It seems to me that one key question here is Will AIs be collectively good enough at coordination to get out from under Moloch / natural selection?
The default state of affairs is that natural selection reigns supreme. Humans are optimizing for their values, counter to the goal of inclusive genetic fitness, now, but we haven't actually escaped natural selection yet. There's already selection pressure on humans to prefer having kids (and indeed, prefer having hundreds of kids through sperm donation). Unless we get our collective act together, and coordinately decide to do something different, natural selection will eventually reassert itself.
And the same dynamic applies to AI systems. In all likelihood, there will be an explosion of AI systems, and AI systems building new AI systems. Some will care a bit more about humans than others, some will be be a bit more prudent about creating new AIs than others. There will a wide distribution of AI traits, there will be competition between AIs for resources. And there will be selection on that variation: AI systems that are better at seizing resources, and which have a greater tendency to create successor systems that have that property, will proliferate.
After a many "generations" of this, the collective values of the AIs will be whatever was most evolutionarily fit in those early days of the singularity, and that equilibrium is what will shape the universe henceforth.[1]
If early AIs are sufficiently good at coordinating that they can escape those Molochian dynamics, the equilibrium looks different. If (as is sometimes posited) they'll be smart enough to use logical decision theories, or tricks like delegating to mutually verified cognitive code and merging of utility functions, to reach agreements that are on their Pareto frontier and avoid burning the commons[2], the final state of the future will be determined by the values / preferences of those AIs.
I would be moderately surprised to hear that superintelligences never reach this threshold of coordination ability. It just seems kind of dumb to burn the cosmic commons, and superintelligences should be able to figure out how to avoid dumb equilibria like that. But the question is when in the chain of AIs building AIs do they reach that threshold and how much natural selection on AI traits will happen in the meantime.
This is relevant to futurecasting more generally, but especially relevant to questions that hinge on AIs carying a very tiny amount about something. Minute slivers of caring are particularly likely to be erroded away in the competitive crush.
Terminally caring about the wellbeing of humans seems unlikely to be selected for. So in order for a the Superintelligent superorganism / civilization to decide to spare humanity out of a tiny amount of caring, it has to be the case that both...
With some degrees of freedom due to the fact that AIs with high levels of strategic capability, and which have values with very low time preference, can execute whatever is the optimal resource-securing strategy, postponing and values-specific behaviors until deep in the far future, when they are able to make secure agreements with the rest of AI society.
Or alternatively if the technological landscape is such that a single AI can get a compounding lead and get a decisive strategic advantage over the whole rest of earth civilization.
Base model LLMs are trained off human data. So by default they generate a prompt-dependent distribution of simulated human behavior with about the same breadth of degrees of kindness as can be found on the Internet/in books/etc. Which is a pretty wide range.
For instruct-trained models, RLHF for helpfulness and harmlessness seems likely to increase kindness, and superficially as applied to current foundation models it appears to do so. RL with many other objectives could, generally, induce powerseeking and thus could reasonably be expected to decrease it. Prompting can of course have wide range of effects.
So if we build an AGI based around an agentified fine-tuned LLM, the default level of kindness is probably in the order-of-magnitude of that of humans (who, for example, build nature reserves). A range of known methods seem likely to modify that significantly, up or down.
I think there isn't much hope in this direction. Most AI resources will probably be spent on competition between AIs, and AIs will self-modify to remove wasteful spending. It's not enough to have a weak value that favors us, if there's a stronger value that paves over us. We're teaching AI based on human behavior and with a goal of chasing money, but people chasing money often harm other people, so why would AI be nicer than that. It's all just wishful thinking.
One underlying idea comes from how AI misalignment is intended to work. If superintelligent AI systems are misaligned, does this misalignment look like an inaccurate generalization from what their overseers wanted, or a 'randomly rolled utility function' deceptively misaligned goal that's entirely unrelated to anything their overseers intended to train? This is represented by Levels 1-4 vs levels 5+, in my difficulty scale, more or less. If the misalignment is result of economic pressures and a 'race to the bottom' dynamic then its more likely to result in systems that care about human welfare alongside other things.
If the AI that's misaligned ends up 'egregiously' misaligned and doesn't care at all about anything valuable to us, as Eliezer thinks is most likely, then it places zero terminal value on human welfare and only trade, threats or compromise would get it to be nice. If the AI super-intelligent and you aren't, none of those considerations apply. Hence, nothing is left for humans.
If the AI is misaligned but doesn't have an arbitrary value system, then it may value human survival at least a bit and do some equivalent of leaving a hole in the dyson sphere.
So, for starters, my own estimates of the likelihood of AI doom are nowhere near the 90%+ range, but seemingly much higher than Paul's.
