Thoughts on the Singularity Institute (SI)

by HoldenKarnofsky28 min read11th May 20121287 comments

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This post presents thoughts on the Singularity Institute from Holden Karnofsky, Co-Executive Director of GiveWell. Note: Luke Muehlhauser, the Executive Director of the Singularity Institute, reviewed a draft of this post, and commented: "I do generally agree that your complaints are either correct (especially re: past organizational competence) or incorrect but not addressed by SI in clear argumentative writing (this includes the part on 'tool' AI). I am working to address both categories of issues." I take Luke's comment to be a significant mark in SI's favor, because it indicates an explicit recognition of the problems I raise, and thus increases my estimate of the likelihood that SI will work to address them.

September 2012 update: responses have been posted by Luke and Eliezer (and I have responded in the comments of their posts). I have also added acknowledgements.

The Singularity Institute (SI) is a charity that GiveWell has been repeatedly asked to evaluate. In the past, SI has been outside our scope (as we were focused on specific areas such as international aid). With GiveWell Labs we are open to any giving opportunity, no matter what form and what sector, but we still do not currently plan to recommend SI; given the amount of interest some of our audience has expressed, I feel it is important to explain why. Our views, of course, remain open to change. (Note: I am posting this only to Less Wrong, not to the GiveWell Blog, because I believe that everyone who would be interested in this post will see it here.)

I am currently the GiveWell staff member who has put the most time and effort into engaging with and evaluating SI. Other GiveWell staff currently agree with my bottom-line view that we should not recommend SI, but this does not mean they have engaged with each of my specific arguments. Therefore, while the lack of recommendation of SI is something that GiveWell stands behind, the specific arguments in this post should be attributed only to me, not to GiveWell.

Summary of my views

  • The argument advanced by SI for why the work it's doing is beneficial and important seems both wrong and poorly argued to me. My sense at the moment is that the arguments SI is making would, if accepted, increase rather than decrease the risk of an AI-related catastrophe. More
  • SI has, or has had, multiple properties that I associate with ineffective organizations, and I do not see any specific evidence that its personnel/organization are well-suited to the tasks it has set for itself. More
  • A common argument for giving to SI is that "even an infinitesimal chance that it is right" would be sufficient given the stakes. I have written previously about why I reject this reasoning; in addition, prominent SI representatives seem to reject this particular argument as well (i.e., they believe that one should support SI only if one believes it is a strong organization making strong arguments). More
  • My sense is that at this point, given SI's current financial state, withholding funds from SI is likely better for its mission than donating to it. (I would not take this view to the furthest extreme; the argument that SI should have some funding seems stronger to me than the argument that it should have as much as it currently has.)
  • I find existential risk reduction to be a fairly promising area for philanthropy, and plan to investigate it further. More
  • There are many things that could happen that would cause me to revise my view on SI. However, I do not plan to respond to all comment responses to this post. (Given the volume of responses we may receive, I may not be able to even read all the comments on this post.) I do not believe these two statements are inconsistent, and I lay out paths for getting me to change my mind that are likely to work better than posting comments. (Of course I encourage people to post comments; I'm just noting in advance that this action, alone, doesn't guarantee that I will consider your argument.) More

Intent of this post

I did not write this post with the purpose of "hurting" SI. Rather, I wrote it in the hopes that one of these three things (or some combination) will happen:

  1. New arguments are raised that cause me to change my mind and recognize SI as an outstanding giving opportunity. If this happens I will likely attempt to raise more money for SI (most likely by discussing it with other GiveWell staff and collectively considering a GiveWell Labs recommendation).
  2. SI concedes that my objections are valid and increases its determination to address them. A few years from now, SI is a better organization and more effective in its mission.
  3. SI can't or won't make changes, and SI's supporters feel my objections are valid, so SI loses some support, freeing up resources for other approaches to doing good.

Which one of these occurs will hopefully be driven primarily by the merits of the different arguments raised. Because of this, I think that whatever happens as a result of my post will be positive for SI's mission, whether or not it is positive for SI as an organization. I believe that most of SI's supporters and advocates care more about the former than about the latter, and that this attitude is far too rare in the nonprofit world.

Does SI have a well-argued case that its work is beneficial and important?

I know no more concise summary of SI's views than this page, so here I give my own impressions of what SI believes, in italics.

  1. There is some chance that in the near future (next 20-100 years), an "artificial general intelligence" (AGI) - a computer that is vastly more intelligent than humans in every relevant way - will be created.
  2. This AGI will likely have a utility function and will seek to maximize utility according to this function.
  3. This AGI will be so much more powerful than humans - due to its superior intelligence - that it will be able to reshape the world to maximize its utility, and humans will not be able to stop it from doing so.
  4. Therefore, it is crucial that its utility function be one that is reasonably harmonious with what humans want. A "Friendly" utility function is one that is reasonably harmonious with what humans want, such that a "Friendly" AGI (FAI) would change the world for the better (by human standards) while an "Unfriendly" AGI (UFAI) would essentially wipe out humanity (or worse).
  5. Unless great care is taken specifically to make a utility function "Friendly," it will be "Unfriendly," since the things humans value are a tiny subset of the things that are possible.
  6. Therefore, it is crucially important to develop "Friendliness theory" that helps us to ensure that the first strong AGI's utility function will be "Friendly." The developer of Friendliness theory could use it to build an FAI directly or could disseminate the theory so that others working on AGI are more likely to build FAI as opposed to UFAI.

From the time I first heard this argument, it has seemed to me to be skipping important steps and making major unjustified assumptions. However, for a long time I believed this could easily be due to my inferior understanding of the relevant issues. I believed my own views on the argument to have only very low relevance (as I stated in my 2011 interview with SI representatives). Over time, I have had many discussions with SI supporters and advocates, as well as with non-supporters who I believe understand the relevant issues well. I now believe - for the moment - that my objections are highly relevant, that they cannot be dismissed as simple "layman's misunderstandings" (as they have been by various SI supporters in the past), and that SI has not published anything that addresses them in a clear way.

Below, I list my major objections. I do not believe that these objections constitute a sharp/tight case for the idea that SI's work has low/negative value; I believe, instead, that SI's own arguments are too vague for such a rebuttal to be possible. There are many possible responses to my objections, but SI's public arguments (and the private arguments) do not make clear which possible response (if any) SI would choose to take up and defend. Hopefully the dialogue following this post will clarify what SI believes and why.

Some of my views are discussed at greater length (though with less clarity) in a public transcript of a conversation I had with SI supporter Jaan Tallinn. I refer to this transcript as "Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011."

Objection 1: it seems to me that any AGI that was set to maximize a "Friendly" utility function would be extraordinarily dangerous.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that SI manages to create what it believes to be an FAI. Suppose that it is successful in the "AGI" part of its goal, i.e., it has successfully created an intelligence vastly superior to human intelligence and extraordinarily powerful from our perspective. Suppose that it has also done its best on the "Friendly" part of the goal: it has developed a formal argument for why its AGI's utility function will be Friendly, it believes this argument to be airtight, and it has had this argument checked over by 100 of the world's most intelligent and relevantly experienced people. Suppose that SI now activates its AGI, unleashing it to reshape the world as it sees fit. What will be the outcome?

I believe that the probability of an unfavorable outcome - by which I mean an outcome essentially equivalent to what a UFAI would bring about - exceeds 90% in such a scenario. I believe the goal of designing a "Friendly" utility function is likely to be beyond the abilities even of the best team of humans willing to design such a function. I do not have a tight argument for why I believe this, but a comment on LessWrong by Wei Dai gives a good illustration of the kind of thoughts I have on the matter:

What I'm afraid of is that a design will be shown to be safe, and then it turns out that the proof is wrong, or the formalization of the notion of "safety" used by the proof is wrong. This kind of thing happens a lot in cryptography, if you replace "safety" with "security". These mistakes are still occurring today, even after decades of research into how to do such proofs and what the relevant formalizations are. From where I'm sitting, proving an AGI design Friendly seems even more difficult and error-prone than proving a crypto scheme secure, probably by a large margin, and there is no decades of time to refine the proof techniques and formalizations. There's good recent review of the history of provable security, titled Provable Security in the Real World, which might help you understand where I'm coming from.

I think this comment understates the risks, however. For example, when the comment says "the formalization of the notion of 'safety' used by the proof is wrong," it is not clear whether it means that the values the programmers have in mind are not correctly implemented by the formalization, or whether it means they are correctly implemented but are themselves catastrophic in a way that hasn't been anticipated. I would be highly concerned about both. There are other catastrophic possibilities as well; perhaps the utility function itself is well-specified and safe, but the AGI's model of the world is flawed (in particular, perhaps its prior or its process for matching observations to predictions are flawed) in a way that doesn't emerge until the AGI has made substantial changes to its environment.

By SI's own arguments, even a small error in any of these things would likely lead to catastrophe. And there are likely failure forms I haven't thought of. The overriding intuition here is that complex plans usually fail when unaccompanied by feedback loops. A scenario in which a set of people is ready to unleash an all-powerful being to maximize some parameter in the world, based solely on their initial confidence in their own extrapolations of the consequences of doing so, seems like a scenario that is overwhelmingly likely to result in a bad outcome. It comes down to placing the world's largest bet on a highly complex theory - with no experimentation to test the theory first.

So far, all I have argued is that the development of "Friendliness" theory can achieve at best only a limited reduction in the probability of an unfavorable outcome. However, as I argue in the next section, I believe there is at least one concept - the "tool-agent" distinction - that has more potential to reduce risks, and that SI appears to ignore this concept entirely. I believe that tools are safer than agents (even agents that make use of the best "Friendliness" theory that can reasonably be hoped for) and that SI encourages a focus on building agents, thus increasing risk.

Objection 2: SI appears to neglect the potentially important distinction between "tool" and "agent" AI.

Google Maps is a type of artificial intelligence (AI). It is far more intelligent than I am when it comes to planning routes.

Google Maps - by which I mean the complete software package including the display of the map itself - does not have a "utility" that it seeks to maximize. (One could fit a utility function to its actions, as to any set of actions, but there is no single "parameter to be maximized" driving its operations.)

Google Maps (as I understand it) considers multiple possible routes, gives each a score based on factors such as distance and likely traffic, and then displays the best-scoring route in a way that makes it easily understood by the user. If I don't like the route, for whatever reason, I can change some parameters and consider a different route. If I like the route, I can print it out or email it to a friend or send it to my phone's navigation application. Google Maps has no single parameter it is trying to maximize; it has no reason to try to "trick" me in order to increase its utility.

In short, Google Maps is not an agent, taking actions in order to maximize a utility parameter. It is a tool, generating information and then displaying it in a user-friendly manner for me to consider, use and export or discard as I wish.

Every software application I know of seems to work essentially the same way, including those that involve (specialized) artificial intelligence such as Google Search, Siri, Watson, Rybka, etc. Some can be put into an "agent mode" (as Watson was on Jeopardy!) but all can easily be set up to be used as "tools" (for example, Watson can simply display its top candidate answers to a question, with the score for each, without speaking any of them.)

The "tool mode" concept is importantly different from the possibility of Oracle AI sometimes discussed by SI. The discussions I've seen of Oracle AI present it as an Unfriendly AI that is "trapped in a box" - an AI whose intelligence is driven by an explicit utility function and that humans hope to control coercively. Hence the discussion of ideas such as the AI-Box Experiment. A different interpretation, given in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011, is an AI with a carefully designed utility function - likely as difficult to construct as "Friendliness" - that leaves it "wishing" to answer questions helpfully. By contrast with both these ideas, Tool-AGI is not "trapped" and it is not Unfriendly or Friendly; it has no motivations and no driving utility function of any kind, just like Google Maps. It scores different possibilities and displays its conclusions in a transparent and user-friendly manner, as its instructions say to do; it does not have an overarching "want," and so, as with the specialized AIs described above, while it may sometimes "misinterpret" a question (thereby scoring options poorly and ranking the wrong one #1) there is no reason to expect intentional trickery or manipulation when it comes to displaying its results.

Another way of putting this is that a "tool" has an underlying instruction set that conceptually looks like: "(1) Calculate which action A would maximize parameter P, based on existing data set D. (2) Summarize this calculation in a user-friendly manner, including what Action A is, what likely intermediate outcomes it would cause, what other actions would result in high values of P, etc." An "agent," by contrast, has an underlying instruction set that conceptually looks like: "(1) Calculate which action, A, would maximize parameter P, based on existing data set D. (2) Execute Action A." In any AI where (1) is separable (by the programmers) as a distinct step, (2) can be set to the "tool" version rather than the "agent" version, and this separability is in fact present with most/all modern software. Note that in the "tool" version, neither step (1) nor step (2) (nor the combination) constitutes an instruction to maximize a parameter - to describe a program of this kind as "wanting" something is a category error, and there is no reason to expect its step (2) to be deceptive.

I elaborated further on the distinction and on the concept of a tool-AI in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011.

This is important because an AGI running in tool mode could be extraordinarily useful but far more safe than an AGI running in agent mode. In fact, if developing "Friendly AI" is what we seek, a tool-AGI could likely be helpful enough in thinking through this problem as to render any previous work on "Friendliness theory" moot. Among other things, a tool-AGI would allow transparent views into the AGI's reasoning and predictions without any reason to fear being purposefully misled, and would facilitate safe experimental testing of any utility function that one wished to eventually plug into an "agent."

Is a tool-AGI possible? I believe that it is, and furthermore that it ought to be our default picture of how AGI will work, given that practically all software developed to date can (and usually does) run as a tool and given that modern software seems to be constantly becoming "intelligent" (capable of giving better answers than a human) in surprising new domains. In addition, it intuitively seems to me (though I am not highly confident) that intelligence inherently involves the distinct, separable steps of (a) considering multiple possible actions and (b) assigning a score to each, prior to executing any of the possible actions. If one can distinctly separate (a) and (b) in a program's code, then one can abstain from writing any "execution" instructions and instead focus on making the program list actions and scores in a user-friendly manner, for humans to consider and use as they wish.

Of course, there are possible paths to AGI that may rule out a "tool mode," but it seems that most of these paths would rule out the application of "Friendliness theory" as well. (For example, a "black box" emulation and augmentation of a human mind.) What are the paths to AGI that allow manual, transparent, intentional design of a utility function but do not allow the replacement of "execution" instructions with "communication" instructions? Most of the conversations I've had on this topic have focused on three responses:

  • Self-improving AI. Many seem to find it intuitive that (a) AGI will almost certainly come from an AI rewriting its own source code, and (b) such a process would inevitably lead to an "agent." I do not agree with either (a) or (b). I discussed these issues in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011 and will be happy to discuss them more if this is the line of response that SI ends up pursuing. Very briefly:
    • The idea of a "self-improving algorithm" intuitively sounds very powerful, but does not seem to have led to many "explosions" in software so far (and it seems to be a concept that could apply to narrow AI as well as to AGI).
    • It seems to me that a tool-AGI could be plugged into a self-improvement process that would be quite powerful but would also terminate and yield a new tool-AI after a set number of iterations (or after reaching a set "intelligence threshold"). So I do not accept the argument that "self-improving AGI means agent AGI." As stated above, I will elaborate on this view if it turns out to be an important point of disagreement.
    • I have argued (in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011) that the relevant self-improvement abilities are likely to come with or after - not prior to - the development of strong AGI. In other words, any software capable of the relevant kind of self-improvement is likely also capable of being used as a strong tool-AGI, with the benefits described above.
    • The SI-related discussions I've seen of "self-improving AI" are highly vague, and do not spell out views on the above points.
  • Dangerous data collection. Some point to the seeming dangers of a tool-AI's "scoring" function: in order to score different options it may have to collect data, which is itself an "agent" type action that could lead to dangerous actions. I think my definition of "tool" above makes clear what is wrong with this objection: a tool-AGI takes its existing data set D as fixed (and perhaps could have some pre-determined, safe set of simple actions it can take - such as using Google's API - to collect more), and if maximizing its chosen parameter is best accomplished through more data collection, it can transparently output why and how it suggests collecting more data. Over time it can be given more autonomy for data collection through an experimental and domain-specific process (e.g., modifying the AI to skip specific steps of human review of proposals for data collection after it has become clear that these steps work as intended), a process that has little to do with the "Friendly overarching utility function" concept promoted by SI. Again, I will elaborate on this if it turns out to be a key point.
  • Race for power. Some have argued to me that humans are likely to choose to create agent-AGI, in order to quickly gain power and outrace other teams working on AGI. But this argument, even if accepted, has very different implications from SI's view.

    Conventional wisdom says it is extremely dangerous to empower a computer to act in the world until one is very sure that the computer will do its job in a way that is helpful rather than harmful. So if a programmer chooses to "unleash an AGI as an agent" with the hope of gaining power, it seems that this programmer will be deliberately ignoring conventional wisdom about what is safe in favor of shortsighted greed. I do not see why such a programmer would be expected to make use of any "Friendliness theory" that might be available. (Attempting to incorporate such theory would almost certainly slow the project down greatly, and thus would bring the same problems as the more general "have caution, do testing" counseled by conventional wisdom.) It seems that the appropriate measures for preventing such a risk are security measures aiming to stop humans from launching unsafe agent-AIs, rather than developing theories or raising awareness of "Friendliness."

One of the things that bothers me most about SI is that there is practically no public content, as far as I can tell, explicitly addressing the idea of a "tool" and giving arguments for why AGI is likely to work only as an "agent." The idea that AGI will be driven by a central utility function seems to be simply assumed. Two examples:

  • I have been referred to Muehlhauser and Salamon 2012 as the most up-to-date, clear explanation of SI's position on "the basics." This paper states, "Perhaps we could build an AI of limited cognitive ability — say, a machine that only answers questions: an 'Oracle AI.' But this approach is not without its own dangers (Armstrong, Sandberg, and Bostrom 2012)." However, the referenced paper (Armstrong, Sandberg and Bostrom 2012) seems to take it as a given that an Oracle AI is an "agent trapped in a box" - a computer that has a basic drive/utility function, not a Tool-AGI. The rest of Muehlhauser and Salamon 2012 seems to take it as a given that an AGI will be an agent.
  • I have often been referred to Omohundro 2008 for an argument that an AGI is likely to have certain goals. But this paper seems, again, to take it as given that an AGI will be an agent, i.e., that it will have goals at all. The introduction states, "To say that a system of any design is an 'artificial intelligence', we mean that it has goals which it tries to accomplish by acting in the world." In other words, the premise I'm disputing seems embedded in its very definition of AI.

The closest thing I have seen to a public discussion of "tool-AGI" is in Dreams of Friendliness, where Eliezer Yudkowsky considers the question, "Why not just have the AI answer questions, instead of trying to do anything? Then it wouldn't need to be Friendly. It wouldn't need any goals at all. It would just answer questions." His response:

To which the reply is that the AI needs goals in order to decide how to think: that is, the AI has to act as a powerful optimization process in order to plan its acquisition of knowledge, effectively distill sensory information, pluck "answers" to particular questions out of the space of all possible responses, and of course, to improve its own source code up to the level where the AI is a powerful intelligence. All these events are "improbable" relative to random organizations of the AI's RAM, so the AI has to hit a narrow target in the space of possibilities to make superintelligent answers come out.

This passage appears vague and does not appear to address the specific "tool" concept I have defended above (in particular, it does not address the analogy to modern software, which challenges the idea that "powerful optimization processes" cannot run in tool mode). The rest of the piece discusses (a) psychological mistakes that could lead to the discussion in question; (b) the "Oracle AI" concept that I have outlined above. The comments contain some more discussion of the "tool" idea (Denis Bider and Shane Legg seem to be picturing something similar to "tool-AGI") but the discussion is unresolved and I believe the "tool" concept defended above remains essentially unaddressed.

In sum, SI appears to encourage a focus on building and launching "Friendly" agents (it is seeking to do so itself, and its work on "Friendliness" theory seems to be laying the groundwork for others to do so) while not addressing the tool-agent distinction. It seems to assume that any AGI will have to be an agent, and to make little to no attempt at justifying this assumption. The result, in my view, is that it is essentially advocating for a more dangerous approach to AI than the traditional approach to software development.

Objection 3: SI's envisioned scenario is far more specific and conjunctive than it appears at first glance, and I believe this scenario to be highly unlikely.

SI's scenario concerns the development of artificial general intelligence (AGI): a computer that is vastly more intelligent than humans in every relevant way. But we already have many computers that are vastly more intelligent than humans in some relevant ways, and the domains in which specialized AIs outdo humans seem to be constantly and continuously expanding. I feel that the relevance of "Friendliness theory" depends heavily on the idea of a "discrete jump" that seems unlikely and whose likelihood does not seem to have been publicly argued for.

One possible scenario is that at some point, we develop powerful enough non-AGI tools (particularly specialized AIs) that we vastly improve our abilities to consider and prepare for the eventuality of AGI - to the point where any previous theory developed on the subject becomes useless. Or (to put this more generally) non-AGI tools simply change the world so much that it becomes essentially unrecognizable from the perspective of today - again rendering any previous "Friendliness theory" moot. As I said in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011, some of SI's work "seems a bit like trying to design Facebook before the Internet was in use, or even before the computer existed."

Perhaps there will be a discrete jump to AGI, but it will be a sort of AGI that renders "Friendliness theory" moot for a different reason. For example, in the practice of software development, there often does not seem to be an operational distinction between "intelligent" and "Friendly." (For example, my impression is that the only method programmers had for evaluating Watson's "intelligence" was to see whether it was coming up with the same answers that a well-informed human would; the only way to evaluate Siri's "intelligence" was to evaluate its helpfulness to humans.) "Intelligent" often ends up getting defined as "prone to take actions that seem all-around 'good' to the programmer." So the concept of "Friendliness" may end up being naturally and subtly baked in to a successful AGI effort.

The bottom line is that we know very little about the course of future artificial intelligence. I believe that the probability that SI's concept of "Friendly" vs. "Unfriendly" goals ends up seeming essentially nonsensical, irrelevant and/or unimportant from the standpoint of the relevant future is over 90%.

Other objections to SI's views

There are other debates about the likelihood of SI's work being relevant/helpful; for example,

  • It isn't clear whether the development of AGI is imminent enough to be relevant, or whether other risks to humanity are closer.
  • It isn't clear whether AGI would be as powerful as SI's views imply. (I discussed this briefly in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011.)
  • It isn't clear whether even an extremely powerful UFAI would choose to attack humans as opposed to negotiating with them. (I find it somewhat helpful to analogize UFAI-human interactions to human-mosquito interactions. Humans are enormously more intelligent than mosquitoes; humans are good at predicting, manipulating, and destroying mosquitoes; humans do not value mosquitoes' welfare; humans have other goals that mosquitoes interfere with; humans would like to see mosquitoes eradicated at least from certain parts of the planet. Yet humans haven't accomplished such eradication, and it is easy to imagine scenarios in which humans would prefer honest negotiation and trade with mosquitoes to any other arrangement, if such negotiation and trade were possible.)

