And just, what? What? This is just such a wild thing to say in that context! "[D]eserve to live, or deserve to suffer"? People around here are, like, transhumanists, right? Everyone deserves to live! No one deserves to suffer! Who in particular was arguing that some people don't deserve to live or do deserve to suffer, such that this basic level of mutual respect is in danger of not being achieved?
Come on man, you have the ability to understand the context better.
First of all, retaliation clearly has its place. If someone acts in a way that wantonly hurts others, it is the correct choice to inflict some suffering on them, for the sake of setting the right incentives. It is indeed extremely common that from this perspective of fairness and incentives, people "deserve" to suffer.
And indeed, maintaining an equilibrium in which the participants do not have outstanding grievances and would take the opportunity to inflict suffering on each other as payback for those past grievances is hard! Much of modern politics, many dysfunctional organizations, and many subcultures are indeed filled with mutual grievances moving things far away from the mutual assumption that it's good to not h...
I hope you now understand now how it's not "such a wild thing to say in that context". Indeed, it's approximately the same thing you are saying here.
Sorry for the misunderstanding. That's my bad. Your additional explanation here helps me understand what you were saying. (Readers should feel free to assign me lower status for being so dumb as to misinterpret it the first time!)
The rest of your comment, about ignoring the status implications of one's speech, is interesting. As you've noticed, I am often doing a thing where I deliberately ignore the social implications of my or others' speech (effectively "declar[ing] defeat" and "pretend[ing] that dimension is [not] there"), but I think this is often a good thing. I'm going to think more carefully about your comment and write another post explaining why I think that.
In the high stakes case: MAD makes sense and retaliation is a better equilibrium than not threatening retaliation.
In the low stakes case: If you punch me, I will likely punch back (or otherwise try to get you punished). This generally works as a fine deterrent for most cases.
I feel like this isn’t a particularly rare or weird concept. Really as basic game theory as it gets.
Habryka (or my steelman of him) raises a valid point: If members of a language community predominantly experience communication as part of a conflict, then someone trying to speak an alternate, descriptive dialect can't actually do that without establishing the credibility of that intent through adequate, contextually appropriate differential signaling costs.
I wish there were more attention paid to the obvious implications of this for just about any unironic social agenda relying on speech to organize itself: if you actually can't expect to be understood nondramatically when talking about X, then you actually can't nondramatically propose X, whether that's "do the most good" or "make sure the AI doesn't kill us all" or "go to Mars" or "develop a pinprick blood test" or anything else that hasn't already been thoroughly ritualized.
If members of a language community predominantly experience communication as part of a conflict
I don't think the premise of "predominantly experience communication as part of a conflict" (emphasis mine) is a necessary premise for costly differential signaling to become an important part of communication.
To illustrate, we can apply the same analysis to the case of physical touch. Most people experience most touch not as part of an attempt to physically hurt them. This doesn't mean that communication and negotiation about touch isn't heavily shaped by the risk of physical injury or violence. It's sufficient for a small part of touch to be related to physical violence to make it important that physical touch is accompanied with differential signaling that any given interaction will not involve violence.
Communication doesn't need to be "predominantly conflict" in order for it to be important to differentially signal that you are trying to have a more conflict focused or more descriptive-focused language[1].
And of course the problem of mimicry is real. Both engagements aiming for physical violence, and speech acts aiming to covertly change the status dynamics will have an in...
I agree that there are more complicated intermediate cases in between the extremes, which are easier to analyze because they are simpler.
Your analogy to the relation between touch and violence is logical, but I think that it relies on false albeit facially plausible premises. Our sensitivity to touch is highly socially conditioned and therefore contingent. It seems to have much more to do with negotiating territorial boundaries and dominance relations (e.g. who's allowed to touch whom in what ways) than safety in a sense that isn't mediated by such social positioning.