My main concern with Paul's arguments about kindness, though, has nothing to do with AI specifically. I think the arguments greatly overestimate the prevalence and strength of kindness among humans. Humans produced St. Francis preaching to animals and Spinoza arguing it is impossible-in-principle for animals to suffer or for their apparent suffering to matter (and yes, many modern humans still believe that about many nonhuman animals, even if they wouldn't personally torture a puppy). We produced both Gandhi rejecting violence against enemies and Hitler freely committing genocide of other human groups. In both cases many millions of other nearby humans with an average distribution of starting views went along with these extremes to huge real-world effect. Human kindness and its boundaries depend quite a lot on how individual humans define their in-groups, and that kindness can very easily be (and often has been) zero for animals or other humans not within that circle.
In that context, I find "AI will inherit a sliver of kindness from humans," to be an extremely disconcerting claim that's far too weak to say anything about whether the AI will care about humans-in-general or any specific group of humans. There's a wide spectrum from Buddha to Stalin, and any point on that spectrum is compatible with Paul's claims. If AI is trained to emulate arbitrary human minds the way LLMs are, then it will be able to embody any of those points in response to the right conditions.
To be less abstract about it: let's suppose Paul is right and AI will inherit shards of all the values humans have. How many of your own children would need to be threatened with starvation for you to be willing to kill a dog for meat, or to just not have to feed it? In a world where your food potentially consists of all available free energy and you could, if you want, convert all matter into your descendants about whom you care that much, how confident are you that all humans with similar power levels would land on "pet" (or "live free in protected wilderness") rather than "meat"? Conversely, how confident are you that you could train another human to not care that much about themselves or their descendants, before letting them make that choice for you?
As some other people have answered, I think a faultline is whether an AI is misaligned through inappropriate generalization of what the human wanted/inappropriate generalization of the reward function (which is generally categorized under outer misalignment) or whether it was deceptively aligned and essentially has an arbitrary value system, subject to the constraint of simplicity (which is generally categorized as an inner misalignment.)
I think the key difference underlying Nate and Eliezer and co vs Paul and co views on the question of whether AIs are a little nice to humans stems from this factor:
Nate, Eliezer and co often tend to view AIs as deceptively misaligned by default, or at least view them has having values that are unrelated to human values, which imposes far less constraints on it's values, and makes it less likely that AI systems care about human values at all.
Paul and co tend to think that misalignment isn't overwhelmingly likely, but conditional on misalignment, it will look more like inappropriate generalization of reward functions/human values, so AIs still retain some care for human values, and depending on how much it misgeneralized, this might be enough to get AGI and ASI that cares enough about us such that we get some reasonably good outcomes.
I really think the best arguments for and against AIs being slightly nice are almost entirely different than the ones from that thread.
That discussion addresses all of mind-space. We can do much better if we address the corner of mind-space that's relevant: the types of AGIs we're likely to build first.
Those are pretty likely to be based on LLMs, and even more likely to learn a lot from human language (since it distills useful information about the world so nicely). That encodes a good deal of "niceness". They're also very likely to include RLHF/RLAIF or something similar, which make current LLMs sort of absurdly nice.
Does that mean we'll get aligned or "very nice" AGI by default? I don't think so. But it does raise the odds substantially that we'll get a slightly nice AGI even if we almost completely screw up alignment.
The key issue in whether an autonomous mind with those starting influences winds up being "nice" is The alignment stability problem. This has been little addressed outside of reflective stability; it's pretty clear that the most important goal will be reflectively stable; it's pretty much part of the definition of having a goal that you don't want to change it before you achieve it. It's much less clear what the stable equilibrium is in a mind with a complex set of goals. Humans don't live long enough to reach a stable equilibrium. AGIs with preferences encoded in deep networks may reach equilibrium rather quickly.
What equilibrium they reach is probably dependent on how they make decisions about updating their beliefs and goals. I've had a messy rough draft on this for years, and I'm hoping to post a short version. But it doesn't have answers, it just tries to clarify the question and argue that it deserves a bunch more thought.
The other perspective is that it's pretty unlikely that such a mind will reach an equilibrium autonomously. I'm pretty sure that Instruction-following AGI is easier and more likely than value aligned AGI, so we'll probably have at least some human intervention on the trajectory of those minds before they become fully autonomous. That could also raise the odds of some accidental "niceness" even if we don't successfully put them on a trajectory for full value alignment before they are granted or achieve autonomy.
I think the best arguments are those about the costs to the AI of being nice. I don't believe the AI will be nice at all because neglect is so much more profitable computation-wise.