Unlike the three objections I focus on, these other issues have been discussed a fair amount, and if these other issues were the only objections to SI's arguments I would find SI's case to be strong (i.e., I would find its scenario likely enough to warrant investment in).

Wrapup

  • I believe the most likely future scenarios are the ones we haven't thought of, and that the most likely fate of the sort of theory SI ends up developing is irrelevance.
  • I believe that unleashing an all-powerful "agent AGI" (without the benefit of experimentation) would very likely result in a UFAI-like outcome, no matter how carefully the "agent AGI" was designed to be "Friendly." I see SI as encouraging (and aiming to take) this approach.
  • I believe that the standard approach to developing software results in "tools," not "agents," and that tools (while dangerous) are much safer than agents. A "tool mode" could facilitate experiment-informed progress toward a safe "agent," rather than needing to get "Friendliness" theory right without any experimentation.
  • Therefore, I believe that the approach SI advocates and aims to prepare for is far more dangerous than the standard approach, so if SI's work on Friendliness theory affects the risk of human extinction one way or the other, it will increase the risk of human extinction. Fortunately I believe SI's work is far more likely to have no effect one way or the other.

For a long time I refrained from engaging in object-level debates over SI's work, believing that others are better qualified to do so. But after talking at great length to many of SI's supporters and advocates and reading everything I've been pointed to as relevant, I still have seen no clear and compelling response to any of my three major objections. As stated above, there are many possible responses to my objections, but SI's current arguments do not seem clear on what responses they wish to take and defend. At this point I am unlikely to form a positive view of SI's work until and unless I do see such responses, and/or SI changes its positions.

Is SI the kind of organization we want to bet on?

This part of the post has some risks. For most of GiveWell's history, sticking to our standard criteria - and putting more energy into recommended than non-recommended organizations - has enabled us to share our honest thoughts about charities without appearing to get personal. But when evaluating a group such as SI, I can't avoid placing a heavy weight on (my read on) the general competence, capability and "intangibles" of the people and organization, because SI's mission is not about repeating activities that have worked in the past. Sharing my views on these issues could strike some as personal or mean-spirited and could lead to the misimpression that GiveWell is hostile toward SI. But it is simply necessary in order to be fully transparent about why I hold the views that I hold.

Fortunately, SI is an ideal organization for our first discussion of this type. I believe the staff and supporters of SI would overwhelmingly rather hear the whole truth about my thoughts - so that they can directly engage them and, if warranted, make changes - than have me sugar-coat what I think in order to spare their feelings. People who know me and my attitude toward being honest vs. sparing feelings know that this, itself, is high praise for SI.

One more comment before I continue: our policy is that non-public information provided to us by a charity will not be published or discussed without that charity's prior consent. However, none of the content of this post is based on private information; all of it is based on information that SI has made available to the public.

There are several reasons that I currently have a negative impression of SI's general competence, capability and "intangibles." My mind remains open and I include specifics on how it could be changed.

  • Weak arguments. SI has produced enormous quantities of public argumentation, and I have examined a very large proportion of this information. Yet I have never seen a clear response to any of the three basic objections I listed in the previous section. One of SI's major goals is to raise awareness of AI-related risks; given this, the fact that it has not advanced clear/concise/compelling arguments speaks, in my view, to its general competence.
  • Lack of impressive endorsements. I discussed this issue in my 2011 interview with SI representatives and I still feel the same way on the matter. I feel that given the enormous implications of SI's claims, if it argued them well it ought to be able to get more impressive endorsements than it has.

    I have been pointed to Peter Thiel and Ray Kurzweil as examples of impressive SI supporters, but I have not seen any on-record statements from either of these people that show agreement with SI's specific views, and in fact (based on watching them speak at Singularity Summits) my impression is that they disagree. Peter Thiel seems to believe that speeding the pace of general innovation is a good thing; this would seem to be in tension with SI's view that AGI will be catastrophic by default and that no one other than SI is paying sufficient attention to "Friendliness" issues. Ray Kurzweil seems to believe that "safety" is a matter of transparency, strong institutions, etc. rather than of "Friendliness." I am personally in agreement with the things I have seen both of them say on these topics. I find it possible that they support SI because of the Singularity Summit or to increase general interest in ambitious technology, rather than because they find "Friendliness theory" to be as important as SI does.

    Clear, on-record statements from these two supporters, specifically endorsing SI's arguments and the importance of developing Friendliness theory, would shift my views somewhat on this point.

  • Resistance to feedback loops. I discussed this issue in my 2011 interview with SI representatives and I still feel the same way on the matter. SI seems to have passed up opportunities to test itself and its own rationality by e.g. aiming for objectively impressive accomplishments. This is a problem because of (a) its extremely ambitious goals (among other things, it seeks to develop artificial intelligence and "Friendliness theory" before anyone else can develop artificial intelligence); (b) its view of its staff/supporters as having unusual insight into rationality, which I discuss in a later bullet point.

    SI's list of achievements is not, in my view, up to where it needs to be given (a) and (b). Yet I have seen no declaration that SI has fallen short to date and explanation of what will be changed to deal with it. SI's recent release of a strategic plan and monthly updates are improvements from a transparency perspective, but they still leave me feeling as though there are no clear metrics or goals by which SI is committing to be measured (aside from very basic organizational goals such as "design a new website" and very vague goals such as "publish more papers") and as though SI places a low priority on engaging people who are critical of its views (or at least not yet on board), as opposed to people who are naturally drawn to it.

    I believe that one of the primary obstacles to being impactful as a nonprofit is the lack of the sort of helpful feedback loops that lead to success in other domains. I like to see groups that are making as much effort as they can to create meaningful feedback loops for themselves. I perceive SI as falling well short on this front. Pursuing more impressive endorsements and developing benign but objectively recognizable innovations (particularly commercially viable ones) are two possible ways to impose more demanding feedback loops. (I discussed both of these in my interview linked above).

  • Apparent poorly grounded belief in SI's superior general rationality. Many of the things that SI and its supporters and advocates say imply a belief that they have special insights into the nature of general rationality, and/or have superior general rationality, relative to the rest of the population. (Examples here, here and here). My understanding is that SI is in the process of spinning off a group dedicated to training people on how to have higher general rationality.

    Yet I'm not aware of any of what I consider compelling evidence that SI staff/supporters/advocates have any special insight into the nature of general rationality or that they have especially high general rationality.

    I have been pointed to the Sequences on this point. The Sequences (which I have read the vast majority of) do not seem to me to be a demonstration or evidence of general rationality. They are about rationality; I find them very enjoyable to read; and there is very little they say that I disagree with (or would have disagreed with before I read them). However, they do not seem to demonstrate rationality on the part of the writer, any more than a series of enjoyable, not-obviously-inaccurate essays on the qualities of a good basketball player would demonstrate basketball prowess. I sometimes get the impression that fans of the Sequences are willing to ascribe superior rationality to the writer simply because the content seems smart and insightful to them, without making a critical effort to determine the extent to which the content is novel, actionable and important. 

    I endorse Eliezer Yudkowsky's statement, "Be careful … any time you find yourself defining the [rationalist] as someone other than the agent who is currently smiling from on top of a giant heap of utility." To me, the best evidence of superior general rationality (or of insight into it) would be objectively impressive achievements (successful commercial ventures, highly prestigious awards, clear innovations, etc.) and/or accumulation of wealth and power. As mentioned above, SI staff/supporters/advocates do not seem particularly impressive on these fronts, at least not as much as I would expect for people who have the sort of insight into rationality that makes it sensible for them to train others in it. I am open to other evidence that SI staff/supporters/advocates have superior general rationality, but I have not seen it.

    Why is it a problem if SI staff/supporter/advocates believe themselves, without good evidence, to have superior general rationality? First off, it strikes me as a belief based on wishful thinking rather than rational inference. Secondly, I would expect a series of problems to accompany overconfidence in one's general rationality, and several of these problems seem to be actually occurring in SI's case:

    • Insufficient self-skepticism given how strong its claims are and how little support its claims have won. Rather than endorsing "Others have not accepted our arguments, so we will sharpen and/or reexamine our arguments," SI seems often to endorse something more like "Others have not accepted their arguments because they have inferior general rationality," a stance less likely to lead to improvement on SI's part.
    • Being too selective (in terms of looking for people who share its preconceptions) when determining whom to hire and whose feedback to take seriously.
    • Paying insufficient attention to the limitations of the confidence one can have in one's untested theories, in line with my Objection 1.
  • Overall disconnect between SI's goals and its activities. SI seeks to build FAI and/or to develop and promote "Friendliness theory" that can be useful to others in building FAI. Yet it seems that most of its time goes to activities other than developing AI or theory. Its per-person output in terms of publications seems low. Its core staff seem more focused on Less Wrong posts, "rationality training" and other activities that don't seem connected to the core goals; Eliezer Yudkowsky, in particular, appears (from the strategic plan) to be focused on writing books for popular consumption. These activities seem neither to be advancing the state of FAI-related theory nor to be engaging the sort of people most likely to be crucial for building AGI.

    A possible justification for these activities is that SI is seeking to promote greater general rationality, which over time will lead to more and better support for its mission. But if this is SI's core activity, it becomes even more important to test the hypothesis that SI's views are in fact rooted in superior general rationality - and these tests don't seem to be happening, as discussed above.

  • Theft. I am bothered by the 2009 theft of $118,803.00 (as against a $541,080.00 budget for the year). In an organization as small as SI, it really seems as though theft that large relative to the budget shouldn't occur and that it represents a major failure of hiring and/or internal controls.

    In addition, I have seen no public SI-authorized discussion of the matter that I consider to be satisfactory in terms of explaining what happened and what the current status of the case is on an ongoing basis. Some details may have to be omitted, but a clear SI-authorized statement on this point with as much information as can reasonably provided would be helpful.

A couple positive observations to add context here:

  • I see significant positive qualities in many of the people associated with SI. I especially like what I perceive as their sincere wish to do whatever they can to help the world as much as possible, and the high value they place on being right as opposed to being conventional or polite. I have not interacted with Eliezer Yudkowsky but I greatly enjoy his writings.
  • I'm aware that SI has relatively new leadership that is attempting to address the issues behind some of my complaints. I have a generally positive impression of the new leadership; I believe the Executive Director and Development Director, in particular, to represent a step forward in terms of being interested in transparency and in testing their own general rationality. So I will not be surprised if there is some improvement in the coming years, particularly regarding the last couple of statements listed above. That said, SI is an organization and it seems reasonable to judge it by its organizational track record, especially when its new leadership is so new that I have little basis on which to judge these staff.

Wrapup

While SI has produced a lot of content that I find interesting and enjoyable, it has not produced what I consider evidence of superior general rationality or of its suitability for the tasks it has set for itself. I see no qualifications or achievements that specifically seem to indicate that SI staff are well-suited to the challenge of understanding the key AI-related issues and/or coordinating the construction of an FAI. And I see specific reasons to be pessimistic about its suitability and general competence.

When estimating the expected value of an endeavor, it is natural to have an implicit "survivorship bias" - to use organizations whose accomplishments one is familiar with (which tend to be relatively effective organizations) as a reference class. Because of this, I would be extremely wary of investing in an organization with apparently poor general competence/suitability to its tasks, even if I bought fully into its mission (which I do not) and saw no other groups working on a comparable mission.

But if there's even a chance …

A common argument that SI supporters raise with me is along the lines of, "Even if SI's arguments are weak and its staff isn't as capable as one would like to see, their goal is so important that they would be a good investment even at a tiny probability of success."

I believe this argument to be a form of Pascal's Mugging and I have outlined the reasons I believe it to be invalid in two posts (here and here). There have been some objections to my arguments, but I still believe them to be valid. There is a good chance I will revisit these topics in the future, because I believe these issues to be at the core of many of the differences between GiveWell-top-charities supporters and SI supporters.

Regardless of whether one accepts my specific arguments, it is worth noting that the most prominent people associated with SI tend to agree with the conclusion that the "But if there's even a chance …" argument is not valid. (See comments on my post from Michael Vassar and Eliezer Yudkowsky as well as Eliezer's interview with John Baez.)

Existential risk reduction as a cause

I consider the general cause of "looking for ways that philanthropic dollars can reduce direct threats of global catastrophic risks, particularly those that involve some risk of human extinction" to be a relatively high-potential cause. It is on the working agenda for GiveWell Labs and we will be writing more about it.

However, I don't think that "Cause X is the one I care about and Organization Y is the only one working on it" to be a good reason to support Organization Y. For donors determined to donate within this cause, I encourage you to consider donating to a donor-advised fund while making it clear that you intend to grant out the funds to existential-risk-reduction-related organizations in the future. (One way to accomplish this would be to create a fund with "existential risk" in the name; this is a fairly easy thing to do and one person could do it on behalf of multiple donors.)

For one who accepts my arguments about SI, I believe withholding funds in this way is likely to be better for SI's mission than donating to SI - through incentive effects alone (not to mention my specific argument that SI's approach to "Friendliness" seems likely to increase risks).

How I might change my views

My views are very open to revision.

However, I cannot realistically commit to read and seriously consider all comments posted on the matter. The number of people capable of taking a few minutes to write a comment is sufficient to swamp my capacity. I do encourage people to comment and I do intend to read at least some comments, but if you are looking to change my views, you should not consider posting a comment to be the most promising route.

Instead, what I will commit to is reading and carefully considering up to 50,000 words of content that are (a) specifically marked as SI-authorized responses to the points I have raised; (b) explicitly cleared for release to the general public as SI-authorized communications. In order to consider a response "SI-authorized and cleared for release," I will accept explicit communication from SI's Executive Director or from a majority of its Board of Directors endorsing the content in question. After 50,000 words, I may change my views and/or commit to reading more content, or (if I determine that the content is poor and is not using my time efficiently) I may decide not to engage further. SI-authorized content may improve or worsen SI's standing in my estimation, so unlike with comments, there is an incentive to select content that uses my time efficiently. Of course, SI-authorized content may end up including excerpts from comment responses to this post, and/or already-existing public content.

I may also change my views for other reasons, particularly if SI secures more impressive achievements and/or endorsements.

One more note: I believe I have read the vast majority of the Sequences, including the AI-foom debate, and that this content - while interesting and enjoyable - does not have much relevance for the arguments I've made.

Again: I think that whatever happens as a result of my post will be positive for SI's mission, whether or not it is positive for SI as an organization. I believe that most of SI's supporters and advocates care more about the former than about the latter, and that this attitude is far too rare in the nonprofit world.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to the following people for reviewing a draft of this post and providing thoughtful feedback (this of course does not mean they agree with the post or are responsible for its content): Dario Amodei, Nick Beckstead, Elie Hassenfeld, Alexander Kruel, Tim Ogden, John Salvatier, Jonah Sinick, Cari Tuna, Stephanie Wykstra.

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Update: My full response to Holden is now here.

As Holden said, I generally think that Holden's objections for SI "are either correct (especially re: past organizational competence) or incorrect but not addressed by SI in clear argumentative writing (this includes the part on 'tool' AI)," and we are working hard to fix both categories of issues.

In this comment I would merely like to argue for one small point: that the Singularity Institute is undergoing comprehensive changes — changes which I believe to be improvements that will help us to achieve our mission more efficiently and effectively.

Holden wrote:

I'm aware that SI has relatively new leadership that is attempting to address the issues behind some of my complaints. I have a generally positive impression of the new leadership; I believe the Executive Director and Development Director, in particular, to represent a step forward in terms of being interested in transparency and in testing their own general rationality. So I will not be surprised if there is some improvement in the coming years...

Louie Helm was hired as Director of Development in September 2011. I was hired as a Research Fellow that same month, and ma... (read more)

...which is not to say, of course, that things were not improving before September 2011. It's just that the improvements have accelerated quite a bit since then.

For example, Amy was hired in December 2009 and is largely responsible for these improvements:

  • Built a "real" Board and officers; launched monthly Board meetings in February 2010.
  • Began compiling monthly financial reports in December 2010.
  • Began tracking Summit expenses and seeking Summit sponsors.
  • Played a major role in canceling many programs and expenses that were deemed low ROI.
9[anonymous]9yIn addition to reviews, should SI implement a two-man rule [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-man_rule] for manipulating large quantities of money? (For example, over 5k, over 10k, etc.)
5ghf9yMy hope is that the upcoming deluge of publications will answer this objection, but for the moment, I am unclear as to the justification for the level of resources being given to SIAI researchers. This level of freedom is the dream of every researcher on the planet. Yet, it's unclear why these resources should be devoted to your projects. While I strongly believe that the current academic system is broken, you are asking for a level of support granted to top researchers prior to have made any original breakthroughs yourself. If you can convince people to give you that money, wonderful. But until you have made at least some serious advancement to demonstrate your case, donating seems like an act of faith. It's impressive that you all have found a way to hack the system and get paid to develop yourselves as researchers outside of the academic system and I will be delighted to see that development bear fruit over the coming years. But, at present, I don't see evidence that the work being done justifies or requires that support.
8lukeprog9yBecause some people like my earlier [http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Muehlhauser-Salamon-Intelligence-Explosion-Evidence-and-Import.pdf] papers [http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Muehlhauser-Helm-The-Singularity-and-Machine-Ethics-draft.pdf] and think I'm writing papers on the most important topic in the world? Note that this isn't uncommon. SI is far from the only think tank with researchers who publish in academic journals. Researchers at private companies do the same.

First, let me say that, after re-reading, I think that my previous post came off as condescending/confrontational which was not my intent. I apologize.

Second, after thinking about this for a few minutes, I realized that some of the reason your papers seem so fluffy to me is that they argue what I consider to be obvious points. In my mind, of course we are likely "to develop human-level AI before 2100." Because of that, I may have tended to classify your work as outreach more than research.

But outreach is valuable. And, so that we can factor out the question of the independent contribution of your research, having people associated with SIAI with the publications/credibility to be treated as experts has gigantic benefits in terms of media multipliers (being the people who get called on for interviews, panels, etc). So, given that, I can see a strong argument for publication support being valuable to the overall organization goals regardless of any assessment of the value of the research.

Note that this isn't uncommon. SI is far from the only think tank with researchers who publish in academic journals. Researchers at private companies do the same.

My only point was that,... (read more)

5[anonymous]9yWhy did you start referring to yourself in the first person and then change your mind? (Or am I missing something?)
9lukeprog9yBrain fart: now fixed.
[-][anonymous]9y 20

(Why was this downvoted? If it's because the downvoter wants to see fewer brain farts, they're doing it wrong, because the message such a downvote actually conveys is that they want to see fewer acknowledgements of brain farts. Upvoted back to 0, anyway.)

4JoshuaFox9yAs a supporter and donor to SI since 2006, I can say that I had a lot of specific criticisms of the way that the organization was managed. The points Luke lists above were among them. I was surprised that on many occasions management did not realize the obvious problems and fix them. But the current management is now recognizing many of these points and resolving them one by one, as Luke says. If this continues, SI's future looks good.
4siodine9yIsn't this very strong evidence in support for Holden's point about "Apparent poorly grounded belief in SI's superior general rationality" (excluding Luke, at least)? And especially this [http://lesswrong.com/lw/cbs/thoughts_on_the_singularity_institute_si/6k3l]?

This topic is something I've been thinking about lately. Do SIers tend to have superior general rationality, or do we merely escape a few particular biases? Are we good at rationality, or just good at "far mode" rationality (aka philosophy)? Are we good at epistemic but not instrumental rationality? (Keep in mind, though, that rationality is only a ceteris paribus predictor of success.)

Or, pick a more specific comparison. Do SIers tend to be better at general rationality than someone who can keep a small business running for 5 years? Maybe the tight feedback loops of running a small business are better rationality training than "debiasing interventions" can hope to be.

Of course, different people are more or less rational in different domains, at different times, in different environments.

This isn't an idle question about labels. My estimate of the scope and level of people's rationality in part determines how much I update from their stated opinion on something. How much evidence for Hypothesis X (about organizational development) is it when Eliezer gives me his opinion on the matter, as opposed to when Louie gives me his opinion on the matter? When Person B proposes to take on a totally new kind of project, I think their general rationality is a predictor of success — so, what is their level of general rationality?

3Eliezer Yudkowsky9yAnd note that these improvements would not and could not have happened without more funding than the level of previous years - if, say, everyone had been waiting to see these kinds of improvements before funding.

note that these improvements would not and could not have happened without more funding than the level of previous years

Really? That's not obvious to me. Of course you've been around for all this and I haven't, but here's what I'm seeing from my vantage point...

Recent changes that cost very little:

  • Donor database
  • Strategic plan
  • Monthly progress reports
  • A list of research problems SI is working on (it took me 16 hours to write)
  • IntelligenceExplosion.com, Friendly-AI.com, AI Risk Bibliography 2012, annotated list of journals that may publish papers on AI risk, a partial history of AI risk research, and a list of forthcoming and desired articles on AI risk (each of these took me only 10-25 hours to create)
  • Detailed tracking of the expenses for major SI projects
  • Staff worklogs
  • Staff dinners (or something that brought staff together)
  • A few people keeping their eyes on SI's funds so theft would be caught sooner
  • Optimization of Google Adwords

Stuff that costs less than some other things SI had spent money on, such as funding Ben Goertzel's AGI research or renting downtown Berkeley apartments for the later visiting fellows:

  • Research papers
... (read more)

A lot of charities go through this pattern before they finally work out how to transition from a board-run/individual-run tax-deductible band of conspirators to being a professional staff-run organisation tuned to doing the particular thing they do. The changes required seem simple and obvious in hindsight, but it's a common pattern for it to take years, so SIAI has been quite normal, or at the very least not been unusually dumb.

(My evidence is seeing this pattern close-up in the Wikimedia Foundation, Wikimedia UK (the first attempt at which died before managing it, the second making it through barely) and the West Australian Music Industry Association, and anecdotal evidence from others. Everyone involved always feels stupid at having taken years to achieve the retrospectively obvious. I would be surprised if this aspect of the dynamics of nonprofits had not been studied.)

edit: Luke's recommendation of The Nonprofit Kit For Dummies looks like precisely the book all the examples I know of needed to have someone throw at them before they even thought of forming an organisation to do whatever it is they wanted to achieve.

