Why do some societies exhibit more antisocial punishment than others? Martin explores both some literature on the subject, and his own experience living in a country where "punishment of cooperators" was fairly common.

William_S1dΩ561157
17
I worked at OpenAI for three years, from 2021-2024 on the Alignment team, which eventually became the Superalignment team. I worked on scalable oversight, part of the team developing critiques as a technique for using language models to spot mistakes in other language models. I then worked to refine an idea from Nick Cammarata into a method for using language model to generate explanations for features in language models. I was then promoted to managing a team of 4 people which worked on trying to understand language model features in context, leading to the release of an open source "transformer debugger" tool. I resigned from OpenAI on February 15, 2024.
habryka19h3616
3
Does anyone have any takes on the two Boeing whistleblowers who died under somewhat suspicious circumstances? I haven't followed this in detail, and my guess is it is basically just random chance, but it sure would be a huge deal if a publicly traded company now was performing assassinations of U.S. citizens.  Curious whether anyone has looked into this, or has thought much about baseline risk of assassinations or other forms of violence from economic actors.
Thomas Kwa10hΩ617-5
7
You should update by +-1% on AI doom surprisingly frequently This is just a fact about how stochastic processes work. If your p(doom) is Brownian motion in 1% steps starting at 50% and stopping once it reaches 0 or 1, then there will be about 50^2=2500 steps of size 1%. This is a lot! If we get all the evidence for whether humanity survives or not uniformly over the next 10 years, then you should make a 1% update 4-5 times per week. In practice there won't be as many due to heavy-tailedness in the distribution concentrating the updates in fewer events, and the fact you don't start at 50%. But I do believe that evidence is coming in every week such that ideal market prices should move by 1% on maybe half of weeks, and it is not crazy for your probabilities to shift by 1% during many weeks if you think about it.
Dalcy1d356
1
Thoughtdump on why I'm interested in computational mechanics: * one concrete application to natural abstractions from here: tl;dr, belief structures generally seem to be fractal shaped. one major part of natural abstractions is trying to find the correspondence between structures in the environment and concepts used by the mind. so if we can do the inverse of what adam and paul did, i.e. 'discover' fractal structures from activations and figure out what stochastic process they might correspond to in the environment, that would be cool * ... but i was initially interested in reading compmech stuff not with a particular alignment relevant thread in mind but rather because it seemed broadly similar in directions to natural abstractions. * re: how my focus would differ from my impression of current compmech work done in academia: academia seems faaaaaar less focused on actually trying out epsilon reconstruction in real world noisy data. CSSR is an example of a reconstruction algorithm. apparently people did compmech stuff on real-world data, don't know how good, but effort-wise far too less invested compared to theory work * would be interested in these reconstruction algorithms, eg what are the bottlenecks to scaling them up, etc. * tangent: epsilon transducers seem cool. if the reconstruction algorithm is good, a prototypical example i'm thinking of is something like: pick some input-output region within a model, and literally try to discover the hmm model reconstructing it? of course it's gonna be unwieldly large. but, to shift the thread in the direction of bright-eyed theorizing ... * the foundational Calculi of Emergence paper talked about the possibility of hierarchical epsilon machines, where you do epsilon machines on top of epsilon machines and for simple examples where you can analytically do this, you get wild things like coming up with more and more compact representations of stochastic processes (eg data stream -> tree -> markov model -> stack automata -> ... ?) * this ... sounds like natural abstractions in its wildest dreams? literally point at some raw datastream and automatically build hierarchical abstractions that get more compact as you go up * haha but alas, (almost) no development afaik since the original paper. seems cool * and also more tangentially, compmech seemed to have a lot to talk about providing interesting semantics to various information measures aka True Names, so another angle i was interested in was to learn about them. * eg crutchfield talks a lot about developing a right notion of information flow - obvious usefulness in eg formalizing boundaries? * many other information measures from compmech with suggestive semantics—cryptic order? gauge information? synchronization order? check ruro1 and ruro2 for more.
Buck2dΩ31438
6
[epistemic status: I think I’m mostly right about the main thrust here, but probably some of the specific arguments below are wrong. In the following, I'm much more stating conclusions than providing full arguments. This claim isn’t particularly original to me.] I’m interested in the following subset of risk from AI: * Early: That comes from AIs that are just powerful enough to be extremely useful and dangerous-by-default (i.e. these AIs aren’t wildly superhuman). * Scheming: Risk associated with loss of control to AIs that arises from AIs scheming * So e.g. I exclude state actors stealing weights in ways that aren’t enabled by the AIs scheming, and I also exclude non-scheming failure modes. IMO, state actors stealing weights is a serious threat, but non-scheming failure modes aren’t (at this level of capability and dignity). * Medium dignity: that is, developers of these AIs are putting a reasonable amount of effort into preventing catastrophic outcomes from their AIs (perhaps they’re spending the equivalent of 10% of their budget on cost-effective measures to prevent catastrophes). * Nearcasted: no substantial fundamental progress on AI safety techniques, no substantial changes in how AI works. This subset of risk is interesting because I think it’s a natural scenario at which to target technical work on AI safety. (E.g. it’s the main scenario we’re targeting with our AI control agenda.) I claim that the majority of this risk comes from the lab using AIs internally to do AI development (by which I mean both research and engineering). This is because the AIs doing AI development naturally require access to compute and model weights that they can potentially leverage into causing catastrophic outcomes—in particular, those resources can be abused to run AIs unmonitored. Using AIs for AI development looks uniquely risky to me among applications of early-transformative AIs, because unlike all other applications I know about: * It’s very expensive to refrain from using AIs for this application. * There’s no simple way to remove affordances from the AI such that it’s very hard for the AI to take a small sequence of actions which plausibly lead quickly to loss of control. In contrast, most other applications of AI probably can be controlled just by restricting their affordances. If I’m right that the risk from scheming early-transformative models is concentrated onto this pretty specific scenario, it implies a bunch of things: * It implies that work on mitigating these risks should focus on this very specific setting. * It implies that AI control is organizationally simpler, because most applications can be made trivially controlled. * It is pretty plausible to me that AI control is quite easy, because you actually can remove affordances from the AIs that are doing AI R&D such that it’s hard for them to cause problems.

