Related to: Privileging the Hypothesis

Remember the exercises in critical reading you did in school, where you had to look at a piece of writing and step back and ask whether the author was telling the whole truth? If you really want to be a critical reader, it turns out you have to step back one step further, and ask not just whether the author is telling the truth, but why he's writing about this subject at all.

-- Paul Graham

There's an old saying in the public opinion business: we can't tell people what to think, but we can tell them what to think about.

-- Doug Henwood

Many philosophers—particularly amateur philosophers, and ancient philosophers—share a dangerous instinct: If you give them a question, they try to answer it.

-- Eliezer Yudkowsky

Here are some political questions that seem to commonly get discussed in US media: should gay marriage be legal? Should Congress pass stricter gun control laws? Should immigration policy be tightened or relaxed? 

These are all examples of what I'll call privileged questions (if there's an existing term for this, let me know): questions that someone has unjustifiably brought to your attention in the same way that a privileged hypothesis unjustifiably gets brought to your attention. The questions above are probably not the most important questions we could be answering right now, even in politics (I'd guess that the economy is more important). Outside of politics, many LWers probably think "what can we do about existential risks?" is one of the most important questions to answer, or possibly "how do we optimize charity?" 

Why has the media privileged these questions? I'd guess that the media is incentivized to ask whatever questions will get them the most views. That's a very different goal from asking the most important questions, and is one reason to stop paying attention to the media. 

The problem with privileged questions is that you only have so much attention to spare. Attention paid to a question that has been privileged funges against attention you could be paying to better questions. Even worse, it may not feel from the inside like anything is wrong: you can apply all of the epistemic rationality in the world to answering a question like "should Congress pass stricter gun control laws?" and never once ask yourself where that question came from and whether there are better questions you could be answering instead.

I suspect this is a problem in academia too. Richard Hamming once gave a talk in which he related the following story:

Over on the other side of the dining hall was a chemistry table. I had worked with one of the fellows, Dave McCall; furthermore he was courting our secretary at the time. I went over and said, "Do you mind if I join you?" They can't say no, so I started eating with them for a while. And I started asking, "What are the important problems of your field?" And after a week or so, "What important problems are you working on?" And after some more time I came in one day and said, "If what you are doing is not important, and if you don't think it is going to lead to something important, why are you at Bell Labs working on it?" I wasn't welcomed after that; I had to find somebody else to eat with!

Academics answer questions that have been privileged in various ways: perhaps the questions their advisor was interested in, or the questions they'll most easily be able to publish papers on. Neither of these are necessarily well-correlated with the most important questions. 

So far I've found one tool that helps combat the worst privileged questions, which is to ask the following counter-question:

What do I plan on doing with an answer to this question?

With the worst privileged questions I frequently find that the answer is "nothing," sometimes with the follow-up answer "signaling?" That's a bad sign. (Edit: but "nothing" is different from "I'm just curious," say in the context of an interesting mathematical or scientific question that isn't motivated by a practical concern. Intellectual curiosity can be a useful heuristic.)

(I've also found the above counter-question generally useful for dealing with questions. For example, it's one way to notice when a question should be dissolved, and asked of someone else it's one way to help both of you clarify what they actually want to know.)

Privileging the Question
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[-]elharo640

The correct response to Hamming's question is "Because I have a comparative advantage in working on the problem I am working on". There are many, many important problems in the world of greater and lesser degrees of importance. There are many, many people working on them, even within one field. It does not make sense for everyone to attack the same most important problem, if indeed such a single problem could even be identified. There is a point of diminishing returns. 100 chemists working on the most important problem in chemistry are not going to advance chemistry as much as 10 chemists working on the most important problem, and 90 working on a variety of other, lesser problems.

This point was first made to me by Richard Stallman who told me quite clearly that free software was not the most important problem in the world--I think he cited overpopulation as an example of a more serious problem--but software freedom was the problem he was uniquely well situated to address.

There are seven billion people in the world. I know of no problem that actually needs 7 billion minds to solve it. We are pretty much all well advised to find the biggest problem we have a comparative advantage at, and work on solving that problem. We don't all have to, indeed we shouldn't, all work on the same thing.

I'm torn regarding this argument. Aaron Swartz wrote a very nice piece which I can't find (his personal site now appears to be down) about how working entirely on things that are your current comparative advantage is fixed mindset, and what you could be doing instead is changing what your comparative advantage is. I'm glad that Aaron Swartz did this, and I worry that focusing on comparative advantage gives me an excuse not to branch out. (My current comparative advantage is in mathematics but I'm not convinced that means I should only be spending my life working on mathematics.)

8Zaine
To make my argument clearer, I will use you as an example; please forgive me. If you have a comparative advantage in maths, and decide to change your comparative advantage to medical, computer, or social science, as soon as you have caught up on the fundamentals of the field necessary to make an informed opinion you will already have a comparative advantage because of your background. Your proficiency in maths lent you a comparative advantage in maths; your comparative advantage in maths lends you a comparative advantage in [economics]; your comparative advantage in maths and [economics] lends you a comparative advantage in [biochemistry], etcetera.

I think this makes sense. We need to distinguish between something like "obvious current comparative advantage" and "less obvious potential comparative advantage." In practice, the heuristic "stick to your comparative advantage" may optimize excessively for the former at the expense of the latter.