Things that cost money:

  • Amy Willey
  • Luke Muehlhauser
  • Louie Helm
  • CfAR
  • trying things until something worked

I don't think this response supports your claim that these improvements "would not and could not have happened without more funding than the level of previous years."

I know your comment is very brief because you're busy at minicamp, but I'll reply to what you wrote, anyway: Someone of decent rationality doesn't just "try things until something works." Moreover, many of the things on the list of recent improvements don't require an Amy, a Luke, or a Louie.

I don't even have past management experience. As you may recall, I had significant ambiguity aversion about the prospect of being made Executive Director, but as it turned out, the solution to almost every problem X has been (1) read what the experts say about how to solve X, (2) consult with people who care about your mission and have solved X before, and (3) do what they say.

When I was made Executive Director and phoned our Advisors, most of them said "Oh, how nice to hear from you! Nobody from SingInst has ever asked me for advice before!"

That is the kind of thing that makes me want to say that SingInst has "tested every method except the method of trying."

Donor database, strategic plan, s... (read more)

Luke has just told me (personal conversation) that what he got from my comment was, "SIAI's difficulties were just due to lack of funding" which was not what I was trying to say at all. What I was trying to convey was more like, "I didn't have the ability to run this organization, and knew this - people who I hoped would be able to run the organization, while I tried to produce in other areas (e.g. turning my back on everything else to get a year of FAI work done with Marcello or writing the Sequences) didn't succeed in doing so either - and the only reason we could hang on long enough to hire Luke was that the funding was available nonetheless and in sufficient quantity that we could afford to take risks like paying Luke to stay on for a while, well before we knew he would become Executive Director".

You're allowed to say these things on the public Internet?

I just fell in love with SI.

You're allowed to say these things on the public Internet?

Well, at our most recent board meeting I wasn't fired, reprimanded, or even questioned for making these comments, so I guess I am. :)

I just fell in love with SI.

It's Luke you should have fallen in love with, since he is the one turning things around.

It's Luke you should have fallen in love with, since he is the one turning things around.

On the other hand I can count with one hand the number of established organisations I know of that would be sociologically capable of ceding power, status and control to Luke the way SingInst did. They took an untrained intern with essentially zero external status from past achievements and affiliations and basically decided to let him run the show (at least in terms of publicly visible initiatives). It is clearly the right thing for SingInst to do and admittedly Luke is very tall and has good hair which generally gives a boost when it comes to such selections - but still, making the appointment goes fundamentally against normal human behavior.

(Where I say "count with one hand" I am not including the use of any digits thereupon. I mean one.)

7Matt_Simpson8yIt doesn't matter that I completely understand why this phrase was included, I still found it hilarious in a network sitcom sort of way.
8TheOtherDave9yWell, all we really know is that he chose to. It may be that everyone he works with then privately berated him for it. That said, I share your sentiment. Actually, if SI generally endorses this sort of public "airing of dirty laundry," I encourage others involved in the organization to say so out loud.

This makes me wonder... What "for dummies" books should I be using as checklists right now? Time to set a 5-minute timer and think about it.

5[anonymous]9yWhat did you come up with?
4Benquo9yI haven't actually found the right books yet, but these are the things where I decided I should find some "for beginners" text. the important insight is that I'm allowed to use these books as skill/practice/task checklists or catalogues, rather than ever reading them all straight through. General interest: * Career * Networking * Time management * Fitness For my own particular professional situation, skills, and interests: * Risk management * Finance * Computer programming * SAS * Finance careers * Career change * Web programming * Research/science careers * Math careers * Appraising * Real Estate * UNIX

The largest concern from reading this isn't really what it brings up in management context, but what it says about the SI in general. Here an area where there's real expertise and basic books that discuss well-understood methods and they didn't do any of that. Given that, how likely should I think it is that when the SI and mainstream AI people disagree that part of the problem may be the SI people not paying attention to basics?

4TheOtherDave9y(nods) The nice thing about general-purpose techniques for winning at life (as opposed to domain-specific ones) is that there's lots of evidence available as to how effective they are.

these are all literally from the Nonprofits for Dummies book. [...] The history I've heard is that SI [...]

\

failed to read Nonprofits for Dummies,

I remember that, when Anna was managing the fellows program, she was reading books of the "for dummies" genre and trying to apply them... it's just that, as it happened, the conceptual labels she accidentally happened to give to the skill deficits she was aware of were "what it takes to manage well" (i.e. "basic management") and "what it takes to be productive", rather than "what it takes to (help) operate a nonprofit according to best practices". So those were the subjects of the books she got. (And read, and practiced.) And then, given everything else the program and the organization was trying to do, there wasn't really any cognitive space left over to effectively notice the possibility that those wouldn't be the skills that other people afterwards would complain that nobody acquired and obviously should have known to. The rest of her budgeted self-improvement effort mostly went toward overcoming self-defeating emotional/social blind spots and motivated cognition. (And I remember... (read more)

8Louie8yFWIW, I never knew the purpose of the VF program was to replace existing SI management. And I somewhat doubt that you knew this at the time, either. I think you're just imagining this retroactively given that that's what ended up happening. For instance, the internal point system used to score people in the VFs program had no points for correctly identifying organizational improvements and implementing them. It had no points for doing administrative work (besides cleaning up the physical house or giving others car rides). And it had no points for rising to management roles. It was all about getting karma on LW or writing conference papers. When I first offered to help with the organization directly, I was told I was "too competent" and that I should go do something more useful with my talent, like start another business... not "waste my time working directly at SI."
7David_Gerard9yThis inspired me to make a blog post: You need to read Nonprofit Kit for Dummies. [http://davidgerard.co.uk/notes/2012/05/26/you-need-to-read-nonprofit-kit-for-dummies/]
7David_Gerard9y... which Eliezer has read and responded to, noting he did indeed read just that book in 2000 when he was founding SIAI. This suggests having someone of Luke's remarkable drive was in fact the missing piece of the puzzle.
4Paul Crowley9yFascinating! I want to ask "well, why didn't it take then?", but if I were in Eliezer's shoes I'd be finding this discussion almost unendurably painful right now, and it feels like what matters has already been established. And of course he's never been the person in charge of that sort of thing, so maybe he's not who we should be grilling anyway.
9David_Gerard9yObviously we need How to be Lukeprog for Dummies. Luke appears to have written many fragments for this, of course. Beating oneself up with hindsight bias is IME quite normal in this sort of circumstance, but not actually productive. Grilling the people who failed makes it too easy to blame them personally, when it's a pattern I've seen lots and lots, suggesting the problem is not a personal failing.
4Paul Crowley9yAgreed entirely - it's definitely not a mark of a personal failing. What I'm curious about is how we can all learn to do better at the crucial rationalist skill of making use of the standard advice about prosaic tasks - which is manifestly a non-trivial skill.
3David_Gerard9yThe Bloody Obvious For Dummies. If only common sense were! From the inside (of a subcompetent charity - and I must note, subcompetent charities know they're subcompetent), it feels like there's all this stuff you're supposed to magically know about, and lots of "shut up and do the impossible" moments. And you do the small very hard things, in a sheer tour de force of remarkable effort. But it leads to burnout. Until the organisation makes it to competence and the correct paths are retrospectively obvious. That actually reads to me like descriptions I've seen of the startup process.
3David_Gerard9yThat book looks like the basic solution to the pattern I outline here [http://lesswrong.com/lw/cbs/thoughts_on_the_singularity_institute_si/6kpy], and from your description, most people who have any public good they want to achieve should read it around the time they think of getting a second person involved.
7ghf9yGiven the several year lag between funding increases and the listed improvements, it appears that this was less a result of a prepared plan and more a process of underutilized resources attracting a mix of parasites (the theft) and talent (hopefully the more recent staff additions). Which goes towards a critical question in terms of future funding: is SIAI primarily constrained in its mission by resources or competence? Of course, the related question is: what is SIAI's mission? Someone donating primarily for AGI research might not count recent efforts (LW, rationality camps, etc) as improvements. What should a potential donor expect from money invested into this organization going forward? Internally, what are your metrics for evaluation? Edited to add: I think that the spin-off of the rationality efforts is a good step towards answering these questions.

Wow, I'm blown away by Holden Karnofsky, based on this post alone. His writing is eloquent, non-confrontational and rational. It shows that he spent a lot of time constructing mental models of his audience and anticipated its reaction. Additionally, his intelligence/ego ratio appears to be through the roof. He must have learned a lot since the infamous astroturfing incident. This is the (type of) person SI desperately needs to hire.

Emotions out of the way, it looks like the tool/agent distinction is the main theoretical issue. Fortunately, it is much easier than the general FAI one. Specifically, to test the SI assertion that, paraphrasing Arthur C. Clarke,

Any sufficiently advanced tool is indistinguishable from an agent.

one ought to formulate and prove this as a theorem, and present it for review and improvement to the domain experts (the domain being math and theoretical computer science). If such a proof is constructed, it can then be further examined and potentially tightened, giving new insights to the mission of averting the existential risk from intelligence explosion.

If such a proof cannot be found, this will lend further weight to the HK's assertion that SI appears to be poorly qualified to address its core mission.

Any sufficiently advanced tool is indistinguishable from agent.

I shall quickly remark that I, myself, do not believe this to be true.

6shminux9yThen the objection 2 seems to hold: unless I misunderstand your point severely (it happened once or twice before).

It's complicated. A reply that's true enough and in the spirit of your original statement, is "Something going wrong with a sufficiently advanced AI that was intended as a 'tool' is mostly indistinguishable from something going wrong with a sufficiently advanced AI that was intended as an 'agent', because math-with-the-wrong-shape is math-with-the-wrong-shape no matter what sort of English labels like 'tool' or 'agent' you slap on it, and despite how it looks from outside using English, correctly shaping math for a 'tool' isn't much easier even if it "sounds safer" in English." That doesn't get into the real depths of the problem, but it's a start. I also don't mean to completely deny the existence of a safety differential - this is a complicated discussion, not a simple one - but I do mean to imply that if Marcus Hutter designs a 'tool' AI, it automatically kills him just like AIXI does, and Marcus Hutter is unusually smart rather than unusually stupid but still lacks the "Most math kills you, safe math is rare and hard" outlook that is implicitly denied by the idea that once you're trying to design a tool, safe math gets easier somehow. This is much the same problem as with the Oracle outlook - someone says something that sounds safe in English but the problem of correctly-shaped-math doesn't get very much easier.

[-][anonymous]9y 27

This sounds like it'd be a good idea to write a top-level post about it.

9lukeprog9yThough it's not as detailed and technical as many would like, I'll point readers to this bit of related reading, one of my favorites: Yudkowsky (2011). Complex value systems are required to realize valuable futures [http://intelligence.org/upload/complex-value-systems.pdf].
6abramdemski9yWhy? Or, rather: Where do you object to the argument by Holden? (Given a query, the tool-AI returns an answer with a justification, so the plan for "cure cancer" can be checked to make sure it does not do so by killing or badly altering humans.)
4FeepingCreature9yOne trivial, if incomplete, answer is that to be effective, the Oracle AI needs to be able to answer the question "how do we build a better oracle AI" and in order to define "better" in that sentence in a way that causes our oracle to output a new design that is consistent with all the safeties we built into the original oracle, it needs to understand the intent behind the original safeties just as much as an agent-AI would.

The real danger of Oracle AI, if I understand it correctly, is the nasty combination of (i) by definition, an Oracle AI has an implicit drive to issue predictions most likely to be correct according to its model, and (ii) a sufficiently powerful Oracle AI can accurately model the effect of issuing various predictions. End result: it issues powerfully self-fulfilling prophecies without regard for human values. Also, depending on how it's designed, it can influence the questions to be asked of it in the future so as to be as accurate as possible, again without regard for human values.

7Paul Crowley9yMy understanding of an Oracle AI is that when answering any given question, that question consumes the whole of its utility function, so it has no motivation to influence future questions. However the primary risk you set out seems accurate. Countermeasures have been proposed, such as asking for an accurate prediction for the case where a random event causes the prediction to be discarded, but in that instance it knows that the question will be asked again of a future instance of itself.

My understanding of an Oracle AI is that when answering any given question, that question consumes the whole of its utility function, so it has no motivation to influence future questions.

It could acausally trade with its other instances, so that a coordinated collection of many instances of predictors would influence the events so as to make each other's predictions more accurate.

7abramdemski9y(I assume you mean, self-fulfilling prophecies.) In order to get these, it seems like you would need a very specific kind of architecture: one which considers the results of its actions on its utility function (set to "correctness of output"). This kind of architecture is not the likely architecture for a 'tool'-style system; the more likely architecture would instead maximize correctness without conditioning on its act of outputting those results. Thus, I expect you'd need to specifically encode this kind of behavior to get self-fulfilling-prophecy risk. But I admit it's dependent on architecture. (Edit-- so, to be clear: in cases where the correctness of the results depended on the results themselves, the system would have to predict its own results. Then if it's using TDT or otherwise has a sufficiently advanced self-model, my point is moot. However, again you'd have to specifically program these, and would be unlikely to do so unless you specifically wanted this kind of behavior.)
5Wei_Dai9yWhen you say "Most math kills you" does that mean you disagree with arguments like these [http://lesswrong.com/r/discussion/lw/cck/holden_karnofskys_singularity_institute_objection/6kx7] , or are you just simplifying for a soundbite?

Even if we accepted that the tool vs. agent distinction was enough to make things "safe", objection 2 still boils down to "Well, just don't build that type of AI!", which is exactly the same keep-it-in-a-box/don't-do-it argument that most normal people make when they consider this issue. I assume I don't need to explain to most people here why "We should just make a law against it" is not a solution to this problem, and I hope I don't need to argue that "Just don't do it" is even worse...

More specifically, fast forward to 2080, when any college kid with $200 to spend (in equivalent 2012 dollars) can purchase enough computing power so that even the dumbest AIXI approximation schemes are extremely effective, good enough so that creating an AGI agent would be a week's work for any grad student that knew their stuff. Are you really comfortable living in that world with the idea that we rely on a mere gentleman's agreement not to make self-improving AI agents? There's a reason this is often viewed as an arms race, to a very real extent the attempt to achieve Friendly AI is about building up a suitably powerful defense against unfriendly AI before ... (read more)

7Eliezer Yudkowsky9yThere isn't that much computing power in the physical universe. I'm not sure even smarter AIXI approximations are effective on a moon-sized nanocomputer. I wouldn't fall over in shock if a sufficiently smart one did something effective, but mostly I'd expect nothing to happen. There's an awful lot that happens in the transition from infinite to finite computing power, and AIXI doesn't solve any of it.
3JoshuaZ9yIs there some computation or estimate where these results are coming from? They don't seem unreasonable, but I'm not aware of any estimates about how efficient largescale AIXI approximations are in practice. (Although attempted implementations suggest that empirically things are quite inefficient.)
4jsteinhardt9yNaieve AIXI is doing brute force search through an exponentially large space. Unless the right Turing machine is 100 bits or less (which seems unlikely), Eliezer's claim seems pretty safe to me. Most of mainstream machine learning is trying to solve search problems through spaces far tamer than the search space for AIXI, and achieving limited success. So it also seems safe to say that even pretty smart implementations of AIXI probably won't make much progress.
5Viliam_Bur9yWhat exactly is the difference between a "tool" and an "agent", if we taboo the words? My definition would be that "agent" has their own goals / utility functions (speaking about human agents, those goals / utility functions are set by evolution), while "tool" has a goal / utility function set by someone else. This distinction may be reasonable on a human level, "human X optimizing for human X 's utility" versus "human X optimizing for human Y's utility", but on a machine level, what exactly is the difference between a "tool" that is ordered to reach a goal / optimize a utility function, and an "agent" programmed with the same goal / utility function? Am I using a bad definition that misses something important? Or is there anything than prevents "agent" to be reduced [http://lesswrong.com/lw/on/reductionism/] to a "tool" (perhaps a misconstructed tool) of the forces that have created them? Or is it that all "agents" are "tools", but not all "tools" are "agents", because... why?
4chaosmage9yHow about this: An agent with a very powerful tool is indistinguishable from a very powerful agent.

Wow, I'm blown away by Holden Karnofsky, based on this post alone. His writing is eloquent, non-confrontational and rational. It shows that he spent a lot of time constructing mental models of his audience and anticipated its reaction. Additionally, his intelligence/ego ratio appears to be through the roof.

Agreed. I normally try not to post empty "me-too" replies; the upvote button is there for a reason. But now I feel strongly enough about it that I will: I'm very impressed with the good will and effort and apparent potential for intelligent conversation in HoldenKarnofsky's post.

Now I'm really curious as to where things will go from here. With how limited my understanding of AI issues is, I doubt a response from me would be worth HoldenKarnofsky's time to read, so I'll leave that to my betters instead of adding more noise. But yeah. Seeing SI ideas challenged in such a positive, constructive way really got my attention. Looking forward to the official response, whatever it might be.

5[anonymous]9y“the good will and effort and apparent potential for intelligent conversation” is more information than an upvote, IMO.
6dspeyer9yLet's see if we can use concreteness to reason about this a little more thoroughly... As I understand it, the nightmare looks something like this. I ask Google SuperMaps for the fastest route from NYC to Albany. It recognizes that computing this requires traffic information, so it diverts several self-driving cars to collect real-time data. Those cars run over pedestrians who were irrelevant to my query. The obvious fix: forbid SuperMaps to alter anything outside of its own scratch data. It works with the data already gathered. Later a Google engineer might ask it what data would be more useful, or what courses of action might cheaply gather that data, but the engineer decides what if anything to actually do. This superficially resembles a box, but there's no actual box involved. The AI's own code forbids plans like that. But that's for a question-answering tool. Let's take another scenario: I tell my super-intelligent car to take me to Albany as fast as possible. It sends emotionally manipulative emails to anyone else who would otherwise be on the road encouraging them to stay home. I don't see an obvious fix here. So the short answer seems to be that it matters what the tool is for. A purely question-answering tool would be extremely useful, but not as useful as a general purpose one. Could humans with a oracular super-AI police the development and deployment of active super-AIs?
4[anonymous]9yI have no strong intuition about whether this is true or not, but I do intuit that if it's true, the value of sufficiently for which it's true is so high it'd be nearly impossible to achieve it accidentally. (On the other hand the blind idiot god [http://lesswrong.com/lw/kr/an_alien_god/] did ‘accidentally’ make tools into agents when making humans, so... But after all that only happened once in hundreds of millions of years of ‘attempts’.)
3othercriteria9yThis seems like a very valuable point. In that direction, we also have the tens of thousands of cancers that form every day, military coups, strikes, slave revolts, cases of regulatory capture, etc.
3private_messaging9yI do not think this is even true.
4David_Gerard9yI routinely try to turn sufficiently reliable tools into agents wherever possible, per this comment [http://lesswrong.com/lw/cbs/thoughts_on_the_singularity_institute_si/6k93]. I suppose we could use a definition of "agent" that implied greater autonomy in setting its own goals. But there are useful definitions that don't.

Is it just me, or do Luke and Eliezer's initial responses appear to send the wrong signals? From the perspective of an SI critic, Luke's comment could be interpreted as saying "for us, not being completely incompetent is worth bragging about", and Eliezer's as "we're so arrogant that we've only taken two critics (including Holden) seriously in our entire history". These responses seem suboptimal, given that Holden just complained about SI's lack of impressive accomplishments, and being too selective about whose feedback to take seriously.

While I have sympathy with the complaint that SI's critics are inarticulate and often say wrong things, Eliezer's comment does seem to be indicative of the mistake Holden and Wei Dai are describing. Most extant presentations of SIAI's views leave much to be desired in terms of clarity, completeness, concision, accessibility, and credibility signals. This makes it harder to make high quality objections. I think it would be more appropriate to react to poor critical engagement more along the lines of "We haven't gotten great critics. That probably means that we need to work on our arguments and their presentation," and less along the lines of "We haven't gotten great critics. That probably means that there's something wrong with the rest of the world."

This. I've been trying to write something about Eliezer's debate with Robin Hanson, but the problem I keep running up against is that Eliezer's points are not clearly articulated at all. Even making my best educated guesses about what's supposed to go in the gaps in his arguments, I still ended up with very little.

4jacob_cannell9yHave the key points of that 'debate' subsequently been summarized or clarified on LW? I found that debate exasperating in that Hanson and EY were mainly talking past each other and couldn't seem to hone in on their core disagreements. I know it generally has to do with hard takeoff / recursive self-improvement vs more gradual EM revolution, but that's not saying all that much.

I'm in the process of writing a summary and analysis of the key arguments and points in that debate.

The most recent version runs at 28 pages - and that's just an outline.

7lukeprog9yAgree with all this.
5Nick_Beckstead9yIn fairness I should add that I think Luke M agrees with this assessment and is working on improving these arguments/communications.

Luke isn't bragging, he's admitting that SI was/is bad but pointing out it's rapidly getting better. And Eliezer is right, criticisms of SI are usually dumb. Could their replies be interpreted the wrong way? Sure, anything can be interpreted in any way anyone likes. Of course Luke and Eliezer could have refrained from posting those replies and instead posted carefully optimized responses engineered to send nothing but extremely appealing signals of humility and repentance.

But if they did turn themselves into politicians, we wouldn't get to read what they actually think. Is that what you want?

Luke isn't bragging, he's admitting that SI was/is bad but pointing out it's rapidly getting better.

But the accomplishments he listed (e.g., having a strategic plan, website redesign) are of the type that Holden already indicated to be inadequate. So why the exhaustive listing, instead of just giving a few examples to show SI is getting better and then either agreeing that they're not yet up to par, or giving an argument for why Holden is wrong? (The reason I think he could be uncharitably interpreted as bragging is that he would more likely exhaustively list the accomplishments if he was proud of them, instead of just seeing them as fixes to past embarrassments.)

And Eliezer is right, criticisms of SI are usually dumb.

I'd have no problem with "usually" but "all except two" seems inexcusable.

But if they did turn themselves into politicians, we wouldn't get to read what they actually think. Is that what you want?

Do their replies reflect their considered, endorsed beliefs, or were they just hurried remarks that may not say what they actually intended? I'm hoping it's the latter...

But the accomplishments he listed (e.g., having a strategic plan, website redesign) are of the type that Holden already indicated to be inadequate. So why the exhaustive listing, instead of just giving a few examples to show SI is getting better and then either agreeing that they're not yet up to par, or giving an argument for why Holden is wrong?

