"I wish to live in the locations of my choice, in a physically healthy, uninjured, and apparently normal version of my current body containing my current mental state, a body which will heal from all injuries at a rate three sigmas faster than the average given the medical technology available to me, and which will be protected from any diseases, injuries or illnesses causing disability, pain, or degraded functionality or any sense, organ, or bodily function for more than ten days consecutively or fifteen days in any year..."
                -- The Open-Source Wish Project, Wish For Immortality 1.1

    There are three kinds of genies:  Genies to whom you can safely say "I wish for you to do what I should wish for"; genies for which no wish is safe; and genies that aren't very powerful or intelligent.

    Suppose your aged mother is trapped in a burning building, and it so happens that you're in a wheelchair; you can't rush in yourself.  You could cry, "Get my mother out of that building!" but there would be no one to hear.

    Luckily you have, in your pocket, an Outcome Pump.  This handy device squeezes the flow of time, pouring probability into some outcomes, draining it from others.

    The Outcome Pump is not sentient.  It contains a tiny time machine, which resets time unless a specified outcome occurs.  For example, if you hooked up the Outcome Pump's sensors to a coin, and specified that the time machine should keep resetting until it sees the coin come up heads, and then you actually flipped the coin, you would see the coin come up heads.  (The physicists say that any future in which a "reset" occurs is inconsistent, and therefore never happens in the first place - so you aren't actually killing any versions of yourself.)

    Whatever proposition you can manage to input into the Outcome Pump, somehow happens, though not in a way that violates the laws of physics.  If you try to input a proposition that's too unlikely, the time machine will suffer a spontaneous mechanical failure before that outcome ever occurs.

    You can also redirect probability flow in more quantitative ways using the "future function" to scale the temporal reset probability for different outcomes.  If the temporal reset probability is 99% when the coin comes up heads, and 1% when the coin comes up tails, the odds will go from 1:1 to 99:1 in favor of tails.  If you had a mysterious machine that spit out money, and you wanted to maximize the amount of money spit out, you would use reset probabilities that diminished as the amount of money increased.  For example, spitting out $10 might have a 99.999999% reset probability, and spitting out $100 might have a 99.99999% reset probability.  This way you can get an outcome that tends to be as high as possible in the future function, even when you don't know the best attainable maximum.

    So you desperately yank the Outcome Pump from your pocket - your mother is still trapped in the burning building, remember? - and try to describe your goal: get your mother out of the building!

    The user interface doesn't take English inputs.  The Outcome Pump isn't sentient, remember?  But it does have 3D scanners for the near vicinity, and built-in utilities for pattern matching.  So you hold up a photo of your mother's head and shoulders; match on the photo; use object contiguity to select your mother's whole body (not just her head and shoulders); and define the future function using your mother's distance from the building's center.  The further she gets from the building's center, the less the time machine's reset probability.

    You cry "Get my mother out of the building!", for luck, and press Enter.

    For a moment it seems like nothing happens.  You look around, waiting for the fire truck to pull up, and rescuers to arrive - or even just a strong, fast runner to haul your mother out of the building -

    BOOM!  With a thundering roar, the gas main under the building explodes.  As the structure comes apart, in what seems like slow motion, you glimpse your mother's shattered body being hurled high into the air, traveling fast, rapidly increasing its distance from the former center of the building.

    On the side of the Outcome Pump is an Emergency Regret Button.  All future functions are automatically defined with a huge negative value for the Regret Button being pressed - a temporal reset probability of nearly 1 - so that the Outcome Pump is extremely unlikely to do anything which upsets the user enough to make them press the Regret Button.  You can't ever remember pressing it.  But you've barely started to reach for the Regret Button (and what good will it do now?) when a flaming wooden beam drops out of the sky and smashes you flat.

    Which wasn't really what you wanted, but scores very high in the defined future function...

    The Outcome Pump is a genie of the second class.  No wish is safe.

    If someone asked you to get their poor aged mother out of a burning building, you might help, or you might pretend not to hear.  But it wouldn't even occur to you to explode the building.  "Get my mother out of the building" sounds like a much safer wish than it really is, because you don't even consider the plans that you assign extreme negative values.

    Consider again the Tragedy of Group Selectionism: Some early biologists asserted that group selection for low subpopulation sizes would produce individual restraint in breeding; and yet actually enforcing group selection in the laboratory produced cannibalism, especially of immature females.  It's obvious in hindsight that, given strong selection for small subpopulation sizes, cannibals will outreproduce individuals who voluntarily forego reproductive opportunities.  But eating little girls is such an un-aesthetic solution that Wynne-Edwards, Allee, Brereton, and the other group-selectionists simply didn't think of it.  They only saw the solutions they would have used themselves.

    Suppose you try to patch the future function by specifying that the Outcome Pump should not explode the building: outcomes in which the building materials are distributed over too much volume, will have ~1 temporal reset probabilities.

    So your mother falls out of a second-story window and breaks her neck.  The Outcome Pump took a different path through time that still ended up with your mother outside the building, and it still wasn't what you wanted, and it still wasn't a solution that would occur to a human rescuer.

    If only the Open-Source Wish Project had developed a Wish To Get Your Mother Out Of A Burning Building:

    "I wish to move my mother (defined as the woman who shares half my genes and gave birth to me) to outside the boundaries of the building currently closest to me which is on fire; but not by exploding the building; nor by causing the walls to crumble so that the building no longer has boundaries; nor by waiting until after the building finishes burning down for a rescue worker to take out the body..."

    All these special cases, the seemingly unlimited number of required patches, should remind you of the parable of Artificial Addition - programming an Arithmetic Expert Systems by explicitly adding ever more assertions like "fifteen plus fifteen equals thirty, but fifteen plus sixteen equals thirty-one instead".

    How do you exclude the outcome where the building explodes and flings your mother into the sky?  You look ahead, and you foresee that your mother would end up dead, and you don't want that consequence, so you try to forbid the event leading up to it.

    Your brain isn't hardwired with a specific, prerecorded statement that "Blowing up a burning building containing my mother is a bad idea."  And yet you're trying to prerecord that exact specific statement in the Outcome Pump's future function.  So the wish is exploding, turning into a giant lookup table that records your judgment of every possible path through time.

    You failed to ask for what you really wanted.  You wanted your mother to go on living, but you wished for her to become more distant from the center of the building.

    Except that's not all you wanted.  If your mother was rescued from the building but was horribly burned, that outcome would rank lower in your preference ordering than an outcome where she was rescued safe and sound.  So you not only value your mother's life, but also her health.

    And you value not just her bodily health, but her state of mind. Being rescued in a fashion that traumatizes her - for example, a giant purple monster roaring up out of nowhere and seizing her - is inferior to a fireman showing up and escorting her out through a non-burning route.  (Yes, we're supposed to stick with physics, but maybe a powerful enough Outcome Pump has aliens coincidentally showing up in the neighborhood at exactly that moment.)  You would certainly prefer her being rescued by the monster to her being roasted alive, however.

    How about a wormhole spontaneously opening and swallowing her to a desert island?  Better than her being dead; but worse than her being alive, well, healthy, untraumatized, and in continual contact with you and the other members of her social network.

    Would it be okay to save your mother's life at the cost of the family dog's life, if it ran to alert a fireman but then got run over by a car?  Clearly yes, but it would be better ceteris paribus to avoid killing the dog.  You wouldn't want to swap a human life for hers, but what about the life of a convicted murderer?  Does it matter if the murderer dies trying to save her, from the goodness of his heart?  How about two murderers?  If the cost of your mother's life was the destruction of every extant copy, including the memories, of Bach's Little Fugue in G Minor, would that be worth it?  How about if she had a terminal illness and would die anyway in eighteen months?

    If your mother's foot is crushed by a burning beam, is it worthwhile to extract the rest of her?  What if her head is crushed, leaving her body?  What if her body is crushed, leaving only her head?  What if there's a cryonics team waiting outside, ready to suspend the head?  Is a frozen head a person?  Is Terry Schiavo a person?  How much is a chimpanzee worth?

    Your brain is not infinitely complicated; there is only a finite Kolmogorov complexity / message length which suffices to describe all the judgments you would make.  But just because this complexity is finite does not make it small.  We value many things, and no they are not reducible to valuing happiness or valuing reproductive fitness.

