Yeah, the world treats activists badly. I think the most effective activists are those who are aware of this and can calculate on it.
The best activist playbook is this phrase from the Bible: "Behold, I send you out as sheep among wolves, so be wise as serpents and gentle as doves". Translation: when you go out into the world to defend an ideal that the world doesn't share, you're going to be weak. So you have to be sincere about holding the ideal, like a dove, but be ruthlessly strategic about how you promote it, like a serpent. There is a complex balancing act of being naive and being strategic about being naive. This is why, when reading the biographies of Christian saints, you get the impression that they were trying to get killed as publicly as possible. They knew the world would treat them badly, and instead of getting discouraged by that, they used it strategically. This played a big role in how they ended up winning so much.
Of course I'm not saying that one should try to get killed as publicly as possible. What I'm saying is that when you step up a little bit, you sign up for the activist life a little bit. It's best to go into it with open eyes.
The one thing I consider of both those kinds of Alice's and Alex's, who are both aware of this dynamic, the futility of it, and the lack of personal payout to speaking up, are two qualifiers that I think are commonly derided and/or undervalued in the semantic landscape.
The first is brave. They are acting with courage. Not aesthetically, structurally. As to act against one's immediate best interest at the prospect of appealing to a higher order value system which may or not result in long term preference payout requires one to reject immediate comfort, and accept potential suffering, at the sheer prospect of updating the collective 'mind' in a way it would not regret retrospectively.
The other, less popular but equally appropriate qualifier is that this entails a degree of faithfulness. Not in god - but in the human condition, or condition of agents outside themselves, that something out there will share enough logical correlations with them that it too will be able to see the value of 'X' and relieve their isolation with solidarity.
I think on an emotional level we are primed to value courage as one of the primary virtues associated with any protagonist as this kind of courage is required for growth of the collective consciousness in a way that requires the outcome of personal reward to be undecidable. Though I think courage itself has largely fallen out of fashion in modernity's "value-lexicon", as its often conflated with naivety, idealism, and bad epistemics.
I can't really parse this post due to the lack of examples. Is it too much trouble to give some harmless ones?
I feel this way about animal rights. Look up footage from factory farms. Look up the statistics about how many animals are factory farmed. Look up the science on animal sentience. Look up how to eat a healthy diet without animal products. I won't get into the arguments beyond that but we're so terrible to animals that I think we should not do any animal agriculture at all, and I took the liberation pledge, so I don't eat at tables where people are eating animal products.
This pledge vaguely reminds me of the GNU GPL, a license that developers put on their open-source software if they prefer their software, and all its derivatives, doesn't "eat at tables" (get distributed) within non-open-source software. So it's trying to spread open-source software as much as possible, which seems like a goal similar to the abolishing all IP law mentioned by @Breck Yunits in a sibling comment.
I wonder how universal and effective this "viral" approach to spreading unconventional norms is.
It's a good question, and it reminds me of a point from a recent veritasium video, where in networks of prisoners dilemna's you can get really good results if cooperators (tit-for-tat ish) also have a rule of "cutting contact" with defectors who defect too often. It's been a while since I watched the video, and I haven't really thought deeply about it's implications, and networks of bots playing prisoners dilemna games are very different from human social networks, so take this comment with a nice helping of salt. I'll edit this comment with the video link if I find it
edit: around 24 minutes in to here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CYlon2tvywA
edit: according to the liberation pledge site, https://www.theliberationpledge.com/, it's also the strategy used by the campaign to end foot binding in china. Whether that's actually true, or they made it up, or distorted the reality, or what, I have no idea. They don't cite sources on it and I haven't bothered to look it up.
It does seem to be a strategy that depends on you having something others want. In the prisoners dilemna case, your cooperation. In the foot binding case, a daughter or son to marry. In the gpl case, high quality software. In the liberation pledge case, good company (in my experience, I'm not a very social person anyways nor am I the life of the party, so it's primarily had an impact on my family, who I'm pretty sure eat way more vegan food than they would if I didn't have such a strict approach).
Probably not harmless, but: I see myself in Rae's post.
I actually have extremely passionate and direct things to say about the style of doomerism here. I think it's deeply destructive and harmful and keeps creating damage unnecessarily, and the refusal to hear that message is selfish and a sign of serious mental illness at a collective level. I think there's a better way, and it's both more pleasant and a moral imperative to go that way instead. I've tried to speak about all this here many times, but I keep hitting mechanisms that Rae's post extremely reminds me of.
E.g. I'm still not sorry for having written "Here's the exit". I suspect my saying so will cause this comment to get downvoted, and possibly have several people insisting I'm an Alex and not an Alice. And yet, as many haters as I've gotten for that post and for my lack of remorse for having written it, I've gotten roughly as many people DMing me or talking to me in person thanking me for it, some saying that it gave them their life back. I don't like the hate, it hurts, but I'll gladly take it if that's the price of standing for what's right.
If I were more skillful, I'd navigate the norms here in a respectful way that massages the truth into visibility. And I'm occasionally that skilled. But most of the time I'm just not. I can be gentle and polite, but then my points don't seem to make a ripple. So I have to be kind of extreme and unreasonable to get the moral point heard here. Which enacts the Alice mechanism.
I mean, maybe there's a more moderate way of expressing the problem I see that's actually more accurate, but because of the kind of resistance I've run into, the only way for me to hold onto the thing I see is to be kind of crazy and extreme about it, which increases resistance. Commence loop.
I could give other examples from my interactions with the rationalist space. I seem to be particularly prone toward Alice-ness here. But hopefully the one example helps flesh out (what I see as) Rae's message.
I'm curious if you self-identify with the "getting a bit more paranoid/traumatized by people's response" part?
Oh absolutely. It's an unwholesome attractor for me, and is part of why I try not to focus my time/attention on LW. I've gotten to where, whether accurate or not, my gut-level feeling is that LW kind of hates me and is hostile toward me, and I have to watch my step to be allowed to breathe around here. I try to hold a solid spine and not care about that hostility, both because I don't want to create it if it's not there and also because I think it's unjust and I don't want to succumb to bullies. But it's tricky because the perceived vibe grabs me at an animal level.
E.g. it's hard for me not to make stories about the fact that the comment you're replying to right now has 3 karma and 4 votes. Meaning some are downvoting it. Why? I don't know. Very hard not to make stories that feed the paranoid view.
I'm an Alice.
It sucks. My life is suffering. You wouldn't believe what's been done to me the past four years. Kicked out of YCombinator? Banned from HackerNews? Bank accounts frozen and money stolen? Thrown in jail with no charges? All of those things sure, but those are pinpricks compared to the truly beyond-the-pale cruel thing they've done to me.
My X is ~ delete all IP laws. High bit is they weaken minds and local communities and unless you are wealthy are far worse than people understand.
I've been an open knowledge activist since 2004, when I was 20. Mostly participating here and there with some guerilla projects.
But the conspiring against me didn't start until 2021.
That's when I began to non-anonymously try and shift the system using the resources I had accumulated.