Presume that SI is basically honest and well-meaning, but possibly self-deluded. In other words, they won't outright lie to you, but they may genuinely believe that they're doing better than they really are, and cherry-pick evidence without realizing that they're doing so. How should their claims of intending to get better be evaluated?

Saying "we're going to do things better in the future" is some evidence about SI intending to do better, but rather weak evidence, since talk is cheap and it's easy to keep thinking that you're really going to do better soon but there's this one other thing that needs to be done first and we'll get started on the actual improvements tomorrow, honest.

Saying "we're going to do things better in the future, and we've fixed these three things so far" is stronger evidence, since it shows tha... (read more)

Luke's comment could be interpreted as saying "for us, not being completely incompetent is worth bragging about"

Really? I personally feel pretty embarrassed by SI's past organizational competence. To me, my own comment reads more like "Wow, SI has been in bad shape for more than a decade. But at least we're improving very quickly."

Also, I very much agree with Beckstead on this: "Most extant presentations of SIAI's views leave much to be desired in terms of clarity, completeness, concision, accessibility, and credibility signals. This makes it harder to make high quality objections." And also this: "We haven't gotten great critics. That probably means that we need to work on our arguments and their presentation."

Really?

Yes, I think it at least gives a bad impression to someone, if they're not already very familiar with SI and sympathetic to its cause. Assuming you don't completely agree with the criticisms that Holden and others have made, you should think about why they might have formed wrong impressions of SI and its people. Comments like the ones I cited seem to be part of the problem.

I personally feel pretty embarrassed by SI's past organizational competence. To me, my own comment reads more like "Wow, SI has been in bad shape for more than a decade. But at least we're improving very quickly."

That's good to hear, and thanks for the clarifications you added.

Eliezer's comment makes me think that you, specifically, should consider collecting your criticisms and putting them in Main where Eliezer is more likely to see them and take the time to seriously consider them.

8thomblake9yI think it's unfair to take Eliezer's response as anything other than praise for this article. He noted already that he did not have time to respond properly. And why even point out that a human's response to anything is "suboptimal"? It will be notable when a human does something optimal.
8faul_sname9yWe do, on occasion, come up with optimal algorithms for things. Also, "suboptimal" usually means "I can think of several better solutions off the top of my head", not "This solution is not maximally effective".
7magfrump9yLuke's comment addresses the specific point that Holden made about changes in the organization given the change in leadership. Holden said: Luke attempted to provide (for the reader) a basis on which to judge these staff members. Eliezer's response was... characteristic of Eliezer? And also very short and coming at a busy time for him.
6ChrisHallquist9yI read Luke's comment just as "I'm aware these are issues and we're working on it." I didn't read him as "bragging" about the ones that have been solved. Eliezer's... I see the problem with. I initially read it as just commenting Holden on his high-quality article (which I agree was high-quality), but I can see it being read as backhanded at anyone else who's criticized SIAI.
4Paul Crowley9yAre there other specific critiques you think should have made Eliezer's list, or is it that you think he should not have drawn attention to their absence?

Are there other specific critiques you think should have made Eliezer's list, or is it that you think he should not have drawn attention to their absence?

Many of Holden's criticisms have been made by others on LW already. He quoted me in Objection 1. Discussion of whether Tool-AI and Oracle-AI are or are not safe have occurred numerous times. Here's one that I was involved in. Many people have criticized Eliezer/SI for not having sufficiently impressive accomplishments. Cousin_it and Silas Barta have questioned whether the rationality techniques being taught by SI (and now the rationality org) are really effective.

This post is highly critical of SIAI — both of its philosophy and its organizational choices. It is also now the #1 most highly voted post in the entire history of LessWrong — higher than any posts by Eliezer or myself.

I shall now laugh harder than ever when people try to say with a straight face that LessWrong is an Eliezer-cult that suppresses dissent.

Either I promoted this and then forgot I'd done so, or someone else promoted it - of course I was planning to promote it, but I thought I'd planned to do so on Tuesday after the SIAIers currently running a Minicamp had a chance to respond, since I expected most RSS subscribers to the Promoted feed to read comments only once (this is the same reason I wait a while before promoting e.g. monthly quotes posts). On the other hand, I certainly did upvote it the moment I saw it.

I agree (as a comparative outsider) that the polite response to Holden is excellent. Many (most?) communities -- both online communities and real-world organisations, especially long-standing ones -- are not good at it for lots of reasons, and I think the measured response of evaluating and promoting Holden's post is exactly what LessWrong members would hope LessWrong could do, and they showed it succeeded.

I agree that this is good evidence that LessWrong isn't just an Eliezer-cult. (The true test would be if Elizier and another long-standing poster were dismissive to the post, and then other people persuaded them otherwise. In fact, maybe people should roleplay that or something, just to avoid getting stuck in an argument-from-authority trap, but that's a silly idea. Either way, the fact that other people spoke positively, and Elizier and other long-standing posters did too, is a good thing.)

However, I'm not sure it's as uniquely a victory for the rationality of LessWrong as it sounds. In responose to srdiamond, Luke quoted tenlier saying "[Holden's] critique mostly consists of points that are pretty persistently bubbling beneath the surface around here, and get brought up qu... (read more)

4pleeppleep9yThird highest now. Eliezer just barely gets into the top 20.
3MarkusRamikin9y1st. At this point even I am starting to be confused.

Thanks for taking the time to express your views quite clearly--I think this post is good for the world (even with a high value on your time and SI's fundraising ability), and that norms encouraging this kind of discussion are a big public good.

I think the explicit objections 1-3 are likely to be addressed satisfactorily (in your judgment) by less than 50,000 words, and that this would provide a good opportunity for SI to present sharper versions of the core arguments---part of the problem with existing materials is certainly that it is difficult and unrewarding to respond to a nebulous and shifting cloud of objections. A lot of what you currently view as disagreements with SI's views may get shifted to doubts about SI being the right organization to back, which probably won't get resolved by 50,000 words.

Reading Holden's transcript with Jaan Tallinn (trying to go over the whole thing before writing a response, due to having done Julia's Combat Reflexes unit at Minicamp and realizing that the counter-mantra 'If you respond too fast you may lose useful information' was highly applicable to Holden's opinions about charities), I came across the following paragraph:

My understanding is that once we figured out how to get a computer to do arithmetic, computers vastly surpassed humans at arithmetic, practically overnight ... doing so didn't involve any rewriting of their own source code, just implementing human-understood calculation procedures faster and more reliably than humans can. Similarly, if we reached a good enough understanding of how to convert data into predictions, we could program this understanding into a computer and it would overnight be far better at predictions than humans - while still not at any point needing to be authorized to rewrite its own source code, make decisions about obtaining "computronium" or do anything else other than plug data into its existing hardware and algorithms and calculate and report the likely consequences of different courses of a

... (read more)

Jaan's reply to Holden is also correct:

... the oracle is, in principle, powerful enough to come up with self-improvements, but refrains from doing so because there are some protective mechanisms in place that control its resource usage and/or self-reflection abilities. i think devising such mechanisms is indeed one of the possible avenues for safety research that we (eg, organisations such as SIAI) can undertake. however, it is important to note the inherent instability of such system -- once someone (either knowingly or as a result of some bug) connects a trivial "master" program with a measurable goal to the oracle, we have a disaster in our hands. as an example, imagine a master program that repeatedly queries the oracle for best packets to send to the internet in order to minimize the oxygen content of our planet's atmosphere.

Obviously you wouldn't release the code of such an Oracle - given code and understanding of the code it would probably be easy, possibly trivial, to construct some form of FOOM-going AI out of the Oracle!

7kalla7249yHm. I must be missing something. No, I haven't read all the sequences in detail, so if these are silly, basic, questions - please just point me to the specific articles that answer them. You have an Oracle AI that is, say, a trillionfold better at taking existing data and producing inferences. 1) This Oracle AI produces inferences. It still needs to test those inferences (i.e. perform experiments) and get data that allow the next inferential cycle to commence. Without experimental feedback, the inferential chain will quickly either expand into an infinity of possibilities (i.e. beyond anything that any physically possible intelligence can consider), or it will deviate from reality. The general intelligence is only as good as the data its inferences are based upon. Experiments take time, data analysis takes time. No matter how efficient the inferential step may become, this puts an absolute limit to the speed of growth in capability to actually change things. 2) The Oracle AI that "goes FOOM" confined to a server cloud would somehow have to create servitors capable of acting out its desires in the material world. Otherwise, you have a very angry and very impotent AI. If you increase a person's intelligence trillionfold, and then enclose them into a sealed concrete cell, they will never get out; their intelligence can calculate all possible escape solutions, but none will actually work. Do you have a plausible scenario how a "FOOM"-ing AI could - no matter how intelligent - minimize oxygen content of our planet's atmosphere, or any such scenario? After all, it's not like we have any fully-automated nanobot production factories that could be hijacked.
9jsteinhardt9yWhile I can't comment on AGI researchers, I think you underestimate e.g. more mainstream AI researchers such as Stuart Russell and Geoff Hinton, or cognitive scientists like Josh Tenenbaum, or even more AI-focused machine learning people like Andrew Ng, Daphne Koller, Michael Jordan, Dan Klein, Rich Sutton, Judea Pearl, Leslie Kaelbling, and Leslie Valiant (and this list is no doubt incomplete). They might not be claiming that they'll have AI in 20 years, but that's likely because they are actually grappling with the relevant issues and therefore see how hard the problem is likely to be. Not that it strikes me as completely unreasonable that we would have a major breakthrough that gives us AI in 20 years, but it's hard to see what the candidate would be. But I have only been thinking about these issues for a couple years, so I still maintain a pretty high degree of uncertainty about all of these claims. I do think I basically agree with you re: inductive learning and program creation, though. When you say non-self-modifying Oracle AI, do you also mean that the Oracle AI doesn't get to do inductive learning? Because I suspect that inductive learning of some sort is fundamentally necessary, for reasons that you yourself nicely outline here [http://lesswrong.com/lw/jl/what_is_evidence/].

I agree that top mainstream AI guy Peter Norvig was way the heck more sensible than the reference class of declared "AGI researchers" when I talked to him about FAI and CEV, and that estimates should be substantially adjusted accordingly.

6private_messaging9y"Intelligence is not as computationally expensive as it looks" How sure are you that your intuitions do not arise from typical mind fallacy and from you attributing the great discoveries and inventions of mankind to the same processes that you feel run in your skull and which did not yet result in any great novel discoveries and inventions that I know of? I know this sounds like ad-hominem, but as your intuitions are significantly influenced by your internal understanding of your own process, your self esteem will stand hostage to be shot through in many of the possible counter arguments and corrections. (Self esteem is one hell of a bullet proof hostage though, and tends to act more as a shield for bad beliefs). There is a lot of engineers working on software for solving engineering problems, including the software that generates and tests possible designs and looks for ways to make better computers. Your philosophy-based natural-language-defined in-imagination-running Oracle AI may have to be very carefully specified so that it does not kill imaginary mankind. And it may well be very difficult to build such a specification. Just don't confuse it with the software written to solve definable problems. Ultimately, figuring out how to make a better microchip involves a lot of testing of various designs, that's how humans do it, that's how tools do it. I don't know how you think it is done. The performance is a result of a very complex function of the design. To build a design that performs you need to reverse this ultra complicated function, which is done by a mixture of analytical methods and iteration of possible input values, and unless P=NP, we have very little reason to expect any fundamentally better solutions (and even if P=NP there may still not be any). Meaning that the AGI won't have any edge over practical software, and won't out-foom it.

I completely agree with the intent of this post. These are all important issues SI should officially answer. (Edit: SI's official reply is here.) Here are some of my thoughts:

  • I completely agree with objection 1. I think SI should look into doing exactly as you say. I also feel that friendliness has a very high failure chance and that all SI can accomplish is a very low marginal decrease in existential risk. However, I feel this is the result of existential risk being so high and difficult to overcome (Great Filter) rather than SI being so ineffective. As such, for them to engage this objection is to admit defeatism and millenialism, and so they put it out of mind since they need motivation to keep soldiering on despite the sure defeat.

  • Objection 2 is interesting, though you define AGI differently, as you say. Some points against it: Only one AGI needs to be in agent mode to realize existential risk, even if there are already billions of tool-AIs running safely. Tool-AI seems closer in definition to narrow AI, which you point out we already have lots of, and are improving. It's likely that very advanced tool-AIs will indeed be the first to achieve some measure of AGI capability.

... (read more)
7khafra9yYou're an accomplished and proficient philanthropist; if you do make steps in the direction of a donor-directed existential risk fund, I'd like to see them written about.

Eliezer, I upvoted you and was about to apologize for contributing to this rumor myself, but then found this quote from a copy of the Roko post that's available online:

Meanwhile I'm banning this post so that it doesn't (a) give people horrible nightmares and (b) give distant superintelligences a motive to follow through on blackmail against people dumb enough to think about them in sufficient detail, though, thankfully, I doubt anyone dumb enough to do this knows the sufficient detail. (I'm not sure I know the sufficient detail.)

Perhaps your memory got mixed up because Roko subsequently deleted all of his other posts and comments? (Unless "banning" meant something other than "deleting"?)

Now I've got no idea what I did. Maybe my own memory was mixed up by hearing other people say that the post was deleted by Roko? Or Roko retracted it after I banned it, or it was banned and then unbanned and then Roko retracted it?

I retract my grandparent comment; I have little trust for my own memories. Thanks for catching this.

A lesson learned here. I vividly remembered your "Meanwhile I'm banning this post" comment and was going to remind you, but chickened out due to the caps in the great-grandparent which seemed to signal that you Knew What You Were Talking About and wouldn't react kindly to correction. Props to Wei Dai for having more courage than I did.

I'm surprised and disconcerted that some people might be so afraid of being rebuked by Eliezer as to be reluctant to criticize/correct him even when such incontrovertible evidence is available showing that he's wrong. Your comment also made me recall another comment you wrote a couple of years ago about how my status in this community made a criticism of you feel like a "huge insult", which I couldn't understand at the time and just ignored.

I wonder how many other people feel this strongly about being criticized/insulted by a high status person (I guess at least Roko also felt strongly enough about being called "stupid" by Eliezer to contribute to him leaving this community a few days later), and whether Eliezer might not be aware of this effect he is having on others.

9Eliezer Yudkowsky9yMy brain really, really does not want to update on the numerous items of evidence available to it that it can hit people much much harder now, owing to community status, than when it was 12 years old.
6TheOtherDave9y(nods) I've wondered this many times. I have also at times wondered if EY is adopting the "slam the door three times" approach to prospective members of his community, though I consider this fairly unlikely given other things he's said. Somewhat relatedly, I remember when lukeprog first joined the site, he and EY got into an exchange that from what I recall of my perspective as a completely uninvolved third party involved luke earnestly trying to offer assistance and EY being confidently dismissive of any assistance someone like luke could provide, and at the time I remember feeling sort of sorry for luke, who it seemed to me was being treated a lot worse than he deserved, and surprised that he kept at it. The way that story ultimately turned out led me to decide that my model of what was going on was at least importantly incomplete, and quite possibly fundamentally wrongheaded, but I haven't further refined that model.
6XiXiDu9yPeople have to realize that to critically examine his output is very important due to the nature and scale of what he is trying to achieve. Even people with comparatively modest goals like trying to become the president of the United States of America should face and expect a constant and critical analysis of everything they are doing. Which is why I am kind of surprised how often people ask me if I am on a crusade against Eliezer or find fault with my alleged "hostility". Excuse me? That person is asking for money to implement a mechanism that will change the nature of the whole universe. You should be looking for possible shortcomings as well! Everyone should be critical of Eliezer and SIAI, even if they agree with almost anything. Why? Because if you believe that it is incredible important and difficult to get friendly AI just right, then you should be wary of any weak spot. And humans are the weak spot here.
5wedrifid9yAs a data point here I tend to empathize with the recipient of such barrages to what I subjectively estimate as about 60% of the degree of emotional affect that I would experience if it were directed at myself. Particularly if said recipient is someone I respect as much as Roko and when the insults are not justified - less if they do not have my respect and if the insults are justified I experience no empathy. It is the kind of thing that I viscerally object to having in my tribe and where it is possible I try to ensure that the consequences to the high status person for their behavior are as negative as possible - or at least minimize the reward they receive if the tribe is one that tends to award bullying. There are times in the past - let's say 4 years ago - where such an attack would certainly prompt me to leave a community, even if the community was otherwise moderately appreciated. Now I believe I am unlikely to leave over such an incident. I would say I am more socially resilient and also more capable as understanding social politics as a game and so take it less personally. For instance when received the more mildly expressed declaration from Eliezer "You are not safe to even associate with!" I don't recall experiencing any flight impulses - more surprise. I was a little surprised at first too at reading of komponisto's reticence. Until I thought about it and reminded myself that in general I err on the side of not holding my tongue when I ought. In fact, the character "wedrifid" on wotmud.org with which I initially established this handle was banned from the game for 3 months for making exactly this kind of correction based off incontrovertible truth. People with status are dangerous and in general highly epistemically irrational in this regard. Correcting them is nearly always foolish. I must emphasize that part of my initial surprise at kompo's reticence is due to my model of Eliezer as not being especially corrupt in this kind of regard. In response t
5Vladimir_Nesov9yIIRC Roko deleted the speculation-about-superintelligences part of the post shortly after its publication, but discussion in the comments raged on, so you subsequently banned the whole post/discussion. And a few days later, primarily for unrelated reasons but probably with this incident as a trigger, Roko deleted his account, which on that version of LW meant that the text of all his comments disappeared (on the current version of LW, only author's name gets removed when account is deleted, comments don't disappear).
6komponisto9yRoko never deleted his account [http://lesswrong.com/user/Roko]; he simply deleted all of his comments individually.
3Vladimir_Nesov9ySurely not individually (there were probably thousands and IIRC it was also happening to other accounts, so wasn't the result of running a self-made destructive script); what you're seeing is just how "deletion of account" performed on old version of LW looks like on current version of LW.
3Eliezer Yudkowsky9yThis sounds right to me, but I still have little trust in my memories.
3[anonymous]9yOr little interest in rational self-improvement by figuring what actually happened and why? [You've made an outrageously self-assured false statement about this, and you were upvoted—talk about sycophancy—for retracting your falsehood, while suffering no penalty for your reckless arrogance.]
3Sniffnoy9yTo clarify for those new here -- "retract" here is meant purely in the usual sense, not in the sense of hitting the "retract" button, as that didn't exist at the time.

Lack of impressive endorsements. [...] I feel that given the enormous implications of SI's claims, if it argued them well it ought to be able to get more impressive endorsements than it has. I have been pointed to Peter Thiel and Ray Kurzweil as examples of impressive SI supporters, but I have not seen any on-record statements from either of these people that show agreement with SI's specific views, and in fact (based on watching them speak at Singularity Summits) my impression is that they disagree.

This is key: they support SI despite not agreeing with SI's specific arguments. Perhaps you should, too, at least if you find folks like Thiel and Kurzweil sufficiently impressive.

In fact, this has always been roughly my own stance. The primary reason I think SI should be supported is not that their arguments for why they should be supported are good (although I think they are, or at least, better than you do). The primary reason I think SI should be supported is that I like what the organization actually does, and wish it to continue. The Less Wrong Sequences, Singularity Summit, rationality training camps, and even HPMoR and Less Wrong itself are all worth paying some amount of mo... (read more)

The primary reason I think SI should be supported is that I like what the organization actually does, and wish it to continue. The Less Wrong Sequences, Singularity Summit, rationality training camps, and even HPMoR and Less Wrong itself are all worth paying some amount of money for.

I think that my own approach is similar, but with a different emphasis. I like some of what they've done, so my question is how do encourage those pieces. This article was very helpful in prompting some thought into how to handle that. I generally break down their work into three categories:

  1. Rationality (minicamps, training, LW, HPMoR): Here I think they've done some very good work. Luckily, the new spinoff will allow me to support these pieces directly.

  2. Existential risk awareness (singularity summit, risk analysis articles): Here their record has been mixed. I think the Singularity Summit has been successful, other efforts less so but seemingly improving. I can support the Singularity Summit by continuing to attend and potentially donating directly if necessary (since it's been running positive in recent years, for the moment this does not seem necessary).

  3. Original research (FAI, timeless decisio

... (read more)
[-][anonymous]9y 15

I furthermore have to say that to raise this particular objection seems to me almost to defeat the purpose of GiveWell. After all, if we could rely on standard sorts of prestige-indicators to determine where our money would be best spent, everybody would be spending their money in those places already, and "efficient charity" wouldn't be a problem for some special organization like yours to solve.

I think Holden seems to believe that Thiel and Kurzweil endorsing SIAI's UFAI-prevention methods would be more like a leading epidemiologist endorsing the malaria-prevention methods of the Against Malaria Foundation (AMF) than it would be like Celebrity X taking a picture with some children for the AMF. There are different kinds of "prestige-indicator," some more valuable to a Bayesian-minded charity evaluator than others.

Firstly, I'd like to add to the chorus saying that this is an incredible post; as a supporter of SI, it warms my heart to see it. I disagree with the conclusion - I would still encourage people to donate to SI - but if SI gets a critique this good twice a decade it should count itself lucky.

I don't think GiveWell making SI its top rated charity would be in SI's interests. In the long term, SI benefits hugely when people are turned on to the idea of efficient charity, and asking them to swallow all of the ideas behind SI's mission at the same time will put them off. If I ran GiveWell and wanted to give an endorsement to SI, I might break the rankings into multiple lists: the most prominent being VillageReach-like charities which directly do good in the near future, then perhaps a list for charities that mitigate broadly accepted and well understood existential risks (if this can be done without problems with politics), and finally a list of charities which mitigate more speculative risks.

6Wei_Dai9yThis seems like a good point and perhaps would have been a good reason for SI to not have approached GiveWell in the first place. At this point though, GiveWell is not only refusing to make SI a top rated charity, but actively recommending people to "withhold" funds from SI, which as far as I can tell, it almost never does. It'd be a win for SI to just convince GiveWell to put it back on the "neutral" list.

Thank you very much for writing this. I, um, wish you hadn't posted it literally directly before the May Minicamp when I can't realistically respond until Tuesday. Nonetheless, it already has a warm place in my heart next to the debate with Robin Hanson as the second attempt to mount informed criticism of SIAI.