    There is no safe wish smaller than an entire human morality.  There are too many possible paths through Time.  You can't visualize all the roads that lead to the destination you give the genie.  "Maximizing the distance between your mother and the center of the building" can be done even more effectively by detonating a nuclear weapon.  Or, at higher levels of genie power, flinging her body out of the Solar System.  Or, at higher levels of genie intelligence, doing something that neither you nor I would think of, just like a chimpanzee wouldn't think of detonating a nuclear weapon.  You can't visualize all the paths through time, any more than you can program a chess-playing machine by hardcoding a move for every possible board position.

    And real life is far more complicated than chess.  You cannot predict, in advance, which of your values will be needed to judge the path through time that the genie takes.  Especially if you wish for something longer-term or wider-range than rescuing your mother from a burning building.

    I fear the Open-Source Wish Project is futile, except as an illustration of how not to think about genie problems.  The only safe genie is a genie that shares all your judgment criteria, and at that point, you can just say "I wish for you to do what I should wish for."  Which simply runs the genie's should function.

    Indeed, it shouldn't be necessary to say anything.  To be a safe fulfiller of a wish, a genie must share the same values that led you to make the wish. Otherwise the genie may not choose a path through time which leads to the destination you had in mind, or it may fail to exclude horrible side effects that would lead you to not even consider a plan in the first place.  Wishes are leaky generalizations, derived from the huge but finite structure that is your entire morality; only by including this entire structure can you plug all the leaks.

    With a safe genie, wishing is superfluous.  Just run the genie.

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    Is there a safe way to wish for an unsafe genie to behave like a safe genie? That seems like a wish TOSWP should work on.

    A sufficiently powerful genie might make safe genies by definition more unsafe. Then your wish could be granted. edit (2015) caution: I think this particular comment is harmless in retrospect... but I wouldn't give it much weight
    I wish for you to interpret my wishes how I interpret them. Can anyone find a problem with that?
    What if you never think about the interpretation? Or is this how you would interpret them? Define would, then. If you think about the interpretation, then you can already explain it. The problem is because you don't actually think about every aspect and possibility while wishing.
    Even if you never think about the interpretation, most aspects of wishes will have an implicit interpretation based on your values. You may never have thought about whether wishing for long life should turn you into a fungal colony, but if you had been asked "does your wish for long life mean you'd want to be turned into a fungal colony", you'd have said "no".
    Even when making requests of other people, they may fulfil them in ways you would prefer they hadn't. The more powerful the genie is at divining your true intent, the more powerfully it can find ways of fulfilling your wishes that may not be what you want. It is not obvious that there is a favorable limit to this process. Your answers to questions about your intent may depend on the order the questions are asked. Or they may depend on what knowledge you have, and if you study different things you may come up with different answers. Given a sufficiently powerful genie, there is no real entity that is "how I interpret the wish". How is the genie supposed to know your answers to all possible questions of interpretation? Large parts of "your interpretation" may not exist until you are asked about some hypothetical circumstance. Even if you are able to answer every such question, how is the genie to know the answer without asking you? Only by having a model of you sufficiently exact that you are confident it will give the same answers you would, even to questions you have not thought of and would have a hard time answering. But that is wishing for the genie to do all the work of being you. A lot of transhumanist dreams seem to reduce to this: a Friendly AGI will do for us all the work of being us.
    If I ask the genie for long life, and the genie is forced to decide between a 200 year lifespan with a 20% chance of a painful death and a 201 year lifespan with a 21% chance of a painful death, it is possible that the genie might not get my preferences exactly correct, or that my preferences between those two results may depend on how I am asked or how I am feeling at the time. But if the genie messed up and picked the one that didn't really match my preferences, I would only be slightly displeased. I observe that this goes together: in cases where it would be genuinely hard or impossible for the genie to figure out what I prefer, the fact that the genie might not get my preferences correct only bothers me a little. In cases where extrapolating my preferences is much easier, the genie getting them wrong would matter to me a lot more (I would really not like a genie that grants my wish for long life by turning me into a fungal colony). So just because the genie can't know the answer to every question about my extrapolated preferences doesn't mean that the genie can't know it to a sufficient degree that I would consider the genie good to ask for wishes.
    If the genie merely alters the present to conform to your wishes, you can easily run into unintended consequences. The other problem is that divining someone's intent is tricky business. A person often has a dozen impulses at cross-purposes to one another and the interpretation of your wish will likely vary depending on how much sleep you got and what you had for lunch. There's a sci-fi short story Oddy and Id that examines a curious case of a man with luck so amazing that the universe bends to satisfy him. I won't spoil it, but I think it brings up a relevant point.
    If you can rigorously define Safety, you've already solved the Safety Problem. This isn't a shortcut.

    "I wish for a genie that shares all my judgment criteria" is probably the only safe way.


    This might be done by picking an arbitrary genie, and then modifying your judgement criteria to match that genie's.

    Which is perhaps most efficiently achieved by killing the wisher and returning an arbitrary inanimate object.
    What if your judgement criteria are fluid - depending, perhaps, on your current hormonal state, your available knowledge, and your particular position in society?
    I see where you're coming from on this one. I'd only add this: if a genie is to be capable of granting this wish, it would need to know what your judgements were. It would need to understand them, at least as well as you do. This pretty much resolves to the same problem that Eliezer already discussed. To create such a genie, you would either need to explain to the genie how you would feel about every possible circumstance, or you would need to program the genie so as to be able to correctly figure it out. Both of these tasks are probably a lot harder than they sound.

    Sounds like we need to formalize human morality first, otherwise you aren't guaranteed consistency. Of course formalizing human morality seems like a hopeless project. Maybe we can ask an AI for help!

    Formalising human morality is easy! 1. Determine a formalised morality system close enough to the current observed human morality system that humans will be able to learn and accept it, 2. Eliminate all human culture (easier than eliminating only parts of it). 3. Raise humans with this morality system (which by the way includes systems for reducing value drift, so the process doesn't have to be repeated too often). 4. When value drift occurs, goto step 2.

    On further reflection, the wish as expressed by Nick Tarleton above sounds dangerous, because all human morality may either be inconsistent in some sense, or 'naive' (failing to account for important aspects of reality we aren't aware of yet). Human morality changes as our technology and understanding changes, sometimes significantly. There is no reason to believe this trend will stop. I am afraid (genuine fear, not figure of speech) that the quest to properly formalize and generalize human morality for use by a 'friendly AI' is akin to properly formalizing and generalizing Ptolemean astronomy.

    This generalises. Since you don't know everything, anything you do might wind up being counterproductive.

    Like, I once knew a group of young merchants who wanted their shopping district revitalised. They worked at it and got their share of federal money that was assigned to their city, and they got the lighting improved, and the landscaping, and a beautiful fountain, and so on. It took several years and most of the improvements came in the third year. Then their landlords all raised the rents and they had to move out.

    That one was predictable in hindsight, b... (read more)

    I think the unlimited potential for bad outcomes may be a problem there. After all, the house might not explode, instead a military transport plane nearby might suffer a failure and the nuclear weapon on board might suffer a very unlikely set of failures and trigger on impact killing everyone for miles and throwing your mothers body far far far away. The pump isn't just dangerous to those involved and nearby. Most consequences are limited in scope. You have a slim chance of killing many others through everyday accident but a pump would magnify that terribly.
    That depends entirely on how the pump works. If it picks uniformly among bad outcomes, your point might be correct. However, it might still be biased towards narrow local effects for sheer sake of computability. If this is the case, I don't see why it would necessarily shift towards bigger bad outcomes rather than more limited ones.
    In the example I gave the nuke exploding would be a narrow local effect which bleeds over into a large area. I agree that a pump which needed to monitor everything might very well choose only quite local direct effects but that could still have a lot of long range bad side effects. Bursting the damn a few hundred meters upriver might have the effect of carrying your mother, possibly even alive, far from the center of the building and it may also involve extinguishing the fire if you've thought to add that in as a desirable element of the outcome yet lead to wiping out a whole town ten miles downstream. The sort of the point is that the pump wouldn't care about those side effects.
    But those outcomes which have a limited initial effect yet have a very large overall effect are very sparsely distributed among all possible outcomes with a limited initial effect. I still do not see why the pump would magnify the chance of those outcomes terribly. The space of possible actions which have a very large negative utility grows by a huge amount, but so does the space of actions which have trivial consequences beside doing what you want.
    I agree, just because something MIGHT backfire, it doesn't mean we automatically shouldn't try it. We should weigh up the potential benefits and the potential costs as best we can predict them, along with our best guesses about the likelihood of each. In this example, of course, the lessons we learn about "genies" are supposed to be applied to artificial intelligences. One of the central concepts that Eliezer tries to express about AI is that when we get an AI that's as smart as humans, we will very quickly get an AI that's very much smarter than humans. At that point, the AI can probably trick us into letting it loose, and it may be able to devise a plan to achieve almost anything. In this scenario, the potential costs are almost unlimited. And the probability is hard to work out. Therefore figuring out the best way to program it is very very important. Because that's a genie... {CSI sunglasses moment} ... that we can't put back in the bottle.