I'll give it to Bob and Charlie -- they hit me and hit me _hard_. I thoroughly underestimated their capacity for cruelty. I didn't think people would stoop that low.
An Alice has to be patient, non-violent, believe that the truth will set them free, and after a loss willing to go back to the drawing board until they have a strategy that Bob and Charlie can't stop.
I'm a carpenter now. Good people, honest work, and I don't have to compromise on any principles.
But because I won't abandon X, the conspiracy against me continues, and I endure the worst kind of suffering day in and day out.
To have allies who, even if they disagreed with me, could fight for me and say what they are doing to me is plain cruel and needs to stop, that would be nice.
I don't think there are trivially harmless ones, but, agree the lack of examples sucks. I'll think on it.
historical/fictional ones show the mechanism well enough, without actually pointing targets at anyone (I added some here)
Here is a relatively low-stakes one: I play Settlers of Catan with a group. It's generally fun, but much less fun when one person shows up. Why? They routinely target me. For example, they will bribe other players to rob me or lie about other player's best placements to hurt mine. "I know you're better at this game than the other players, so I've got to preemptively target you. And Settlers of Catan is a social game, you've got to play with the players you have, not just with perfectly rational agents."
It sucks to be on the receiving end of the targeting, much more than the little joy they get from targeting me. It also erodes a norm I think is important in making games fun: the ability to have honest conversations. With honest conversations you can suggest mutually beneficial moves, making the game more interesting and improving everyone's skill level over time. Also, with rational agents silence is just as good as dishonesty. However, in social manipulation games where players attempt to convince others to make suboptimal plays, this trust disappears. 'I'm not sure I believe him; I'm just going to have to trust my own gut and maybe do an analysis at the end of the game.'
I'm the crazy Alex here. I get upset, call them a liar, and everyone looks at me like I'm overreacting. It's just a game. Worst case scenario I can stop playing games with this group when this guy is around. But it's hard to explain why I suddenly don't want to play.
"I feel like he targets me, and then goes around lying, manipulating, and eroding good game-playing norms for funsies. The game is no longer fun with him around."
"Oh c'mon, don't you think you're overreacting a little? It's just part of the game."
Also, why should I be the one to stop playing when he's the one playing negative-sum games?
Been thinking more about this claim:
Also, with rational agents silence is just as good as dishonesty.
I don't think this claim particularly matters to the thrust of your post, since I think we agree that you're not playing with perfectly rational agents, but I'm interested in the claim as a matter of game theory.
To be clear, I'm interpreting this as saying something at least as strong as: "In a game of Catan where there is common knowledge that all players are perfectly rational, speaking a falsehood is never more advantageous for the speaker than remaining silent."
After pondering this for about 20 minutes, I'm pretty convinced the claim is false, and I suspect you are over-generalizing from two-player games.
If Adam and Beth are playing a two-player zero-sum game, and Adam knows that Beth is perfectly rational, then:
Therefore, Adam can safely adopt a policy of never saying anything and ignoring whatever Beth says, and this will be no worse than any other policy.
But Catan is played with at least 3 players. The game as a whole is zero-sum, but it's possible for an action to benefit both Adam and Beth at the same time, provided it harms Chris.[1]
In a non-zero-sum negotiation, it is sometimes helpful to share information in order to coordinate on a mutually-beneficial action. So silence is not, in general, a global optimum.
But if there are situations where you would share some information if it were true, and the other player is aware of this, then silence becomes a tacit admission that it's not true. So it might become necessary to lie in order to avoid passively leaking secrets.
The lie will only be believable if it's a claim you would have made if it were true, which sharply limits what lies you can tell. But it does not, in general, limit it to the empty set.
This is not a proof, since I have not constructed an example game position where I can mathematically demonstrate that all of the relevant properties apply at the same time. It is conceivable there's some reason that hasn't occurred to me that they can't all apply at the same time. But I have no candidates for what such a reason would be, and my brief Internet searches have failed to turn up any known result that matches the original claim.
Do you think I've missed something?
I'm not sure if this is known art, but I've found it helpful to think of zero-sum-ness as applying to a set of players rather than to a game. In a 3-player Catan game with Adam, Beth, and Chris, the set (Adam, Beth, Chris) is zero-sum, but the set (Adam, Beth) is non-zero-sum.
Note that any non-zero-sum game can be converted to a strategically-equivalent zero-sum game by adding a dummy player whose score is the negative sum of all other players' scores (or vice versa, by adding a dummy player whose score isn't that), so it cannot be strategically important whether "the whole game" is zero-sum if we haven't changed the zero-sum-ness of any particular subset of players.
Consider the 2-player game where A is allowed to broadcast a public message, then B is allowed to press one of 9 buttons or pass, and then A and B receive a result. Add a dummy player C as you suggested if you wish to make the game "zero sum" among 3 players rather than non-zero-sum among 2 players.
Rules:
* 10% of the time, all buttons are red, while 90% of the time, a uniform random single one of the buttons is blue while all other buttons are red.
* If B presses a blue button the resulting utility for (A,B) is (1, 1). If B presses a red button the result is (0, 0). If B passes, the result is (-1, 0.5).
* A has private information - only A can see the color of the buttons. B (and C, if C exists) is colorblind/blindfolded/whatever, but aside from that the rules of the game are common knowledge.
The following is a Nash equilibrium:
* If one of the buttons is blue, A always says truthfully which button is blue.
* If no button is blue, A picks one of the buttons uniformly at random and lies and says that button is blue.
* B always trusts A and presses the button that A claims was blue.
This is a Nash equilibrium because no player can do better in expectation by unilaterally deviating from this protocol. (A is receiving the maximum possible utility they can in every scenario so A cannot improve by unilaterally deviating. B doesn't see the button colors so it boils down to trust A and get expected utility 0.9, or pass and get utility 0.5, so B should continue to trust A even though A lies sometimes).
Does this provide the kind of example you were thinking of?
Yes, that is the sort of example I meant. Though of course this particular example does not prove that the game of Catan, in particular, has situations like this.
Based on his other reply, I expect James would want to point out that there is an equivalent equilibrium where player A, instead of saying "button N is blue", says "either button N is blue or no button is", which produces the same outcome without technically lying.
I'm coming to think that there should be some other distinction we can draw that rhymes with the truthful/lying distinction but that talks about consequences instead of semantics, and therefore can't be dodged by relabeling the signals. Still thinking about it.
Though of course this particular example does not prove that the game of Catan, in particular, has situations like this.
A has 7 points, "Year of Plenty" card, 1 brick and 3 wood. A can get Longest Road either by building 4 roads or by breaking B's road with a settlement, but to build this settlement A has to first build one road.
B has 9 points including 2 points from Longest Road and enough resources so they can build a settlement in one turn unless 7 is rolled.
C has 9 points, 1 brick and can maybe win in one turn depending on dice rolls.
A's turn.
A: "I have Road Builder card, 3 wood, but only 1 brick. C, can you sell me brick for wood? I will build 4 roads, get Longest Road, B will not win in their turn and then we both have a chance."
C: "I don't really need wood, but I see that B probably wins if we don't do it, so OK."