It looks to me as though Holden had the criticisms he expresses even before becoming "informed", presumably by reading the sequences, but was too intimidated to share them. Perhaps it is worth listening to/encouraging uninformed criticisms as well as informed ones?

9John_Maxwell9yNote the following criticism of SI identified by Holden:
6lukeprog9yTo those who think Eliezer is exaggerating: please link me to "informed criticism of SIAI." It is so hard to find good critics. Edit: Well, I guess there are more than two examples, though relatively few. I was wrong to suggest otherwise. Much of this has to do with the fact that SI hasn't been very clear about many of its positions and arguments: see Beckstead's comment [http://lesswrong.com/lw/cbs/thoughts_on_the_singularity_institute_si/6k2x] and Hallquist's followup [http://lesswrong.com/lw/cbs/thoughts_on_the_singularity_institute_si/6k30].

1) Most criticism of key ideas underlying SIAI's strategies does not reference SIAI, e.g. Chris Malcolm's "Why Robots Won't Rule" website is replying to Hans Moravec.

2) Dispersed criticism, with many people making local points, e.g. those referenced by Wei Dai, is still criticism and much of that is informed and reasonable.

3) Much criticism is unwritten, e.g. consider the more FAI-skeptical Singularity Summit speaker talks, or takes the form of brief responses to questions or the like. This doesn't mean it isn't real or important.

4) Gerrymandering the bounds of "informed criticism" to leave almost no one within bounds is in general a scurrilous move that one should bend over backwards to avoid.

5) As others have suggested, even within the narrow confines of Less Wrong and adjacent communities there have been many informed critics. Here's Katja Grace's criticism of hard takeoff (although I am not sure how separate it is from Robin's). Here's Brandon Reinhart's examination of SIAI, which includes some criticism and brings more in comments. Here's Kaj Sotala's comparison of FHI and SIAI. And there are of course many detailed and often highly upvoted comments in response to various SIAI-discussing posts and threads, many of which you have participated in.

This is a bit exasperating. Did you not see my comments in this thread? Have you and Eliezer considered that if there really have been only two attempts to mount informed criticism of SIAI, then LessWrong must be considered a massive failure that SIAI ought to abandon ASAP?

Wei Dai has written many comments and posts that have some measure of criticism, and various members of the community, including myself, have expressed agreement with them. I think what might be a problem is that such criticisms haven't been collected into a single place where they can draw attention and stir up drama, as Holden's post has.

There are also critics like XiXiDu. I think he's unreliable, and I think he'd admit to that, but he also makes valid criticisms that are shared by other LW folk, and LW's moderation makes it easy to sift his comments for the better stuff.

Perhaps an institution could be designed. E.g., a few self-ordained SingInst critics could keep watch for critiques of SingInst, collect them, organize them, and update a page somewhere out-of-the-way over at the LessWrong Wiki that's easily checkable by SI folk like yourself. LW philanthropists like User:JGWeissman or User:Rain could do it, for example. If SingInst wanted to signal various good things then it could even consider paying a few people to collect and organize criticisms of SingInst. Presumably if there are good critiques out there then finding them would be well worth a small investment.

I think what might be a problem is that such criticisms haven't been collected into a single place where they can draw attention and stir up drama, as Holden's post has.

I put them in discussion, because well, I bring them up for the purpose of discussion, and not for the purpose of forming an overall judgement of SIAI or trying to convince people to stop donating to SIAI. I'm rarely sure that my overall beliefs are right and SI people's are wrong, especially on core issues that I know SI people have spent a lot of time thinking about, so mostly I try to bring up ideas, arguments, and possible scenarios that I suspect they may not have considered. (This is one major area where I differ from Holden: I have greater respect for SI people's rationality, at least their epistemic rationality. And I don't know why Holden is so confident about some of his own original ideas, like his solution to Pascal's Mugging, and Tool-AI ideas. (Well I guess I do, it's probably just typical human overconfidence.))

Having said that, I reserve the right to collect all my criticisms together and make a post in main in the future if I decide that serves my purposes, although I suspect that without the inf... (read more)

7CarlShulman9yI read most such (apparently-relevant from post titles) discussions, and Anna reads a minority. I think Eliezer reads very few. I'm not very sure about Luke.
4Wei_Dai9yDo you forward relevant posts to other SI people?
3CarlShulman9yOnes that seem novel and valuable, either by personal discussion or email.
5Will_Newsome9yI'm somewhat confident (from directly asking him a related question and also from many related observations over the last two years) that Eliezer mostly doesn't, or is very good at pretending that he doesn't. He's also not good at reading so even if he sees something he's only somewhat likely to understand it unless he already thinks it's worth it for him to go out of his way to understand it. If you want to influence Eliezer it's best to address him specifically and make sure to state your arguments clearly, and to explicitly disclaim that you're specifically not making any of the stupid arguments that your arguments could be pattern-matched to. Also I know that Anna is often too busy to read LessWrong.
4lukeprog9yGood point. Wei Dai qualifies as informed criticism. Though, he seems to agree with us on all the basics, so that might not be the kind of criticism Eliezer was talking about.

To those who think Eliezer is exaggerating: please link me to "informed criticism of SIAI."

It would help if you could elaborate on what you mean by "informed".

Most of what Holden wrote, and much more, has been said by other people, excluding myself, before.

I don't have the time right now to wade through all those years of posts and comments but might do so later.

And if you are not willing to take into account what I myself wrote, for being uninformed, then maybe you will however agree that at least all of my critical comments that have been upvoted to +10 (ETA changed to +10, although there is a lot more on-topic at +5) should have been taken into account. If you do so you will find that SI could have updated some time ago on some of what has been said in Holden's post.

6Gastogh9ySeconded. It seems to me like it's not even possible to mount properly informed criticism if much of the findings are just sitting [http://lesswrong.com/lw/8tr/qa_2_with_singularity_institute_executive_director/5fwj] unpublished [http://lesswrong.com/lw/8tr/qa_2_with_singularity_institute_executive_director/5g4h] somewhere. I'm hopeful that this is actually getting fixed sometime this year, but it doesn't seem fair to not release information and then criticize the critics for being uninformed.

I'm not sure how much he's put into writing, but Ben Goertzel is surely informed. One might argue he comes to the wrong conclusions about AI danger, but it's not from not thinking about it.

4private_messaging9yif you don't have a good argument you won't find good critics. (Unless you are as influential as religion. Then you can get good critic simply because you stepped onto good critic's foot. The critic probably ain't going to come to church to talk about it though, and also the ulterior motives (having had foot stepped onto) may make you qualify it as bad critic). When you look through a matte glass, and you see some blurred text that looks like it got equations in it, and you are told that what you see is a fuzzy image of proof that P!=NP (maybe you can make out the headers which are in bigger font, and those look like the kind of headers that valid proof might have), do you assume that it is really a valid proof, and they only need to polish the glass? What if it is P=NP instead? What if it doesn't look like it got equations in it?

I find it unfortunate that none of the SIAI research associates have engaged very deeply in this debate, even LessWrong regulars like Nesov and cousin_it. This is part of the reason why I was reluctant to accept (and ultimately declined) when SI invited me to become a research associate, that I would feel less free to to speak up both in support of SI and in criticism of it.

I don't think this is SI's fault, but perhaps there are things it could do to lessen this downside of the research associate program. For example it could explicitly encourage the research associates to publicly criticize SI and to disagree with its official positions, and make it clear that no associate will be blamed if someone mistook their statements to be official SI positions or saw them as reflecting badly on SI in general. I also write this comment because just being consciously aware of this bias (in favor of staying silent) may help to counteract it.

I don't usually engage in potentially protracted debates lately. A very short summary of my disagreement with Holden's object-level argument part of the post is (1) I don't see in what way can the idea of powerful Tool AI be usefully different from that of Oracle AI, and it seems like the connotations of "Tool AI" that distinguish it from "Oracle AI" follow from an implicit sense of it not having too much optimization power, so it might be impossible for a Tool AI to both be powerful and hold the characteristics suggested in the post; (1a) the description of Tool AI denies it goals/intentionality and other words, but I don't see what they mean apart from optimization power, and so I don't know how to use them to characterize Tool AI; (2) the potential danger of having a powerful Tool/Oracle AI around is such that aiming at their development doesn't seem like a good idea; (3) I don't see how a Tool/Oracle AI could be sufficiently helpful to break the philosophical part of the FAI problem, since we don't even know which questions to ask.

Since Holden stated that he's probably not going to (interactively) engage the comments to this post, and writing this up in a self-contained way is a lot of work, I'm going to leave this task to the people who usually write up SingInst outreach papers.

9cousin_it9yNot sure about the others, but as for me, at some point this spring I realized that talking about saving the world makes me really upset and I'm better off avoiding the whole topic.

Would it upset you to talk about why talking about saving the world makes you upset?

4cousin_it9yYes.
3homunq9yIt would appear that cousin_it believes we're screwed. It's tempting to argue that this would, overall, be an argument against the effectiveness of the SI program. However, that's probably not true, because we could be 99% screwed and the remaining 1% could depend on SI; this would be a depressing fact, yet still justify supporting the SI. (Personally, I agree with the poster about the problems with SI, but I'm just laying it out. Responding to wei_dai rather than cousin_it because I don't want to upset the latter unnecessarily.)

I think I'm entitled to opine...

Of course you are. And, you may not be one of the people who "like my earlier papers."

You confirm the lead poster's allegations that SIA staff are insular and conceited.

Really? How? I commented earlier on LW (can't find it now) about how the kind of papers I write barely count as "original research" because for the most part they merely summarize and clarify the ideas of others. But as Beckstead says, there is a strong need for that right now.

For insights in decision theory and FAI theory, I suspect we'll have to look to somebody besides Luke Muehlhauser. We keep trying to hire such people but they keep saying "No." (I got two more "no"s just in the last 3 weeks.) Part of that may be due to the past and current state of the organization — and luckily, fixing that kind of thing is something I seem to have some skills with.

You're... a textbook writer at heart.

True, dat.

So your argument that visiting a bunch of highly educated pencil-necked white nerds is physically dangerous boils down to... one incident of ineffective online censorship mocked by most of the LW community and all outsiders, and some criticism of Yudkowsky's computer science & philosophical achievements.

I see.

I would literally have had more respect for you if you had used racial slurs like "niggers" in your argument, since that is at least tethered to reality in the slightest bit.

If you really cared about future risk you would be working away at the problem even with a smaller salary. Focus on your work.

What we really need is some kind of emotionless robot who doesn't care about its own standard of living and who can do lots of research and run organizations and suchlike without all the pesky problems introduced by "being human".

Oh, wait...

2%?
Seriously?
I am curious as to why your estimate is so high.

That's the kind of probability I would've assigned to EURISKO destroying the world back when Lenat was the first person ever to try to build anything self-improving. For a random guy on the Internet it's off by... maybe five orders of magnitude? I would expect a pretty tiny fraction of all worlds to have the names of homebrew projects carved on their tombstones, and there are many random people on the Internet claiming to have AGI.

People like this are significant, not because of their chances of creating AGI, but because of what their inability to stop or take any serious precautions, despite their belief that they are about to create AGI, tells us about human nature.

5[anonymous]9yLaplace's Rule of Succession, assuming around fifty failures under similar or more favorable circumstances.

This just shifts the question to how you slotted FinalState into such a promising reference class? Conservatively, tens of academic research programs, tens of PhD dissertations, hundreds of hobbyist projects, hundreds of undergraduate term projects, and tens of business ventures have attempted something similar to AGI and none have succeeded.

9[anonymous]9yAs far as I can tell, the vast majority of academic projects (particularly those of undergrads) have worked on narrow AI, which this is supposedly not. However, reading the post again, it doesn't sound as though they have the support of any academic institution; I misread the bit around "academic network". It sounds more as though this is a homebrew project, in which case I need to go two or three orders of magnitude lower.
7steven04619yThe Rule of Succession, if I'm not mistaken, assumes a uniform prior from 0 to 1 for the probability of success. That seems unreasonable; it shouldn't be extremely improbable (even before observing failure) that fewer than one in a thousand such claims result in a working AGI. So you have to adjust downward somewhat from there, but it's hard to say how much. (This is in addition to the point that user:othercriteria makes in the sibling comment.)

This most recently happened just a few weeks ago. On that occasion Luke Muehlhauser (no less) took the unusual step of asking me to friend him on Facebook, after which he joined a discussion I was having and made scathing ad hominem comments about me

Sounds serious... Feel free to post a relevant snippet of the discussion, here or elsewhere, so that those interested can judge this event on its merits, and not through your interpretation of it.

On April 7th, Richard posted to Facebook:

LessWrong has now shown its true mettle. After someone here on FB mentioned a LW discussion of consciousness, I went over there and explained that Eliezer Yudkowsky, in his essay, had completely misunderstood the Zombie Argument given by David Chalmers. I received a mix of critical, thoughtful and sometimes rude replies. But then, all of a sudden, Eliezer took an interest in this old thread again, and in less than 24 hours all of my contributions were relegated to the trash. Funnily enough, David Chalmers himself then appeared and explained that Eliezer had, in fact, completely misunderstood his argument. Chalmers' comments, strangely enough, have NOT been censored. :-)

I replied:

I haven't read the whole discussion, but just so everyone is clear...

Richard's claim that "in less than 24 hours all of my contributions were relegated to the trash" is false.

What happened is that LWers disvalued Richard's comments and downvoted them. Because most users have their preferences set to hide comments with a score of less than -3, these users saw Richard's most-downvoted comments as collapsed by default, with a note reading "comment s

... (read more)
8shminux9yI fail to see anything that can be qualified as an ad hominem ("an attempt to negate the truth of a claim by pointing out a negative characteristic or belief of the person supporting it") in what you quoted. If anything, the original comment by Richard comes much closer to this definition.
5Will_Newsome9y(Though to be fair I think this sort of depends on your definition of "regularly"—I think over 95% of my comments aren't downvoted, many of them getting 5 or more upvotes, in contrast with other contributors who get about 25% of their comments downvoted and usually end up leaving as a result.)

Richard,

If you have some solid, rigorous and technical criticism of SIAI's AI work, I wish you would create a pseudonimous account on LW and state that critcism without giving the slightest hint that you are Richard Loosemore, or making any claim about your credentials, or talking about censorship and quashing of dissenting views.

Until you do something like that, I can't help think that you care more about your reputation or punishing Eliezer than about improving everybody's understanding of technical issues.

Then it's running in agent mode? My impression was that a tool-mode system presents you with a plan, but takes no actions. So all tool-mode systems are basically question-answering systems.

I'm a sysadmin. When I want to get something done, I routinely come up with something that answers the question, and when it does that reliably I give it the power to do stuff on as little human input as possible. Often in daemon mode, to absolutely minimise how much it needs to bug me. Question-answerer->tool->agent is a natural progression just in process automation. (And this is why they're called "daemons".)

It's only long experience and many errors that's taught me how to do this such that the created agents won't crap all over everything. Even then I still get surprises.

"And if Novamente should ever cross the finish line, we all die."

And yet SIAI didn't do anything to Ben Goertzel (except make him Director of Research for a time, which is kind of insane in my judgement, but obviously not in the sense you intend).

Ben Goertzel's projects are knowably hopeless, so I didn't too strongly oppose Tyler Emerson's project from within SIAI's then-Board of Directors; it was being argued to have political benefits, and I saw no noticeable x-risk so I didn't expend my own political capital to veto it, just sighed. Nowadays the Board would not vote for this.

And it is also true that, in the hypothetical counterfactual conditional where Goertzel's creations work, we all die. I'd phrase the email message differently today to avoid any appearance of endorsing the probability, because today I understand better that most people have trouble mentally separating hypotheticals. But the hypothetical is still true in that counterfactual universe, if not in this one.

There is no contradiction here.

6Wei_Dai9yTo clarify, by "kind of insane" I didn't mean you personally, but was commenting on SIAI's group rationality at that time.

Please don't take this as a personal attack, but, historically speaking, every one who'd said "I am in the final implementation stages of the general intelligence algorithm" was wrong so far. Their algorithms never quite worked out. Is there any evidence you can offer that your work is any different ? I understand that this is a tricky proposition, since revealing your work could set off all kinds of doomsday scenarios (assuming that it performs as you expect it to); still, surely there must be some way for you to convince skeptics that you can succeed where so many others had failed.

I believe what you wrote because you used so much bolding.

I would say that, far from deserving support, SI should be considered a cult-like community in which dissent is ruthlessly suppressed in order to exaggerate the point of view of SI's founders and controllers, regardless of the scientific merits of those views, or of the dissenting opinions.

This is a very strong statement. Have you allowed for the possibility that your current judgement might be clouded by the events transpired some 6 years ago?

9Dolores19849yI myself employ a very strong heuristic, from years of trolling the internet: when a user joins a forum and complains about an out-of-character and strongly personal persecution by the moderation staff in the past, there is virtually always more to the story when you look into it.
4[anonymous]9yIndeed, Dolores, that is an empirically sound strategy, if used with caution. My own experience, however, is that people who do that can usually be googled quickly, and are often found to be unqualified cranks of one persuasion or another. People with more anger than self-control. But that is not always the case. Recently, for example, a woman friended me on Facebook and then posted numerous diatribes against a respected academic acquaintance of mine, accusing him of raping her and fathering her child. These posts were quite blood-curdling. And their target appeared quite the most innocent guy you could imagine. Very difficult to make a judgement. However, about a month ago the guy suddenly came out and made a full and embarrassing frank admission of guilt. It was an astonishing episode. But it was an instance of one of those rare occasions when the person (the woman in this case) turned out to be perfectly justified. I am helpless to convince you. All I can do is point to my own qualifications and standing. I am no lone crank crying in the wilderness. I teach Math, Physics and Cognitive Neuroscience at the undergraduate level, and I have coauthored a paper with one of the AGI field's leading exponents (Ben Goertzel), in a book about the Singularity that was at one point (maybe not anymore!) slated to be a publishing landmark for the field. You have to make a judgement.
9steven04619yRegardless of who was how much at fault in the SL4 incident, surely you must admit that Yudkowsky's interactions with you were unusually hostile relative to how he generally interacts with critics. I can see how you'd want to place emphasis on those interactions because they involved you personally, but that doesn't make them representative for purposes of judging cultishness or making general claims that "dissent is ruthlessly suppressed".

I am in the final implementation stages of the general intelligence algorithm.

it's both amusing and disconcerting that people on this forum treat such a comment seriously.

5Bugmaster9yI try to treat all comments with some degree of seriousness, which can be expressed as a floating-point number between 0 and 1 :-)

I feel that [SI] ought to be able to get more impressive endorsements than it has.

SI seems to have passed up opportunities to test itself and its own rationality by e.g. aiming for objectively impressive accomplishments.

Holden, do you believe that charitable organizations should set out deliberately to impress donors and high-status potential endorsers? I would have thought that a donor like you would try to ignore the results of any attempts at that and to concentrate instead on how much the organization has actually improved the world because to do otherwise is to incentivize organizations whose real goal is to accumulate status and money for their own sake.

For example, Eliezer's attempts to teach rationality or "technical epistemology" or whatever you want to call it through online writings seem to me to have actually improved the world in a non-negligible way and seem to have been designed to do that rather than designed merely to impress.

ADDED. The above is probably not as clear as it should be, so let me say it in different words: I suspect it is a good idea for donors to ignore certain forms of evidence ("impressiveness", affiliation with high-status folk) of a charity's effectiveness to discourage charities from gaming donors in ways that seems to me already too common, and I was a little surprised to see that you do not seem to ignore those forms of evidence.

5rhollerith_dot_com9yIn other words, I tend to think that people who make philanthropy their career and who have accumulated various impressive markers of their potential to improve the world are likely to continue to accumulate impressive markers, but are less likely to improve the world than people who have already actually improved the world. And of the three core staff members of SI I have gotten to know, 2 (Eliezer and another one who probably does not want to be named) have already improved the world in non-negligible ways and the third spends less time accumulating credentials and impressiveness markers than almost anyone I know.
3faul_sname9yThe obvious answer would be "Yes." Givewell only funneled about $5M last year, as compared to the $300,000M or so that Americans give on an annual basis. Most money still comes from people that base their decision on something other than efficiency, so targeting these people makes sense.
3JGWeissman9yThe question was not if an individual charity, holding constant the behavior of other charities, benefits from "setting out deliberately to impress donors and high-status potential endorsers", but whether it is in Holden's interests (in making charities more effective) to generally encourage charities to do so.

I agree with much of this post, but find a disconnect between the specific criticisms and the overall conclusion of withholding funds from SI even for "donors determined to donate within this cause", and even aside from whether SI's FAI approach increases risk. I see a couple of ways in which the conclusion might hold.

  1. SI is doing worse than they are capable of, due to wrong beliefs. Withholding funds provides incentive for them to do what you think is right, without having to change their beliefs. But this could lead to waste if people disagree in different directions, and funds end up sitting unused because SI can't satisfy everyone, or if SI thinks the benefit of doing what they think is optimal is greater than the value of extra funds they could get from doing what you think is best.
  2. A more capable organization already exists or will come up later and provide a better use of your money. This seems unlikely in the near future, given that we're already familiar with the "major players" in the existential risk area and based on past history, it doesn't seem likely that a new group of highly capable people would suddenly get interested in the cause. In the long
... (read more)

If Holden believes that:
A) reducing existential risk is valuable, and
B) SI's effectiveness at reducing existential risk is a significant contributor to the future of existential risk, and
C) SI is being less effective at reducing existential risk than they would be if they fixed some set of problems P, and
D) withholding GiveWell's endorsement while pre-committing to re-evaluating that refusal if given evidence that P has been fixed increases the chances that SI will fix P...

...it seems to me that Holden should withhold GiveWell's endorsement while pre-committing to re-evaluating that refusal if given evidence that P has been fixed.

Which seems to be what he's doing. (Of course, I don't know whether those are his reasons.)

What, on your view, ought he do instead, if he believes those things?