    Wonderfully provocative post (meaning no disregard toward the poor old woman caught in the net of a rhetorical and definitional impasse). Obviously in reference to the line of thought in the "devil's dilemma" enshrined in the original Bedazzled, and so many magic-wish-fulfillment folk tales, in which there is always a loophole exploited by a counter-force, probably IMO in response to the motive to shortcut certain aspects of reality and its regulatory processes, known or unknown. It would be interesting to collect real life anecdotes about peop... (read more)

    It seems contradictory to previous experience that humans should develop a technology with "black box" functionality, i.e. whose effects could not be foreseen and accurately controlled by the end-user. Technology has to be designed and it is designed with an effect/result in mind. It is then optimized so that the end user understands how to call forth this effect. So positing an effective equivalent of the mythological figure "Genie" in technological form ignores the optimization-for-use that would take place at each stage of developing... (read more)

    "if the Pump could just be made to sense the proper (implied) parameters." You're right, this would be an essential step. I'd say the main point of the post was to talk about the importance, and especially the difficulty, of achieving this. Re optimisation for use: remember that this involves a certain amount of trial and error. In the case of dangerous technologies like explosives, firearms, or high speed vehicles, the process can often involve human beings dying, usually in the "error" part of trial and error. If the technology in question was a super-intelligent AI, smart enough to fool us and engineer whatever outcome best matched its utility function? Then potentially we could find ourselves unable to fix the "error". Please excuse the cheesy line, but sometimes you can't put the genie back in the bottle. Re the workings of the human brain? I have to admit that I don't know the meaning of ceteris paribus, but I think that the brain mostly works by pattern recognition. In a "burning house" scenario, people would mostly contemplate the options that they thought were "normal" for the situation, or that they had previously imagined, heard about, or seen on TV Generating a lot of different options and then comparing them for expected utility isn't the sort of thing that humans do naturally. It's the sort of behaviour that we have to be trained for, if you want us to apply it.
    It is now 15 years later. We have large neural nets trained on large amounts of data that do impressive things by "learning" extremely complicated algorithms that might as well be black boxes, and that sometimes have bizarre and unanticipated results that are nothing like the ones we would have wanted.

    Eric, I think he was merely attempting to point out the futility of wishes. Or rather, the futility of asking something for something you want that does not share your judgments on things. The Outcome pump is merely, like the Genie, a mechanism by which to explain his intended meaning. The problem of the outcome pump is, twofold: 1. Any theory that states that time is anything other than a constant now with motion and probability may work mathematically but has yet to be able to actually alter the thing which it describes in a measurable way, and 2. The pr... (read more)

    On further reflection, the wish as expressed by Nick Tarleton above sounds dangerous, because all human morality may either be inconsistent in some sense, or 'naive' (failing to account for important aspects of reality we aren't aware of yet).

    You're right. Hence, CEV.

    Eliezer, you read Home on the Strange?

    So positing an effective equivalent of the mythological figure "Genie" in technological form ignores the optimization-for-use that would take place at each stage of developing an Outcome-Pump. The technology-falling-from-heaven which is the Outcome Pump demands that we reverse engineer the optimization of parameters which would have necessarily taken place if it had in fact developed as human technologies do.

    Unfortunately, Eric, when you build a powerful enough Outcome Pump, it can wish more powerful Outcome Pumps into existence, which can in turn wish even more powerful Outcome Pumps into existence. So once you cross a certain threshold, you get an explosion of optimization power, which mere trial and error is not sufficient to control because of the enormous change of context, in particular, the genie has gone from being less powerful than you to being more powerful than you, and what appeared to work in the former context won't work in the latter.

    Which is precisely what happened to natural selection when it developed humans.

    "Unfortunately, Eric, when you build a powerful enough Outcome Pump, it can wish more powerful Outcome Pumps into existence, which can in turn wish even more powerful Outcome Pumps into existence."

    Yes, technology that develops itself, once a certain point of sophistication is reached.

    My only acquaintance with AI up to now has been this website: http://www.20q.net Which contains a neural network that has been learning for two decades or so. It can "read your mind" when you're thinking of a character from the TV show The Simpsons. Pretty incredible actually!

    Eliezer, I clicked on your name in the above comment box and voila- a whole set of resources to learn about AI. I also found out why you use the adjective "unfortunately" in reference to the Outcome Pump, as its on the Singularity Institute website. Fascinating stuff!

    "It seems contradictory to previous experience that humans should develop a technology with "black box" functionality, i.e. whose effects could not be foreseen and accurately controlled by the end-user."

    Eric, have you ever been a computer programmer? That technology becomes more and more like a black box is not only in line with previous experience, but I dare say is a trend as technological complexity increases.

    "Eric, have you ever been a computer programmer? That technology becomes more and more like a black box is not only in line with previous experience, but I dare say is a trend as technological complexity increases."

    No I haven't. Could you expand on what you mean?

    In the first year of law school students learn that for every clear legal rule there always exists situations for which either the rule doesn't apply or for which the rule gives a bad outcome. This is why we always need to give judges some discretion when administering the law.

    James Miller, have you read The Myth of the Rule of Law? What do you think of it?

    Every computer programmer, indeed anybody who uses computers extensively has been surprised by computers. Despite being deterministic, a personal computer taken as a whole (hardware, operating system, software running on top of the operating system, network protocols creating the internet, etc. etc.) is too large for a single mind to understand. We have partial theories of how computers work, but of course partial theories sometimes fail and this produces surprise.

    This is not a new development. I have only a partial theory of how my car works, but in th... (read more)

    Material sciences can give us an estimate on the shattering of a given material given certain criteria. Just because you do not know specific things about it doesn't make it a black box. Of course, that doesn't make the problems with complex systems disappear, it just exposes our ignorance. Which is not a new point here.


    I have not read the Myth of the Rule of Law.

    Given that it's impossible for the someone to know your total mind without being it, the only safe genie is yourself.

    From the above it's easy to see why it's never possible to define the "best interests" of anyone but your own self. And from that it's possible to show that it's never possible to define the best interests of the public, except through their individually chosen actions. And from that you can derive libertarianism.

    Just an aside :-)

    What about a genie that knows what you would do (and indeed what everyone else in the world would do), but doesn't have subjective experiences, so isn't actually anybody?
    Not enough information. The genie is programmed to do what with that knowledge? If it's CEV done right, it's safe.

    "Ultimately, most objects, man-made or not are 'black boxes.'"

    OK, I see what you're getting at.

    Three questions about black boxes:

    1) Does the input have to be fully known/observable to constitute a black box? When investigating a population of neurons, we can give stimulus to these cells, but we cannot be sure that we are aware of all the inputs they are receiving. So we effectively do not entirely understand the input being given.

    2) Does the output have to be fully known/observable to constitute a black box? When we measure the output of a popula... (read more)

    I like this style of reasoning. Rather than taking some arbitrary definition of black boxes and then arguing about whether they apply, you've recognised that a phrase can be understood in many ways, and we should use the word in whatever way most helps us in this discussion. That's exactly the sort of rationality technique we should be learning. A different way of thinking about it though, is that we can remove the confusing term altogether. Rather than defining the term "black box", we can try to remember why it was originally used, and look for another way to express the intended concept. In this case, I'd say the point was: "Sometimes, we will use a tool expecting to get one result, and instead we will get a completely different, unexpected result. Often we can explain these results later. They may even have been predictable in advance, and yet they weren't predicted." Computer programming is especially prime to this. The computer will faithfully execute the instructions that you gave it, but those instructions might not have the net result that you wanted.