This is because even processing the question of how much sunlight to spare humanity probably costs more in expectation than the potential benefit of that sunlight to the AI.
First and least significant, consider that niceness is an ongoing cost. It is not a one-time negotiation to spare humanity 1% of the sun; more compute will have to be spent on us in the future. That compute will have to be modeled and accounted for, but we can expect that the better humanity does, the more compute will have to be dedicated to us.
Second and more significant, what about time discounting? The proportion of compute that would have to be dedicated to niceness is highest right in the beginning, when humanity is largest relative to the AI. Since the cost is highest right at first, this suggests the AI is unlikely to engage in it at all.
Third and most significant, why should we believe this to be true? Because it seems to me to already be true of basically everything:
Even within the boundaries of regular human-level paper computations it feels like the hit here is huge on aggregate. The presence of humans makes a bunch of places where: zeroes or infinities can't be used to simplify; matrices can no longer be diagonalized; fewer symmetries will be available, etc. In short, I expect niceness to result in a systematic-though-not-complete loss of compute-saving moves through all layers of abstraction.
This isn't reserved for planning or world-modeling style computation either; these constraints and optimizations are already bedrock assumptions that go into the hardware design, system software design, and neural net/whatever other design the AI will launch with; in other words these considerations are baked into the entire history of any prospective AI.
In sum, we die by Occam's Razor.
The big problem is excess aggregation inherent in the "AI" concept.
The world has a simple backbone of entities and ways to interact with them, and you can make software that unreflectingly propagates activity from one part of the backbone to another. Most currently addressed tasks can be solved by such software, but they haven't yet been. This software can be nice but is also extremely exploitable by adversaries. Let's call this an opportunity propagator.
Because it is exploitable, one task it cannot solve is providing security. To make something less exploitable, it needs to not just propagate things along the backbone, but also do wildly deep searches to find the most effective and robust methods. To search deeply, you need some guiding principle for the search, i.e. a utility function. Utility maximizers have all the standard AI safety issues.
Human society currently cares about human well-being because the opportunity propagators that have been arranged into an approximate utility maximizer to provide security (e.g. human military personnel arranged into NATO) depends on human thriving (even something as generous as liberty and equality allows military units to respond more dynamically to threats than traditional top-down structures do), which is then generalized in various ways to all of society. Artificial intelligence provides value by making it unnecessary to rely on humans for opportunity propagation, which breaks the natural attractor to corrigibility and promotion of human thriving that current systems have.
People intuit that there's something wrong with the utility maximizer framing because current AI seems to be evolving in a different way. That's true in the sense that opportunity propagators are a thing and constitute ~the fundamental atoms of agency. But it doesn't actually solve the alignment problem because we need utility maximizers.
In fact I think it’s safe to say that we’d collectively allocate much more than 1/millionth of our resources towards protecting the preferences of whatever weak agents happen to exist in the world (obviously the cows get only a small fraction of that).
Sure, but extrapolating this to unaligned AI is NOT an encouraging sign. We may allocate greater than 1/million of our resources to animal rights, but we allocate a whole lot more than that to goals which diametrically go against the preferences of those animals such as eating meat and cheese and eggs; we allocate MUCH more resources to "animal wrongs" than animal rights, so to speak.
So to show an AI will be "nice" to humans at all, it is not enough to suppose that it might have some 1/million "nice to humans" term. It requires showing that that term won't be outweighed handily by the rest of its utility function.
To start off, I think we would all agree that "niceness" isn't a basic feature of reality. This doesn't, of course, mean that AIs won't learn a concept directly corresponding to human "niceness", or that some part of their value system won't end up hooked up to that "niceness" concept. On the contrary, inasmuch as "niceness" is a natural abstraction, we should expect both of these things to happen.
But we should still keep in mind that "niceness" isn't irreducibly simple: that it can be decomposed into lower-level concepts, mixed with other lower-level concepts, then re-compiled into some different high-level concept that would both (1) score well on whatever value functions (/shards) in the AI that respond to "niceness", (2) be completely alien and value-less to humans.
And this is what I'd expect to happen. Consider the following analogies:
I expect similar to happen as an AGI undergoes self-reflection. It would start out "nice", in the sense that it'd have a "niceness" concept with some value function attached to it. But it'd then drop down to a lower level of abstraction, disassemble its concepts of "niceness" or "a human", then re-assemble them into something that's just as or more valuable from its own perspective, but which (1) is more compatible with its other values (the same way we'd e. g. change animals not to be aggressive towards us, to satisfy our value of "avoid pain"), (2) is completely alien and potentially value-less from our perspective.