As a parent I see other parents tightly control how their babies are allowed to play with mine. Even under circumstances where there is no likely serious bodily harm from touch, they are anxious about the prospect of young children working out their own differences, anxious about permitting wrong kind of intimacy or conflict, and visibly working to inculcate these anxieties in their children.
I think our attitudes towards speech are similarly mediated by considerations of territoriality and dominance, such that "taking offense" has to do with demonstrating one's power to suppress adverse speech within one's territory, s...
Oh I think you're missing something pretty simple on the physical touch thing. In my model of the world the potential for violence or other form of seriously invasive acts (e.g. sexual assault) is why physical touch has gained the norms whereby unwanted touch is considered relatively more important to police boundary violations around than most unwanted behavior (which typically doesn't have as much consent-focus).
In contrast, sometimes strangers try to engage me on conversations about national politics in a way I find a complete waste of my time and soul-sucking; sometimes I am relatively high status in a room and people talk to me in a sycophantic way that I find very tedious to put up with. But this doesn't cross a line into "perhaps this person should be socially ostracized" because there isn't an underlying threat in the unwanted speech, so I just find it a bit annoying.
If someone were to regularly push me around in ways I didn't want, or touch me sexually in ways I did not want, I would make some move to have them socially ostracized, because the boundary here is much more important and it would be a sign that this person may indeed be violent or commit sexual assault. It's a really important part of why unwanted physical touch norms are more sensitive than unwanted speech is (though to be clear there are many kinds of speech that are well worth policing too).
I agree that norms around physical touch are different from norms around speech. I think it’s a decent but not perfect analogy, intended primarily to convey the structure of my argument, not as a social precedent in support of it. Feel free to choose from any other domain with asymmetricly large costs where much value is lost and costly differential signaling is required, even without the domain consisting “predominantly” of the costs.
Er, you’re the one making the analogy, so surely it’s up to you to choose a better example, not your interlocutor…
I agree he could have chosen a better example. But like, are you trying to understand Habryka? Or are you just trying to litigate proper use of analogies? Your comment reads to me as 20% responding to his point, and 80% litigation. This sort of thing feels like an advanced version of arguing about definitions instead of just tabooing the word and talking about the underlying point each person is trying to make.
Hmm, seems like I didn't communicate well enough. Trying again.
I believe you understand and disagree with his point. I also believe you think his analogy is bad. When I first read your reply I thought you were disagreeing because of/due to the disanalogies, and for no other reason. I no longer think this.
Your disagreement of his point, and your critique of his analogy felt very mixed together. Which like, he's using the analogy to explicate his point for a reason, so fair. But there's something like a difference between using an analogy as supporting argument, and using an analogy just to point at the thing.
If you desire another analogy, most computer traffic is not malware or exploits, nevertheless it sure really matters a lot whether your specific message is malware or some kind of exploit.
As far as I can tell your comment doesn't address this point directly? I'm asking for something like a clearer distinction between disagreeing with his point, and critiquing the analogy. Especially in this case where I don't think the particulars of the analogy where central to his point.
extremely harsh language – lots of italics
Excuse me, what?
Italics is “harsh language” now??
Separately, your phrasing:
criticizes his interlocutors with extremely harsh language – lots of italics and harsh language like “needs to die a flaming death”
… implies that I was referring to some person or people with the phrase “needs to die a flaming death”. I hope you can see how totally unacceptable that implication is. (I won’t belabor the point that it’s false; you know that. But please correct the phrasing; falsely implying that I expressed a desire for a person to die violently is absolutely not ok, even if that implication was accidental, as I assume that it was.)
I think there are a few things being conflated in the situations you're talking about.
1) "Do I respect you, as a person?"
2) "Do I respect your ideas on the topic at hand?"
3) "Am I cowed away from challenging what I don't [know that I] respect?"
With these distinctions in place, we can keep a simple definition of respect as "Honestly evaluated value of engaging", and stop polluting the term "respect" with unlike things which people sometimes want to pretend are "just respect".