2MalcolmOcean
So in that case, the question is in some ways addressed by narrowing the meaning of "field". If a physicist interprets Hamming's question as "what is the most important problem in your field?" as "what is the most important problem in physics?" then obviously not everyone should be answering it. If, instead, the physicist interprets it as "what is the most important problem in quantum cryptography?", that being his/her more specific field, then it becomes more reasonable (and more vital!) that the physicist is indeed working on the most important problem in their field. Although, upon reflection, if I decide to become the world's expert in lit-match juggling, and the most important problem is lighting the third one before the first two burn down, that is obviously not necessarily an important problem on a larger scale. But I think my point above still has value even if it's missing something that permits this counterexample.
0Jiro
And a response that brings up another important point is simply that everyday language is said without precision. When someone claims that their problem isn't important, they don't mean that it has zero importance, and when they say it's not going to lead to something important, they aren't really claiming that it has a zero chance of leading to anything important. Indeed, they aren't even claiming aht the expected value of it is low--imagine they are working on something which, by contributing to general knowledge, increases the odds of solving each of 2000 problems by 0.1% each, Nobody in their right mind would claim that that is an important problem, yet it increases the expected number of important problems that are solved by more than 1.
2Ether
I would

The comparison that leapt into my mind was Chomskians talking about how politicians and the media decide which topics are even discussed. Not sure if they have a term for that. I guess what you call "Privileging the Question" is part of framing in the social sciences sense. It's handy to have a phrase for this particular thing, though.

1lukeprog
Good find!
7Psychosmurf
I believe they would term it "manufactured consent." Although, I think the two ideas are slightly different. The idea behind manufactured consent is that, in order to answer a question one way or another, you must implicitly accept its premises. It is a special, politicized case of privileging the question.
[-][anonymous]350

Before going back to check the name, I just assumed the academic asking awkward questions and making people feel bad about their life-choices was Robin Hanson.

This seems related to Robin Hanson's concept of "pulling sideways",. Some questions (e.g. income tax levels or gay marriage) get privileged because the alternative answers align with pre-existing political coalitions, so they give people an opportunity to cheer for their side and against the Enemy, whereas other questions whose answers would involve "pulling sideways" are ignored.

7CronoDAS
Apparently there are indeed still issues that haven't gotten stuck being aligned with one or the other major U.S. political parties - if what I read is correct, the bill before Congress that would make it easier for states to collect sales taxes on Internet purchases has both support and opposition from members of both parties. Source.
5Eugine_Nier
I don't think that's a good example since it does align with political parties. A better example of an important issue that doesn't align with political parties and thus gets mostly ignored by congress is copyright reform.
0DanArmak
Isn't it more that both parties are against it?
0Eugine_Nier
But a lot of the population is for it. So there are people in both parties that are for it (partially for the same reason a lot of the population is, partially in an attempt to get some of the pro-copyright reform vote).

There's a Swedish word for this, "problemformuleringsprivilegiet," which roughly translates as "the privilege to formulate the problem."

Which is basically the same phrase, but without spaces between words.

In a way of self-fulfilling prophecies, a privileged question becomes important when it is brought to everyone's attention. It becomes the question to decide whether you are a Green or Blue. Refuse to deal with it, and all Greens will suspect that you are a Blue, and all Blues will suspect that you are a Green. Then you may feel the social consequences of having enemies but no allies.

[-]Benya210

The questions above are probably not the most important questions we could be answering right now, even in politics (I'd guess that the economy is more important). Outside of politics, many LWers probably think "what can we do about existential risks?" is one of the most important questions to answer, or possibly "how do we optimize charity?"

(This is not meant as a criticism of the post:) I hope I'm not the only one who went "gaaah" here about the latter two not being questions we could be answering right now in politics :-) Not that I have much hope that this is doable, but still.

(I started out writing "not that I have any hope", but then remembered that GiveWell didn't manage to find good opportunities for funding immunizations or micronutrient supplementation -- the first of which they "consider to have the strongest evidence base of any intervention we know of" -- with a major reason being that government and multilateral funders are already taking the best opportunities. See also Eliezer's comment and Holden's reply, suggesting the reason is that there are some people in government to whom measurable, quantifiable, tangible... (read more)

Often, my mother will ask me "what do you think about [some issue that's been discussed in the media lately]?" and I'm like "how the heck should I know, and why should I even care?" It usually irritates her -- "you surely must have an opinion about that! How can you have no opinion?" (Sometimes I retort by asking for her opinion about some unanswered question about physics or something like that, but then she usually says something to the effect that her question, unlike mine, is so intrinsically important that any good citizen has a duty to form an opinion on it.)

