckoner I gave which clearly show Archimedes rejects heliocentrism and describes it as a minority rejected position and he only draws on Aristarchus as a worst-case a fortiori argument. Far from being a weak argument from silence (weak because while we lack a lot of material, I don't think we lack so much material that they could have seriously maintained heliocentrism without us knowing; absence of evidence is evidence of absence), your chosen Sand Reckoner example shows the opposite. If this is the best you can do, I see no reason to revise the usual historical scenario that heliocentrism was rejected because any version consistent with observations had absurd consequences.
0Douglas_Knight
Aristarchus made the universe big because he himself thought about parallax. Maybe some critic first made this objection to him, but such details are lost to time, and uninteresting to compared to the question of the response to the complete theory. As to the rest, I abandon all hope of convincing you. I ask only that any third parties read the whole exchange and not trust Gwern's account of my claims.
0ChristianKl
Atoms can actually be divided into parts, so it's not clear that the atomists where right. If you would tell some atomist about quantum states, I would doubt that they would find that to be a valid example of what they mean with "atom".
7gwern
The atomists were more right than the alternatives: the world is not made of continuously divisible bone substances, which are bone no matter how finely you divide them, nor is it continuous mixtures of fire or water or apeiron.
2Richard_Kennaway
You could say the same of Dalton.
0NancyLebovitz
How about "human beings only use 10% of their brains"? Not political, not flamebait, but possibly also "a lot of people say it and sounds plausible" rather than armchair theorizing. "Everyone should drink eight glasses of water a day" is probably in the same category.
3sixes_and_sevens
I looked through Wikipedia's list of common misconceptions for anything that people might arise independently in lots of people through reasonable reflection, rather than just "facts" that sneak into the public consciousness, but none of them really qualify.
0Azathoth123
Of course, false "facts" can also easily sneak into less trafficked Wikipedia pages, such as its list of common misconceptions.
-1Leonhart
Perhaps "The person who came out of the teleporter isn't me, because he's not made of the same atoms"?
-1John_Maxwell
Why not also spend an equally amount of time searching for examples that prove the opposite of the point you're trying to make? Or are you speaking to an audience that doesn't agree this is possible in principle? Edit: Might Newtonian physics be an example?
[-][anonymous]140

A thought I've had floating around for a few years now.

With the Internet, it's a lot easier to self-study than ever before. This changes the landscape. Money is much less of a limiting factor, and things like time, motivation, and availability of learning material are now more important. It occurs to me that the last is greatly language-dependent. If the only language you speak is spoken by five million other people, you might as well not have the Internet at all. But even if you speak a major language, the material you'll be getting is greatly inferior in quantity, and probably quality, to material available to English speakers. Just checking stats for Wikipedia, the English version is many times larger than other versions and scores much better on all indices. For newer things like MOOCS and Quora, the gap is even larger, and a counterpart often doesn't even exist (Based on my experiences with Korean, my native language).

Could this spark a significant education gap between English speakers and non-speakers? Since learning through the web has only recently become competitive with traditional methods of learning, we shouldn't expect to see the bulk of the effects for at least a decade or so.

Given that most of the important scientific papers are in English there already a gap between people who can speak English and people who don't. I don't think that you can get a good position in a Western business these days if you can't speak any English.