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[If you haven't come since we started meeting at Rocky Hill Cohousing, make sure to read this for more details about where to go and park.]

We're the regular Northampton area meetup for Astral Codex Ten readers, and (as far as I know) the only rationalist or EA meetup in Western Massachusetts.

We started as part of the blog's 2018 "Meetups Everywhere" event, and have been holding meetups with varying degrees of regularity ever since. At most meetups we get about 4-7 people out of a rotation of 15-20, with a nice mix of regular faces, people who only drop in once in a while, and occasionally total newcomers.

After meeting more sporadically in the past, we recently started meeting biweekly (currently every other Saturday, although there's a chance I'll...

(ElevenLabs reading of this post, if anyone can tell me how to embed the audio into Lesswrong I'd appreciate it)

I'm excited to share a project I've been working on that I think many in the Lesswrong community will appreciate - converting some rational fiction into high-quality audiobooks using cutting-edge AI voice technology from ElevenLabs, under the name "Askwho Casts AI".

The keystone of this project is an audiobook version of Planecrash (AKA Project Lawful), the epic glowfic authored by Eliezer Yudkowsky and Lintamande. Given the scope and scale of this work, with its large cast of characters, I'm using ElevenLabs to give each character their own distinct voice. It's a labor of love to convert this audiobook version of this story, and I hope if anyone has bounced...

GPT-5 training is probably starting around now. It seems very unlikely that GPT-5 will cause the end of the world. But it’s hard to be sure. I would guess that GPT-5 is more likely to kill me than an asteroid, a supervolcano, a plane crash or a brain tumor. We can predict fairly well what the cross-entropy loss will be, but pretty much nothing else.

Maybe we will suddenly discover that the difference between GPT-4 and superhuman level is actually quite small. Maybe GPT-5 will be extremely good at interpretability, such that it can recursively self improve by rewriting its own weights.