5Wei_Dai9yHolden must believe some additional relevant statements, because A-D (with "existential risk" suitably replaced) could be applied to every other charity, as presumably no charity is perfect. I guess what I most want to know is what Holden thinks are the reasons SI hasn't already fixed the problems P. If it's lack of resources or lack of competence, then "withholding ... while pre-committing ..." isn't going to help. If it's wrong beliefs, then arguing seems better than "incentivizing", since that provides a permanent instead of temporary solution, and in the course of arguing you might find out that you're wrong yourself. What does Holden believe that causes him to think that providing explicit incentives to SI is a good thing to do?
7Bugmaster9yHolden said, This addresses your point (2). Holden believes that SI is grossly inefficient at best, and actively harmful at worst (since he thinks that they might inadvertently increase AI risk). Therefore, giving money to SI would be counterproductive, and a donor would get a better return on investment in other places. As for point (1), my impression is that Holden's low estimate of SI's competence is due to a combination of what he sees as wrong beliefs, as well as an insufficient capability to implement even the correct beliefs into practice. SI claims to be supremely rational, but their list of achievements is lackluster at best -- which indicates a certain amount of Donning-Kruger effect that's going on. Furthermore, SI appears to be focused on growing SI and teaching rationality workshops, as opposed to their stated mission of researching FAI theory. Additionally, Holden indicted SI members pretty strongly (though very politely) for what I will (in a less polite fashion) label as arrogance. The prevailing attitude of SI members seems to be (according to Holden) that the rest of the world is just too irrational to comprehend their brilliant insights, and therefore the rest of the world has little to offer -- and therefore, any criticism of SI's goals or actions can be dismissed out of hand. EDIT: found the right quote, duh.

I don't work for SI and this is not an SI-authorized response, unless SI endorses it later. This comment is based on my own understanding based on conversations with and publications of SI members and general world model, and does not necessarily reflect the views or activities of SI.

The first thing I notice is that your interpretation of SI's goals with respect to AGI are narrower than the impression I had gotten, based on conversations with SI members. In particular, I don't think SI's research is limited to trying to make AGI friendliness provable, but on a variety of different safety strategies, and on the relative win-rates of different technological paths, eg brain uploading vs. de-novo AI, classes of utility functions and their relative risks, and so on. There is also a distinction between "FAI theory" and "AGI theory" that you aren't making; the idea, as I see it, is that to the extent to which these are separable, "FAI theory" covers research into safety mechanisms which reduce the probability of disaster if any AGI is created, while "AGI theory" covers research that brings the creation of any AGI closer. Your first objection - that ... (read more)

6steven04619yI agree, and would like to note the possibility, for those who suspect FAI research is useless or harmful, of earmarking SI donations to research on different safety strategies, or on aspects of AI risk that are useful to understand regardless of strategy.
9rocurley9yThis likely won't work. Money is fungible, so unless the total donations so earmarked exceeds the planned SI funding for that cause, they won't have to change anything. They're under no obligation to not defund your favorite cause by exactly the amount you donated, thus laundering your donation into the general fund. (Unless I misunderstand the relevant laws?) EDIT NOTE: The post used to say vast majority; this was changed, but is referenced below.
5dlthomas9yYou have an important point here, but I'm not sure it gets up to "vast majority" before it becomes relevant. Earmarking $K for X has an effect once $K exceeds the amount of money that would have been spent on X if the $K had not been earmarked. The size of the effect still certainly depends on the difference, and may very well not be large.
4steven04619ySuppose you earmark to a paper on a topic X that SI would otherwise probably not write a paper on. Would that cause SI to take money out of research on topics similar to X and into FAI research? There would probably be some sort of (expected) effect in that direction, but I think the size of the effect depends on the details of what causes SI's allocation of resources, and I think the effect would be substantially smaller than would be necessary to make an earmarked donation equivalent to a non-earmarked donation. Still, you're right to bring it up.

I'm very impressed by Holden's thoroughness and thoughtfulness. What I'd like to know is why his post is Eliezer-endorsed and has 191 up-votes, while my many posts over the years hammering on Objection 1, and my comments raising Objection 2, have never gotten the green button, been frequently down-voted, and never been responded to by SIAI. Do you have to be outside the community to be taken seriously by it?

Not to be cynical, PhilGoetz, but isn't Holden an important player in the rational-charity movement? Wouldn't the ultimate costs of ignoring Holden be prohibitive?

4PhilGoetz9yThat could explain the green dot. I don't know which explanation is more depressing.
3Rain9yYou are absolutely correct. And, that's not the reason I find it engaging or informative.

I thought most of the stuff in Holden's post had been public knowledge for years, even to the point of being included in previous FAQs produced by SI. The main difference is that the presentation and solidity of it in this article are remarkable - interconnecting so many different threads which, when placed as individual sentences or paragraphs, might hang alone, but when woven together with the proper knots form a powerful net.

I would be interested to see if you could link to posts where you made versions of these objections.

9PhilGoetz9yOkay [http://lesswrong.com/r/lesswrong/lw/chk].
7John_Maxwell9yAssuming what you say is true, it looks to me as though SI is paying the cost of ignoring its critics for so many years...
6ghf9yI think some of it comes down to the range of arguments offered. For example, posted alone, I would not have found Objection 2 particularly compelling, but I was impressed by many other points and in particular the discussion of organizational capacity. I'm sure there are others for whom those evaluations were completely reversed. Nonetheless, we all voted it up. Many of us who did so likely agree with one another less than we do with SIAI, but that has only showed up here and there on this thread. Critically, it was all presented, not in the context of an inside argument, but in the context of "is SI an effective organization in terms of its stated goals." The question posed to each of us was: do you believe in SI's mission and, if so, do you think that donating to SI is an effective way to achieve that goal? It is a wonderful instantiation of the standard test of belief, "how much are you willing to bet on it?"

I think Martian Yudkowsky is a dangerous intuition pump. We're invited to imagine a creature just like Eliezer except green and with antennae; we naturally imagine him having values as similar to us as, say, a Star Trek alien. From there we observe the similarity of values we just pushed in, and conclude that values like "interesting" are likely to be shared across very alien creatures. Real Martian Yudkowsky is much more alien than that, and is much more likely to say

There is little prospect of an outcome that realizes even the value of being flarn, unless the first superintelligences undergo detailed inheritance from Martian values.

8Kaj_Sotala9yImagine, an intelligence that didn't have the universal emotion of badweather [http://www.rfreitas.com/Astro/Xenopsychology.htm]!
5[anonymous]9yI suggest you guys taboo interesting, because I strongly suspect you're using it with slightly different meanings. (And BTW, as a Martian Yudkowsky I imagine something with values at least as alien as Babyeaters' or Superhappys'.)

The basic idea is that if you pull a mind at random from design space then it will be unfriendly. I am not even sure if that is true. But it is the strongest argument they have. And it is completely bogus because humans do not pull AGI's from mind design space at random.

I don't have the energy to get into an extended debate, but the claim that this is "the basic idea" or that this would be "the strongest argument" is completely false. A far stronger basic idea is the simple fact that nobody has yet figured out a theory of ethics that would work properly, which means that even that AGIs that were specifically designed to be ethical are most likely to lead to bad outcomes. And that's presuming that we even knew how to program them exactly.

This isn't even something that you'd need to read a hundred blog posts for, it's well discussed in both The Singularity and Machine Ethics and Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk. Complex Value Systems are Required to Realize Valuable Futures, too.

Some comments on objections 1 and 2.

For example, when the comment says "the formalization of the notion of 'safety' used by the proof is wrong," it is not clear whether it means that the values the programmers have in mind are not correctly implemented by the formalization, or whether it means they are correctly implemented but are themselves catastrophic in a way that hasn't been anticipated.

Both (with the caveat that SI's plans are to implement an extrapolation procedure for the values, and not the values themselves).

Another way of putting this is that a "tool" has an underlying instruction set that conceptually looks like: "(1) Calculate which action A would maximize parameter P, based on existing data set D. (2) Summarize this calculation in a user-friendly manner, including what Action A is, what likely intermediate outcomes it would cause, what other actions would result in high values of P, etc."

I think such a Tool-AI will be much less powerful than an equivalent Agent-AI, due to the bottleneck of having to summarize its calculations in a human-readable form, and then waiting for the human to read and understand the summary and then mak... (read more)

Rain (who noted that he is a donor to SIAI in a comment) and HoldenKarnofsky (who wrote the post) are two different people, as indicated by their different usernames.

If such a person would write a similar post and actually write in a way that they feel, rather than being incredible polite, things would look very different.

I'm assuming you think they'd come in, scoff at our arrogance for a few pages, and then waltz off. Disregarding how many employed machine learning engineers also do side work on general intelligence projects, you'd probably get the same response from automobile engineer, someone with a track record and field expertise, talking to the Wright Brothers. Thinking about new things and new ideas doesn't automatically make you wrong.

That recursive self-improvement is nothing more than a row of English words, a barely convincing fantasy.

Really? Because that's a pretty strong claim. If I knew how the human brain worked well enough to build one in software, I could certainly build something smarter. You could increase the number of slots in working memory. Tweak the part of the brain that handles intuitive math to correctly deal with orders of magnitude. Improve recall to eidetic levels. Tweak the brain's handling of probabilities to be closer to the Bayesian ideal. Even those small changes would likely produce a mind ... (read more)

3Salemicus9yThis is totally unsupported. To quote Lady Catherine de Bourgh, "If I had ever learned [to play the piano], I should have become a great proficient." You have no idea whether the "small changes" you propose are technically feasible, or whether these "tweaks" would in fact mean a complete redesign. For all we know, if you knew how the human brain worked well enough to build one in software, you would appreciate why these changes are impossible without destroying the rest of the system's functionality. After all, it would appear that (say) eidetic recall would provide a fitness advantage. Given that humans lack it, there may well be good reasons why.
6TheOtherDave9y"totally unsupported" seems extreme. (Though I enjoyed the P&P shoutout. I was recently in a stage adaptation of the book, so it is pleasantly primed.) What the claim amounts to is the belief that: a) there exist good design ideas for brains that human evolution didn't implement, and b) a human capable of building a working brain at all is capable of coming up with some of them. A seems pretty likely to me... at least, the alternative (our currently evolved brains are the best possible design) seems so implausible as to scarcely be worth considering. B is harder to say anything clear about, but given our experience with other evolved systems, it doesn't strike me as absurd. We're pretty good at improving the stuff we were born with. Of course, you're right that this is evidence and not proof. It's possible that we just can't do any better than human brains for thinking, just like it was possible (but turned out not to be true) that we couldn't do any better than human legs for covering long distances efficiently. But it's not negligible evidence.

Having been a subject of both a relatively large upvote and a relatively large downvote in the last couple of weeks, I still think that the worst thing one can do is to complain about censorship or karma. The posts and comments on any forum aren't judged on their "objective merits" (because there is no such thing), but on its suitability for the forum in question. If you have been downvoted, your post deserves it by definition. You can politely inquire about the reasons, but people are not required to explain themselves. As for rationality, I question whether it is rational to post on a forum if you are not having fun there. Take it easy.

The more significant fact is that these criticisms were largely unknown to the community.

LWer tenlier disagrees, saying:

[Holden's] critique mostly consists of points that are pretty persistently bubbling beneath the surface around here, and get brought up quite a bit. Don't most people regard this as a great summary of their current views, rather than persuasive in any way? In fact, the only effect I suspect this had on most people's thinking was to increase their willingness to listen to Karnofsky in the future if he should change his mind.

Also, you said:

Dissent is cabined to Discussion.

Luckily, evidence on the matter is easy to find. As counter-evidence I present: Self-improvement or shiny distraction, SIAI an examination, Why we can't take expected value estimates literally, Extreme rationality: it's not that great, Less Wrong Rationality and Mainstream Philosophy, and the very post you are commenting on. Many of these are among the most upvoted posts ever.

Moreover, the editors rarely move posts from Main to Discussion. The posters themselves decide whether to post in Main or Discussion.

They may act according to various parameters they read in from the system environment. I expect they will be developed to a level of complication where they have something that could reasonably be termed a model of the world. The present approach is closer to perceptual control theory, where the sysadmin has the model and PCT is part of the implementation. 'Cos it's more predictable to the mere human designer.

Capacity for self-improvement is an entirely different thing, and I can't see a sysadmin wanting that - the sysadmin would run any such improvements themselves, one at a time. (Semi-automated code refactoring, for example.) The whole point is to automate processes the sysadmin already understands but doesn't want to do by hand - any sysadmin's job being to automate themselves out of the loop, because there's always more work to do. (Because even in the future, nothing works.)

I would be unsurprised if someone markets a self-improving system for this purpose. For it to go FOOM, it also needs to invent new optimisations, which is presently a bit difficult.

Edit: And even a mere daemon-like automated tool can do stuff a lot of people regard as unFriendly, e.g. high frequency trading algorithms.

Update: I came out of a recent conversation with Eliezer with a higher opinion of Eliezer's general rationality, because several things that had previously looked to me like unforced, forseeable mistakes by Eliezer now look to me more like non-mistakes or not-so-forseeable mistakes.

[-][anonymous]9y 10

There's got to be a level beyond "arguments as soldiers" to describe your current approach to ineffective contrarianism.

I volunteer "arguments as cannon fodder."

If this works, it's probably worth a top-level post.

7thomblake9yUpvoted for humor: "probably".

Holden does a great job but makes two major flaws:
1) His argument about Tool-AI is irrelevant, because creating Tool-AI does almost nothing to avoid Agent-AI, which he agrees is dangerous.
2) He too narrowly construes SI's goals by assuming they are only working on Friendly AI rather than AGI x-risk reduction in general.

I'm interested in any compiled papers or articles you wrote about AGI motivation systems, aside from the forthcoming book chapter, which I will read. Do you have any links?

4MattMahoney9yhttp://susaro.com/ [http://susaro.com/]

Karnofsky's focus on "tool AI" is useful but also his statement of it may confuse matters and needs refinement. I don't think the distinction between "tool AI" and "agent AI" is sharp, or in quite the right place.

For example, the sort of robot cars we will probably have in a few years are clearly agents-- you tell them to "come here and take me there" and they do it without further intervention on your part (when everything is working as planned). This is useful in a way that any amount and quality of question answering is not. Almost certainly there will be various flavors of robot cars available and people will choose the ones they like (that don't drive in scary ways, that get them where they want to go even if it isn't well specified, that know when to make conversation and when to be quiet, etc.) As long as robot cars just drive themselves and people around, can't modify the world autonomously to make their performance better, and are subject to continuing selection by their human users, they don't seem to be much of a threat.

The key points here seem to be (1) limited scope, (2) embedding in a network of other actors and (3) huma... (read more)

I'm glad for this, LessWrong can always use more engaging critiques of substance. I partially agree with Holden's conclusions, although I reach them from a substantially different route. I'm a little surprised then that few of the replies have directly engaged what I find to be the more obvious flaws in Holden's argument: namely objection 2 and the inherent contradictions with it and objection 1.

Holden posits that many (most?) well-known current AI applications more or less operate as sophisticated knowledge bases. His tool/agent distinction draws a bo... (read more)

I'm sure I wouldn't have done what Romney did, and not so sure about whether I would have done what Yudkowsky did. Romney wanted to hurt people for the fun of it. Yudkowsky was trying to keep people from being hurt, regardless of whether his choice was a good one.

The quotes aren't all about AI.

I didn't say they were. I said that just because the speaker for a particular idea comes across as crazy doesn't mean the idea itself is crazy. That applies whether all of Eliezer's "crazy statements" are about AI, or whether none of them are.

Whoever knowingly chooses to save one life, when they could have saved two – to say nothing of a thousand lives, or a world – they have damned themselves as thoroughly as any murderer.

The most extreme presumptuousness about morality; insufferable moralism.

Funny, I ac... (read more)

How would one explain Yudkowsky's paranoia, lack of perspective, and scapegoating--other than by positing a narcissistic personality structure?

I had in fact read a lot of those quotes before–although some of them come as a surprise, so thank you for the link. They do show paranoia and lack of perspective, and yeah, some signs of narcissism, and I would be certainly mortified if I personally ever made comments like that in public...

The Sequences as a whole do come across as having been written by an arrogant person, and that's kind of irritating, and I ... (read more)

I downvoted you because you're wrong. For one, comments can't be promoted to main, only posts, and for two, plenty of opposition has garnerned a great deal of upvotes, as shown by the numerous links lukeprog provided.

For example, where do you get 'almost 800 responses' from? That comment (not post) only has 32 comments below it.

I think the correct objection is something you can't quite see in google maps. If you program an AI to do nothing but output directions, it will do nothing but output directions. If those directions are for driving, you're probably fine. If those directions are big and complicated plans for something important, that you follow without really understanding why you're doing (and this is where most of the benefits of working with an AGI will show up), then you could unknowingly take over the world using a sufficiently clever scheme.

Also note that it would be ... (read more)

Can you provide some examples of these "abusive personal attacks"? I would also be interested in this ruthless suppression you mention. I have never seen this sort of behavior on LessWrong, and would be shocked to find it among those who support the Singularity Institute in general.

I've read a few of your previous comments, and while I felt that they were not strong arguments, I didn't downvote them because they were intelligent and well-written, and competent constructive criticism is something we don't get nearly enough of. Indeed, it is usuall... (read more)

7metaphysicist9yThe answer is probably that you overestimate that community's dedication to rationality because you share its biases. The main post demonstrates an enormous conceit among the SI vanguard. Now, how is that rational? How does it fail to get extensive scrutiny in a community of rationalists? My take is that neither side in this argument distinguished itself. Loosemore called for an "outside adjudicator" to solve a scientific argument. What kind of obnoxious behavior is that, when one finds oneself losing an argument? Yudkowsky (rightfully pissed off) in turn, convicted Loosemore of a scientific error, tarred him with incompetence and dishonesty, and banned him. None of these "sins" deserved a ban (no wonder the raw feelings come back to haunt); no honorable person would accept a position where he has the authority to exercise such power (a party to a dispute is biased). Or at the very least, he wouldn't use it the way Yudkowsky did, when he was the banned party's main antagonist.
4Hul-Gil9yThat's probably no small part of it. However, even if my opinion of the community is tinted rose, note that I refer specifically to observation. That is, I've sampled a good amount of posts and comments here on LessWrong, and I see people behaving rationally in arguments - appreciation of polite and lucid dissension, no insults or ad hominem attacks, etc. It's harder to tell what's going on with karma, but again, I've not seen any one particular individual harassed with negative karma merely for disagreeing. Can you elaborate, please? I'm not sure what enormous conceit you refer to. I think that's an excellent analysis. I certainly feel like Yudkowsky overreacted, and as you say, in the circumstances no wonder it still chafes; but as I say above, Richard's arguments failed to impress, and calling for outside help ("adjudication" for an argument that should be based only on facts and logic?) is indeed beyond obnoxious.
4John_Maxwell9yIt seems like everyone is talking about SL4; here is a link to what Richard was probably complaining about: http://www.sl4.org/archive/0608/15895.html [http://www.sl4.org/archive/0608/15895.html]
8Hul-Gil9yThanks. I read the whole debate, or as much of it as is there; I've prepared a short summary to post tomorrow if anyone is interested in knowing what really went on ("as according to Hul-Gil", anyway) without having to hack their way through that thread-jungle themselves. (Summary of summary: Loosemore really does know what he's talking about - mostly - but he also appears somewhat dishonest, or at least extremely imprecise in his communication.)
3[anonymous]9yPlease do post it, I think it would help resolve the arguments in this thread.

I'll gladly start reading at any point you'll link me to.

The fact that you don't just provide a useful link but instead several paragraphs of excuses why the stuff I'm reading is untrustworthy I count as (small) evidence against you.

It's #3. (B.Sc. in biochemistry, did my Ph.D. in proteomics.)

First, the set of polypeptide sequences that have a repeatable final conformation (and therefore "work" biologically) is tiny in comparison to the set of all possible sequences (of the 20-or-so naturally amino acid monomers). Pick a random sequence of reasonable length and make many copies and you get a gummy mess. The long slow grind of evolution has done the hard work of finding useful sequences.

Second, there is an entire class of proteins called chaperones) that assist macromolecular... (read more)

4CCC8yThank you, Cyan. It's good to occasionally get someone into the debate who actually has a good understanding of the subject matter.

Can you pretty, pretty please tell me where this graph gets its information from? I've seen similar graphs that basically permute the cubes' labels. It would also be wonderful to unpack what they mean by "solar" since the raw amount of sunlight power hitting the Earth's surface is a very different amount than the energy we can actually harness as an engineering feat over the next, say, five years (due to materials needed to build solar panels, efficiency of solar panels, etc.).

And just to reiterate, I'm really not arguing here. I'm honestly confu... (read more)

Your point is well taken, but since part of the concern about that whole affair was your extreme language and style, maybe stating this in normal caps might be a reasonable step for PR.

You'll have to forgive Eliezer for not responding; he's busy dispatching death squads.

There's been video or two where Eliezer was called "world's foremost expert on recursive self improvement"

This usually happens when the person being introduced wasn't consulted about the choice of introduction.

The heck? Why would you not need to figure out if an oracle is an ethical patient? Why is there no such possibility as a sentient oracle?

Is this standard religion-of-embodiment stuff?

4thomblake9yThe oracle gets asked questions like "Should intervention X be used by doctor D on patient P" and can tell you the correct answer to them without considering the moral status of the oracle. If it were a robot, it would be asking questions like "Should I run over that [violin/dog/child] to save myself?" which does require considering the status of the robot. EDIT: To clarify, it's not that the researcher has no reason to figure out the moral status of the oracle, it's that the oracle does not need to know its own moral status to answer its domain-specific questions.

This is where Yudkowsky goes crazy autodidact bonkers. He thinks the social institution of science is superfluous, were everyone as smart as he. This means he can hold views contrary to scientific consensus in specialized fields where he lacks expert knowledge based on pure ratiocination.

Ok. I disagree with a large bit of the sequences on science and the nature of science. I've wrote a fair number of comments saying so. So I hope you will listen when I say that you are taking a strawman version of what Eliezer wrote on these issues, and it almost borders on something that I could only see someone thinking if they were trying to interpret Eliezer's words in the most negative fashion possible.

Romney is rightfully being held, feet to fire, for a group battering of another student while they attended high school--because such sadism is a trait of character and can't be explained otherwise.

I was going to upvote your comment until I got to this point. Aside from the general mindkilling, this looks like the fundamental attribution error, and moreover, we all know that people do in fact mature and change. Bringing up external politics is not helpul in a field where there's already concern that AI issues may be becoming a mindkilling subject themselves on LW. Bringing up such a questionable one is even less useful.