2[anonymous]
I was thinking more in terms of nations. The top few percent of any country can already speak English and have all the resources necessary for learning. The education the rest get is largely determined by the quality of their country's educational system. MOOCs disrupt this pattern.
3ChristianKl
I personally didn't learn my English in the formal education system of Germany but on the internet. I think that countries like Korea, China or Japan don't really provide students with much free time to learn English on their own or use MOOCs.
0[anonymous]
That's interesting. Would you say that your English ability is typical of what an intelligent German speaker could attain through the Internet? For Koreans, learning English well enough to comfortably learn in it is extremely difficult short of living in an English speaking country for multiple years at a young age. I hear that the Japanese also have this problem. I knew that it's easier for speakers of European languages to learn English than for East Asian languages, but your ability is way above what I thought would be feasible without spending insane amounts of time on English. If you are typical, well that explains why RichardKennaway belowmentioned choosing to learn English as if it were a minor thing. You see, I have this perception of English as a "really hard thing" that takes years to get mediocre at. And I believe this is the common view among East Asians.
7Kaj_Sotala
I recall reading a news article that claimed that the difference between the kids who play a lot of video games and spend a lot of time on the English-speaking Internet, and the kids who do not, is very obvious in the English classes of most Finnish schools these days. Basically the avid gamers get top grades without even trying much. My personal experience was similar - I learned very little English in school that I wouldn't already have learned from video games, books, and the English-speaking Internet before that. That said, this doesn't contradict the "it takes years to become good" idea - it did take us years, we just had pretty much our entire childhoods to practice.
4Emile
The important category is probably speakers of germanic languages; Italians and Russians probably don't get as big of an advantage.
5gjm
I strongly suspect that they're still a lot better off than native speakers of (say) Mandarin or Korean or Japanese. To be more specific: I suspect German is somewhat better for this purpose than Italian, which in turn is substantially better than Russian, which in turn is substantially better than Hungarian, which in turn is substantially better than Mandarin. * English and German are both Germanic languages. They share a lot of structure and vocabulary and are written with more or less the same letters. * English and Italian are both languages with a lot of Latin in their heritage. They share some structure and a lot of vocabulary and are written with exactly the same letters. * English and Russian are both Indo-European languages with some classical heritage. They share some structure but rather little vocabulary, and their writing systems are closely related. * Hungarian is not Indo-European, but largely shares its writing system with English. * Mandarin is not Indo-European (and I think is decidedly further from Indo-European than Hungarian is). It works in a completely different way from English in many many ways, and has a radically (ha!) different writing system. I would guess (but don't know enough for my guess to be worth much) that the gap between Hungarian and Mandarin is substantially the largest of the ones above, and that one could find other languages that would slot into that gap while maintaining the "substantially better" progression.
0Emile
Agreed. I don't think the writing system would account for that much of a difference, since learning the Latin Alphabet is something everybody is doing anyway, and it's not much extra work (compared to grammar and vocabulary). I still suspect Hungarian-speakers might find English easier because of closer cultural assumptions and background.
1ChristianKl
I probably do spend insane amounts of time on the English internet. An amount of time that a Japanese student simply couldn't because he's to busy keeping up with the extensive school curriculum in the Japan. East Asians tend to spend a lot of time to drill children to perform well on standardized tests with doesn't leave much time for things like learning English. Another issue is that a lot of the language teaching of English in East Asia is simply highly inefficient. That will change with various internet elearning projects. An outlier would be Singapore where as Wikipedia suggest: "The English language is now the most medium form of communication among students from primary school to university."
3Emile
I've seen them spend a lot of time drilling for standardized English tests, but those tests miss a lot of things, and quite a few students do well on those tests but can't have a conversation in English. Or know what "staunch", "bristle", and "bulwark" mean, but not "bullshit".
7Richard_Kennaway
And ability to learn. The greater the gap, the greater the incentive for non-speakers to narrow the gap by becoming speakers.
1[anonymous]
Yes, but only if the gap is known to exist.

I recently learned that chocolate contain significant amount of coffeine. 100g chocolate contain roughly as much as a cup of black tea. As a result I updated in the direction of not eating chocolate directly before going to bed.

I don't know whether the information is new to everyone, but it was interesting for me.