3jimmy
Have you tried responding to that and taking the conversation a step or two further to see if you can resolve it?
2A1987dM
Not that I remember of. By now, she's probably accepted my aloofness as yet another weird quirk of mine, and I'm OK with that.
1Luke_A_Somers
Questions about physics are probably separate enough from the normal person's life that even if they do connect back, it's at a long inferential distance. Have you tried asking about things that are more clearly applicable to her, or are you picking things you consider equally irrelevant? If the latter, in the absence of an explanation, she will naturally consider them much less relevant.
3A1987dM
The point is to have her realize how it feels like to be asked a question about which one doesn't give a damn about.
6ModusPonies
It doesn't seem to be working. I'd suggest a different approach. (My own response to this sort of thing is usually "well, it doesn't seem important and I haven't been following it because [reasons], but now that you mention it, [rampant speculation]." This gets across that I don't consider it a useful question, but still respects the other person and their desire to have a conversation.)
6A1987dM
The problem with that is that IME people will take my rampant speculation way too seriously.
2Eugine_Nier
Depends on the person. It's perfectly possible that your rampant speculation is much better than anything they could come up with.
-3MugaSofer
Well, if you get into an argument, you can always say "as I said, I don't know much about this" and change the subject, right?

I think this line of thinking is very important. People would benefit immensely from becoming better at deciding what questions to address with their scarce cognitive resources. However, I do not think this problem of "meta-rationality" is an easy one, and in particular I'm not sure your heuristic is a good one. The principle that a good question has a clear-cut policy implication conflicts directly with the principle of curiosity. Maybe if an individual is an high-stress, high-stakes decision-making role, he or she may want to ignore questions that are not immediately relevant to the problems at hand. But the whole idea of academia is that society benefits when some individuals have the time and the incentive to go out and answer questions of academic interest - because, of course, we don't know what we don't know and some ideas, or their consequences, may have nonobvious policy implications somewhere down the road.

I propose the following heuristics, noting that in this area one should adopt a "fox-like" strategy and try to apply as many different perspectives as possible:

Does this question have a definitive answer? Will I know I have the right answer when

... (read more)
0Qiaochu_Yuan
I was hoping that starting with examples involving politics would make it clear that I wasn't suggesting we toss out intellectual curiosity, but I can make an edit clarifying this.
0Eugine_Nier
Why shouldn't the same exception apply to political questions? From an outside view this almost seems like "asking questions in my field is satisfying curiosity, asking questions outside my field is privileging the question".

Are people intellectually curious about political questions like gay marriage and gun control? That isn't my impression.

2Jack
There is a large extent to which those questions are about values and not facts. But I am extremely curious about e.g. How and when does prohibition succeed in controlling the usage of a good? How are social institutions like marriage affected by how society understands them and what sort of negative externalities might there be from reforming long standing social rules? Marriage rates have dropped off a cliff among certain demographics and it seems plausible that a) that leads to really bad things and b) the cause might have had something to do with the rhetoric about marriage used by important figures in politics and academia. I'm not sure that necessarily involves the gay marriage question or that it implies a particular answer to the gay marriage question. But both issues exist at intersections of very interesting economic and socio-cultural questions such that I generally enjoy broad, thoughtful and knowledgeable discussions of those political issues.
1Qiaochu_Yuan
Sure, so discuss those general questions and not the specific ones (which are not only privileged but which many people are mind-killed over).

The Overton Window is a related concept, but it's at least as much about what people may not consider as it's about what's drawn to their attention.

Related:

Merely reflecting upon my own life, I can see how vastly the kinds of things I find interesting and important have changed. Some topics that used to matter so much to me are now essentially irrelevant except as whimsical amusements, while others that I had never even considered are now my top priorities.

The scary thing is just how easily and imperceptibly these sorts of shifts can happen. I've been amazed to observe how much small, seemingly trivial cues build up to have an enormous impact on the direction of one's concerns. The types of conversations I overhear, blog entries and papers and emails I read, people I interact with, and visual cues I see in my environment tend basically to determine what I think about during the day and, over the long run, what I spend my time and efforts doing. One can maintain a stated claim that "X is what I find overridingly important," but as a practical matter, it's nearly impossible to avoid the subtle influences of minor day-to-day cues that can distract from such ideals.

Those who dismiss postmodernism are condemned to reinvent it, one piece at a time.

[-]gwern550

Unfortunately, there seems to be no such thing as Postmodernism: The Good Bits.

(If you order a big sundae and discover that the top scoop is dog shit, it makes more sense to go buy your own ice cream and make your own sundae - even knowing you're reinventing many pieces of the original sundae - than settling for the original sundae and trying to carefully spoon around the shit.)

Speaking as a fan of the stuff, I fully appreciate and frequently concur with your reasons for not wanting to touch it.

1scav
Postmodernism or dogshit? ;)
6Metus
Can you give a summary of postmodernism or should I just google it myself?
6David_Gerard
Probably not one that's very useful. If you think of it as an artistically-related metatheory construction kit (so, a meta-meta-theory), that would probably describe what the bits that aren't shit are useful for. Gwern (per comment parallel to yours) probably wouldn't benefit, having deep cultural knowledge in at least one area, though he might find useful bits to avoid having to reinvent terminology. (Oh, and it's not one thing - any area that has something that corresponds to a "modernist" outlook, where progress can occur, is likely to spawn a "postmodernism" which involves questioning every assumption including that the right questions are being asked. Remember that it sprang up after World War II, which was seen by the postmodernists as the horrific reductio ad absurdum failure of several decades-long modernist programmes.) What I mean is that dismissing this icky squishy cultural "what is meaning?" stuff as a diseased discipline does not somehow mean you, as a bounded human intellect in the world, are immune to the problems the toolkit-constructing toolkit in question can somewhat alleviate. Because the proper study of mankind is man. Squishy and infuriating as humanity is, directed cyclic graphs of preferences and all. FWIW, don't read original Derrida unless the wall opposite needs a few more dents in it - stick to commentaries.
[-]ikrase110

I challenge anybody to come up with a higher-density description of postmodernism than 'Fallacy Of Gray Plus Meta Everything with Leftism'. Remember that it arose out of an enviroment that was far too absolutist and ignored meta-analysis.