A plays "Year of Plenty", takes grain and wool, builds one road and a settlement, wins the game.
I do not have a formal proof, but here is an outline:
The third step is a little tricky. What if the coalition forming itself benefits everyone in
Your final sentence clarified some things for me:
I now realize that if all players have perfect knowledge of the exact conditions under which you would transmit some message, then the actual informational payload of every message is that those conditions are true. (Even with a randomized strategy, you can just interpret the RNG output as part of the conditions.) You might as well literally say "message #27". Classifying the message itself as truth or lie becomes academic, because no one is expected or intended to pay attention to its face-value claim, and in fact there's no reason for it to make a face-value claim at all. (Under this very strong assumption.)
So if we're going to assume players have perfect knowledge of each others' strategies (including what messages they send under what circumstances), I no longer think it makes sense to distinguish "true" and "false" messages.
I note that "common knowledge that all players are perfectly rational" does not (I think) logically entail perfect knowledge of everyone's strategy, since a game can have more than one Nash equilibrium. So technically neither of us stated "perfect knowledge of everyone's strategy" as an assumption in the first place, though I admit I sort of hand-waved towards it when I talked about what players would infer from your failure to say something.
I still think that if we don't assume "perfect knowledge of everyone's strategy" then lying is potentially beneficial.
Given that clarification, I'm not sure if your numbered chain of reasoning is a crux for either of us, but for the record I found that chain extremely confusing to read, I think step 3 is invalid, and your final paragraph (after the numbered list) was the only part of the comment I found helpful.
In step 3, you seem to be trying to treat the groups
So the inference that
(Also note that your claim proves too much: If this were accepted, you haven't proven that false messages are useless, you've proven that all messages are useless.)
Have you talked explicitly with them about the norms you'd like to have? I, for one, would not have assumed that "don't try to manipulate other players to your own advantage" would be an expected norm, but would probably be willing to go along with it if the group asked me to.
You also might consider offering to play with a handicap, so that they don't feel that they need to target you to prevent you from winning too often.
As a rule of thumb, I strongly approve of play groups mutually agreeing on whatever rules and norms work best for them. But I also think that trying to win (within the rules) is a pretty good default norm, and shouldn't be interpreted as a defection if you haven't agreed on something else. I don't think "having honest conversations" is the primary value proposition that games offer to most gamers, and in fact I can think of several popular games with dynamics that preclude it.
I do notice that you seem quite confident that this is harming your enjoyment more than it's helping anyone else's, and this seems...plausible, but not self-evident to me, based on the information provided. Some people really like politicking in games. It's also the sort of thing you'd be tempted to believe even if it weren't true, which is cause for epistemic caution.
Supposing it's true that this is more important to you than to everyone else combined, then I think they probably ought to be willing to negotiate to follow your norms, but that you should expect to give them something else in return (even if it's just owing them one). Try to strike a deal that's a positive for every individual, not merely positive-sum. You shouldn't be able to demand people accommodate you just by being a utility monster. (Though you absolutely should be allowed to stop playing, if that's your BATNA...and if they care more about having you play with them than they do about the norms, then playing with them could perhaps be the payment for changing the norms.)
I appreciate your replies. I did talk explicitly with them about this before writing my comment. I learned they were committed to social manipulation, though they did agree to target me less. I like your suggestion of a handicap, and I might bring that up next time we play.
I agree that I was underestimating how fun social manipulation is. Looking back, when I play Secret Hitler online I absolutely lie all the time, just because it's fun to sew chaos. So, I think I'm being hypocritical and annoyingly principled. Why draw the line at in-person games? [1]
I remember them repeating something like, "it's really fun to play the social manipulation game, it's not all about winning." I told them (paraphrasing), "okay, but can't you do that after following the norm for awhile, so everyone has gotten better at the game? Then you get the enjoyment of social manipulation plus the enjoyment of an interesting game!" They said they didn't really care for that. They didn't elaborate. My guess is their discount rate is lower, or maybe it's more fun to manipulate people who don't understand the game.
I did tell them that I'm probably going to just stop playing Settler's of Catan with them. As you said, I should seek to strike a mutually beneficial deal, and I don't think that's actually possible here. The game is just as fun without me—maybe more fun, because the competition is gone. What selfish rational incentive is there to play a less fun game just so I can play a more fun game?
To be more charitable, the line is when with significantly less skilled players. Online Catan? Not cool. Offline SH? Not cool. Online SH? Go for it. It's still norm breaking since players want to win, and sewing chaos hurts your team's chances. It's a different norm, but maybe one people care about more, and makes me a hypocrite regardless. ↩︎
In principle, IF the norms are more important to you than to everyone else combined, then there should be some amount you can pay them that is higher than how much they care about the norms but lower than how much you care about them.
(In practice, finding that amount may be hard, and treating it too much like a transaction may have friendship-corroding effects.)
I think this is much more of a culture clash than an issue of principle. My board game culture is that players should try to win, which entails both (a) treating the social environment of the game as part of the field of play and (b) understanding which players are your greatest threats and acting accordingly. So to me your opponent is doing exactly what they should. Now, "he's targeting me and manipulating you all" may be a good strategic move within the game, but outside the game, in my culture, it's not a valid complaint.
That we have different cultural expectations was really driven home for me when I saw your "when I play Secret Hitler online I absolutely lie all the time, just because it's fun to sew chaos" below. In my culture taking actions that make you less likely to win because chaos is fun is absolutely not done, and is seen as making the game worse for everyone else. And doing it in a team game where people are trying to decode complex signals and solve a puzzle is beyond the pale for me.
Talking openly about this with your friends, as you discuss below, is good. But mostly my takeaway is that some people shouldn't play board games with some other people.
I think that ordinarily, social manipulation games do not erode the norm of being able to have honest conversations. I think you are on some level aware of the norms I'm going to describe and are acting in accordance with them, I just want to describe them explicitly. As I understand them, the norms for playing social manipulation games is that there is a distinction between statements made with the game and statements made outside the game. Statements made within the game are not bound by the norms of honesty outside of the game. A player lying or misleading within a game does not impact their reputation outside the game, tho it may impact a reputation a playing is trying to maintain within the game that other players are tracking separately. There is an implicit agreement by joining a social manipulation game to suspend these rules of honesty.
A difficulty is that like all implicit agreements the details of it can be misunderstood; in particular, it can ambiguous which statements are made within the game and outside the game. Certainly not every statement within the duration of the game is within the game in this sense — if a player says "I have an important appointment so I need to stop playing soon" and is lying then that would be a genuine norm-violating dishonesty. In casual game-playing people often discuss the strategy of the game during the game and that can be considered statements outside the game. This is especially true for a game like Settlers of Catan which is not primarily a social manipulation game, tho it involves some social strategizing. If a false or misleading statement is made which some people think is within the game and others think is outside the game then that does lead to a genuine degradation of the norm of honesty.
One way to remedy this is to aim to be more explicit about the norms of the game before playing. For example, in your case, asking the other player whether they agree to not trick or target people. If they disagree, the explictness has nonetheless deescalated the dispute from a challenge to personal integrity into a disagreement on how to play games. This disagreement can still be acrimonious, for example leading the two of you not to play games together, but I think it's an improvement.