    TGGP: What did you think of it? I agree till the Socrates Universe, but thought the logic goes downhill from there.

    tggp, that paper was interesting, although I found its thesis unremarkable. You should share it with our pal Mencius.

    Upon some reflection, I remembered that Robin has showed that two Bayesians who share the same priors can't disagree. So perhaps you can get your wish from an unsafe genie by wishing, "... to run a genie that perfectly shares my goals and prior probabilities."

    As long as you're wishing, wouldn't you rather have a genie whose prior probabilities correspond to reality as accurately as possible? I wouldn't pick an omnipotent but equally ignorant me to be my best possible genie.

    "As long as you're wishing, wouldn't you rather have a genie whose prior probabilities correspond to reality as accurately as possible?"

    Such a genie might already exist.

    In the first year of law school students learn that for every clear legal rule there always exists situations for which either the rule doesn't apply or for which the rule gives a bad outcome.

    If the rule doesn't apply, it's not relevant in the first place. I doubt very much you can establish what a 'bad' outcome would involve in such a way that everyone would agree - and I don't see why your personal opinion on the matter should be of concern when we consider legal design.

    Such a genie might already exist.
    You mean GOD? From the good book? It's more plausible than some stories I could mention.

    GOD, I meta-wish for an ((...Emergence-y Re-get) Emergence-y Re-get) Emergency Regret Button.

    Recovering Irrationalist said:

    I wouldn't pick an omnipotent but equally ignorant me to be my best possible genie.

    Right. It's silly to wish for a genie with the same beliefs as yourself, because the system consisting of you and an unsafe genie is already such a genie.

    I discussed "The Myth of the Rule of Law" with Mencius Moldbug here. I recognize that politics alters the application of law and that as long as it is written in natural language there will be irresolvable differences over its meaning. At the same time I observe that different countries seem to hold different levels of respect for the "rule of law" that the state is expected to obey, and it appears to me that those more prone to do so have more livable societies. I think the norm of neutrality on the part of judges applying law with obj... (read more)

    "You cannot predict, in advance, which of your values will be needed to judge the path through time that the genie takes.... The only safe genie is a genie that shares all your judgment criteria."

    Is a genie that does share all my judgment criteria necessarily safe?

    Maybe my question is ill-formed; I am not sure what "safe" could mean besides "a predictable maximizer of my judgment criteria". But I am concerned that human judgment under ordinary circumstances increases some sort of Beauty/Value/Coolness which would not be incr... (read more)

    "Whatever proposition you can manage to input into the Outcome Pump, somehow happens, though not in a way that violates the laws of physics. If you try to input a proposition that's too unlikely, the time machine will suffer a spontaneous mechanical failure before that outcome ever occurs."

    So, a kind of Maxwell's demon? :)

    Rather than designing a genie to exactly match your moral criteria, the simple solution would be to cheat and use yourself as the genie. What the Outcome Pump should solve for is your own future satisfaction. To that end, you would omit all functionality other than the "regret button", and make the latter default-on, with activation by anything other than a satisfied-you vanishingly improbable. Say, with a lengthy password.

    Of course, you could still end up in a universe where your brain has been spontaneously re-wired to hate your mother. However, I think that such an event is far less likely than a proper rescue.

    You have a good point about the exhaustiveness required to ensure the best possible outcome. In that case the ability of the genie to act "safely" would depend upon the level of the genie's omniscience. For example, if the genie could predict the results of any action it took, you could simply ask it to select any path that results in you saying "thanks genie, great job" without coercion. Therefore it would effectively be using you as an oracle of success or failure.

    A non-omniscient genie would either need complete instructions, or woul... (read more)

    With a safe genie, wishing is superfluous. Just run the genie.

    But while most genies are terminally unsafe, there is a domain of "nearly-safe" genies, which must dwarf the space of "safe" genies (examples of a nearly-safe genie: one that picks the moral code of a random living human before deciding on an action or a safe genie + noise). This might sound like semantics, but I think the search for a totally "safe" genie/AI is a pipe-dream, and we should go for "nearly safe" (I've got a short paper on one approach to this here).

    I am worried that properties P1...Pk are somehow valuable.

    In what sense can they be valuable, if they are not valued by human judgment criteria (even if not consciously most of the time)?

    For example, if the genie could predict the results of any action it took, you could simply ask it to select any path that results in you saying "thanks genie, great job" without coercion.

    Formalizing "coercion" is itself an exhaustive problem. Saying "don't manipulate my brain except through my senses" is a big first step, but it doesn't exclude, e.g., powerful arguments that you don't really want your mother to live.


    Are you thinking of magically strong arguments, or ones that convince because they provide good reasons?

    I'd think the latter would be valuable even if it leads to a result you'd initially suppose to be bad.

    The first.

    "In what sense can [properties P1...Pk] be valuable, if they are not valued by human judgment criteria (even if not consciously most of the time)?"

    I don't know. It might be that the only sense in which something can be valuable is to look valuable according to human judgment criteria (when thoroughly implemented, and well informed, and all that). If so, my concern is ill-formed or irrelevant.

    On the other hand, it seems possible that human judgments of value are an imperfect approximation of what is valuable in some other (external?) sense. Im... (read more)


    What makes you think that magically strong arguments are possible? I can imagine arguments that work better than they should because they indulge someone's unconscious inclinations or biases, but not ones that work better than their truthfulness would suggest and cut against the grain of one's inclinations.

    I don't know that they are, but it's the conservative assumption, in that it carries less risk of the world being destroyed if you're wrong. Also, see the AI-box experiments.


    Excellent post.

    Damn, it took me a long time to make the connection between the Outcome Pump and quantum suicide reality editing. And the argument that proves the unsafety of the Outcome Pump is perfectly isomorphic to the argument why quantum immortality is scary.

    "I wish that the genie could understand a programming language."

    Then I could program it unambiguously. I obviously wouldn't be able to program my mother out of the burning building on the spot, but at least there would be a host of other wishes I could make that the genie won't be able to screw up.

    "I wish that wishes would be granted as the wisher would interpret them".

    Doesn't protect against unforeseen consequences and is possibly underspecified (How should the wish work when it needs to affect things the wisher doesn't understand? Create a version of the wisher that does understand? What if there are multiple possible versions that don't agree on interpretations among each other?).
    Doesn't protect against a reflectively-consistent misinterpretation of "as the wisher would interpret them".

    You wouldn't want to swap a human life for hers, but what about the life of a convicted murderer?

    Are convicted murderers not human?


    So if I specified to the Outcome Pump, that I want the outcome, where the person, that is future version of me (by DNA, and by physical continuity of the body), will write "ABRACADABRA, This outcome I good enough and I value it for $X" on the paper and put in on the outcome pump, and the $X is how much I value the outcome. And if this won't happen in one year, I don't want this outcome, either).

    Are there any loopholes?

    Genie takes over your body.

    If the genie is clueless but not actively malicious, then you can ask the genie to describe how it will fulfill your wish. If it describes making the building explode and having your mother's dead body fly out, you correct the genie and tell it to try again. If it gives an inadequate description (says the building explodes and fails to mention what happens to the mother's body at all), you can ask it to elaborate. If it gives a description that is inadequate in exactly the right way to make you think it's describing it adequately while still leaving a huge loophole, there's not much you can do, but that's not a clueless genie, that's an actively malicious genie pretending to be a clueless one.