2Jack
Analytic approaches to continental concerns are routinely insightful. The problem with post-modernism is language and methodology more than the subjects and theses. But it's so big a problem than any analytic approach is almost inevitably the best thing written on the subject.
-2Richard_Kennaway
Those who dismiss the dangers of mountaineering are condemned to fall off mountains, one cliff at a time. To borrow gwern's comment, there is no such thing as Falling Off Mountains: The Good Bits.

Great post. Similar thoughts have been expressed by some LessWrong users on Twitter, but having a nice long summary here is much better. I'd advocate promoting this one to Main.

Why has the media privileged these questions? I'd guess that the media is incentivized to ask whatever questions will get them the most views. That's a very different goal from asking the most important questions, and is one reason to stop paying attention to the media.

It's not that simple. Getting views is important but it isn't the only consideration. Journalists want to win publisher prizes. Journalists have an interest to build relationships with people who can supply them additional stories.

Owners of newscorporations have their interests. Buyers ... (read more)

Journalism is under tight deadlines. If the story is just to complex the time that the journalist needs to write the story isn't used "productively".

Data point: I knew a person who worked as a journalist for a newspaper. Each day they received from their boss a random topic to write about, and they had to write three or four articles within the day. There was no time to do any research, and there was no budget for travelling and seeing something firsthand.

That situation left only a few possible strategies: (1) Call a few relevant people by phone. Most of them will refuse to talk with you, because they have experience that in the past they told a journalist something and the journalist wrote something else using their name as a support. A few people will respond. Compile their answers into articles. (2) Know a few people willing to talk about this topic. Call them. (3) Use Google and steal information from other articles, especially the foreign ones. (4) Just invent the story, using any cliche you know. (5) Any combination of the above. For example write the story first, using the cliches you know, then call random people and try to get them agreeing with you, and then ... (read more)

2Zaine
What country was this?
-5elharo
[-]xv1560

It's rather against the point of the article to start talking about the above examples of privileged questions...

Even so, it's worth noting that immigration policy is a rare, important question with first-order welfare effects. Relaxing border fences creates a free lunch in the same way that donating to the Against Malaria Foundation creates a free lunch. It costs on the order of $7 million to save an additional American life, but on the order of $2500 to save a life if you're willing to consider non-Americans.

By contrast, most of politics consists of ... (read more)

8Qiaochu_Yuan
I think it's plausible that immigration policy is in fact an important question but less plausible that that's why people talk about it. (Similarly, a privileged hypothesis need not be wrong.)
3Jack
xv15's point is actually really really standard among public intellectuals and elites.
-1xv15
Sure.

It's only an aside to your main point, but "work on the most important problems you can think of" is a horrible heuristic for everybody to follow. If you want to advance human knowledge, then work on the most important problems you can think of, as weighted by your best estimate of the likely time advantage of "when I would discover a solution" over "when someone else would have discovered a solution". Unless you are one of the smartest people in the world, this weight is likely to be negligibly greater than 0 for many of th... (read more)

0Qiaochu_Yuan
Of course.

I think I'm missing the point of something.

Can you give examples of overpriviledged questions and what harm might come from overpriviledging them?

The general harm is that paying attention to unimportant question X means you have less time to pay attention to possibly more important question Y. Was this unclear from the text? For example:

  • In another comment here, Alejandro1 linked to this Robin Hanson post about policy questions that are orthogonal to vs. that map closely onto traditional liberal vs. conservative divides. The former are underprivileged and the latter are overprivileged, and the harm is that people are likely missing opportunities to implement useful policies because of this. (Perhaps Robin has prediction markets in mind as an example?)

  • Non-white feminists have a beef with white feminists part of which I think concerns white feminists having overprivileged certain kinds of questions, e.g. questions based on gender alone when non-white feminists think that gender, race, and class need to be understood together. The harm here is that the concerns of white feminism dominate feminist discussion and so don't leave room for the concerns of non-white feminism.

  • Similarly, and as an expansion of the gay marriage example, (I think) many LGBT activists think that gay marriage is less pressing than issues like bullying and job security. The harm here is, as above, that concerns about gay marriage dominate discussion of gay rights and so don't leave room for possibly more important concerns.

6thomblake
To take another tack on the gay marriage example, asking the question also implies that it's the sort of thing one is allowed to decide on. I welcome a national debate on "Should we give Thom Blake a million dollars" but am less enthusiastic about debating "Should we throw rocks at Thom".
4Prismattic
As a minor historical note, the focus on gay marriage rather than other aspects of gay rights started out as a minority position, not a privileged one. Or so I gather from reading Andrew Sullivan, who seems to have been pushing for the emphasis on marriage rights at a time when that was still controversial among LGBT activists. ETA: I find the downvote bizarre. I assume it's for PITMK reasons, but I'm not presenting a normative stance one way or the other.
[-]Cyan50

Promote to Main?