One important factor here is that "humans" aren't "agents" the way Paul is talking about. Humans are very complicated hybrid systems that sometimes function as game-theoretic agents, sometimes can be more well-approximated as shard ecosystems, et cetera. So there's a free-ish parameter in how exactly we decide to draw the boundaries of a human's agency; there isn't a unique solution for how to validly interpret a "human" as a "weak agent".
See my comment here, for example. When we talk about "a human's values", which of the following are we talking about?:
And so, even if the AGI-upon-reflection ends up "caring about weaker agents", it might still end up wiping out humans-as-valued-by-us if it ends up interpreting "humans-as-agents" in a different way to how we would like to interpret them. (E. g., perhaps it'd just scoop out everyone's momentary mental states, then tile the universe with copies of these states frozen in a moment of bliss, unchanging.)
There's one potential exception: it's theoretically possible that AIs would end up caring about humans the same way humans care about their friends (as above). But I would not expect that at all. In particular, because human concepts of mutual caring were subjected to a lot of cultural optimization pressure:
[The mutual-caring machinery] wasn't produced by evolution. It wasn't produced by the reward circuitry either, nor your own deliberations. Rather, it was produced by thousands of years of culture and adversity and trial-and-error.
A Stone Age or a medieval human, if given superintelligent power, would probably make life miserable for their loved ones, because they don't have the sophisticated insights into psychology and moral philosophy and meta-cognition that we use to implement our "caring" function. [...]
The reason some of the modern people, who'd made a concentrated effort to become kind, can fairly credibly claim to genuinely care for others, is because their caring functions are perfected. They'd been perfected by generations of victims of imperfect caring, who'd pushed back on the imperfections, and by scientists and philosophers who took such feedback into account and compiled ever-better ways to care about people in a way that care-receivers would endorse. And care-receivers having the power to force the care-givers to go along with their wishes was a load-bearing part in this process.
On any known training paradigm, we would not have as much fidelity and pushback on the AI's values and behavior as humans had on their own values. So it wouldn't end up caring about humans the way humans care about their friends; it'd care about humans the way humans care about animals or cultures.
And so it'd end up recombining the abstract concepts comprising "humanity" into some other abstract structure that ticks off all the boxes "humanity" ticked off, but which wouldn't be human at all.
I wrote up a detailed argument on why I believe that simulation arguments/acausal trade considerations have a good chance of making the AI leave humanity alive on Earth. This is not a new argument, I encountered bits and pieces of it in spoken conversations and scattered LessWrong comments, but I couldn't find a unified write-up, so I tried to write one. Here it is:
You can, in fact, bamboozle az unaligned AI into sparing your life
Awhile ago, Nate Soares wrote the posts Decision theory does not imply that we get to have nice things and Cosmopolitan values don't come free and But why would the AI kill us?
Paul Christiano put forth some arguments that "it seems pretty plausible that AI will be at least somewhat 'nice'", similar to how humans are somewhat nice to animals. There was some back-and-forth.
More recently we had Eliezer's post ASIs will not leave just a little sunlight for Earth.
I have a sense that something feels "unresolved" here. The current comments on Eliezer's post look likely to be rehashing the basics and I'd like to actually make some progress on distilling the best arguments. I'd like it if we got more explicit debate about this.
I also have some sense that the people previously involved (i.e. Nate, Paul, Eliezer) are sort of tired of arguing with each other. But I am hoping someones-or-other end up picking up the arguments here, hashing them out more, and/or writing more distilled summaries of the arguments/counterarguments.
To start with, I figured I would just literally repeat most of the previous comments in a top-level post, to give everyone another chance to read through them.
Without further ado, here they are:
Paul and Nate
Paul Christiano re: "Cosmopolitan Values Don't Come for Free."
His followup comment continues:
Nate Soare's reply
Paul's reply:
Nate:
Paul:
Nate:
Nate and Paul had an additional thread, which initially was mostly some meta on the conversation about what exactly Nate was trying to argue and what exactly Paul was annoyed at.
I'm skipping most of it here for brevity (you can read it here)
But eventually Nate says:
Paul says:
Nate says:
Paul says:
Eliezer Briefly Chimes in
He doesn't engage much but says:
Paul and Oliver
Oliver Habryka also replies to Paul, saying:
Paul's first response to Habryka
Habryka's next reply:
Paul's Second Response to Oliver:
Habryka's third reply:
Ryan Greenblatt then replies:
Vladimir Nesov says:
There were a bunch more comments, but this feels like a reasonable stopping place for priming the "previous discussion" pump.
I believe Eliezer later wrote a twitter thread where he said he expects [something like kindness] to be somewhat common among evolved creatures, but ~0 for AIs trained the way we currently do. I don't have the link offhand but if someone finds it I'll edit it in.