Hopefully model evaluations can catch catastrophic risks before wide deployment, but again, it’s hard to be sure. GPT-5 could plausibly be devious enough to circumvent all of...

Maybe GPT-5 will be extremely good at interpretability, such that it can recursively self improve by rewriting its own weights.

I am by no means an expert on machine learning, but this sentence reads weird to me. 

I mean, it seems possible that a part of a NN develops some self-reinforcing feature which uses the gradient descent (or whatever is used in training) to go into a particular direction and take over the NN, like a human adrift on a raft in the ocean might decide to build a sail to make the raft go into a particular direction. 

Or is that s... (read more)

2Nathan Helm-Burger13h
I absolutely sympathize, and I agree that with the world view / information you have that advocating for a pause makes sense. I would get behind 'regulate AI' or 'regulate AGI', certainly. I think though that pausing is an incorrect strategy which would do more harm than good, so despite being aligned with you in being concerned about AGI dangers, I don't endorse that strategy. Some part of me thinks this oughtn't matter, since there's approximately ~0% chance of the movement achieving that literal goal. The point is to build an anti-AGI movement, and to get people thinking about what it would be like to be able to have the government able to issue an order to pause AGI R&D, or turn off datacenters, or whatever. I think that's a good aim, and your protests probably (slightly) help that aim. I'm still hung up on the literal 'Pause AI' concept being a problem though. Here's where I'm coming from:  1. I've been analyzing the risks of current day AI. I believe (but will not offer evidence for here) current day AI is already capable of providing small-but-meaningful uplift to bad actors intending to use it for harm (e.g. weapon development). I think that having stronger AI in the hands of government agencies designed to protect humanity from these harms is one of our best chances at preventing such harms.  2. I see the 'Pause AI' movement as being targeted mostly at large companies, since I don't see any plausible way for a government or a protest movement to enforce what private individuals do with their home computers. Perhaps you think this is fine because you think that most of the future dangers posed by AI derive from actions taken by large companies or organizations with large amounts of compute. This is emphatically not my view. I think that actually more danger comes from the many independent researchers and hobbyists who are exploring the problem space. I believe there are huge algorithmic power gains which can, and eventually will, be found. I furthermore
1yanni kyriacos15h
Hi Tomás! is there a prediction market for this that you know of?
1yanni kyriacos15h
I think it is unrealistic to ask people to internalise that level of ambiguity. This is how EA's turn themselves into mental pretzels.

I say this because I can hardly use a computer without constantly getting distracted. Even when I actively try to ignore how bad software is, the suggestions keep coming.

Seriously Obsidian? You could not come up with a system where links to headings can't break? This makes you wonder what is wrong with humanity. But then I remember that humanity is building a god without knowing what they will want.

So for those of you who need to hear this: I feel you. It could be so much better. But right now, can we really afford to make the ultimate <programming language/text editor/window manager/file system/virtual collaborative environment/interface to GPT/...>?

Can we really afford to do this while our god software looks like...

May this find you well.

Dagon42m40

Agreed, but it's not just software.  It's every complex system, anything which requires detailed coordination of more than a few dozen humans and has efficiency pressure put upon it.  Software is the clearest example, because there's so much of it and it feels like it should be easy.