[pollid:460]

9Luke_A_Somers
Flesh out a bit more, then promote to main.
9TheOtherDave
How important is it that I answer that question, really?

You will signal that you care about the quality of articles on LessWrong. That means that you are a loyal member of our team, and we love you.

2TheOtherDave
I am sad that this got downvoted; it amused me inordinately. Not least because, well, it's accurate.
-2MugaSofer
So what you're saying is, "signalling?"
0Viliam_Bur
Yes, joking is a subset of signalling. ;-)
7wedrifid
There is (apparently) only one way to find out! How important is it that Dave answers that question, really? [pollid:461]
-2MugaSofer
Hmm. The winner appears to be "Whatevs.", followed by "The question is important but Dave shouldn't answer because we don't care what he personally thinks and nobody loves him." I'm sorry, Dave ...
2TheOtherDave
I'll somehow recover from the blow. There is some theoretical sense in which the fact that right now the "nobody loves Dave" answer is tied with "Extremely important" helps.
1[anonymous]
If it's any consolation, I only voted for that one because it was funny, not because I thought it was true. I wuv you :3
0NancyLebovitz
At the moment, "nobody loves Dave" and "the fate of the cosmic commons is at stake!" are running neck and neck. I suggest leaving it up to Omega.
1TheOtherDave
"nobody loves Dave" has now edged out "the fate of the cosmic commons is at stake!" by one vote. Of course, if I take the weighted average, that still works out to a way higher evaluation of my personal significance than seems at all justifiable. Is it possible people aren't all being entirely sincere in their votes? Nah, that's crazy talk.
8Qiaochu_Yuan
I voted "Eh" so I could see the poll results and determine whether I should in fact promote this post, but I see that there are a lot of "Eh"s and I'm wondering if others did the same.
[-][anonymous]30

What do I plan on doing with an answer to this question? With the worst privileged questions I frequently find that the answer is "nothing," sometimes with the follow-up answer "signaling?" That's a bad sign.

Do you mean by this that one should always have a non-"nothing" answer to this question, or just that the "nothing" answer frequently (though not always) indicates a privileging problem?

I think if the answer is literally "nothing" then that is bad, but "nothing" to many people could mean "nothing, I'm just curious" and then you can expand that to "I think this is an interesting question and I enjoy thinking about it on an intellectual level," which is not in fact nothing; what you're doing is satisfying your intellectual curiosity. (This might apply to a random math or physics question you ask yourself, for example.)

5[anonymous]
My initial reaction to your question was 'what about curiosity-driven research?', it seems like this was true of other people too. I would suggest editing to make clear that 'curiosity' is an acceptable response.
3Qiaochu_Yuan
Done.
2Jack
My problem is that "curiosity" is not a discriminating feature for me at all. I am automatically extremely curious about any research question.

I think this post is covering a superset of the unhelpful questions that I pointed out here, because the ones that I mentioned are also dissolved by "What do you plan to do with the answer?" Sometimes, you do have a goal in mind, but you don't realize that the question you're asking isn't going to yield an answer that's relevant or helpful with respect to that goal (which is a mini lost purpose in the form of expended clock cycles but maybe also yelling at a tiny child.) Meanwhile, I think the signalling ones are usually when you feel like you need to formulate an opinion on something just because it's in the media even though it doesn't affect your daily life.

I think the answer "I'll be like whoaaa, because this question is interesting!" is a helpful, non-nothing answer, but something like "then I'll put it in this paper and eventually it will lead to more papers, but not much else" is indicative of larger lost purposes.

-1[anonymous]
But that is a 'nothing' answer. Just finding a question and answer interesting isn't doing something with the answer. And while I agree that having really bad reasons for trying to answer questions is really bad, I'm still not sure what to make of the original 'nothing' comment. Is 'nothing' indicative of a bad reason for trying to answer a question? If it is, is it merely evidence for, or does it (or the motivations it reflects) constitute a bad reason?
1jooyous
I will experience an increase in utility from the process of finding out the answer? I will bask in the good feeling of having my question answered? I will gleefully tell like-minded friends about it, thus infecting them with my enthusiasm? I guess it's hard to tell the difference if you haven't encountered the second type of question, where you think, "Oh well, I better develop an opinion on this whole gay marriage thing because everyone is talking about it and I'm the type of person that has opinions." It feels kinda like a chore you should do. (It's even worse when you feel pressure to make the opinion unique and interesting.) The difference between that feeling and realizing you don't know something and then checking it on wikipedia and going "ohhhh" is really big.

General note: you are demonstrating a pattern of posting comments that seem to depend on more shared context than actually exists, and which I suspect are consequently pretty much unintelligible to the majority of readers.

[-]Jiro20

The questions above are probably not the most important questions we could be answering right now, even in politics (I'd guess that the economy is more important).

I don't know about that. Probably the most important question that can be asked in politics is "how can we produce a perfect society in every which way according to the following list of criteria...."