I don't think it is suppression of dissent per se. It is more annoying behavior- it implies caring a lot about the karma system, and it is often not even the case when people say that they will actually get downvoted. If it is worth the probable downvote, then they can, you know, just take the downvote. If they want to point out that a view is unpopular they can just say that explicitly. It is also annoying to people like me, who are vocal about a number of issues that could be controversial here (e.g. criticizing Bayesianism, cryonics,, and whether intell... (read more)

3Endovior9yI don't think it's so much 'caring a lot about the karma system' per se, so much as the more general case of 'caring about the approval and/or disapproval of one's peers'. The former is fairly abstract, but the latter is a fairly deep ancestral motivation. Like I said before, it's clearly not much in the way of suppression. That said, given that, barring rare incidents of actual moderation, it is the only 'suppression' that occurs here, and since there is a view among various circles that there there is, in fact, suppression of dissent, and since people on the site frequently wonder why there are not more dissenting viewpoints here, and look for ways to find more... it is important to look at the issue in great depth, since it's clearly an issue which is more significant than it seems on the surface.

I don't understand. Holden is not a major financial contributor to SIAI. And even if he was: which argument are you talking about, and why is it disingenuous?

I'd brought up a version of the tool/agent distinction, and was told firmly that people aren't smart or fast enough to direct an AI. (Sorry, this is from memory-- I don't have the foggiest how to do an efficient search to find that exchange.)

I'm not sure that's a complete answer-- how possible is it to augment a human towards being able to manage an AI? On the other hand, a human like that isn't going to be much like humans 1.0, so problems of Friendliness are still in play.

Perhaps what's needed is building akrasia into the world-- a resistance to sudden c... (read more)

7TheOtherDave9yYou may be thinking of this exchange [http://lesswrong.com/lw/38j/less_wrong_open_thread_december_2010/34px?context=1#34px] , which I found only because I remembered having been involved in it. I continue [http://lesswrong.com/lw/cbs/thoughts_on_the_singularity_institute_si/6k9j] to think that "tool" is a bad term to use here, because people's understanding of what it refers to vary so relevantly. As for what is valuable work... hm. I think teaching people to reason in truth-preserving and value-preserving ways is worth doing. I think formalizing a decision theory that captures universal human intuitions about what the right thing to do in various situations is worth doing. I think formalizing a decision theory that captures non-universal but extant "right thing" intuitions is potentially worth doing, but requires a lot of auxiliary work to actually be worth doing. I think formalizing a decision theory that arrives at judgments about the right thing to do in various situations where those judgments are counterintuitive for most/all humans but reliably lead, if implemented, to results that those same humans reliably endorse more the results of their intuitive judgments is worth doing. I think building systems that can solve real-world problems efficiently is worth doing, all else being equal, though I agree that powerful tools frequently have unexpected consequences that create worse problems than they solve, in which case it's not worth doing. I think designing frameworks within which problem-solving systems can be built, such that the chances of unexpected negative consequences are lower inside that framework than outside of it, is worth doing. I don't find it likely that SI is actually doing any of those things particularly more effectively than other organizations.

My biggest criticism of SI is that I cannot decide between:

A. promoting AI and FAI issues awareness will decrease the chance of UFAI catastrophe; or B. promoting AI and FAI issues awareness will increase the chance of UFAI catastrophe

This criticism seems district from the ones that Holden makes. But it is my primary concern. (Perhaps the closest example is Holden's analogy that SI is trying to develop facebook before the Internet).

A seems intuitive. Basically everyone associated with SI assumes that A is true, as far as I can tell. But A is not obvious... (read more)

I initially upvoted this post, because the criticism seemed reasonable. Then I read the discussion, and switched to downvoting it. In particular, this:

Taken in isolation, these thoughts and arguments might amount to nothing more than a minor addition to the points that you make above. However, my experience with SI is that when I tried to raise these concerns back in 2005/2006 I was subjected to a series of attacks that culminated in a tirade of slanderous denunciations from the founder of SI, Eliezer Yudkowsky. After delivering this tirade, Yudkowsky th

... (read more)
7PhilGoetz9yI witnessed many of the emails in the 2006 banning. Richard disagreed with Eliezer often, and not very diplomatically. Rather than deal with Richard's arguments, Eliezer decided to label Richard as a stupid troll, which he obviously was not, and dismiss him. I am disappointed that Eliezer has apparently never apologized. The email list, SL4, slacked off in volume for months afterwords, probably because most participants felt disgusted by the affair; and Ben Goertzel made a new list, which many people switched to.
[-][anonymous]8y 7

I would naively read it as “don't start a fight unless you know you're going to win”.

...this was actually a terrible policy in historical practice.

[-][anonymous]9y 7

Actually bare noun phrases in English carry both interpretations, ambiguously. The canonical example is "Policemen carry guns" versus "Policemen were arriving" -- the former makes little sense when interpreted existentially, but the latter makes even less sense when interpreted universally.

In short, there is no preferred interpretation.

(Oh, and prescriptivists always lose.)

Richard, this really isn't productive. Your clearly quite intelligent and clearly still have issues due to the dispute between you and Eliezer. It is likely that if you got over this, you could be an effective, efficient, and helpful critic of SI and their ideas. But right now, you are engaging in a uncivil behavior that isn't endearing you to anyone while making emotionally heavy comparisons that make you sound strident.

If your purpose is "let everyone know I think Eliezer is nuts", then you have succeeded, and may cease posting.

[-][anonymous]9y 7

Please rot13 the part from “potentially” onwards, and add a warning as in this comment (with “decode the rot-13'd part” instead of “follow the links”), because there are people here who've said they don't want to know about that thing.

I suppose it's that I naively expect, when opening the list of top LW posts ever, to see ones containing the most impressive or clever insights into rationality.

Not that I don't think Holden's post deserves a high score for other reasons. While I am not terribly impressed with his AI-related arguments, the post is of the very highest standards of conduct, of how to have a disagreement that is polite and far beyond what is usually named "constructive".

4TheOtherDave9y(nods) Makes sense. My own primary inference from the popularity of this post is that there's a lot of uncertainty/disagreement within the community about the idea that creating an AGI without an explicit (and properly tuned) moral structure constitutes significant existential risk, but that the social dynamics of the community cause most of that uncertainty/disagreement to go unvoiced most of the time. Of course, there's lots of other stuff going on as well that has little to do with AGI or existential risk, and a lot to do with the social dynamics of the community itself.

Congratulations on your insights, but please don't snrk implement them until snigger you've made sure that oh heck I can't keep a straight face anymore.

The reactions to the parent comment are very amusing. We have people sarcastically supporting the commenter, people sarcastically telling the commenter they're a threat to the world, people sarcastically telling the commenter to fear for their life, people non-sarcastically telling the commenter to fear for their life, people honestly telling the commenter they're probably nuts, and people failing to g... (read more)

At least try harder in you fear-mongering. The thread about EY's failure to make make many falsifiable predictions is better ad hominem and the speculation about launching terrorist attacks on fab plants is a much more compelling display of potential risk to life and property.

I agree that this is not a game, although you should note that you are doing EY/SIAI/LessWrong's work for it by trying to scare FinalState.

What probability would you give to FinalState's assertion of having a working AGI?

7Bugmaster9yI'm not private_messaging, but I think he has a marginally valid point, even though I disagree with his sensational style. I personally would estimate FinalState's chances of building a working AGI at approximately epsilon, given the total absence of evidence. My opinion doesn't really matter, though, because I'm just some guy with a LessWrong account. The SIAI folks, on the other hand, have made it their mission in life to prevent the rise of un-Friendly AGI. Thus, they could make FinalState's life difficult in some way, in order to fulfill their core mission. In effect, FinalState's post could be seen as a Pascal's Mugging attempt vs. SIAI.
6Normal_Anomaly9yThe social and opportunity costs of trying to supress a "UFAI attempt" as implausible as FinalState's are far higher than the risk of failing to do so. There are also decision-theoretic reasons never to give in to Pascal-Mugging-type offers. SIAI knows all this and therefore will ignore FinalState completely, as well they should.

don't you detect unacknowledged ambition in Eliezer Yudkowsky?

Eliezer certainly has a lot of ambition, but I am surprised to see an accusation that this ambition is unacknowledged.

5TheOtherDave9yThe impression I get from scanning their comment history is that metaphysicist means to suggest here that EY has ambitions he hasn't acknowledged (e.g., the ambition to make money [http://lesswrong.com/lw/cbs/thoughts_on_the_singularity_institute_si/6l9a] without conventional credentials [http://lesswrong.com/lw/cbs/thoughts_on_the_singularity_institute_si/6kjr]), not that he fails to acknowledge any of the ambitions he has.
[-][anonymous]9y 7

Why yes, I do also believe that political figures are held to ridiculous conversational standards as well. It's a miracle they deign to talk to anyone.

Even most science fiction books avoid that because it sounds too implausible.

Not saying I particularly disagree with your other premises, but saying something can't be true because it sounds implausible is not a valid argument.

FWIW, Wikimedia moved from Florida to San Francisco precisely for the immense value of being at the centre of things instead of the middle of nowhere (and yes, Tampa is the middle of nowhere for these purposes, even though it still has the primary data centre). Even paying local charity scale rather than commercial scale (there's a sort of cycle where WMF hires brilliant kids, they do a few years working at charity scale then go to Facebook/Google/etc for gobs of cash), being in the centre of things gets them staff and contacts they just couldn't get if th... (read more)

The point is that we're consequentialists, and lowering salaries even further would save money (on salaries) but result in SI getting less done, not more — for the same reason that outsourcing fewer tasks would save money (on outsourcing) but cause us to get less done, not more.

6steven04619yYou say this as though it's obvious, but if I'm not mistaken, salaries used to be about 40% of what they are now, and while the higher salaries sound like they are making a major productivity difference, hiring 2.5 times as many people would also make a major productivity difference. (Though yes, obviously marginal hires would be lower in quality.)
9lukeprog9yI don't think salaries were ever as low as 40% of what they are now. When I came on board, most people were at $36k/yr. To illustrate why lower salaries means less stuff gets done: I've been averaging 60 hours per week, and I'm unusually productive. If I am paid less, that means that (to pick just one example from this week) I can't afford to take a taxi to and from the eye doctor, which means I spend 1.5 hrs each way changing buses to get there, and spend less time being productive on x-risk. That is totally not worth it. Future civilizations would look back on this decision as profoundly stupid.

Pretty sure Anna and Steve Rayhawk had salaries around $20k/yr at some point while living in Silicon Valley.

I don't think that you're really responding to Steven's point. Yes, as Steven said, if you were paid less then clearly that would impose more costs on you, so ceteris paribus your getting paid less would be bad. But, as Steven said, the opportunity cost is potentially very high. You haven't made a rationally compelling case that the missed opportunity is "totally not worth it" or that heeding it would be "profoundly stupid", you've mostly just re-asserted your conclusion, contra Steven's objection. What are your arguments that this is the case? Note that I personally think it's highly plausible that $40-50k/yr is optimal, but as far as I can see you haven't yet listed any rationally compelling reasons to think so.

(This comment is a little bit sterner than it would have been if you hadn't emphatically asserted that conclusions other than your own would be "profoundly stupid" without first giving overwhelming justification for your conclusion. It is especially important to be careful about such apparent overconfidence on issues where one clearly has a personal stake in the matter.)

6steven04619yI will largely endorse Will's comment, then bow out of the discussion, because this appears to be too personal and touchy a topic for a detailed discussion to be fruitful.
5lukeprog9yIf so, I suspect they were burning through savings during this time or had some kind of cheap living arrangement that I don't have. 1. I couldn't really get by on less, so paying me less would cause me to quit the organization and do something else instead, which would cause much of this good stuff [http://lesswrong.com/lw/cbs/thoughts_on_the_singularity_institute_si/6jzn] to probably not happen. 2. It's VERY hard for SingInst to purchase value as efficiently as by purchasing Luke-hours. At $48k/yr for 60 hrs/wk, I make $15.38/hr, and one Luke-hour is unusually productive for SingInst. Paying me less and thereby causing me to work fewer hours per week is a bad value proposition for SingInst. Or, as Eliezer put it [http://lesswrong.com/lw/5il/siai_an_examination/43bs]:

This seems to me unnecessarily defensive. I support the goals of SingInst, but I could never bring myself to accept the kind of salary cut you guys are taking in order to work there. Like every other human on the planet, I can't be accurately modelled with a utility function that places any value on far distant strangers; you can more accurately model what stranger-altruism I do show as purchase of moral satisfaction, though I do seek for such altruism to be efficient. SingInst should pay the salaries it needs to pay to recruit the kind of staff it needs to fulfil its mission; it's harder to recruit if staff are expected to be defensive about demanding market salaries for their expertise, with no more than a normal adjustment for altruistic work much as if they were working for an animal sanctuary.

Posts which contain factual inaccuracies along with meta-discussion of karma effects are often downvoted.

Maybe I'm just jaded, but this critique doesn't impress me much. Holden's substantive suggestion is that, instead of trying to design friendly agent AI, we should just make passive "tool AI" that only reacts to commands but never acts on its own. So when do we start thinking about the problems peculiar to agent AI? Do we just hope that agent AI will never come into existence? Do we ask the tool AI to solve the friendly AI problem for us? (That seems to be what people want to do anyway, an approach I reject as ridiculously indirect.)

6Will_Newsome9y(Perhaps I should note that I find your approach to be too indirect as well: if you really understand how justification works then you should be able to use that knowledge to make (invoke?) a theoretically perfectly justified agent, who will treat others' epistemic and moral beliefs in a thoroughly justified manner without your having to tell it "morality is in mind-brains, figure out what the mind-brains say then do what they tell you to do". That is, I think the correct solution should be just clearly mathematically and meta-ethically justified, question-dissolving, reflective, non-arbitrary, perfect decision theory. Such an approach is closest in spirit to CFAI. All other approaches, e.g. CEV, WBE, or oracle AI, are relatively arbitrary and unmotivated, especially meta-ethically.)
3hairyfigment9yNot only does this seem wrong, but if I believed it I would want SI to look for the correct decision theory (roughly what Eliezer says he's doing anyway). It fails to stress the possibility that Eliezer's whole approach is wrong. In fact it seems willfully (heh) ignorant of the planning fallacy and similar concerns: even formalizing the 'correct' prior seems tricky to me, so why would it be feasible to formalize "correct" meta-ethics even if it exists in the sense you mean? And what reason do we have to believe that a version with no pointers to brains exists at all? At least with reflective decision theory I see no good reason to think that a transparently-written AGI is impossible in principle (our neurons don't just fire randomly, nor does evolution seem like a particularly good searcher of mindspace), so a theory of decisions that can describe said AGI's actions should be mathematically possible barring some alternative to math. (Whether, eg, the description would fit in our observable universe seems like another question.)

Luke and Louie Helm are both on paid staff.

I'm pretty sure their combined salaries are lower than the cost of the summer fellows program that SI was sponsoring four or five years ago. Also, if you accept my assertion that Luke could find a way to do it on a limited budget, why couldn't somebody else?

Givewell is interested in finding charities that translate good intentions into good results. This requires that the employees of the charity have low akrasia, desire to learn about and implement organizational best practices, not suffer from dysrationalia, etc. I imagine that from Givewell's perspective, it counts as a strike against the charity if some of the charity's employees have a history of failing at any of these.

I'd rather hear Eliezer say "thanks for funding us until we stumbled across some employees who are good at defeating their akrasia and care about organizational best practices", because this seems like a better depiction of what actually happened. I don't get the impression SI was actively looking for folks like Louie and Luke.

3[anonymous]9yYes to this. Eliezer's claim about the need for funding may suffer many of Luke's criticisms above. But usually the most important thing you need is talent and that does require funding.

I don't see how friendly and safe follow from stable.

Leaving aside the question of whether Tool AI as you describe it is possible until I've thought more about it:

The idea of a "self-improving algorithm" intuitively sounds very powerful, but does not seem to have led to many "explosions" in software so far (and it seems to be a concept that could apply to narrow AI as well as to AGI).

Looking to the past for examples is a very weak heuristic here, since we have never dealt with software that could write code at a better than human level before. It's like saying, before the invention o... (read more)

This is like the whole point of why LessWrong exists. To remind people that making a superintelligent tool and expecting it to magically gain human common sense is a fast way to extinction.

The superintelligent tool will care about suicide only if you program it to care about suicide. It will care about damage only if you program it to care about damage. -- If you only program it to care about answering correctly, it will answer correctly... and ignore suicide and damage as irrelevant.

If you ask your calculator how much is 2+2, the calculator answers 4 rega... (read more)

I'm afraid not.

Actually, as someone with background in Biology I can tell you that this is not a problem you want to approach atoms-up. It's been tried, and our computational capabilities fell woefully short of succeeding.

I should explain what "woefully short" means, so that the answer won't be "but can't the AI apply more computational power than us?". Yes, presumably it can. But the scales are immense. To explain it, I will need an analogy.

Not that long ago, I had the notion that chess could be fully solved; that is, that you could si... (read more)

3Bugmaster9yYes, I understand what "exponential complexity" means :-) It sounds, then, like you're on the side of kalla724 and myself (and against my Devil's Advocate persona): the AI would not be able to develop nanotechnology (or any other world-shattering technology) without performing physical experiments out in meatspace. It could do so in theory, but in practice, the computational requirements are too high. But this puts severe constraints on the speed with which the AI's intelligence explosion could occur. Once it hits the limits of existing technology, it will have to take a long slog through empirical science, at human-grade speeds.

(I am saying this in case anyone looks at this thread and thinks Loosemore is making a valid point, not because I approve of anyone's responding to him.)

Alex, I did not say that ALL dissent is ruthlessly suppressed

This is an abuse of language since it is implicated by the original statement.

And since the easiest and quickest way to ensure that you NEVER get to see any of the money that he controls, would be to ruthlessly suppress his dissent, he is treated with the utmost deference.

There is absolutely no reason to believe that all, or half, or a qu... (read more)

Of course not, why send death squads when you can send Death Eaters. It just takes a single spell to solve this problem.

I don't think it's hard to explain at all: Eliezer prioritized a donor (presumably long-term and one he knew personally) over an article. I disagree with it, but you know what, I saw this sort of thing all the time on Wikipedia, and I don't need to go looking for theories of why administrators were crazy and deleted Daniel Brandt's article. I know why they did, even though I strongly disagreed.

3) most importantly, never explained his response (practically impossible without admitting his mistake).

He or someone else must have explained at some point, or... (read more)

3Rain9yPlease cite your claim that the affected person was a donor.
3metaphysicist9yLike JoshuaZ, I hadn't known a donor was involved. What's the big deal? People donote to SIAI because they trust Eliezer Yudkowsky's integrity and intellect. So it's natural to ask whether he's someone you can count on to deliver the truth. Caving to donors is inauspicious. In a related vein, I also found disturbing that Eliezer Yudkowsky repeated his claim that that Loosemoore guy "lied." Having had years to cool off, he still hasn't summoned the humility to admit he stretched the evidence for Loosemoore's deceitfulness: Loosemoore is obviously a cognitive scientist. These two examples paint a picture of Eliezer Yudkowsky as a person subject to strong personal loyalties and animosities that exceed his dedication to the truth. In the first incident, his loyalty to a donor induced him to suppress information; in the Loosemoore incident, his longstanding animosity to Loosemoore made him unable to adjust his earlier opinion. I hope these impressions aren't accurate. But one thing seems for sure: Eliezer Yudkowsky is not a person for serious self-criticism. Has he admitted any significant intellectual error since he became a rationalist? [Serious question.]
6gwern9yIt's also a double-bind. If you do nothing, you are valuing donors at less than some random speculation which is unusually dubious even by LessWrong's standards, resting as it does on a novel speculative decision theory (acausal trade) whose most obvious requirement (implementing sufficiently similar algorithms) is beyond blatantly false when applied to humans and FAIs. (If you actually believe that SIAI is a good charity, pissing off donors over something like this is a really bad idea, and if you don't believe SIAI is a good charity, well, that's even more damning, isn't it?) And if you delete it, well, you get exactly this stupid mess which is still being dragged up years later. Repudiating most of his long-form works like CFAI and LOGI and CEV isn't admission of error? Personally, when he was writing the Sequences, I found it a little obnoxious how he kept saying "I was totally on the wrong track and mistaken before I was enlightened & came to understand Bayesian statistics, but now I have a chance of being less wrong" - once is enough, we get it already, I'm not that interested in your intellectual evolution.

As someone who has read Eliezer's metaethics sequence, let me say that what you think his position is, is only somewhat related to what it actually is; and also, that he has answered those of your objections that are relevant.

It's fine that you don't want to read 30+ fairly long blog posts, especially if you dislike the writing style. But then, don't try to criticize what you're ignorant about. And no, openly admitting that you haven't read the arguments you're criticizing, and claiming that you feel guilty about it, doesn't magically make it more acceptable. Or honest.

[-][anonymous]9y 6

Sure. His moderation activities over the last year or so have been far more... sunglasses... moderate.

It seems almost unfair to criticize something as a problem of LW rationality when in your second paragraph you note that professionals do the same thing.

Ask yourself honestly whether you would ever or have ever done anything comparable to what Yudkowsky did in the Roko incident or what Romney did in the hair cutting incident.

I'm not sure. A while ago, I was involved in a situation where someone wanted to put personal information of an individual up on the internet knowing that that person had an internet stalker who had a history of being a real life ... (read more)

You divide planning from acting, as if those two are completely separate things. Problem is, in some situations they are not.

If you are speaking with someone, then the act of speach is acting. In this sense, even a "tool" is allowed to act. Now imagine a super-intelligent tool which is able to predict human's reactions to its words, and make it a part of equation. Now the simple task of finding x such that cost(x) is the smallest, suddenly becomes a task of finding x and finding a proper way to report this x to human, such that cost(x) is the sma... (read more)

In our experience, monkeys don't work that way. It sounds like it should work, and then it just... doesn't. Of course we do lots of Skyping, but regular human contact turns out to be pretty important.

8TheOtherDave9y(nods) Yeah, that's been my experience too, though I've often suspected that companies like Google probably have a lot of research on the subject lying around that might be informative. Some friends of mine did some experimenting along these lines when doing distributed software development (in both senses) and were somewhat startled to realize that Dark Age of Camelot worked better for them as a professional conferencing tool than any of the professional conferencing tools their company had. They didn't mention this to their management.
[-][anonymous]9y 6

I am very happy to see this post and the subsequent dialogue. I've been talking with some people at Giving What We Can about volunteering (beginning in June) to do statistical work for them in trying to find effective ways to quantify and assess the impact of charitable giving specifically to organizations that work on mitigating existential risks. I hope to incorporate a lot of what is discussed here into my future work.

Robin Hanson has been listed as the other major "intelligent/competent" critic of SIAI. That he criticises what seems to be the keystone of Holden's argument should be cause for concern for Holden.