1Ustice5h
I don’t know about making god software, but human software is a lot of trial and error. I have been writing code for close to 40 years. The best I can do is write automated tests to anticipate the kinds of errors I might get. My imagination just isn’t as strong as reality. There is provably no way to fully predict how a software system of sufficient complexity. With careful organization it becomes easier to reason about and predict, but unless you are writing provable software (it’s a very slow and complex process, I hear), that’s the best you get. I feel you on being distracted by software bugs. I’m one of those guys that reports them, or even code change suggestions (GitHub Pull Requests).
1Johannes C. Mayer3h
I think it is incorrect to say that testing things fully formally is the only alternative to whatever the heck we are currently doing. I mean there is property-based testing as a first step (which maybe you also refer to with automated tests but I would guess you are probably mainly talking about unit tests). Maybe try Haskell or even better Idris? The Haskell compiler is very annoying until you realize that it loves you. Each time it annoys you with compile errors it actually says "Look I found this error here that I am very very sure you'd agree is an error, so let me not produce this machine code that would do things you don't want it to do". It's very bad at communicating this though, so it's words of love usually are blurted out like this: Don't bother understanding the details, they are not important. So maybe Haskell's greatest strength, being a very "noisy" compiler, is also its downfall. Nobody likes being told that they are wrong, well at least not until you understand that your goals and the compiler's goals are actually aligned. And the compiler is just better at thinking about certain kinds of things that are harder for you to think about. In Haskell, you don't really ever try to prove anything about your program in your program. All of this you get by just using the language normally. You can then go one step further with Agda, Idris2, or Lean, and start to prove things about your programs, which easily can get tedious. But even then when you have dependent types you can just add a lot more information to your types, which makes the compiler able to help you better. Really we could see it as an improvement to how you can tell the compiler what you want. But again, you what you can do in dependent type theory? NOT use dependent type theory! You can use Haskell-style code in Idris whenever that is more convenient. And by the way, I totally agree that all of these languages I named are probably only ghostly images of what they could truly be. But
2Johannes C. Mayer5h
"If you are assuming Software works well you are dead" because: * If you assume this you will be shocked by how terrible software is every moment you use a computer, and your brain will constantly try to fix it wasting your time. * You should not assume that humanity has it in it to make the god software without your intervention. * When making god software: Assume the worst.
May 5th
41 Cleveland Avenue South, Saint Paul

This is just an ACX hangout!  I'm ordering pizza, gonna get a large with half vegetarian toppings.  No reading this week.

25Hour1h10

Primarily people come to this on the discord, so I just have this on lw for visibility

Shannon Vallor is the first Baillie Gifford Chair in the Ethics of Data and Artificial Intelligence at the Edinburgh Futures Institute. She is the author of Technology and the Virtues: A Philosophical Guide to a Future Worth Wanting. She believes that we need to build and cultivate a new virtue ethics appropriate to our technological era. The following summarizes some of her arguments and observations:

Why Do We Need New Virtues?

Vallor believes that we need to discover and cultivate a new set of virtues that is appropriate to the onslaught of technological change that marks our era. This for several reasons, including:

  • Technology is extending our reach, so that our decisions have effects with broader ethical implications than traditional moral wisdom is prepared to cope with.
  • Technology is also starting
...

Something I think humanity is going to have to grapple with soon is the ethics of self-modification / self-improvement, and the perils of value-shift due to rapid internal and external changes. How do we stay true to ourselves while changing fundamental aspects of what it means to be human?

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Executive Summary

In this post I present my results from training a Sparse Autoencoder (SAE) on a CLIP Vision Transformer (ViT) using the ImageNet-1k dataset. I have created an interactive web app, 'SAE Explorer', to allow the public to explore the visual features the SAE has learnt, found here: https://sae-explorer.streamlit.app/ (best viewed on a laptop). My results illustrate that SAEs can identify sparse and highly interpretable directions in the residual stream of vision models, enabling inference time inspections on the model's activations. To demonstrate this, I have included a 'guess the input image' game on the web app that allows users to guess the input image purely from the SAE activations of a single layer and token of the residual stream. I have also uploaded a (slightly outdated)...

Huh, that's indeed somewhat surprising if the SAE features are capturing the things that matter to CLIP (in that they reduce loss) and only those things, as opposed to "salient directions of variation in the data". I'm curious exactly what "failing to work" means -- here I think the negative result (and the exact details of said result) are argubaly more interesting than a positive result would be. 

Dagon1h42

I think this leans a lot on "get evidence uniformly over the next 10 years" and "Brownian motion in 1% steps".  By conservation of expected evidence, I can't predict the mean direction of future evidence, but I can have some probabilities over distributions which add up to 0.  

For long-term aggregate predictions of event-or-not (those which will be resolved at least a few years away, with many causal paths possible), the most likely updates are a steady reduction as the resolution date gets closer, AND random fairly large positive updates as we learn of things which make the event more likely.