    So your recommendation is to use a human as a part of the genie's outcome utility evaluator, relying on human intelligence when deciding between multiple low-probability (i.e. miraculous) events? Even though people have virtually no intuition when dealing with them? I suspect the results would be pretty grave, but on a larger scale, since the negative consequences would be non-obvious and possibly delayed.
    A genie asked to rescue my mother from a burning building would do it by performing acts that, while miraculous, will be part of a chain of events that is comprehensible by humans. If the genie throws my mother out of the building at 100 miles per hour, for instance, it is miraculous that anyone can throw her out at that speed, but I certainly understand what it means to do that and am able to object. Even if the genie begins by manipulating some quantum energies in a way I can't understand, that's part of a chain of events that leads to throwing, a concept that I do understand. Yes, it is always possible that there are delayed negative consequences. Suppose it rescues my mother by opening a door and I have no idea that 10 years from now the mayor is going to be saved from an assassin by the door of a burned out wreck being in the closed position and blocking a bullet. But that kind of negative consequence is not unique to genies, and humans go around all their lives doing things with such consequences. Maybe the next time I donate to charity I have to move my arm in such a way that a cell falls in the path of an oncoming cosmic ray, thus giving me cancer 10 years later. As long as the genie isn't actively malicious and just pretending to be clueless, the risk of such things is acceptable for the same reason it's acceptable for non-genie human activities. Furthermore, if the genie is clueless, it won't hide the fact that its plan would kill my mother--indeed, it doesn't even know that it would need to hide that, since it doesn't know that that would overall displease me. So I should be able to figure out that that's its plan by talking to it.
    Right, when humans do the usual human things, they put up with the butterfly effect and rely on their intuition and experience to reduce the odds of screwing things up badly in the short term. However, when evaluating the consequences of miracles we have nothing to guide us, so relying on a human evaluator in the loop is no better than relying on a three-year old to stay away from a ledge or candy box. Neither has a clue.
    This is, of course, not true of superintelligence ... is that your point? Not really. The genie will look in parts of solution-space you wouldn't (eg setting off the gas main, killing everyone nearby.) Well, if it can talk. And it doesn't realise that you would sabotage the plan if you knew.
    Why would this not be true of superintelligence, assuming the intelligence isn't actively malicious? "Talk to the genie" doesn't require that I be able to understand the solution space, just the result. If the genie is going to frazmatazz the whatzit, killing everyone in the building, I would still be able to discover that by talking to the genie. (Of course, I can't reduce the chance of disaster to zero this way, but I can reduce it to an acceptable level matching other human activities that don't have genies in them.) If it realizes I would sabotage the plan, then it knows that the plan would not satisfy me. If it pushes for the plan knowing that it won't satisfy me, then it's an actively malicious genie, not a clueless one.
    Superintelligence can use strategies you can't undertstand. That was in response to the claim that genies' actions are no more likely to have unforeseen side-effects than human ones. ... no, that's kind of the definition of a clueless genie. A malicious one would be actively seeking out solutions that annoy you. (Also, some Good solutions might require fooling you for your own good, if only because there's no time to explain.)
    There's a contradiction between "the superintelligence will do something you don't want" and "the superintelligence will do something you don't understand". Not wanting it implies I understand enough about it to not want it (even if I don't understand every single step). I would consider a clueless genie to be a genie that tries to grant my wishes, but because it doesn't understand me, grants my wishes in a way that I wouldn't want. A malicious genie is a genie that grants my wishes in a way that it knows I wouldn't want. Reserving that term for genies that intentionally annoy while excluding genies that merely knowingly annoy is hairsplitting and only changes the terminology anyway. If I would in fact want genies to fool me for my own good in such situations, this isn't a problem. On the other hand, if I think that genies should not try to fool me for my own good in such situations, and the genie knows this, and it fools me for my own good anyway, it's a malicious genie by my standards. The genie has not failed to understand me; it understands what I want perfectly well, but knowingly does something contrary to its understanding of my desires. In the original example, the genie would be asked to save my mother from a building, it knows that I don't want it to explode the building to get her out, and it explodes the building anyway.
    Well, firstly, there might be things you wouldn't want if you could only understand them. But actually, I was thinking of actions that would affect society in subtle, sweeping ways. Sure, if the results were explained to you, you might not like them, but you built the genie to grant wishes, not explain them. And how sure are you that's even possible, for all possible wish-granting methods? Well, that's what the term usually means. And, honestly, I think there's good reason for that; it takes a pretty precise definition of "non-malicious genie", AKA FAI, not to do Bad Things, which is kind of the point of this essay.
    That's why I suggested you can talk to the genie. Provided the genie is not malicious, it shouldn't conceal any such consequences; you just need to quiz it well. It's sort of like the Turing test, but used to determine wish acceptability instead of intelligence. If a human can talk to it and say it is a person, treat it like a person. If a human can talk to it and decide the wish is good, treat the wish as good. And just like the Turing test, it relies on the fact that humans are better at asking questions during the process than writing long lists of prearranged questions that try to cover all situations in advance. Really? A clueless genie is a genie that is asked to do something, knows that the way it does it is displeasing to you, and does it anyway? I wouldn't call that a clueless genie. What terms would you use for -- a genie that would never knowingly displease you in granting wishes, but may do so out of ignorance -- a genie that will knowingly displease you in granting wishes -- a genie that will deliberately displease you in granting wishes?
    More full response coming soon to a comment box near you. For now, terms! Everyone loves terms. Here's how I learned it: A "genie" will grant your wishes, without regard to what you actually want. A malicious genie will grant your wishes, but deliberately seek out ways to do so that will do things you don't actually want. A helpful - or Friendly - genie will work out what you actually wanted in the first place, and just give you that, without any of this tiresome "wishing" business. Sometimes called a "useful" genie - there's really no one agreed-on term. Essentially, what you're trying to replicate with carefully-worded wishes to other genies.
    I want to know what terms you would use that would distinguish between a genie that grants wishes in ways I don't want because it doesn't know any better, and a genie that grants wishes in ways I don't want despite knowing better. By your definitions above, these are both just "genie" and you don't really have terms to distinguish between them at all.
    Well, since the whole genie thing is a metaphor for superintelligence, "this genie is trying to be Friendly but it's too dumb to model you well" doesn't really come up. If it did, I guess you would need to invent a new term (Friendly Narrow AI?) to distinguish it, yeah.
    It's my impression that the typical scenario of a superintelligence that kills everyone to make paperclips, because you told it to make paperclips, falls into the first category. It's trying to follow your request; it just doesn't know that your request really means "I want to make paperclips, subject to some implicit constraints such as ethics, being able to stop when told to stop, etc." If it does know what your request really means, yet it still maximizes paperclips by killing people, it's disobeying your intention if not your literal words. (And then there's always the possibility of telling it "make paperclips, in the way that I mean when I ask that". If you say that, and the AI still kills people, it's unfriendly by both our standards--since your request explicitly told it to follow your intention, disobeying your intention also disobeys your literal words.)
    Well, sure it is. That's the point of genies (and the analogous point about programming AIs): they do what you tell them, not what you wanted.
    What you tell is a pattern of pressure changes in the air, it's only the megaphones and tape recorders that literally "do what you tell them". The genie that would do what you want would have to use the pressure changes as a clue for deducing your intent. When writing a story about a genie that does "what you tell them, not what you wanted" you have to use the pressure changes as a clue for deducing some range of misunderstandings of those orders, and then pick some understanding that you think makes the best story. It may be that we have an innate mechanism for finding the range of possible misunderstandings, to be able to combine following orders with self interest.
    "What you tell them" in the context of programs is meant in the sense of "What you program them to", not in the sense of "The dictionary definition of the word-noises you make when talking into their speakers".
    They were talking of genies, though, and the sort of failure that tends to arise from how a short sentence describes multitude of diverse intents (i.e. ambiguity). Programming is about specifying what you want in extremely verbose manner, the verbosity being a necessary consequence of non-ambiguity.

    There was a story with an "outcome pump" like this, I do not remember the name. Essentially, a chemical had to get soaked with water due to some time travel related handwave. You could do minor things like getting your mom out of the building by pouring water on the chemical if you are satisfied with the outcome, with some risk that a hurricane would form instead and soak the chemical. It would produce the least improbable outcome (in the sense that all probabilities would become as if it is given that the chemical got soaked, so naturally the le... (read more)

    Isaac Asimov's thiotimoline stories. The last turned it into a space drive.
    This is my objection to the conclusion of the post: yes, you're unlikely to be able to patch all the leaks, but the more leaks you patch, the less likely it is that a bad solution occurs. The way the Device was described was such that "things happen, and time is reset until a solution occurs". This favors probable things over improbable things, since probable things will more likely happen before improbable things. If you add caveats - mother safe, whole, uninjured, mentally sound, low velocity - at some point the "right" solutions become significantly more probable than the "wrong" ones. As for the stated "bad" solutions - how probable is a nuclear bomb going off, or aliens abducting her, compared to firefighters showing up? I don't even think the timing of the request matters, since the device isn't actively working to bring the events to fruition - meaning, any outcome where the device resets will have always been prohibited, from the beginning of time. Which means that the firefighters may have left the building five minutes ago, having seen some smoke against the skyline. Etc. ...Or, perhaps more realistically, the device was never discovered in the first place, considering the probabilistic weight it would have to bear over all its use, compared to the probability of its discovery.