The trick, of course, is that for most people, the "most important" questions are defined by more than just what the impact of the answer would be when we get one. Likelihood... (read more)

1Qiaochu_Yuan
I agree that these are important criteria but strongly disagree that questions like gay marriage were in fact brought to your attention based on such criteria. I don't think it is. Do you have evidence to the contrary? (As I've mentioned in another comment, I'm pessimistic about the value of voting but willing to update.)
-14seanwelsh77
0seanwelsh77
The kind of questions pols actually think about. (I used to work for one...) 1. How do I get re-elected? 2. Which event/announcement relating to the party platform (the list of 'improve society' criteria that the party has approved) will get airtime and make me look good and my opponent in the next race look bad? 3. Within the current budget what money can I win for my electorate through the normal processes? 4. Who can I help within the limits of my power and influence and the laws and budget as they are? 5. What changes to the current party platform (the list of criteria) do we need to make to achieve 1. Different pols are more or less diligent about these points. So long as the people can SACK pols. I.e. vote them out. Democratic politics seems to work tolerably well...
2Jiro
My point was that "the most important question" doesn't mean "the question which, if answered and implemented, would lead to the biggest benefit". The feasibility of answering and implementing is, for most of us, part of what makes a question an important question. The original post seems to have been saying that "privileged" questions are not really important. I think that, when analyzed with a definition that is closer to what we mean by "important", they are.

All the examples of privileged questions given are disguised manifestations of moral uncertainty

should gay marriage be legal?

is the struggle between a morality that favors equality, and one that has a certain set of values surrounding purity and/or respect for religious authority.

Should Congress pass stricter gun control laws?

is the struggle between individual autonomy vs. harm avoidance

Should immigration policy be tightened or relaxed?

is the struggle between in-group preference and lack thereof

The questions themselves are unimportant...but th... (read more)

Isn't moral strugle a part of how mindkilling feels from inside?

Also, compare these two questions:

a) Should gay marriage be legal?

b) How to optimize the society for more long-term utility for people of any sexual orientation?

Only the first one could get media attention. And it's not because the second one is less moral.