18LawrenceC2h
The general version of this statement is something like: if your beliefs satisfy the law of total expectation, the variance of the whole process should equal the variance of all the increments involved in the process.[1] In the case of the random walk where at each step, your beliefs go up or down by 1% starting from 50% until you hit 100% or 0% -- the variance of each increment is 0.01^2 = 0.0001, and the variance of the entire process is 0.5^2 = 0.25, hence you need 0.25/0.0001 = 2500 steps in expectation. If your beliefs have probability p of going up or down by 1% at each step, and 1-p of staying the same, the variance is reduced by a factor of p, and so you need 2500/p steps.  (Indeed, something like this standard way to derive the expected steps before a random walk hits an absorbing barrier).  Similarly, you get that if you start at 20% or 80%, you need 1600 steps in expectation, and if you start at 1% or 99%, you'll need 99 steps in expectation.  ---------------------------------------- One problem with your reasoning above is that as the 1%/99% shows, needing 99 steps in expectation does not mean you will take 99 steps with high probability -- in this case, there's a 50% chance you need only one update before you're certain (!), there's just a tail of very long sequences. In general, the expected value of variables need not look like I also think you're underrating how much the math changes when your beliefs do not come in the form of uniform updates. In the most extreme case, suppose your current 50% doom number comes from imagining that doom is uniformly distributed over the next 10 years, and zero after --  then the median update size per week is only 0.5/520 ~= 0.096%/week, and the expected number of weeks with a >1% update is 0.5 (it only happens when you observe doom). Even if we buy a time-invariant random walk model of belief updating, as the expected size of your updates get larger, you also expect there to be quadratically fewer of them -- e.
3p.b.3h
I think all the assumptions that go into this model are quite questionable, but it's still an interesting thought.
4Seth Herd5h
But... Why would p(doom) move like Brownian motion until stopping at 0 or 1? I don't disagree with your conclusions, there's a lot of evidence coming in, and if you're spending full time or even part time thinking about alignment, a lot of important updates on the inference. But assuming a random walk seems wrong. Is there a reason that a complex, structured unfolding of reality would look like a random walk?
3Johannes C. Mayer4h
Let xs be a finite list of natural numbers. Let xs' be the list that is xs sorted ascendingly. I could write down in full formality, what it means for a list to be sorted, without ever talking at all about how you would go about calculating xs' given xs. That is the power I am talking about. We can say what something is, without talking about how to get it. And yes this still applies for constructive logic, Because the property of being sorted is just the logical property of a list. It's a definition. To give a definition, I don't need to talk about what kind of algorithm would produce something that satisfies this condition. That is completely separate. And being able to see that as separate is a really useful abstraction, because it hides away many unimportant details. Computer Science is about how-to-do-X knowledge as SICP says. Mathe is about talking about stuff in full formal detail without talking about this how-to-do-X knowledge, which can get very complicated. How does a modern CPU add two 64-bit floating-point numbers? It's certainly not an obvious simple way, because that would be way too slow. The CPU here illustrates the point as a sort of ultimate instantiation of implementation detail.
4Dagon2h
I kind of see what you're saying, but I also rather think you're talking about specifying very different things in a way that I don't think is required.  The closer CS definition of math's "define a sorted list" is "determine if a list is sorted".  I'd argue it's very close to equivalent to the math formality of whether a list is sorted.  You can argue about the complexity behind the abstraction (Math's foundations on set theory and symbols vs CS library and silicon foundations on memory storage and "list" indexing), but I don't think that's the point you're making. When used for different things, they're very different in complexity.  When used for the same things, they can be pretty similar.

Yes, that is a good point. I think you can totally write a program that checks given two lists as input, xs and xs', that xs' is sorted and also contains exactly all the elements from xs. That allows us to specify in code what it means that a list xs' is what I get when I sort xs.

And yes I can do this without talking about how to sort a list. I nearly give a property such that there is only one function that is implied by this property: the sorting function. I can constrain what the program can be totally (at least if we ignore runtime and memory stuff).

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