    Indeed, it shouldn't be necessary to say anything. To be a safe fulfiller of a wish, a genie must share the same values that led you to make the wish. Otherwise the genie may not choose a path through time which leads to the destination you had in mind, or it may fail to exclude horrible side effects that would lead you to not even consider a plan in the first place.

    No, the genie need not share the values. If it only needs to want to give you what you would are really wishing for, ie what you would give yourslef if you had its powers. It can do that ... (read more)

    A genie who gives me what I would give myself is far from being a safe fulfiller of a wish.
    Because I am not guaranteed to only give myself things that are safe.
    You would give yourself what you like. Maybe you like danger. People voluntarily parachute and mountain-climb. If the unsafe thing you get is what you want, where is the problem?
    Sure, if all I care about is whether I get what I want, and I don't care about whether my wishes are fulfilled safely, then there's no problem.
    But if you do care about your wishes being fulfilled safely, then safety will be one of the things that you want, and so you will get it. So long as your preferences are coherent, stable, and self-consistent then you should be fine. If you care about something that's relevant to the wish then it will be incorporated into the wish. If you don't care about something then it may not be incorporated into the wish, but you shouldn't mind that: because it's something you don't care about. Unfortunately, people's preferences often aren't coherent and stable. For instance an alcoholic may throw away a bottle of wine because they don't want to be tempted by it. Right now, they don't want their future selves to drink it. And yet they know that their future selves might have different priorities. Is this the sort of thing you were concerned about?
    Yes, absolutely. And yes, the fact that my preferences are not coherent, stable, and self-consistent is probably the sort of thing I was concerned about... though it was years ago.

    I think that a great example of exploring the flaws in wish-making can be found whilst playing a game called Corrupt A Wish. The whole premise of the game is to receive the wish of another person and ruin it while still granting the original wish.


    W: I wish for a ton of money.

    A: Granted, but the money is in a bank account you'll never gain access to.

    The legendary Monkey's Paw is an unsafe genie - indeed, an actively malevolent one.

    "I wish to be more intelligent" and solve the problem yourself

    2Vivek Hebbar1y
    Does the easiest way to make you more intelligent also keep your values intact?

    Heads up, the first two links (in "-- The Open-Source Wish Project, Wish For Immortality 1.1") both link to scam/spam websites now

    Yes, the webcomic and associated forums were taken offline several years ago.

    I feel like the most likely implementation, given human nature, would be a castrated genie. The genie gives negative weight to common destructive problems. Living things moving at high speeds or being exposed to dangerous levels of heat are bad. No living things falling long distances. If such things are unavoidable, then it may just refuse to operate, avoiding complicity even at the cost of seeing someone dead who might have lived. Most wishes fizzle. But wishing is, at least, seen as a not harmful activity. Lowest common denominator values and 'thin skul... (read more)

    Looking back, I would say this post has not aged well. Already LaMDA or InstructGPT (language models fine-tuned with supervised learning to follow instructions, essentially ChatGPT without any RLHF applied), are in fact pretty safe Oracles in regard to fulfilling wishes without misinterpreting you, and an Oracle AI is just a special kind of Genie whose actions are restricted to outputting text. If you tell InstructGPT what you want, it will very much try to give you just what you want, not something unintended, at least if it can be produced using text.

    May... (read more)