7someonewrongonthenet
You can't even ask this question until you arrive at utilitarianism as a moral philosophy. A person with moral objections against homosexual marriage isn't a utilitarian by definition, since they care about additional things (purity, respect for authority, etc) which have nothing to do with increasing everyone's utility.. When you ask "how to maximize utility", you have already assumed that the moral struggle between harm/care and purity has been settled in favor of harm/care. Otherwise, you would be asking about how to maximize utility while also keeping people from "defiling" themselves.
1roystgnr
As mare-of-night reminded us elsewhere in-thread, even Clippy is a utilitarian. There's nothing special about paperclips or purity that prevents them from being included in someone's definition of utility. On the other hand, even if your post boils down to "my definition of utility is the correct global definition", that's no more wrong than Viliam_Bur's treating "utility for people" as a well-defined term without billions of undetermined coefficients.
5someonewrongonthenet
So the original question was: Under classical preference utilitarianism, you try to maximize everyone's utility and conveniently ignore the problems of putting two utility functions into one equation, and the problems you mention. Continuing to conveniently ignore that problem, I implicitly assume that we agree that the positive utility generated by removing restrictions to homosexuality outweigh the negative utility generated by violating purity boundaries, when applied over the entire population. We still include the purity thing in the calculations of course. For example, I could in principle argue that the negative utility from allowing sex in public probably outweighs the positive utility generated from the removal of the restriction, hence our public obscenity laws.
3Eugine_Nier
That ignores the possibility that there is a reason those purity boundaries were there in the first place.
0someonewrongonthenet
I've seen this before, but I can't say I find it a compelling argument - if an institution was placed for good reason, then at least someone, somewhere would remember why it was placed and could give a compelling argument. If no one can do so, the risk of some, hidden drawback which the original lawmaker could have forseen seems too small to count. I mean, this argument does apply when you are acting alone, on some question that neither you nor anyone you come into contact with knows anything about...but it doesn't apply to something like this.
0NancyLebovitz
How do utilitarians decide to draw the boundary at the whole human race rather than some smaller set of humans?
0someonewrongonthenet
II'm not sure if I understand your question... Utilitarians who choose to draw the line around the whole of the human race do so because they believe they aught to value the whole of the human race.
0NancyLebovitz
Is that a deontological standard? The reason I asked is that, in principle, you could have utilitarianism based on some group smaller than the human race.
0someonewrongonthenet
For some people, probably. Let's take a step back. Morality comes from the "heart". It's made of feelings. Utilitarianism (and much of what falls under moral philosophy) is one of many attempt to make a consistent set of rules to describe inconsistent feelings. The purpose of making a consistent set of rules is 1) to convince others of the morality of an action and 2) because we morally feel aversion to hypocrisy and crave moral consistency. Keeping those aims in mind, drawing the line across all humans, sentient beings, etc has the following benefits: 1) The creators might feel that the equation describes the way they feel better when they factor in all humans. They might hold it as a deontological standard to care about all humans, or they might feel a sense of fairness, or they might have empathy for everyone, etc. 2) Drawing the line across all humans allows you to use the utilitarian standard to negotiate compromises with any arbitrary human you come across. Many humans, having the feelings described in [1], will instinctively accept utilitarianism as a valid way to think about things. There are plenty of things that are problematic here, but that is why utilitarianism defaults to include the whole human race. As with all things moral, that's just an arbitrary choice on our part, and we could easily have done it a different way. We can restrict it to a smaller subset of humans, we can broaden it to non-human things which seem agent-like enough to be worth describing with a utility function, etc. Many utilitarians include animals, for example.
1Juno_Watt
People use feelings/System1 to do morality. That doesn't make it an oracle. Thinking might be more accurate. If you don't know how to solve a problem, you guess. But that doens't mean anything goes. Would anyone include rocks in the Circle? Probably not, since they don't have feelings, values, or preferences. So there seem to be some constraints.
0someonewrongonthenet
Accurate? How can you speak of a moral preference being "accurate" or not? Moral preferences simply are. There are some meta-ethics sequences here that explain the arbitrariness of our moral preferences more eloquently , and here is a fun story that tangentially illustrates it I bet I can find you someone who would say that burning the Quran or the Bible is inherently immoral.
2TheOtherDave
Quite a few of them no doubt. Of course, the overwhelming majority of people who would say that burning the Quran or the Bible is inherently immoral would also say that it's immoral by virtue of the preferences of an entity that, on their view, is in fact capable of having preferences. Of course, I'm sure I could find someone who would say rocks have feelings, values, and preferences.
0Eugine_Nier
I don't think this is an accurate formulation of the general religious attitude towards morality.
0TheOtherDave
I agree. Do you also think it's a false statement?
0Eugine_Nier
Let's just say the expression "it's immoral by virtue of the preferences of an entity" is not actually a good 'translation' of the phrase they'd use.
0TheOtherDave
Um... well, I'm not really sure what to do with that statement, but I'm happy to leave the topic there if you prefer.
-1Eugine_Nier
Ok, maybe I misunderstood your question in the grandparent. Which statement was it referring to?
0TheOtherDave
"the overwhelming majority of people who would say that burning the Quran or the Bible is inherently immoral would also say that it's immoral by virtue of the preferences of an entity that, on their view, is in fact capable of having preferences."
-1Eugine_Nier
They'd phrase it in terms of sacredness, which isn't quite the same thing, e.g., how would you apply your argument to flag burning?
0TheOtherDave
Fair enough.
0someonewrongonthenet
Conversationalists will want to preserve ecosystems, even where those ecosystems are already well studied by science, even when the ecosystem contains no sentient beings (plants, fungi, microbes), even when destroying the ecosystem has many advantages for humans, because they think the ecosystem is intrinsically valuable independently of the effect on beings with feelings, values, and preferences. Some looser examples... Pro-life advocates say that beings without preferences have rights by virtue of future preferences. Not all of them are religious. Hindus treat books (all books in general) with reverence because they are vehicles of learning, despite not necessarily believing in deities. Many social conservatives report being unwilling to slap their fathers, even with permission, as part of a play. The classic trolley problem implies that many people's moral intuitions hinge on the act of murder being wrong, rather than the effect that the death has on the values, feelings, and preferences being morally wrong. Of course, if you are a moral realist, you can just say that these people's intuitions are "wrong"...but the point is that "feelings, values, and preferences" - in a word, utilitarianism - isn't the only guiding moral principle that humans care about. And yes, you could argue that this is all a deity's preferences...but why did they decide that those were in fact the deity's preferences? Doesn't it hint that they might have an underlying feeling of those preferences in themselves, that they would project those wishes on a deity?
1TheOtherDave
No doubt some of them will, but I suspect you meant "conservationists." And yes, I agree that some of those will assign intrinsic value to "nature" in various forms, or at least claim to, as you describe. Some of them do, yes. Indeed, I suspect the ones who say that are disproportionately non-religious. A fine question. That's one possibility, yes.
0Juno_Watt
And, again, if destroying entity X is wrong because some other entity Y says so, that is not inherent.