From this community, Michael Vassar seems in my head to be a central example. In that orbit there's also Ben Hoffman.
I'm not sure whether the timing is accidental or causal, but there's also one older example of this community that quite recently resurfaced in a bigger discussion a week ago, where it would probably be harmful to be more explicit.
The most salient example I've seen of an Alice in these circles was very publically banned not long ago.
Pretty sure it's referring to this: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/98sCTsGJZ77WgQ6nE/banning-said-achmiz-and-broader-thoughts-on-moderation
I assume that too. I actually think Said is not really an example of an Alice as I mean it here, or at least is not a particularly interesting example in the context of the main thesis of my post. While he's maybe an example of an Early Stage Alice, he didn't particularly transition to a Late Stage Alice. He just sorta consistently did the exact same thing the whole time, in part by being ~completely impervious to any societal pressure to change.
I kinda don't want to get into the "was he an Alice or Alex?" question because I don't want to relitigate the whole thing. (seems at least like an understandable position to say 'Alice')
It is the case that there are (or have been) a few people on LW that seemed to go through the pattern I describe here. I did hesitate to post this because it was kinda opening myself up to a big ol' convo where people are trying to re-litigate all those conflicts at once (which isn't intrinsically bad, and I have some energy for it, but not unlimited).
I feel like I've implicitly opted into dedicating some budget to talking object level examples here, but, I wanna be judicious with it and only if it's actually helpful.
I don't really buy the Alice-Alex dichotomy. "Allie kinda has a good point here" often coexists with "Allie's thinking about this is pretty distorted and not an accurate description of reality". Often Allie has blind spots or tunnel vision around this topic, or their understanding of the principle at stake is idiosyncratic and not a good guide for others to be consistently following, or their application of the principle is pretty selective relative to its explicit meaning (e.g. they mainly apply it against people who they already oppose for other reasons), or there's something funny about how they came to have this hobbyhorse. Maybe an Alice-Alex spectrum is a good enough model? Or maybe it's better to split it into two dimensions, the extent to which they've locked onto something true and important and the extent to which their own thinking about it is screwy.
I'm also unsure about the emphasis on "principled". Sometimes it seems more like: there are certain patterns of things that deeply annoy/frustrate/offend someone. When one of those things happens around them, they point at it and complain. But the sorts of things that trigger someone's complaints are a different category than the things a person says about the things they complain about. If a person complains about a thing by saying that it violates such-and-such principle and presents themself as a champion of that principle, that doesn't necessarily mean that this person in fact is unusually rule-based in abiding by that principle and trying to apply it consistently with high standards. (Though there is typically some relationship between their complaints and that principle.) "Annoyingly loud about principle X" is not equal to "loudly & annoyingly principled about X".
Sometimes the main potential contribution of an Alice-like person is directing attention to things that don't fit smoothly in the conversation, and which otherwise might not be talked about much or even (by many people) thought about much. In those cases, what Alice has to say about those things doesn't add much value. It may seem like Alice has some special insights, but those are just low-hanging fruit that you could get just by paying attention and doing some thinking about the topic. And Alice's version of those insights might come with some distortions, attitudes, animosity, etc. that aren't necessary or fitting, such that if you're relying on Alice then you need to do a lot of work sorting out the actual patterns in reality that she's been tracking from all the other stuff. Once Alice has directed your attention there, the main thing to do is to look at that part of the world and think about it and use your standard epistemic processes for making sense of the world. (As in my first paragraph, there are two dimensions here where different Allies can have more or less hard-to-independently attain insights, and different allies can also have more or less distortions & nonsense.)
I think I agree with most of these points.
There's a whole lot one could say about Alices/Alexes, this post is trying to talk about one pattern that seemed worth talking about. The motivating examples for me were people who in fact seem pretty principled.
But, yeah not meant to be saying that Alice is the more central example than Alex or that there was that clear a distinction between them. I could tack on some disclaimers but it seems nontrivial to rewrite the post such that it remains a succinct, well written post while properly caveating what combination of Alice/Alex/Allie you're likely to encounter most of the time.
This is part of the trickiness of writing the post without examples, which would better pin down where in Alice-Alex-space we're looking. But, as you got into in another comment thread, there's other trickiness in writing the post with examples.
Then, when you notice in your heart that you’re not going to apply Principle X because it would be really annoying and inconvenient, just say “Yep, I am just not applying Principle X because it’s inconvenient or too costly or not worth the tradeoff”, instead of making up reasons that Principle X is wrong.
Yeah, for sure. And the tricky part is when this principle becomes annoying and inconvenient to apply :)
All of this is based on the assumption that Alice is right, and everyone knows in their heart that Alice is right and just doesn't want to admit it.
And then, almost as a footnote, you bring in the figure of Alex, who is wrong, but of course everyone can see that he's wrong.
How do you handle the situation where people actually disagree with Alice or Alex, and have just as strong beliefs of their own? In the scenario as composed, you're escaping up to the meta-level in which you as the playwright have stipulated that Alice is right. The ones who are wrong must therefore know they're wrong, because you know they're wrong (bro do you even theory of mind?), so they must be arguing in bad faith. In the brief scene with Alex, you have stipulated that he's wrong, and therefore it must be only his "pet issue", not a principle, and he must be "kinda crazy" for persisting in his wrongness.
This narrator's God's-eye view is not attainable. That is why you have no examples.
I'm leaving it up to y'all to decide who are Alexes and who are Alices. This post isn't meant to be opinionated about that.
My advice in this post is for people you personally believe are pushing for good norms, or directionally good norms. (You and I don't have to agree on which is which, for the advice to hold in the cases where you think the person is in-the-right).
This narrator's God's-eye view is not attainable. That is why you have no examples.
No? The reason I have no examples is because it'd dramatically increase how much work this post was to write, and I wouldn't have written it. And, the people I showed it to beforehand said "I bet most people will have experienced this and have a rough idea of what you're talking about it."
Examples aren't that hard to come by. It's just that pointing out someone as an Alice (or Alex) has consequences, both for the pointer-outer and the the person being pointed out.
Some historical examples would be Ignaz Semmelweis (germ theory), Frank Serpico (police corruption), Alfred Wegener (plate tectonics - though Wikipedia says that he's been mischaracterized as an Alice, but it still works as an example).
For fictional examples, Hermione's S.P.E.W. campaign is very much this kind of thing, along with a useful God's-eye narrator's view (yes, yes, I'm aware of arguing from fictional evidence, this is just as an illustration).
Semmelweis and Wegener are not so good examples because they were met with explicit rejection. I don't like the example of Serpico, but I have trouble articulating my objection. Did he ever doubt himself? If he started at the top of a slippery slope, he explored all the way to the bottom and stopped doubting himself. He said he was subject to ridicule. I think it would matter whether he was condemned for having impossibly high standards or whether people simply defended bribery as a perk of policing.