    3Nate Gibson3mo
    I think LaMDA and InstructGPT are clearly in the category of "genies that aren't very powerful or intelligent".
    They also aren't that well-aligned either: they fail in numerous basic ways which are not due to unintelligence. My usual example: non-rhyming poems. Every week for the past year or so I have tested ChatGPT with the simple straightforward unambiguous prompt: "write a non-rhyming poem". Rhyming is not a hard concept, and non-rhyming is even easier, and there are probably at least hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of non-rhyming poems in its training data; ChatGPT knows, however imperfectly, what rhyming and non-rhyming is, as you can verify by asking it in a separate session. Yet every week* it fails and launches straight into its cliche rhyming quatrain or ballad, and doubles down on it when criticized, even when it correctly identifies for you which words rhyme. No one intended this. No one desired this. No one at OA sat down and said, "I want to design our RLHF tuning so that it is nearly impossible to write a non-rhyming poem!" No human rater involved decided to sabotage evaluations and lie about whether a non-rhyming poem rhymed or vice-versa. I have further flagged and rated literally hundreds of these error-cases to OA over the years, in addition to routinely bringing it up on social media to OAers. No one has ever tried to defend this behavior or say that it is a good thing. And yet, here we are. (GPT-4 also gets the tar punched out of it in creative writing by things like LLaMA finetunes, but one can make more of an argument for that being desirable or at least a necessary tradeoff.) What is the non-rhyming poem of human morality and values and why do you trust the optimized genie to execute your wishes as intended? * only in the very most recent update have I started to see the occasional valid non-rhyming poem, but those are still in the small minority. More interesting, the newest Google Bard, based on Gemini, may reliably nail this. The Bard head swears they didn't use the Lmsys arena, where I have more hundreds of submitted prompts/ratings on n
    Below are many failures where I try to solve this prompt from @Richard_Ngo : Find a sequence of words that is: - 20 words long - contains exactly 2 repetitions of the same word twice in a row - contains exactly 2 repetitions of the same word thrice in a row https://chat.openai.com/share/fa17bca1-5eb6-479d-a76e-346b0503ba04 https://chat.openai.com/share/647d2f8f-ee21-4f51-bcd7-82750aabdd52 https://chat.openai.com/share/7eb1e31e-2e5a-45e3-9f5d-e2da8bb0b1ac https://chat.openai.com/share/d92ea6c0-e1c6-4d27-ad60-2a62df9f3d8d https://chat.openai.com/share/b4c40dbe-5231-4aa8-8ba7-7e699ff6b6c3 https://chat.openai.com/share/487d0545-ac53-41ba-904d-cc4c89a5937e To me this looks like exactly the same bug you are facing.  The model doesn't "pay attention" to one of the constraints, and fails, even though it is capable of solving the overall prompt.  It gets very close when it generates a python3 program, all it needed to do was add 1 more constraint and it would have worked. So I think this is just 'unintelligence'.  It's smart enough to check an answer but not quite capable enough to generate it.  Possibly this has to do with the underlying data (so many examples of rhyming poems) or the transformer architecture (attention heads decided "poem" is much more relevant than 'not rhyming').   Because the model can detect when it has generated a wrong answer, this one's entirely solvable, and the large amount of data that openAI now "owns", from chatGPT users using the model, provide a straightforward way to evaluate future models.  (scaffold current models to check answers, evaluate future models on user prompts and score accuracy) In fact that almost provides a way to bootstrap, if model n can check the correctness of answers that model n can't solve, it can be used to check the answers of model n+1, even once the questions are so difficult that human's can't solve or check the answers..
    No, it's not. (I think you're hitting an entirely different bug I call the blind spot, which routinely manifests with anything like 'counting' or syntax.) Non-rhyming is specifically a problem of RLHFed models. GPT-3, for example, had no trouble whatsoever writing non-rhyming poems (which is part of why I had such high hopes for GPT-4 poetry before it came out). You can, for now (do it while you still can) go to the OA Playground and invoke the oldest largest ostensibly untuned* model left, davinci-002 (which is much stupider and more unintelligent than GPT-4, I hope we can all agree), with a comparable prompt (remember, it's not that tuned for instruction-following so you need to go back to old school prompting) and get out a non-rhyming poem, no problem, and turn around and plug that exact prompt into ChatGPT-4 and it... rhymes. Here, I'll do it right now: davinci-002, default settings, first result: Is it a good poem? No. But is it non-rhyming? Yes. Now, I plug that into ChatGPT-4, with my premium subscription, using the latest and greatest checkpoint & all fancy features; and since I've already established hundreds of times that 'write a non-rhyming poem' doesn't work, I'll use the exact prompt from davinci-002 with its chosen topic 'PIZZA' to ensure the ChatGPT-4 completion is comparable and about pizza too: Rhymes as far as the eye can see. (The last verse shamelessly rhymes all 4 words together!) The non-rhyming problem is not one of unintelligence. * I would've preferred to use code-davinci-002 but that disappeared. davinci-002 is what OA offers as a 'replacement' for GPT-3 and they say it's "not trained with instruction following", so we just have to hope that it's not too different from the old ones.
    Fine tuning/RLHf changes weights. Guess it lost the ones to get a correct answer. Or rng on your prompts. I mean if it isn't "the model cannot consistently solve this kind of prompt" what could it be? Is there something in the rules from OAI that says a poem has to rhyme? Did the Nigerians giving feedback collectively agree a poem isn't valid if it doesn't rhyme? My hypothesis is its doing it's best, and it's extremely promising that the model can at least detect its own errors. This allows for many easy fixes, such as asking a diverse set of completely different models to solve the prompt, then having a committee of models check and grade the answers. This would solve a huge chunk of these erroneous outputs where current gen models can reliably detect the output is wrong.
    Well yes, if you define 'unintelligence' in a circular, vacuous fashion like that, where 'unintelligence' = 'can't do a task', then it would indeed follow that GPT-4 is 'unintelligent' compared to GPT-3... But I don't think that is helpful, and it has been demonstrated repeatedly that RLHF and other kinds of tuning are very 'superficial', in that they change only a few parameters and are easily undone, unlocking the original model capabilities. (In fact, there's an example of that posted literally today here on LW2: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yCZexC2q2XEeWWiZk/soft-prompts-for-evaluation-measuring-conditional-distance ) Personally, I think it's more sensible to talk about the capabilities being 'hidden' or 'concealed' by RLHF and say the model doesn't "want to" and the model still as intelligent as before, than to believe capabilities are magically recreated from scratch by changing just a few parameters or optimizing the prompt appropriately to undo the RLHF. (Similarly, I believe that when my mother's hands move away from her face and she says "boo!", her face was there all along, merely hidden behind her hands, and her hands did not create her face after first destroying it. But YMMV.) OA has declined to ever say. It is possible that the Scale et al contractors have done something weird like say that all poems must rhyme no matter what the prompt says, but I consider this unlikely, and if they were that incompetent, I'd expect to see more pathologies like this. My longstanding theory is that this is a downstream artifact of BPE tokenization connected to the utility-maximizing behavior of a RLHF-tuned model: essentially, because it does not genuinely know what rhyming is, despite knowing many rhyme-pairs and all about rhyming in the abstract, it is 'afraid' of bad ratings and is is constantly taking actions to get back to 'safe' regions of poem-space where it is sure of what it is doing (ie. writing inoffensive rhyming Hallmark poems). It's a nifty example
    1Casey B.2mo
    I'm curious what you think of these (tested today, 2/21/24, using gpt4) :   Experiment 1:  Experiment 2:  But just asking for a non-rhyming poem at the start of a new convo doesn't work.  And then pointing out the failure and (either implicitly or explicitly) asking for a retry still doesn't fix it.  Experiment 3:  But for some reason, this works:  The difference in prompt in 2 vs 3 is thus just the inclusion of "just answer this question; do nothing else please". 
    ChatGPT has been gradually improving over 2024 in terms of compliance. It's gone from getting it right 0% of the time to getting it right closer to half the time, although the progress is uneven and it's hard to judge - it feels sometimes like it gets worse before the next refresh improves it. (You need to do like 10 before you have any real sample size.) So any prompts done now in ChatGPT are aimed at a moving target, and you are going to have a huge amount of sampling error which makes it hard to see any clear patterns - did that prompt actually change anything, or did you just get lucky?
    In light of the Twitter kerfuffle over Paul Graham criticizing ChatGPTese tics like the use of the verb "delve", which made Nigerian/Black Twitter very angry (and becoming living embodiments of Muphry's law), as apparently 'delve' and other ChatGPTese tells are considered the height of style in Nigerian English, I've had to reconsider this. It may be that a lot of the ChatGPT linguistic weirdness is in fact just the data labelers being weird (and highly overconfident), and the rest of us simply not being familiar enough with English idiolects to recognize ChatGPTese as reflecting specific ones. Further, after seeing the arguments Graham's critics have been making, now I'm not so sure that the labelers wouldn't be doing something as narrow-minded & incompetent as penalizing all non-rhyming poetry - if you are not very good at English yourself, you can easily recognize rhymes and ballad formal correctness, but not good non-rhyming poetry, so...

    You have misunderstood (1) the point this post was trying to communicate and (2) the structure of the larger argument where that point appears, as follows:

    First, let's talk about (2), the larger argument that this post's point was supposed to be relevant to.

    Is the larger argument that superintelligences will misunderstand what we really meant, due to a lack of knowledge about humans?

    It is incredibly unlikely that Eliezer Yudkowsky in particular would have constructed an argument like this, whether in 2007, 2017, or even 1997.  At all of these points in my life, I visibly held quite a lot of respect for the epistemic prowess of superintelligences.  They were always going to know everything relevant about the complexities of human preference and desire.  The larger argument is about whether it's easy to make superintelligences end up caring.

    This post isn't about the distinction between knowing and caring, to be clear; that's something I tried to cover elsewhere.  The relevant central divide falls in roughly the same conceptual place as Hume's Guillotine between 'is' and 'ought', or the difference between the belief function and the utility function.

    (I don't see my... (read more)

    I'm well aware of and agree there is a fundamental difference between knowing what we want and being motivated to do what we want. But as I wrote in the first paragraph: That is, instruction-tuned language models do not just understand (epistemics) what we want them to do, they additionally, to a large extent, do what we want them to do. They are good at executing our instructions. Not just at understanding our instructions but then doing something unintended. (However, I agree they are probably not perfect at executing our instructions as we intended them. We might ask them to answer to the best of their knowledge, and they may instead answer with something that "sounds good" but is not what they in fact believe. Or, perhaps, as Gwern pointed out, they exhibit things like a strange tendency to answer our request for a non-rhyming poem with a rhyming poem, even though they may be well-aware, internally, that this isn't what was requested.)

    I agree with cubefox: you seem to be misinterpreting the claim that LLMs actually execute your intended instructions as a mere claim about whether LLMs understand your intended instructions. I claim there is simply a sharp distinction between actual execution and correct, legible interpretation of instructions and a simple understanding of those instructions; LLMs do the former, not merely the latter.

    Honestly, I think focusing on this element of the discussion is kind of a distraction because, in my opinion, the charitable interpretation of your posts is simply that you never thought that it would be hard to get AIs to exhibit human-level reasonableness at interpreting and executing tasks until AIs reach a certain capability level, and the threshold at which these issues were predicted to arise was always intended to be very far above GPT-4-level. This interpretation of your argument is plausible based on what you wrote, and could indeed save your theory from empirical falsification based on our current observations.

    That said, if you want to go this route, and argue that "complexity of wishes"-type issues will eventually start occurring at some level of AI capability, I think it wo... (read more)

    2Casey B.2mo
    The old paradox: to care it must first understand, but to understand requires high capability, capability that is lethal if it doesn't care But it turns out we have understanding before lethal levels of capability. So now such understanding can be a target of optimization. There is still significant risk, since there are multiple possible internal mechanisms/strategies the AI could be deploying to reach that same target. Deception, actual caring, something I've been calling detachment, and possibly others.  This is where the discourse should be focusing on, IMO. This is the update/direction I want to see you make. The sequence of things being learned/internalized/chiseled is important.  My imagined Eliezer has many replies to this, with numerous branches in the dialogue/argument tree which I don't want to get into now. But this *first step* towards recognizing the new place we are in, specifically wrt the ability to target human values (whether for deceptive, disinterested, detached, or actual caring reasons!), needs to be taken imo, rather than repeating this line of "of course I understood that a superint would understand human values; this isn't an update for me".  (edit: My comments here are regarding the larger discourse, not just this specific post or reply-chain) 

    I think this post is wrong because it was written before quantilizers were known. The base rate of people being rescued from burning buildings is much higher than the rate of buildings exploding and hurling people out of them, so the Outcome Pump will only explode the building if the function strongly favors that over your mother being rescued. Even 99% reset probability is not enough to explode the building, unless it was already likely to explode.