9stoat
Caffeine's a strong drug for me, except I have a huge tolerance now because I consume so much coffee. One night a few years ago, after I had quit caffeine for about a month, I was picking away at a bag of chocolate almonds while doing homework, and after a few hours I noticed that I felt pretty much euphoric. So yeah, this is good info to have if you're trying to get off caffeine.
8gwern
Besides caffeine, there's also theobromine. FWIW, I did some reading of studies and it seems that kinds of tea vary too much in caffeine content for classifying by preparation method to be a meaningful indication of caffeine content, and there's some question about how l-theanine plays a role. It's probably better to say 'a cup of tea'.
1Lumifer
Here is some data on tea caffeine content. Anecdotally, I know a person who drinks a lot of "regular" black tea (Ceylon/Assam), but doesn't drink Darjeeling tea because it gets her jittery and too-much-caffeine-shaky.
5gwern
Yeah, that was one of the studies I read on the topic. (The key part is "Caffeine concentrations in white, green, and black teas ranged from 14 to 61 mg per serving (6 or 8 oz) with no observable trend in caffeine concentration due to the variety of tea.", although they bought mostly black teas and not many white/green or any oolongs; but the other studies don't show a clear trend either.)
0Lumifer
Did you see any data on natural variability -- that is, compare the caffeine content in tea from two different bushes on the same planation; from different plantations (on different soils, different altitude, etc.)? What makes tea white/green/oolong/black is just post-harvest thermal processing and it seems likely that the caffeine content is determined at the plant level.
1gwern
Don't think so. It'd be a good study to run, but a bit challenging: even if you buy from a specific plantation, I think they tend to blend or mix leaves from various bushes, so getting the leaves would be more of a challenge than normal. I thought that they were also usually harvested at different times through the year?
2Lumifer
You mean that tea intended to become, say, white, is harvested at different time than tea intended to become black? I don't think that's the case. As far as I know the major difference is what you harvest, but that expresses itself as quality of the tea, not whether it is white or oolong or black. For the top teas you harvest the bud at the tip of the branch and one or two immature leaves next to it (which often look silverish because of fine hairs on these leaves), such teas are known as "tippy". Cheaper teas harvest full-grown leaves. There might well be the difference in caffeine content between the two, but it's not a green/black difference, it's a good tea vs lousy tea difference. Darjeeling is unusual in that it has two specific harvesting seasons (called "first flush" and "second flush") but both are used to make black (well, kinda-black) tea.
1Douglas_Knight
White tea is harvested early and immature. Black/oolong/green is a matter of post-processing. White tea has huge variance in caffeine across varieties. Both tails of the distribution are white.
0Lumifer
Can you provide a link for that assertion? The post-harvesting processing of white tea is quite different from that of green, not to mention black. Also, I believe that while white tea requires top-quality leaves (the bud + 1-2 young leaves) and other teas don't, the top quality greens, oolongs, and blacks use the same "immature" leaves as white.
0ChristianKl
The average difference between different cups of tea are probably greater than the differences between different kinds of black tea. I don't see how using a wider category is helpful for giving people an idea about how much caffeine a bar of chocolate happens to have. A cup of black tea is an amount that the average person wouldn't drink right before bed. If you have a better metric for given people a meaningful idea about the amount of caffeine in chocolate feel free to suggest one.
-1gwern
And I don't see why you should make distinctions which don't make a difference, and engage in false precision. And they would drink a cup of white tea, green tea, or oolong tea right before bed? I already did: 'a cup of tea'.
3ChristianKl
There are various kind of herbal tea that don't have any coffeine in them and I do drink them before going to bed.
0gwern
Yes, but people don't usually mean herbal teas or tisanes when they say 'tea'.
3ChristianKl
That depends very much on the people with whom you interact.
0Antiochus
Caffeinated tea, then?
0Douglas_Knight
100g of pure chocolate is a lot. I normally eat 25g of 85% chocolate. That's probably an upper bound on a typical serving, diluted by other ingredients. For people who do not otherwise consume caffeine, it's a powerful dose, but for people who drink coffee every morning, it's probably not much. Added: 25g of pure chocolate has about 10mg of caffeine, about the same as 25g of liquid coffee.

I've never tried to fnord something before, did I do it right?