1) "Do I respect you as a person?" fits well with the "treat someone like a person" meaning. It means I value not burning bridges by saying things like "Go die, idiot", and will at least say "No thanks" if not "What justifies your confidence in what you're saying?" when you're saying things I have a hard time taking seriously.
2) "Do I respect your ideas on the topic at hand" is closer to "Do I see you as an authority" -- at least, in the sense in which it's legitimate. If you're a math professor and you say something counterintuitive about math, I'm more likely to assign it higher credence and all that. This isn't really as important, because if we have mutual respect for each other then we can explicitly sort o...
Discussion of how people or institutions do things in systematically bad ways could focus on norms and incentives, rather than on the people or the institutions themselves. This covers the vast majority of situations (though not all), and is also more constructive in those situations. False beliefs are the easy case, but it's not the only case where it's practical to argue people into self-directed change.
The people who are enforcing bad norms or establishing bad incentives, while acting under other (or the same) bad norms or incentives would often acknowl...
(I think this post deserves to be Frontpaged, because it's trying to explain useful, relevant timeless insights about psychology. I'm saying this because I was mildly surprised that one of my posts from earlier this week was relegated to Personal.)
This reads to me like an indirect public airing of grievances related to some drama we have insufficient context for, at least without investigating other threads. Without this context, the post is ungrounded, difficult to make sense of, and reads to me as personally-motivated meta-level slop.
I don’t think this deserves front page status as I didn’t find anything useful, relevant, or timeless in it, much less all three.
(Frontpage is not a quality filter, it’s a topic filter. The topic is clearly timeless, and while I agree some interpretations could be too inside-baseball-y, the post is clearly at least aspiring to broader relevance.
In general, bar a fairly small set of exceptions, I think the LW habit of taking local grievances and trying to abstract the disagreement into general principles using non-politicized examples is a good one, and I would like people to keep doing it)
If someone is "optimizing in an objectionable direction" doesn't that just mean they're your enemy? And if so, aren't the valid responses to fight, negotiate, or give up? I don't understand what you're concretely expecting to happen in this situation. It seems like you're expecting the bad guys to surrender just because you explained that they're bad, but I don't see what would motivate them to do that.
This would be way easier to reason about with an example
I feel like you're probably talking about some specific situation but without that it's very unclear
I think this phenomenon can be likened to strawmanning, since both include defense against an imagined version of the "actual meaning". More exactly, I think it can be considered an instance of "subtext strawmanning", since it probably came from applying exaggerations to the connotation of the criticism, using logic like "criticism => impolite => disrespectful => threatening => actual danger".
In general, paying attention to the way in which parties interpret fallaciously aspects of a discussion other than the actual logic seems like a use...
Good analysis of the dynamic the original quote is discussing. The authority figure is expecting 'respect appropriate to their station' and will give in return 'respect appropriate to the other's station'.
The non-authority expects to be able to reject the authority's framework of respect and unilaterally decide on a new one.
The authority, quite naturually, does not take the lower status individual as their authority figure on the meta respect structure.
Unless the meta respect structure of multiple disconnected layers is imposed societally...
In 2015, Autistic Abby on Tumblr shared a viral piece of wisdom about subjective perceptions of "respect":
Sometimes people use "respect" to mean "treating someone like a person" and sometimes they use "respect" to mean "treating someone like an authority"
and sometimes people who are used to being treated like an authority say "if you won't respect me I won't respect you" and they mean "if you won't treat me like an authority I won't treat you like a person"
and they think they're being fair but they aren't, and it's not okay.
There's the core of an important insight here, but I think it's being formulated too narrowly. Abby presents the problem as being about one person strategically conflating two different meanings of respect (if you don't respect me in the strong sense, I won't even respect you in the weak sense). That does happen sometimes, but I think relevantly similar conflicts can occur when two people have different standards of respect that they're both applying consistently.