0TheOtherDave
Indeed. Do you mean to say that you don't expect it to be said, or merely that those saying it are confused?
0Juno_Watt
The latter.
0Juno_Watt
We sometimes extend morality to inanimate objects , but only ones that mean something to us, such as works of art and religious artefacts. That isn't actually inherent because of the "to us" clause, although some people might claim that it is. Pebble sorting is a preference. That's it. I don't have to believe it is a moral preference or a correct moral preference. Moral objectivism isn't obviously wrong, and system 2 isn't obviously the wrong way to realise moral truths. IOW, moral subjectivism isn't obviously true. NB: Objectivism isn't universalism. Beliefs simply are. And some are true and some are not. You seem to be assuming the non-existence of anything that could verify or disprove a moral preference in order to prove more or less the same thing.
0someonewrongonthenet
I would say that the "to us" clause actually applies to everything, and that nothing is "inherent", as you put it. Pebble sorting means something to the pebble sorters. Humans mean something to me. The entirity of morality boils down to what is important "to us"? To me, moral objectivism is obviously wrong and subjectivism is obviously true, and this is embedded in my definition of morality. I'm actually unsure how anyone could think of it in any other coherent way. I think it's time to unpack "morality". I think morality is feelings produced in the human mind about how people aught to act. That is, I think "murder is bad" is in some ways analogous to "Brussels sprouts are gross". From this definition, it follows that I see moral objectivism as obviously wrong - akin to saying, "no man, Brussels sprouts are objectively, inherently gross! In the same way that the sky is objectively blue! / In the same way that tautologies are true!" (Actually, replace blue with the appropriate wavelengths to avoid arguments about perception) What do you think "morality" is, and where do you suppose it comes from?
0Juno_Watt
I think morality is behaving so as to take into account the values and preferences of others as well as ones own. You can succed or fail in that, hence "accurate". Morality may manifest in the form of a feeling for many people, but not for everybody and not all feelings are equal. So I don't think that is inherent, or definitional. I don't think the sprout analogy works, because your feeling that you don't like sprouts doesn't seriously affect others, but the psychoaths fondndess for murder does. The feelings that are relevant to morality are the empathic ones, not personal preferences. That is a clue that morality is about behaving so as to take into account the values and preferences of others as well as ones own. if you think morlaity is the same as a personal preference...what makes it morality? Why don't we just have one word and one way of thinking?
0someonewrongonthenet
Because they feel different to us from the inside - for the same reason that we separate "thinking" and "feeling" even though in the grand scheme of things they are both ways to influence behavior. In Math, empirical evidence is replaced by axioms. In Science, the axioms are the empirical evidence. The point is that all rational agents will converge upon mathematical statements, and will not converge upon moral statements. Do you disagree? I'm very, very sure that my morality doesn't work that way. Imagine you lived on a world with two major factions, A and B. A has a population of 999999. B has a population of 1000. Every individual in A has a very mild preference for horrifically torturing B, and the motivation is sadism and hatred. The torture and slow murder of B is a bonding activity for A, and the shared hatred keeps the society cohesive. Every individual in B has a strong, strong preference not to be tortured, but it doesn't even begin to outweigh the collective preferences of A. From the standpoint of preference utilitarianism, this scenario is analogous to Torture vs. Dust Specks. Preference Utilitarians choose torture, and a good case could be made even under good old human morality to choose torture as the lesser of two evils. This is a problem which I'd give serious weight to choosing torture Preference utilitarian agents would let A torture B - "shut up and multiply". However, from the standpoint of my human morality, this scenario is very different from torture vs. dust specks, and I wouldn't even waste a fraction of a second in deciding what is right in this scenario. Torture for the sake of malice is wrong (to me) and it really doesn't matter what everyone else's preferences are - if it's in my power, I'm not letting A torture B! Morality evolved as a function of how it benefited single alleles, not societies. Under different conditions, it could have evolved differently. You can't generalize from the way morality works in humans to the way
0Juno_Watt
Agreement isn't important: arguments are important. You apparently made the argument that convergence on morality isn't possible because it would require empirically detectable moral objects. I made the counterargument that convergence on morality could work like convergence on mathematical truth. So it seems that convergence on morlaity could happen, since there is a way it could work. OK. Utilitarianism sucks. That doens't mean other objective approaches don't work -- you could be a deontologist. And it doesn't mean subjectivism does work. Says who? We can generalise language, maths and physics beyond our instinctive System I understandings. And we have.
2someonewrongonthenet
is the reason why I said that my morality isn't preference utilitarian. If "taking into account the values and preferences of others as well as your own", then preference utilitarianism seems to be the default way to do that. Alright...so if I'm understanding correctly, you are saying that moral facts exist and people can converge upon them independently, in the same ways that people will converge on mathematical facts. And I'm saying we can't, and that morality is a preference linked to emotions. Neither of us have really done anything but restate our positions here. My position seems more or less inherent in my definition of morality, and I think you understand my position...but I still don't understand yours. Can I have a rudimentary definition of morality, an example of a moral fact, and a process by which two agents can converge upon it? Can you give me a method of evaluating a moral fact which doesn't at some point refer to our instincts? Do moral facts necessarily have to conform to our instincts? As in, if I proved a moral fact to you, but your instincts said it was wrong, would you still accept that it was right?
0Juno_Watt
For lexicographers, the default is apparently deontology "conformity to the rules of right conduct" "Principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behavior." etc. 1 A means by which communities of entities with preferences act in accordance with all their preferences. 2 Murder is wrong. 3 Since agents do not wish to be murdered, it is in their interests to agree to refrain from murder under an arrangement in which other agents agree to refrain from removing them. I don't see why I need to, Utilitarianism and ontology take preferences and intuitions into account. Your argument against utilitarinism that it comes to to conclusions which go against your instincts. That isn't just an assumption that morality has to something to do with instincts, it is a further assumption that your instincts trump all further constderations It is an assumption of subjectivism. You are saying objectivism is false because subjectivism is true. If utilitarianism worked, it would take intuitions and preferences into account, and arrive at some arrangement that minimises the number of people who don't get their instincts or preferences satisfied. Some people have to lose You have decided that is unaccpetable because you have decided that you must not lose. But utilitariansim still works in the sense that a set of subjective prefefernces can be treated as objective facts, and aggregated together. There is nothing to stop different utilitarians (of the same variety) converging on a decision. U-ism "works" in that sense.You objection is not that convergence is not possible, but that what is converged upon is not moral, because your instincts say not. But you don't have any argument beyond an assumption that morality just is what your instincts say. The other side of the argument doesn't have to deny the instinctive or subjective aspect of morality, it only needs to deny that your instincts are supreme. And it can argue that since morality is about the r
0someonewrongonthenet
So there are several things I don't like about this.. 0) It's not in their interests to play the cooperative strategy if they are more powerful, since the othe