Frankenstein's monster doomsayers overwhelmed by Terminator's Skynet become ever-more clever singularity singularity the technological singularity idea that has taken on a life of its own techno-utopians wealthy middle-aged men singularity as their best chance of immortality Singularitarians prepared to go to extremes to stay alive for long enough to benefit from a benevolent super-artificial intelligence a man-made god that grants transcendence doomsayers the techno-dystopians Apocalypsarians equally convinced super-intelligent AI no interest in curing cancer or old age or ending poverty malevolently or maybe just accidentally bring about the end of human civilisation Hollywood Golem Frankenstein's monster Skynet and the Matrix fascinated by the old story man plays god and then things go horribly wrong singularity chain reaction even the smartest humans cannot possibly comprehend how it works out of control singularity technological singularity cautious and prepared optimistic obsessively worried by a hypothesised existential risk a sequence of big ifs risk while not impossible is improbable worrying unnecessarily we're... (read more)

Many European countries, such as France, Denmark and Belgium, enjoyed jokes that were surreal, like Dr Wiseman's favourite:

An alsatian went to a telegram office and wrote: "Woof. Woof. Woof. Woof. Woof. Woof. Woof. Woof. Woof."

The clerk examined the paper and told the dog: "There are only nine words here. You could send another 'Woof' for the same price."

"But," the dog replied, "that would make no sense at all."

Dr Wiseman is now preparing scientific papers based on his findings, which he believes will benefit people developing artificial intelligence in computer programs.

Source, it's from back in 2002

On the limits of rationality given flawed minds —

There is some fraction of the human species that suffers from florid delusions, due to schizophrenia, paraphrenia, mania, or other mental illnesses. Let's call this fraction D. By a self-sampling assumption, any person has a D chance of being a person who is suffering from delusions. D is markedly greater than one in seven billion, since delusional disorders are reported; there is at least one living human suffering from delusions.

Given any sufficiently interesting set of priors, there are some possible beli... (read more)

For you to rule out a belief (e.g. geocentrism) as totally unbelievable, not only does it have to be less likely than insanity, it has to be less likely than insanity that looks like rational evidence for geocentrism.

You can test yourself for other symptoms of delusions - and one might think "but I can be deluded about those too," but you can think of it like requiring your insanity to be more and more specific and complicated, and therefore less likely.

3gjm
The relevant number is probably not D (the fraction of people who suffer from delusions) but a smaller number D0 (the fraction of people who suffer from this particular kind of delusion). In fact, not D0 but the probably-larger-in-this-context number D1 (the fraction of people in situations like yours before this happened who suffer from the particular delusion in question). On the other hand, something like the original D is also relevant: the fraction of people-like-you whose reasoning processes are disturbed in a way that would make you unable to evaluate the available evidence (including, e.g., your knowledge of D1) correctly. Aside from those quibbles, some other things you can do (mostly already mentioned by others here): * Talk to other people whom you consider sane and sensible and intelligent. * Check your reasoning carefully. Pay particular attention to points about which you feel strong emotions. * Look for other signs of delusions. * Apply something resembling scientific method: look for explicitly checkable things that should be true if B and false if not-B, and check them. * Be aware that in the end one really can't reliably distinguish delusions from not-delusions from the inside.
3mathnerd314
The simple answer is to ask someone else, or better yet a group; if D is small, then D^2 or D^4 will be infinitesimal. However, delusions are "infectious" (see Mass hysteria), so this is not really a good method unless you're mostly isolated from the main population. The more complicated answer is to track your beliefs and the evidence for each belief, and then when you get new evidence for a belief, add it to the old evidence and re-evaluate. For example, replacing an old wives' tale with a peer-reviewed study is (usually) a no-brainer. On the other hand, if you have conflicting peer-reviewed studies, then your confidence in both should decrease and you should go back to the old wives' tale (which, being old, is probably useful as a belief, regardless of truth value). Finally, the defeatist answer is that you can't actually distinguish that you are delusional. With the film Shutter Island in mind, I hope you can see that almost nothing is going to shake delusions; you'll just rationalize them away regardless. If you keep notes on your beliefs, you'll dismiss them as being written by someone else. People will either pander to your fantasy or be dismissed as crooks. Every day will be a new one, starting over from your deluded beliefs. In such a situation there's not much hope for change. For the record, I disagree with "delusional disorders being quite rare"; I believe D is somewhere between 0.5 and 0.8. Certainly, only 3% of these are "serious", but I could fill a book with all of the ways people believe something that isn't true.
9ChristianKl
Given replication rates of scientific studies a single study might not be enough. Single studies that go against your intuition are not enough reason to updat