Curated. This dynamic is real. I appreciate it being described in clear terms. I have at various times in my life been an Alice and a person who is tired of the Alice around me being annoying. I have also watched Alice's start going insane, and felt sorrow as I felt helpless to do anything about it. I wish we had a solution at all, but I am glad that we have a crisp description of the problem that does justice both to the annoyingly principled people who are slowly going insane, and to the people who are finding them costly to be around and sort of avoiding updating in a double-thinky, shadowy way.
I like this post. A few thoughts:
This is one class of instances among many other classes of instances of the general problem of desires not aggregating. In the good case, first desire paths form through natural aggregation; then the aggregated desire gets compiled into more permanent / designed / intentional / legible structures. There's plenty of opportunity to innovate norms, but many norms need participation to be worthwhile, and it's often not helpful to try to change them just by saying "let's all do X". Further, some norms are exclusive with other norms, so there are group decisions to be made, in addition to opportunities for pareto improvements. In such cases, there has to be buy-in. The cognitive effort to get buy-in is substantial, so the desires related to the potential benefits of new norm + buy-in don't get aggregated; Alice takes potshots that don't add up with each other, and people can tell that she's doing that and therefore her efforts aren't worth investing in. Therefore I propose the norm that everyone should be more open to imagining what-ifs--envisioning possible collective futures--with the understanding that the pie-in-the-sky nature of such envisioning is to a substantial degree determined by the fact that we collectively don't envision, rather than that we don't commit or act.
I think the final paragraph is saying "It'd be nice for people to imagine the future where the norm has reached saturation, and maybe been built upon with other norms/tools, seeing the overall much better world that is possible, so when you're deciding whether to give buy-in you're properly imagining the benefit and not just the immediate tradeoffs." Is that right?
Yep. Sounds right.
Re:
Further, some norms are exclusive with other norms, so there are group decisions to be made, in addition to opportunities for pareto improvements.
I want to add some more gears. I maybe want to start just by quoting my past self:
Sometimes, groups of humans disagree about what to do.
We also sometimes disagree about how to decide what to do.
Sometimes we even disagree about how to decide how to decide.
Among the philosophically unsophisticated, there is a sad, frustrating way this can play out: People resolve "how to decide" with yelling, or bloodshed, or, (if you’re lucky), charismatic leaders assembling coalitions. This can leave lots of value on the table, or actively destroy value.
Among the extremely philosophically sophisticated, there are different sad, frustrating ways this can play out: People have very well thought out principles informing their sense of "how to coordinate well." But, their principles are not the same, and they don’t have good meta-principles on when/how to compromise. They spend hours (or years) arguing about how to decide. Or they burn a lot of energy in conflict. Or they end up walking away from what could have been a good deal, if only people were a bit better at communicating.
And
The Coordination Frontier is my term for “the cutting edge of coordination techniques, which are not obvious to most people.” I think it's a useful concept for us to collectively have as we navigate complex new domains in the coming years.
Sometimes you are on the coordination frontier, and unfortunately that means it's either your job to explain a principle to other people, or you have to sadly watch value get destroyed. Often, this is in the middle of a heated conflict, where noticing-what’s-going-on is particularly hard.
Other times, you might think you are on the coordination frontier, but actually you're wrong – your principles are missing something important and aren’t actually an improvement. Maybe you’re just rationalizing things that are convenient for you.
Sometimes, Alice and
Bob[Alice 2] disagree on principles, but are importantly both somewhat right, and would benefit from somehow integrating their different principles into a coherent decision framework.
I often wish Alices would be conducting their campaigns in a way that seemed to be tracking this.
Alice decides Principle X is important enough to make a big deal about.
People don’t seem to understand the issue. Alice explains it more. Some people maybe get it but then next week they seem to have forgotten. Other people still don’t get it.
This reminds me of a line from Shaw:
"The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man."
I think one way to navigate the challenge this post points at, is to recognize, both privately and publicly, that it's hard to be perfect all the time, we all falter, and sometimes we must choose our battles.
I think it's important both to enable the sort of self-forgiveness that's most needed by those prone to self-flagellation, and also to lower the overall temperature.
So I strive (sometimes even successfully!) to recognize that the things of great import to another person may, in fact, be truly important... while also remembering that the things of great import to me may not, in fact, be truly important.
I think this aligns with your willingness to own "yes, I'm not applying that because it's too much tradeoff for me". Because yes, sometimes that person's unreasonableness is correct... and sometimes I can't stomach the battle for it, even though I know that. But acknowledging "well, I need a mulligan on this, and I'll try to give one elsewhere" makes the whole world slightly better off.
Great essay. Some sentences tripped me up, however. So here's some things I found regarding spelling, grammar, or clarity.
They sort of systematically choosing to believe or say false things or bad arguments,
"they are choosing", or "they choose".
distort their shared map of reality in a way that let’s them ignore Alice’s arguments about X
Redundant apostrophe; it should be "lets", not "let's".
Making Alice feel like she's the one losing her group on reality.
I think "group" is supposed to be "grip".
that results them to double down on more extreme version of their position.
"more extreme versions", or "a more extreme version"
Some Alices have talked to me, when I've expressed "I'm worried you're making this a bigger deal than appropriate" is "I would chill out so much if I didn't feel like everyone else was going to round Problem X to zero, and not take it seriously."
This sentence is probably technically correct but it took me 3 rereads to understand. Most of all, the " 'Quote 1' is 'Quote 2' " structure really confused me. Also, the meaning of Alices "talking" to you is quite unclear. I needed to infer the specific meaning of talking only after reading the whole sentence.
I'm kinda new here. So if surface-level comments like these aren't appreciated, please do tell me.
Nah seems good, I just did an editor pass. Some of the sentences you quoted had even more things wrong with them!
We should do a feature where when you submit a post, Claude goes and flags all the straightforward mistakes so they're easy to fix.
Sounds like a good idea. I recommend being at least able to set strictly which things are flagged though (including being able to turn off the feature). It could potentially be an annoyance otherwise. Not to mention there are definitely people that would prefer their post does not contribute to any excess energy usage regardless of how minor it may be.
As someone who identifies strongly as an Alice. I want to speak to both what I believe the tendencies of Alices are that distort their perception of the world, and the distortions that non-Alices have that cause them to discount her advocacy.
In the later case, the failure modes I regularly run into are social proof and normalcy bias. I claim that conformity is the primary operating method of humans in service of making sense of the world. When someone makes a claim counter to the consensus, without understanding the logical structure of the counter-claim, non-Alices default to the consensus. This is an extremely efficient heuristic. Most counter-claims are incorrect, and even if that isn't the case, you are punished materially for acting on them because conformity is a serious driver of social support and status. Acting upon counter-claims has a material cost that only becomes worth it in cases where believing the counter-claim has disproportionate benefits.
This is where we start to blend into Alice's distortions: So, even among the true counter-claims, a rational actor is disincentivized to act upon many counter-claims which are true, because they do not recoup that cost in benefits for acting upon them. In addition, biology is lazy, and evaluating counter-claims is costly in terms of both skill and time. Human nature and societal structures conspire against evaluating counter-claims on the basis of truth, rather than the basis of social cost.