What, specifically, is the bundle of privileges associated with being "respected"? Does it merely entail "address people in accordance with commonly accepted norms of speech in polite Society", or does it furthermore entail something like, "don't question people's competence or stated intentions; assume that people are basically honest and know what they're talking about"?
If someone who is used to being treated like an authority said, "If you dare question my competence or stated intentions, then I'll question your competence and stated intentions", then there would be no conflation, but there's still a problem, because competence and intentions are real things in the real physical universe, and literal questions about them should have literal answers. If any attempt to imply the literal question is construed as a mere attack to be met in turn with a counterattack, then the questions never get answered.
In 2019, Benjamin Hoffman commented on a private document about ways people can be hurt by speech:
What I see as under threat is the ability to say in a way that's actually heard, not only that opinion X is false, but that the process generating opinion X is untrustworthy, and perhaps actively optimizing in an objectionable direction. Frequently, attempts to say this are construed primarily as moves to attack some person or institution, pushing them into the outgroup. Frequently, people suggest to me an "equivalent" wording with a softer tone, which in fact omits important substantive criticisms I mean to make, while claiming to understand what's at issue.
In a culture where people respect each other in a strong "don't question people's competence or stated intentions" sense, it's possible to have a discussion that considers whether an interlocutor's belief in X is false. Everyone makes mistakes, after all. It's a lot harder to have a discussion that also considers whether the process that generated opinion X is false, because that would seem to imply questions about the competence or intentions of people who believe X—that it wasn't an "innocent" mistake.
Thus, to people enmeshed in such a culture of strong-sense "respect", any attempt to use language to express hypotheses about systematically flawed belief-generators will end up sounding "harsh" to some degree. It's not going to be easy to propose an equivalent wording, because the disrespect is implied by the hypothesis, not the mere choice of words.
The phrase "systematically flawed belief-generators" is kind of a mouthful. A shorter word that can be used to mean the same thing is bias. It's going to be hard to overcome bias on a website where it's hard to talk about biases.
In a discussion about how to moderate web forums, Wei Dai advanced a similar thesis: that since the nature of offense is about defending against threats to one's social status, there's no way to avoid giving offense while delivering serious criticism as long as it's the case that it's low-status for one's work to deserve serious criticism.
I think there is something to this, though I think you should not model status in this context as purely one dimensional.
Like a culture of mutual dignity where you maintain some basic level of mutual respect about whether other people deserve to live, or deserve to suffer, seems achievable and my guess is strongly correlated with more reasonable criticism being made.
And just, what? What? This is just such a wild thing to say in that context! "[D]eserve to live, or deserve to suffer"? People around here are, like, transhumanists, right? Everyone deserves to live! No one deserves to suffer! Who in particular was arguing that some people don't deserve to live or do deserve to suffer, such that this basic level of mutual respect is in danger of not being achieved?
What's going on in someone's head when they jump from "it's impossible to avoid giving offense when delivering serious criticism" to "but we can at least achieve some basic level of mutual respect about whether other people deserve to live"?
If I had to guess, it's an implied strong definition of respect that bundles not questioning people's competence or stated intentions with being "treated like a person" (worthy of life and the absence of suffering). I'm imagining the response to my incredulity would go something like: "Sure, no one explicitly argued that someone didn't deserve to live or did deserve to suffer, but people aren't dumb and can read subtext. Complying with commonly accepted norms of speech in polite Society just makes it passive-aggressive rather than overtly aggressive, which is worse."
But from the standpoint of the alleged aggressor who doesn't accept that notion of respect, we're not trying to say people should suffer and die. We just mean that opinion X is false, and that the process generating opinion X is untrustworthy, and perhaps actively optimizing in an objectionable direction.
The people who interpret that as treating someone like a non-person think they're being fair—and they are being fair with respect to a notion of fairness that's about mutually granting a bundle of privileges that includes both a right to life and the right to not have one's competence or stated intentions questioned. But that notion of fairness impairs our collective ability to construct shared maps that reflect the territory, and it's not okay.