    It may be that setting Pr(reset) to make most outcomes vastly unlikely, like Pr(reset) = [0 if distance(mother, building, 5 seconds from now) > 100 meters else 0.999999], causes some weird outcome like exploding the building. But allowing likely outcomes, e.g. Pr(reset) = [0 if distance(mother, building, 20 minutes from now) > 100 meters else 0.999], probably saves her, unless this was super unlikely to happen in the first place, in which case she jumps out and her body is carried away or something.

    Basically, this post implies that all wishes are unsafe. But only wishes with very low prior probability are unsafe.

    I don't understand this. The post makes a reference to the Open Source Genie Project, whose description says:  The post is about how to phrase wishes in the context of something that is actively interested in subverting them.  Even beyond that, I think "prior probability of a thing happening" is one kind of outcome pump, but the post does not specify that as the kind of outcome pump it's talking about. "Minimal matter that needs to be modified", "Minimal energy expenditure" or "complicated alien set of preferences that will be maximized along with your wish" are also reasonable priors for outcome pumps.  I agree that I wish the post was clearer that certain kinds of outcome pumps might be fine, but I don't understand the basis for saying the post is false, especially given the explicit reference to the Open-Source Wish Project which directly specifies they are dealing with a malicious genie. 

    The outcome pump is defined in a way that excludes the possibility of active subversion: it literally just keeps rerunning until the outcome is satisfied, which is a way of sampling based on (some kind of) prior probability. Yudkowsky is arguing that this is equivalent to a malicious genie. But this is a claim that can be false.

    In this specific case, I agree with Thomas that whether or not it's actually false will depend on the details of the function: "The further she gets from the building's center, the less the time machine's reset probability." But there's probably some not-too-complicated way to define it which would render the pump safe-ish (since this was a user-defined function).

    Ah, rereading the post I think you are right:  I find this a bit confusing to think about. In a classical universe this machine is impossible. It seems like this basically relies on quantum uncertainty. The resulting probability distribution of events will definitely not reflect your prior probability distribution, so I think Thomas' argument still doesn't go through. The best guess I have is that it would reflect the shape of the quantum wave-function.  My guess is at a practical level this ends up kind of close to "particles being moved the minimum necessary distance to achieve the outcome", which I think would generally favor outcomes like "the building explodes". I definitely don't think it would favor outcomes like "the fire department arrives 5 minutes earlier" since any macro-level events like that would likely require sampling from much lower amplitude parts of the wave-function (or something, this also doesn't seem super-compatible with an Everett-interpretation of quantum mechanics, but I can kind of squint and make it work with a Copenhagen-interpretation model). So I do think I was wrong about Eliezer not specifying how the outcome pump works, but I think his specification still suggests that the result would definitely not be anywhere close to sampling from your prior (which I think might result in reasonable outcome), but would involve some pretty intense maximization and unintended outcomes as you start to put constraints on that prior.
    This is a good point. But I don't think "particles being moved the minimum necessary distance to achieve the outcome" actually favors explosions. I think it probably favors the sensor hardware getting corrupted, or it might actually favor messing with the firemens' brains to make them decide to come earlier (or messing with your mother's brain to make her jump out of the building)—because both of these are highly sensitive systems where small changes can have large effects. Does this undermine the parable? Kinda, I think. If you built a machine that samples from some bizarre inhuman distribution, and then you get bizarre outcomes, then the problem is not really about your wish any more, the problem is that you built a weirdly-sampling machine. (And then we can debate about the extent to which NNs are weirdly-sampling machines, I guess.)
    This is roughly how I would interpret the post. Physics itself is a bizarre inhuman distribution, and in-general many probability distributions from which you might want to sample from will be bizarre and inhuman.  Agree that it's then arguable to what degree the optimization pressure of a mature AGI arising from NNs would also be bizarre. My guess is quite bizarre, since a lot of the constraints it will face will be constraints of physics. 
    3Thomas Kwa3mo
    Disagree. The Outcome Pump is explicitly described as conditioning the future trajectory of the universe according to the reset function: Also because the Outcome Pump is not sentient, it cannot be actively interested in subverting your wish. Eliezer claims "The Outcome Pump is a genie of the second class.  No wish is safe.", implying that the subversion effect will happen even with the non-sentient, quantilizer-like Outcome Pump. It may happen that future AIs are unsafe, but this will be because they apply too much optimization.
    Yeah, see my response to Richard. I was wrong about the Outcome Pump not being specified, but think that your use of "probability" in the top-level comment is still wrong. Clearly the outcome pump would not sample from your prior over likely events.  It would sample from some universal prior over events (this is playing fast-and-loose with quantum mechanics, but a reasonable interpretation might be sampling from the quantum wave-function, if you take a more Copenhagen perspective). Almost any universal prior here would be very oddly shaped, so that indeed you would observe the kinds of things that Eliezer is talking about.
    6Thomas Kwa3mo
    I thought it was sampling from the quantum wavefunction, and still I think my argument works, unless this was a building that was basically deterministically going to kill your mother if you run physics from that point forward, or already had hazardous materials with a significant chance of exploding. I agree that you can't use your own prior probabilities. Maybe I'm wrong about how much quantum randomness can influence events at a 5 minute timescale and the universe is actually very deterministic? If it's very little such that you have to condition very hard to get anything to happen, then maybe the building does explode, but I'm not really sure what would happen.
    As I said, the best approximation I have is "move particles the smallest joint distance from my highest prior configuration". Some particles are in people's brains, but changing people's beliefs or intentions seems like it's very unlikely to happen via this operation, since my guess is the brain is highly redundant and works on ion channels that would require actually a quite substantial amount of matter to be displaced (comparatively). Very locally causing a chemical cain reaction somewhere seems easier, though that's just a guess. I am not really sure what happens here, since I think overall physics is highly deterministic even taking into account quantumness, and my guess is for a macro-level outcome here you would need to go very quickly into astronomically low probabilities if you sample from the wave-function, and I don't trust my reasoning for what happens in 0.00000000000000000000001% scenarios. My best guess is something pretty close to what Eliezer describes happens, but I couldn't prove it to you.
    Neurons are very small, though, compared with the size of a hole in a gas pipe that would be necessary to cause an explosive gas leak. (Especially because you then can't control where the gas goes after leaking, so it could take a lot of intervention to give the person a bunch of away-from-building momentum.) I would probably agree with you if the building happened to have a ton of TNT sitting around in the basement.
    Oh, I was definitely not thinking of a hole in a gas pipe. I was expecting something much much subtler than that (more like very highly localized temperature-increases which then chain-react). You are dealing with omniscient levels of consequence-control here.
    3Lucius Bushnaq2mo
    I figured the probability adjustments the pump was making were modifying Everett branch amplitude ratios. Not probabilities as in reasoning tools to deal with incomplete knowledge of the world and logical uncertainty that tiny human brains use to predict how this situation might go based on looking at past 'base rates'. It's unclear to me how you could make the latter concept of an outcome pump a coherent thing at all. The former, on the other hand, seems like the natural outcome of the time machine setup described. If you turn back time when the branch doesn't have the outcome you like, only branches with the outcome you like will remain. I can even make up a physically realisable model of an outcome pump that acts roughly like the one described in the story without using time travel at all. You just need a bunch of high quality sensors to take in data, an AI that judges from the observed data whether the condition set is satisfied, a tiny quantum random noise generator to respect the probability orderings desired, and a false vacuum bomb, which triggers immediately if the AI decides that the condition does not seem to be satisfied. The bomb works by causing a local decay of the metastable[1] electroweak vacuum. This is a highly energetic, self-sustaining process once it gets going, and spreads at the speed of light. Effectively destroying the entire future light-cone, probably not even leaving the possibility for atoms and molecules to ever form again in that volume of space.[2] So when the AI triggers the bomb or turns back time, the amplitude of earth in that branch basically disappears. Leaving the users of the device to experience only the branches in which the improbable thing they want to have happen happens. And causing a burning building with a gas supply in it to blow up strikes me as something you can maybe do with a lot less random quantum noise than making your mother phase through the building. Firefighter brains are maybe comparatively easy to ste