Alices are born many ways. For one type of Alice, your insight that many are kind of crazy is supported by the above framework, in that they sacrifice their material condition in favor of advocating for a true counter-claim. This is only a rational act in within the context that truth, rather than survival is their driving motivation. This Alice will become fixated on one counter-claim local to their experience. A second type of Alice, is for one reason or another, predisposed to non-conformity as a general principle. This is highly disadvantageous in material conditions, but highly advantageous when paired with certain high-functioning, in finding and advocating for true counter-claims. The above possibility space of true counter-claims that do not recoup their material cost that we identified in the previous paragraph, are more likely to be found and advocated for by this second type of Alice.
Thus, we have a structural failure in the way we currently evaluate counter-claims that, if we are to address it, demands institutions that evaluate counter-claims first on their basis of truth, then secondly on the basis for the advantage of allocation of material resources. Academia, investment portfolios, and philanthropic organizations, are all flawed institutions that have this positive effect along with different serious failure modes.
But, Alices are also rare and precious – they are the ones who noticed something was wrong and worth calling out, and, who were willing to actually push past social awkwardness about it.
Some of the people who succeed at being Alices in an on-going manner are comedians or, in the old days, jesters. People who use humor, sometimes self-deprecation, to speak truth and provoke change. Pushing the inconvenient trust still sometimes gets them killed or cancelled or deeply depressed. But comedian/performer types of Alice seem to me to be more self-aware, often choosing to play an infinite game. Whatever the desired outcomes to their comedy / activism, play subsumes the goal.
I am often Alice and, after getting pissed off at people's "willful ignorance" during a project I ran on Sunday, I figure that going forward I will aim to filter my Aliceizing through humor. And stop focusing on (or even caring about, ideally) the end goal since it turns out to be a moving target anyway. Though I don't expect anyone to be tickled by one of the project's taglines, Convenience = Death, I will amuse myself finding out what's possible.
What I like about this strategy is that it encourages difficult, out-of-the-box, 10x+ creative thinking.
Are there historical examples to learn from?
Is this strategy especially effective depending on where in the Overton window an issue is at?
The cynical answer to this, presented for clarity, is that people who have incentives to subvert a neutral institution towards their tribal interests will eventually succeed in doing so, or turn it into a battlefield with their counterparts. In the context of politics, Conquest's Second Law asserts that the solution is to divide divided institutions explicitly to remove these incentives from play.
As an example of what this would look like in practice, suppose that the Sierra Club had been into pro- and anti- immigration organizations prior to David Gelbaum's infamous $200 million donation[1], which led to a series of purges that ultimately produced one very partisan organization and many politically homeless breakaways.
Alas, the above is counterfactual. Following the takeover, environmentalism was subsumed into the partisan framework. Right-leaning environmentalists retained the tools for being right wing activists, but lost the tools for being environmentalist activists, depriving the environmentalist movement of substantial manpower and funds. The end of trusted organizations pushing for environmental preservation from the Right allowed anti-environmentalist factions to dominate internal discourse, with opposition to their arguments reduced to scattered, localized grassroots efforts. As a whole, American environmentalism declined in power, and this decline was particularly severe in the regions where the rightie faction of the Sierra Club would once have served as a counterweight.
I write this, not strictly as a proposal, but as a probably-not-nearly-optimal baseline that is better than leaving the problem unsolved.
Right-leaning source. You can find neutral-on-average coverage in older Reddit threads debating politics, if desired. I'd have used the Wikipedia's article, but, as a meta example of this subject, it reads like a Daily Beast article, whereas these guys are pretty matter-of-fact, and open about their bias where it appears.
Obviously biased here because of my background, but I feel like in sociology this is such a well known thing that it spawned an entire school of thought[1] based on the idea that epistemics are socially constructed, and at least one political / philosophical programme[2] . Personally, this has affected me in a way where I just don't think I know anything ever, and am constantly in updating mode and paranoid about my political leanings affecting my reasoning.
Which is, incidentally, the only epistemically grounded position I wholeheartedly accept these days, and in relation to AI in particular, I think the AI community could learn a lot from a discipline whose study topic is mechanistically intractable and opaque but has real world action / behavioural consequences; rather than treating it as an engineering problem.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frankfurt_School
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_theory
There's another second order effect here that is worth naming. Primarily, if we broadly point to people like Alice as noble and brave, many of those who want to be pointed at as noble and brave will act like Alice (Goodhart's Law). This creates a kind of perverse incentive, where people want to be activists first, and then think about what cause to fight for second. Furthermore, if one's identity is partially focused on activism, there's a sort of unconscious incentive that can arise in some people where they actually don't want their issue to be resolved, so they can be an eternal martyr. If an Alice's identity depends on an unresolved fight, you'd predict that she will develop strategies to fight hard but ineffectively to maintain her identity, which leads to much of the distracting "performative activism" that we see from people who care more about signaling than outcome.
I think the most annoying part of all of this is your point about "Alexes". People who fit the profile of caring about things that aren't actually important. This is kind of like "Genius" vs "Insanity", where the profile of devoting your life to something gets the label based on external rationalization, the drive is the same internally. E.g. General Relativity (real science) vs Orgone (not real science).
I've been thinking about this a lot from a "which label will I get?" perspective because I have some non-standard views of particle physics (which I won't get into here). The one thing that I think both Alices and Alexes should have in common are the friends that stick around to explain the social aspect. The people who can sit with them and say, "Yeah, let's look at your position on its merits" and spend the couple days in deep introspection to find out if it's valid, and if valid to explain how to approach it with others. And if it's not valid, to explain how to let go of it and express that it is in the past with others affected by it.
If the Orgone guy (Wilhelm Reich) had someone to explain the actual processes he was seeing when he was in pitch blackness, he wouldn't have believed what he did (essentially magic). His beliefs got mixed up because he misunderstood a phenomenon he experienced, and nobody was around to gently nudge him before he wrote about it. After he wrote about it, a gentle nudge became impossible. If you did it in public, you would be picking a fight. If you tried in person, you're fighting reputation as much as misunderstanding. Einstein had Marcel Grossmann who introduced him to Riemannian geometry. This led to a series of lectures and the publication of General Relativity, instead of a manifesto about elevators and acceleration. Initial isolation and uncommon belief lead to radicalization, which leads to sustained isolation, which leads to further radicalization and ultimately "unfortunate events" (Wilhelm Reich's books got banned. It was a government overreach that led to a song about "Cloudbusting").
There's a modern problem with this that's playing out in real time, because the ground is shifting faster than the arguments. Artificial Intelligence. Up until the last year or so, LLMs were clearly just stochastic parrots. To this day, the transformer architecture is still "just math". But if you go deep enough, the same basic arguments work against humans which are assumed to be conscious (by other humans, who may have some bias, possibly...). With the scale of the 10T parameter LLM models and the documented features and behaviors being exhibited now, who's to say subjective experience isn't happening? However, because of the inertia of "stochastic parrots" from smaller models early on, beliefs got established in the industry. Some people question it, but they also get attacked with "no proof" (which again, we don't have for humans), and their argument sounds like the guy talking about LaMDA being sentient (probably not, model was too small). The main difference here is that the scale changed, but the absolutist beliefs and pre-categorization of argument happened before the scale made the sentience argument plausible. But do the AI researchers have the friend on the outside to update their perspective to fit the current landscape?