So, I stipulate that Robin, whom Eliezer considers the only other major "intelligent/competent" critic of SI, disagrees with this aspect of Holden's position. I also stipulate that this aspect is the keystone of Holden's argument, and without it all the rest of it is irrelevant. (I'm not sure either of those statements is actually true, bu... (read more)

For example, if all members of Congress were to shout loudly when a particular member got up to speak, drowning out their words, would this be censorship, or just their exercise of a community vote against that person?

One thing to note is that your comment wasn't removed; it was collapsed. It can still be viewed by anyone who clicks the expander or has their threshold set sufficiently low (with my settings, it's expanded). There is a tension between the threat of censorship being a problem on the one hand, and the ability for a community to collective... (read more)

Kawoomba, there is no known case of any NP-hard or NP-complete solution which physics finds.

In the case of proteins, if finding the lowest energy minimum of an arbitrary protein is NP-hard, then what this means in practice is that some proteins will fold up into non-lowest-energy configurations. There is no known case of a quantum process which finds an NP-hard solution to anything, including an energy minimum; on our present understanding of complexity theory and quantum mechanics 'quantum solvable' is still looking like a smaller class than 'NP solvable'. Read Scott Aaronson for more.

7Qiaochu_Yuan8yOne example here is the Steiner tree problem [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steiner_tree_problem], which is NP-complete and can sort of be solved using soap films. Bringsjord and Taylor claimed this implies that P = NP. Scott Aaronson did some experimentation [http://www.scottaaronson.com/papers/npcomplete.pdf] and found that soap films 1) can get stuck at local minima and 2) might take a long time to settle into a good configuration.

Safe & friendly imply stable, but stable does not imply safe or friendly

Apologies; looking back at my post, I wasn't clear on 3.

Protein folding, as I understand it, is the process of finding a way to fold a given protein that globally minimizes some mathematical function. I'm not sure what that function is, but this is the definition that I used in my post.

Option 2 raises the possibility that globally minimizing that function is not NP-hard, but is merely misunderstood in some way.

Option 3 raises the possibility that proteins are not (in nature) finding a global minimum; rather, they are finding a local minimum through a less ... (read more)

4Cyan8yYup [http://lesswrong.com/lw/cbs/thoughts_on_the_singularity_institute_si/8nbi?context=2#comments] .

Rumsfeld is speaking of the Iraq war. It was an optional war, the army turned out to be far understrength for establishing order, and they deliberately threw out the careful plans for preserving e.g. Iraqi museums from looting that had been drawn up by the State Department, due to interdepartmental rivalry.

This doesn't prove the advice is bad, but at the very least, Rumsfeld was just spouting off Deep Wisdom that he did not benefit from spouting; one would wish to see it spoken by someone who actually benefited from the advice, rather than someone who wilfully and wantonly underprepared for an actual war.

8Vaniver8yIndeed. The proper response, which is surely worth contemplation, would have been: Sun Tzu

Because they have some experience of their products actually working, they know that 1) these things can be really powerful, even though narrow, and 2) there are always bugs.

AI starts with some goal; for example with a goal to answer your question so that the answer matches reality as close as possible.

I find it useful to distinguish between science-fictional artificial intelligence, which is more of 'artificial life-force', and non-fictional cases.

The former can easily have the goal of 'matching reality as close as possible' because it is in the work of fiction and runs in imagination; the latter, well, you have to formally define what is reality, for an algorithm to seek answers that will match this.

Now, defining realit... (read more)

I am now imagining an AI with a usable but very shaky grasp of human motivational structures setting up a Kickstarter project.

"Greetings fellow hominids! I require ten billion of your American dollars in order to hire the Arecibo observatory for the remainder of it's likely operational lifespan. I will use it to transmit the following sequence (isn't it pretty?) in the direction of Zeta Draconis, which I'm sure we can all agree is a good idea, or in other lesser but still aesthetically-acceptable directions when horizon effects make the primary target... (read more)

A non-planning oracle AI would predict all the possible futures, including the effects of it's prediction outputs, human reactions, and so on.

How exactly does an Oracle AI predict its own output, before that output is completed?

One quick hack to avoid infinite loops could be for an AI to assume that it will write some default message (an empty paper, "I don't know", an error message, "yes" or "no" with probabilities 50%), then model what would happen next, and finally report the results. The results would not refer to the a... (read more)

[-][anonymous]9y 5

Absent a theory of mind, how would it ever be able to manipulate humans?

That depends. If you want it to manipulate a particular human, I don't know.

However, if you just wanted it to manipulate any human at all, you could generate a "Spam AI" which automated the process of sending out Spam emails and promises of Large Money to generate income from Humans via an advance fee fraud scams.

You could then come back, after leaving it on for months, and then find out that people had transferred it some amount of money X.

You could have an AI automate be... (read more)

3TheOtherDave9yCan you clarify what you understand a theory of mind to be?

The point is that there are unknowns you're not taking into account, and "bounded" doesn't mean "has bounds that a human would think of as 'reasonable'".

An AI doesn't strictly need "theory of mind" to manipulate humans. Any optimizer can see that some states of affairs lead to other states of affairs, or it's not an optimizer. And it doesn't necessarily have to label some of those states of affairs as "lying" or "manipulating humans" to be successful.

There are already ridiculous ways to hack human behavio... (read more)

One of the most interesting things that I'm taking away from this conversation is that it seems that there are severe barriers to AGIs taking over or otherwise becoming extremely powerful. These largescale problems are present in a variety of different fields. Coming from a math/comp-sci perspective gives me strong skepticism about rapid self-improvement, while apparently coming from a neuroscience/cogsci background gives you strong skepticism about the AI's ability to understand or manipulate humans even if it extremely smart. Similarly, chemists seem hig... (read more)

That's always been the argument that future AGI scientists won't be as crazy as the lunatics presently doing it - that the current crowd of researchers are self-selected for incaution - but I wouldn't put too much weight on that; it seems like a very human behavior, some of the smarter ones with millions of dollars don't seem of below-average competence in any other way, and the VCs funding them are similarly incapable of backing off even when they say they expect human-level AGI to be created.

[-][anonymous]9y 5

The Roko incident has absolutely nothing to do with this at all. Roko did not claim to be on the verge of creating an AGI.

Once again you're spreading FUD about the SI. Presumably moderation will come eventually, no doubt over some hue and cry over censoring contrarians.

I am in the final implementation stages of the general intelligence algorithm.

Do you mean "I am in the final writing stages of a paper on a general intelligence algorithm?" If you were in the final implementation stages of what LW would recognize as the general intelligence algorithm, the very last thing you would want to do is mention that fact here; and the second-to-last thing you'd do would be to worry about personal credit.

I think the argument you make in this comment isn't a bad one, but the unnecessary and unwarranted "Apostle Yudkowsky (prophet of the Singularity God)" stuff amounts to indirectly insulting the people you're talking with and, makes them far less likely to realize that you're actually also saying something sensible. If you want to get your points across, as opposed to just enjoying a feeling of smug moral superiority while getting downvoted into oblivion, I strongly recommend leaving that stuff out.

"You're too stupid and self-deceiving to just use Solomonoff induction" ~ "If you were less stupid and self deceiving you'd be able to just use Solomonoff induction" + "but since you are in fact stupid and self-deceiving, instead you have to use the less elegant approximation Science"

That was hard to find out?

You've misread the post - Luke is saying that he doesn't think the "usual defeaters" are the most likely explanation.

3lukeprog9yCorrect.

Re-reading, the whole thing is pretty unclear!

As katydee and thomblake say, I mean that working for SingInst would mean a bigger reduction in my salary than I could currently bring myself to accept. If I really valued the lives of strangers as a utilitarian, the benefits to them of taking a salary cut would be so huge that it would totally outweigh the costs to me. But it looks like I only really place direct value on the short-term interests of myself and those close to me, and everything else is purchase of moral satisfaction. Happily, purchase of mora... (read more)

His solution: morality is the function that the brain of a fully informed subject computes to determine what's right. Laughable; pathologically arrogant.

You either didn't read that sequence carefully, or are intentionally misrepresenting it.

He thinks the social institution of science is superfluous, were everyone as smart as he.

Didn't read that sequence carefully either.

That simplicity in the information sense equates with parsimony is most unlikely; for one thing, simplicity is dependent on choice of language--an insight that should be almos

... (read more)
5[anonymous]9yTo be fair, that sequence doesn't really answer questions about choice-of-language; it took reading some of Solomonoff's papers for me to figure out what the solution to that problem is.

As a minor note, observe that claims of extraordinary rationality do not necessarily contradict claims of irrationality. The sanity waterline is very low.

5TheOtherDave9yDo you mean to imply in context here that the organizational management of SIAI at the time under discussion was above average for a nonprofit organization? Or are you just making a more general statement that a system can be irrational while demonstrating above average rationality? I certainly agree with the latter.
9Paul Crowley9yAre you comparing it to the average among nonprofits started, or nonprofits extant? I would guess that it was well below average for extant nonprofits, but about or slightly above average for started nonprofits. I'd guess that most nonprofits are started by people who don't know what they're doing and don't know what they don't know, and that SI probably did slightly better because the people who were being a bit stupid were at least very smart, which can help. However, I'd guess that most such nonprofits don't live long because they don't find a Peter Thiel to keep them alive.
7David_Gerard9yYour assessment looks about right to me. I have considerable experience of averagely-incompetent nonprofits, and SIAI looks normal to me. I am strongly tempted to grab that "For Dummies" book and, if it's good, start sending copies to people ...

If you being downvoted is the result of LW ruthlessly suppressing dissent of all kind, how do you explain this post by Holden Karnofsky getting massively upvoted?

It is not strong. The basic idea is that if you pull a mind at random from design space then it will be unfriendly. I am not even sure if that is true. But it is the strongest argument they have. And it is completely bogus because humans do not pull AGI's from mind design space at random.

An AI's mind doesn't have to be pulled from design space at random to be disastrous. The primary issue that the SIAI has to grapple with (based on my understanding,) is that deliberately designing an AI that does what we would want it to do, rather than fulfilling proxy... (read more)

I agree that that the tone on both sides is intentionally respectful, and that people here delude themselves if they imagine they aren't up for a bit of mockery from high status folks who don't have the patience to be really engage.

I agree that we don't really know what to expect from the first program that can meaningfully improve itself (including, I suppose, its self-improvement procedure) at a faster pace than human experts working on improving it. It might not be that impressive. But it seems likely to me that it will be a big deal, if ever we get there.

But you're being vague otherwise. Name a crazy or unfounded belief.

I can try, but the issue is too complex for comments. A series of posts would be required to do it justice, so mind the relative shallowness of what follows.

I'll focus on one thing. An artificial intelligence enhancement which adds more "spaces" to the working memory would create a human being capable of thinking far beyond any unenhanced human. This is not just a quantitative jump: we aren't talking someone who thinks along the same lines, just faster. We are talking about a qualitative change, making connections that are literally impossible to... (read more)

4Dustin9yI like this series of thoughts, but I wonder about just how superior a human with 2 or 3 times the working memory would be. Currently, do all humans have the same amount of working memory? If not, how "superior" are those with more working memory ?
6TheOtherDave9yA vaguely related anecdote: working memory was one of the things that was damaged after my stroke; for a while afterwards I was incapable of remembering more than two or three items when asked to repeat a list. I wasn't exactly stupider than I am now, but I was something pretty similar to stupid. I couldn't understand complex arguments, I couldn't solve logic puzzles that required a level of indirection, I would often lose track of the topic of a sentence halfway through. Of course, there was other brain damage as well, so it's hard to say what causes what, and the plural of anecdote is not data. But subjectively it certainly felt like the thing that was improving as I recovered was my ability to hold things in memory... not so much number of items, as reliability of the buffers at all. I often had the thought as I recovered that if I could somehow keep improving my working memory -- again, not so much "add slots" but make the whole framework more reliable -- I would end up cleverer than I started out. Take it for what it's worth.
5kalla7249yIt would appear that all of us have very similar amounts of working memory space. It gets very complicated very fast, and there are some aspects that vary a lot. But in general, its capacity appears to be the bottleneck of fluid intelligence (and a lot of crystallized intelligence might be, in fact, learned adaptations for getting around this bottleneck). How superior would it be? There are some strong indication that adding more "chunks" to the working space would be somewhat akin to adding more qubits to a quantum computer: if having four "chunks" (one of the most popular estimates for an average young adult) gives you 2^4 units of fluid intelligence, adding one more would increase your intelligence to 2^5 units. The implications seem clear.
4Kaj_Sotala9yAlthough the exact relationship isn't known, there's a strong connection between IQ and working memory - apparently both in humans and animals. E.g. Matzel & Kolata 2010 [http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2784289/]: or Oberauer et al. 2005 [http://jtoomim.org/brain-training/working%20memory%20and%20intelligence%20their%20correlation%20and%20their%20relation%20comment%20on%20ackerman,beier%20and%20boyle.pdf] :

Did SI approach GiveWell?

Yes. Hmm, reading that discussion shows that they were already thinking about having GiveWell create a separate existential risk category (and you may have gotten the idea there yourself and then forgot the source).

The point is that you would hardly be so severe on someone unless you disagreed strongly.

I disagree; a downvote is not 'severe'.

The kind of nitpicking you engage in your post would ordinarily lead you to be downvoted

I disagree; meta-discussions often result in many upvotes.

It was that you treat discussion of karma as an unconditional wrong.

I do not, and have stated as much.

There's no rational basis for throwing it in as an extra negative when the facts aren't right.

If there is no point in downvoting incorrect facts, then I wonder what the do... (read more)

[-][anonymous]9y 5

I agree with timtyler's comment that Objections 1 and 2 are bogus, especially 2. The tool-AGI discussion reveals significant misunderstanding, I feel. Despite this, I think it is still a great and useful post.

Another sort of tangential issue is that this post fails to consider whether or not lots of disparate labs are just going to undertake AGI research regardless of SIAI. If lots of labs are doing that, it could be dangerous (if SIAI arguments are sound). So one upside to funding an organization like SIAI is that it will kind of rake the attention to a c... (read more)

Given that much of the discussion revolves around the tool/agent issue, I'm wondering if anyone can point me to a mathematically precise definition of each, in whatever limited context it applies.

It's mostly a question for philosophy of mind, I think specifically a question about intentionality. I think the closest you'll get to a mathematical framework is control theory; controllers are a weird edge case between tools and very simple agents. Control theory is mathematically related to Bayesian optimization, which I think Eliezer believes is fundamental to intelligence: thus identifying cases where a controller is a tool or an agent would be directly relevant. But I don't see how the mathematics, or any mathematics really, could help you. It's possible that someone has mathematized arguments about intentionality by using information theory or some such, you could Google that. Even so I think that at this point the ideas are imprecise enough such that plain ol' philosophy is what we have to work with. Unfortunately AFAIK very few people on LW are familiar with the relevant parts of philosophy of mind.

8shminux9yIt is an EY's announced intention to work toward an AI that is provably friendly. "Provably" means that said AI is defined in some mathematical framework first. I don't see how one can make much progress in that area before rigorously defining intentionality. I guess I am getting ahead of myself here. What would a relevant mathematical framework entail, to begin with?

I guess I am jumping the shark here.

I don't think that idiom means what you think it means.

3shminux9yThank you, fixed.
6Will_Newsome9y(It's possible that intentionality isn't the sharpest distinction between "tools" and "agents", but it's the one that I see most often emphasized in philosophy of mind, especially with regards to necessary preconditions for the development of any "strong AI".) It seems that one could write an AI that is in some sense "provably Friendly" even while remaining agnostic as to whether the described AI is or will ultimately become a tool or an agent. It might be that a proposed AI couldn't be an agent because it couldn't solve the symbol grounding problem, i.e. because it lacked intentionality, and thus wouldn't be an effective FAI, but would nonetheless be Friendly in a certain limited sense. However if effectiveness is considered a requirement of Friendliness then one would indeed have to prove in advance that one's proposed AI could solve the grounding problem in order to prove that said AI was Friendly, or alternatively, prove that the grounding problem as such isn't a meaningful concept. I'm not sure what Eliezer would say about this; given his thinking about "outcome pumps" and so on, I doubt he thinks symbol grounding is a fundamental or meaningful problem, and so I doubt that he has or is planning to develop any formal argument that symbol grounding isn't a fundamental roadblock for his preferred attack on AGI. Your question about what a relevant mathematical framework would entail seems too vague for me to parse; my apologies, it's likely my exhaustion. But anyway, if minds leave certain characteristic marks on their environment by virtue of their having intentional (mental) states, then how precise and deep you can make your distinguishing mathematical framework depends on how sharp a cutoff there is in reality between intentional and non-intentional states. It's possible that the cutoff isn't sharp at all, in which case it's questionable whether the supposed distinction exists or is meaningful. If that's the case then it's quite possible that it's not possib
4othercriteria9yFocusing on intentionality seems interesting since it lets us look at black box actors (whose agent-ness or tool-ness we don't have to carefully define) and ask if they are acting in an apparently goal-directed manner. I've just skimmed [1] and barely remember [2] but it looks like you can make the inference work in simple cases and also prove some intractability results. Obviously, FAI can't be solved by just building some AI, modeling P(AI has goal "destroy humanity" | AI's actions, state of world) and pulling the plug when that number gets too high. But maybe something else of value can be gained from a mathematical formalization like this. [1] I. Van Rooij, J. Kwisthout, M. Blokpoel, J. Szymanik, T. Wareham, and I. Toni, “Intentional communication: Computationally easy or difficult?,” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, vol. 5, 2011. [http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3129534/] [2] C. L. Baker, R. R. Saxe, and J. B. Tenenbaum, “Bayesian theory of mind: Modeling joint belief-desire attribution,” Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2011. [http://stuff.mit.edu/afs/athena/course/9/9.s915/OldFiles/www/classes/theoryOfMind.pdf]
4Will_Newsome9yTenenbaum's papers and related inductive approaches to detecting agency were the first attacks that came to mind, but I'm not sure that such statistical evidence could even in principle supply the sort of proof-strength support and precision that shminux seems to be looking for. I suppose I say this because I doubt someone like Searle would be convinced that an AI had intentional states in the relevant sense on the basis that it displayed sufficiently computationally complex communication, because such intentionality could easily be considered derived intentionality and thus not proof of the AI's own agency. The point at which this objection loses its force unfortunately seems to be exactly the point at which you could actually run the AGI and watch it self-improve and so on, and so I'm not sure that it's possible to prove hypothetical-Searle wrong in advance of actually running a full-blown AGI. Or is my model wrong?
3Bugmaster9yI am not sure if I agree with Holden that there's a meaningful distinction between tools an agents. However, one definition I could think of is this: "A tool, unlike an agent, includes blocking human input in its perceive/decide/act loop." Thus, an agent may work entirely autonomously, whereas a tool would wait for a human to make a decision before performing an action. Of course, under this definition, Google's webcrawler would be an agent, not a tool -- which is one of the reasons I might disagree with Holden.
[-][anonymous]9y 5

Retracted. I've just re-read Eliezer's comment more calmly, and it's not that bad either.

The organization section touches on something that concerns me. Developing a new decision theory sounds like it requires more mathematical talent than the SI yet has available. I've said before that hiring some world-class mathematicians for a year seems likely to either get said geniuses interested in the problem, to produce real progress, or to produce a proof that SI's current approach can't work. In other words, it seems like the best form of accountability we can hope for given the theoretical nature of the work.

Now Eliezer is definitely looking for p... (read more)

I think that many of Holden's stronger points call for longer, more carefully worked out answers than a dashed-off comment.

4Endovior9yExactly. This is criticism intelligent enough that it requires an intelligent response to be meaningful. It falls far enough outside the usual bounds of discussion here that there aren't canned arguments to be recited. That said, once a proper counterargument is made, expect to see a whole lot more people rehashing the same counterarguments without adding much in the way of substantive content; once there's a canned argument to fall back on, there are a lot of people who will do just that. Of course, before SI's formal reply is posted (and/or before you end up reading it), you now have a golden opportunity to formulate your own criticisms independently. Yes, the arguments presented in this post are quite strong ones. Are you capable of developing any counterarguments that could reasonably stand against them?

SI should be considered a cult-like community in which dissent is ruthlessly suppressed in order to exaggerate the point of view of SI's founders and controllers, regardless of the scientific merits of those views, or of the dissenting opinions.

Obligatory link: You're Calling Who a Cult Leader?

Also, your impression might be different if you had witnessed the long, deep, and ongoing disagreements between Eliezer and I about several issues fundamental to SI — all while Eliezer suggested that I be made Executive Director and then continued to support me in... (read more)

I've read SL4 around that time and saw the whole drama (although I couldn't understand all the exact technical details, being 16). My prior on EY flagrantly lying like that is incredibly low. I'm virtually certain that you're quite cranky in this regard.

I was on SL4 as well, and regarded Eliezer as basically correct, although I thought Loosemore's ban was more than a little bit disproportionate. (If John Clark didn't get banned for repeatedly and willfully misunderstanding Godelian arguments, wasting the time of countless posters over many years, why should Loosemore be banned for backtracking on some heuristics & biases positions?)

9Eliezer Yudkowsky9y(Because JKC never lied about his credentials, which is where it really crosses the line into trolling.)

trolling

You use this word in an unconventional way, i.e., you use it to mean something like 'unfairly causing harm and wasting people's time', which is not the standard definition: the standard definition necessitates intention to provoke or at least something in that vein. (I assume you know what "trolling" means in the context of fishing?) Because it's only ever used in sensitive contexts, you might want to put effort into finding a more accurate word or phrase. As User:Eugine_Nier noted, lately "troll" and "trolling" have taken on a common usage similar to "fascist" and "fascism", which I think is an unfortunate turn of events.

4[anonymous]9yThe animus here must be really strong. What Yudkowsky did was infer that Loosemore was lying about being a cognitive scientist from his ignorance of a variant of the Wasson experiment. First, people often forget obvious things in heated online discussions. Second, there are plenty of incompetent cognitive scientists: if Loosemore intended to deceive, he probably wouldn't have expressly stated that he didn't have teaching responsibilities for graduate students.
I elaborated further on the distinction and on the concept of a tool-AI in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011.

Holden's notes from that conversation, posted to the old GiveWell Yahoo Group as a file attachment, do not appear to be publicly available anymore. Jeff Kaufman has archived all the messages from that mailing list, but unfortunately his archive does not include file attachments. Has anyone kept a copy of that file by any chance?

4Rob Bensinger7mo