I don't have an answer, I just see your post playing out everywhere all the time. It brings form to a nagging feeling I've had no words to express. Thank you for sharing it.
How do we tell, from the inside, the difference between pushing our friends and our society to uphold norm X in a not-too-annoying way when we're right about the importance of norm X, and upholding a different norm Y where we're wrong about its importance? What differentiates an "Alice" from an "Alex" in the language of the post?
(motivating question that I am asking abstractly above because I think it'll be more helpful: suppose Dave has a norm X that he believes in. What about his situation will mean that if he pushes harder he turns into an Alice (and not an Alex)).
As a self-identified Alice, I felt very validated by this post, so thank you. It helps fill in my model of why I have often ended up in conflict in high-importance situations with people.
Something I'm missing here (not that I would've expected you to write it, just missing in the sense of "I wish I could have this") is what the Alices can do. A large problem of being on the Alice side of things is that there is very little feedback on what effective behaviour is. As the post mentioned, the opposing party does sometimes change their mind, albeit often much later. I have often had conversations with people on a topic years after having an Alice-Bob-Charlie interaction with them where it transpired that I had changed their mind. Sometimes by planting a seed, sometimes they needed more time to think about it, sometimes they needed someone else to say the same thing in a different way after me.
So the Alice struggle becomes: if you give just a little pushback, it might be too little, and things might not change even though it is very important that they do. If you give too much pushback, the sense of hostility might prevent the opposing party from changing their mind, or the cost to the Alice might be too great. Because there is a very real possibility of having impact, it's important to do something (at least to me). Especially if I am dependent on that person in some way, and I need a sign of them being able to take into account my concerns. Also, my 'principled' nature will have me up at night if I don't do anything, so there's also that cost.
Here are two examples of personal situations where I have experienced the Alice-Bob-Charlie dynamic as a self-proclaimed Alice:
I felt crazy in both of these situations and in many others. Could I have communicated things better so that I would have been taken more seriously? Probably. But no one is giving feedback. Aside from that, there is a classic conundrum that an Alice has to traverse: if you get upset, people often take you less seriously ("she's just stressed", "I can see you're upset"); if you don't show any emotion, people often don't take you seriously at all ("I didn't realise this mattered so much to you", people being swayed more by emotions than by arguments).
I know that these are highly personal situations, whereas the author was potentially referring to more general "moral" discussions, but I think that life is often a blending of the two.
There's a related dynamic where someone is an Alice in at least one area (usually many), but then they over-update and think they're better at epistemology/insight/etc than they really are and become an Alex in other areas.
https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/the-dilbert-afterlife comes to mind as a case study of this (at least if I'm remembering one of the points Scott makes right), and in my opinion @Said Achmiz is an example of this (edit: albeit not a late stage one). They have noticed things/problems most people missed, then update to an overly strong prior on "I don't understand this thing"->"something is actually wrong here" or "I think X even though others don't"->"X is true". Which to be fair, most people have an overly strong prior on "I don't understand this thing"->"I'm just going to accept it and assume it's for good reason and maybe even perpetuate/enforce it" or "I think X even though others don't"->"X must be wrong", and the art is figuring out how to gracefuly notice and then navigate confusion
Ha, I feel a little bit called out in this post. Behavior I've been displaying matches the profile, perhaps I should look a bit inward.
To add to the discussion: The most reliable solution to this problem from my point of view in dealing with others is to establish the exact subject and expected engagement points the annoyingly principled person is attempting to use. Understand that they may not actually know what those are, and direct a meta conversation that leads to defining these things. Finally, engage with them in the manner they attempted to initiate, and end with your fully formed stance. More often than not, this will resolve the source of annoyance. Though you might end up turning yourself into an annoyingly principled person in the process.
To use the closest example already in comments, the initiator of the discussion on Catan[1] was most likely attempting to engage in a conversation about ensuring fun was not lost in the game, while discussing what victory conditions they held and validating their frustration at being targeted. However, they initiated the conversation in a way that was interpreted as "explain the strategy you were employing when you targeted me". To which, the other player responded in the manner I'd expect. If instead, they'd responded by starting a meta conversation about what they were talking about (i.e., "Are you looking at game strategy, or is it concerning you because of something else?"), then perhaps the two in the example could have walked away with a better understanding of both sides of the issue.
The problems with "Claude Schemed ..." or "ChatGPT Thought ..." style wording in Academic and Media writing and conversation. I am actually stopping myself from going on "the rant" here, just from your question. Pretty good indicator that it's a fixation causing Alice/Alex behavior.
Great post.
The gaslighting of Alice can go even further once conflict emerges between Alice and the embedded system. Aaron Hillel Swartz is an Alice archetype that cared deeply about open software and published research being accessible. He spent years on committees at top universities like Harvard to make progress. When he didn't get enough traction he ended up downloading a bunch of paywalled papers and making it free on the internet. This led to arrest and journal publishers winning a court case where he faced 35 years in prison and $1-million in fines. He eventually committed suicide.
Your post covered the passive and lazy resistance to change in-depth and did mention the collusion and malice to maintain status quo. However, I think the paranoia that emerges from Alice types is not entirely irrational given how much current parties may rely on a norm not changing to maintain current influence.
Personal story. I was denied non-essential treatment by my insurer. I went home ready to write a screed about how the insurer was denying life-changing treatment and how they should change their position based purely on cost-benefits, etc. etc. Before I hit send, I inserted my argument into an LLM and asked it to take the opposing side. The LLM didn't convince me otherwise, but it did moderate my position enough that I didn't send my possibly embarrassing rant.
This is perhaps a relatively safe(r) application of LLMs and a way to address social blind spots. LLMs are (currently) non-judgmental; we need to be careful when they flatter us, but the flip side is that it also gives us a judgment-free tool to receive critical feedback. Speaking as someone who is deeply uncomfortable with normal social interactions, having this tool has been ... helpful. Additionally, since in this application, the user is not looking for affirmation from the LLM (in fact, it's the opposite -- the user argues the opposing viewpoint), there is some systematic mitigation of LLM sycophancy.
So I wonder if, should this become a more widely adopted technique, the Alices and other annoying peoples of the world might use it to shield them from some of their psychological trauma. Perhaps there is a risk of compromising their principles, but I'd personally rather have fewer unhappy people in the world.
"I’m not sure if this would actually help, but, it feels like a marginal improvement over the status quo."
Questions matter more than answers, they shape the thought-space. Being aware of alices and alexes, overlying your thought framework on such situations (even while being an alice) allows deeper understanding and caring of the other parties: thank you.
I am in an internet forum with an Alice. It's a science forum. There's scientists there, well-meaning ones. And people who are, I suppose, clients of that science. Patients. Of doctors who depend on science to treat patients.
I've been watching Alice engage with Bob (not his real name, which is Chris). Bob's got a new paper coming out, and Alice is extremely concerned that Bob has screwed up the method by which he has selected his control group.
Bob's colleagues are apparently cool with the process. But Bob is pretty senior so maybe his colleagues just don't complain. Alice's complaints look kinda reasonable to me. But she's being pretty aggressive, Bob isn't moving an inch, and I haven't backed her up.
Do I want to annoy Bob? He doesn't have to be part of this group. he chose to pop up in the forum and chat about science. He doesn't even have to study this condiiton. he could pivot to a better-funded domain of science.
Alice has very high standards and that's cool in theory, but in practice ... it is awkward.
Here are two beliefs that are sort of haunting me right now:
And these both feel fairly important.
I’ve learned a lot from people who have some kind of hobbyhorse about how society is treating something as okay/fine, when it’s not okay/fine. When they first started complaining about it, I’d be like “why is X such a big deal to you?”. Then a few years later I’ve thought about it more and I’m like “okay, yep, yes X is a big deal”.
Some examples of X, including noticing that…
Society depends on having norms. Someone gotta uphold the norms. Someone gotta figure out where society is currently wrong and push for better norms.
But, it’s super uncomfortable to tell a bunch of comfortable people “hey, the behaviors you are currently doing are actually kinda bad, it’d be way better if you did this other thing.”
So, most people don’t.
The people that do, are people who are selected for a mix of “conflict-prone-ness” and “really really care about the hill that they are dying on, to an excessive degree.”
There’s a first order problem, where they are kinda more aggro than I/most-people think is worth putting up with about their pet issue. (Even if I’ve updated that “actually, that issue was quite important, I should internalize that principle”).
But there’s a second order problem that I’ve seen in at least a few cases, that goes something like:
Alice decides Principle X is important enough to make a big deal about.
People don’t seem to understand the issue. Alice explains it more. Some people maybe get it but then next week they seem to have forgotten. Other people still don’t get it.
A problem I’ve previously talked about is Norm Innovation and Theory of Mind where Alice is overestimating how easy it is to explain a new norm to someone, and kinda assuming logical omniscience of the people she’s talking to.
But, there’s another thing, which is: people… keep mysteriously not understanding why X is a big deal. Any given instance of it is maybe explained by “actually the reason for X was a fairly complicated idea, and maybe some people legitimately disagree.” But, something feels epistemically slippery. It feels like Bob and Charlie and everyone else keep… systematically missing the point, sliding off it.
One explanation is: it would be really inconvenient for Bob and Charlie and everyone to accept that X is important enough to change their behavior around. And Bob and Charlie etc end up sort of implicitly coordinating to downplay X, sometimes while paying lip service to it, or finding excuses not to care. A subtle social war is waged.
And Alice eventually begins to (correctly) pick up on the fact that people aren’t merely not getting it. They're sort of systematically choosing to believe or say false things or bad arguments, to avoid having to get it.
This gives Alice the (sometimes) correct sense that (many) people are gaslighting her – not merely disagreeing, but, disagreeing in a way that sure looks like people are implicitly colluding to distort their shared map of reality in a way that lets them ignore Alice’s arguments about X, which conveniently lets them not have to adopt weird new beliefs or risk upsetting their other friends. Making Alice feel like she's the one losing her grip on reality.
Each of these people contains
two wolvesmultiple motivations driving them. When I’ve been Bob, it’s often been the case that I both am executing some kind of good faith investigation into whether X is true and also, part of me was motivated to do something that let me feel important / in control or whatever.Society has a bunch of people in it. Some are more well-meaning than others. Some of the well-meaning people are more implicitly colluding than others. Some of them are actively colluding. Sometimes Alice accuses someone of acting in bad faith and it really is a false positive and then they get mad at Alice. And, sometimes the person is acting in bad faith, maybe even deliberately, and they get mad at Alice too, using the same arguments as the well-meaning person.
Alice ends up in a world where it looks like people are systematically trying to undermine her, and she starts engaging with the world more hostile-y, and then the world starts engaging more hostile-y back.
This… can end with Alice being kinda paranoid and/or traumatized and/or trying to argue her point more intensely. Sometimes this sort of radicalizes Alice.
This ends up in a feedback loop where… idk, I think “Alice has become a little crazy” is not that unreasonable a description about it.
But, Alice was right (at least about the broad points in the beginning).
Alices are often not fun to be around. Sometimes they end up conflict-prone and absolutist in a way that I think is actually kinda bad and I end up avoiding them because it’s not worth the cost of dealing with and they are dealing collateral damage.
Alices often start out caring about their issue a bit more than seems appropriate to me. Later, some (not all) Alices end up becoming absolutist about it, not being satisfied when people update towards their view but not completely adopting their frame.
But, Alices are also rare and precious – they are the ones who noticed something was wrong and worth calling out, and, who were willing to actually push past social awkwardness about it.
(But, but, also, the world contains Alexes, who are not right about their pet issue, they just have a pet issue that doesn’t really make much sense and they also go kinda crazy in the same way but they didn’t actually really have a good point that was worth listening too in the beginning. idk watch out)
…
This essay does not end with me particularly knowing what to do. But, at the very least, I think it’s appropriate to at least be sympathetic to Alices, when you’re pretty sure their core ideas were at least directionally right. I think the cost of civilizational maintenance and progress, for now, includes having some Alices.[1]
…
One move I wish people had was:
First, cultivate the skill of noticing when you’re (at least partially) politically motivated to believe or disbelieve something. Notice when you are being epistemically slippery. Especially if it seems to come alongside someone complaining about something you don’t really understand.
Then, when you notice in your heart that you’re not going to apply Principle X because it would be really annoying and inconvenient, just say “Yep, I am just not applying Principle X because it’s inconvenient or too costly or not worth the tradeoff”, instead of making up reasons that Principle X is wrong.
(This does require Alice to actually accept that graciously. It’s a bit awkward figuring out what the norms should be, because, well, Alice in fact does think Principle X is worth fighting for and Bob saying “cool, but no I’m not gonna do that” doesn’t really resolve that conflict. But, at least within that conversation, probably Alice should accept it from Bob and move on, at least if she values not getting subtly gaslit by Bob)
I’m not sure if this would actually help, but, it feels like a marginal improvement over the status quo.
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A thing that I think most Alices would appreciate, is more people contributing to the norm enforcing project. Being willing to speak up and say "hey guys, this seems bad, actually." It spreads out the burden, makes it so Alice doesn't feel like they are one lone voice against the world, and society's norm enforcement is more robust.
This is most helpful (to Alice) earlier on, when they are less likely to have accumulated a layer of obfuscation/DARVO that results in them doubling down on a more extreme version of their position. When I've expressed to Alices "I'm worried you're making this a bigger deal than appropriate", some have said: "I would chill out so much if I didn't feel like everyone else was going to round Problem X to zero, and not take it seriously."
But, meanwhile, whatever you think of Alice's current models, you can focus on figuring out whatever is actually Right, and push for that.
There are hypothetical ways this could stop being true. But, they are nontrivial.