This post is a not a so secret analogy for the AI Alignment problem. Via a fictional dialog, Eliezer explores and counters common questions to the Rocket Alignment Problem as approached by the Mathematics of Intentional Rocketry Institute. 

MIRI researchers will tell you they're worried that "right now, nobody can tell you how to point your rocket’s nose such that it goes to the moon, nor indeed any prespecified celestial destination."

dirk7h105
2
Sometimes a vague phrasing is not an inaccurate demarkation of a more precise concept, but an accurate demarkation of an imprecise concept
Fabien Roger8hΩ390
0
List sorting does not play well with few-shot mostly doesn't replicate with davinci-002. When using length-10 lists (it crushes length-5 no matter the prompt), I get: * 32-shot, no fancy prompt: ~25% * 0-shot, fancy python prompt: ~60%  * 0-shot, no fancy prompt: ~60% So few-shot hurts, but the fancy prompt does not seem to help. Code here. I'm interested if anyone knows another case where a fancy prompt increases performance more than few-shot prompting, where a fancy prompt is a prompt that does not contain information that a human would use to solve the task. This is because I'm looking for counterexamples to the following conjecture: "fine-tuning on k examples beats fancy prompting, even when fancy prompting beats k-shot prompting" (for a reasonable value of k, e.g. the number of examples it would take a human to understand what is going on).
The cost of goods has the same units as the cost of shipping: $/kg. Referencing between them lets you understand how the economy works, e.g. why construction material sourcing and drink bottling has to be local, but oil tankers exist. * An iPhone costs $4,600/kg, about the same as SpaceX charges to launch it to orbit. [1] * Beef, copper, and off-season strawberries are $11/kg, about the same as a 75kg person taking a three-hour, 250km Uber ride costing $3/km. * Oranges and aluminum are $2-4/kg, about the same as flying them to Antarctica. [2] * Rice and crude oil are ~$0.60/kg, about the same as $0.72 for shipping it 5000km across the US via truck. [3,4] Palm oil, soybean oil, and steel are around this price range, with wheat being cheaper. [3] * Coal and iron ore are $0.10/kg, significantly more than the cost of shipping it around the entire world via smallish (Handysize) bulk carriers. Large bulk carriers are another 4x more efficient [6]. * Water is very cheap, with tap water $0.002/kg in NYC. But shipping via tanker is also very cheap, so you can ship it maybe 1000 km before equaling its cost. It's really impressive that for the price of a winter strawberry, we can ship a strawberry-sized lump of coal around the world 100-400 times. [1] iPhone is $4600/kg, large launches sell for $3500/kg, and rideshares for small satellites $6000/kg. Geostationary orbit is more expensive, so it's okay for them to cost more than an iPhone per kg, but Starlink wants to be cheaper. [2] https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/APU0000711415. Can't find numbers but Antarctica flights cost $1.05/kg in 1996. [3] https://www.bts.gov/content/average-freight-revenue-ton-mile [4] https://markets.businessinsider.com/commodities [5] https://www.statista.com/statistics/1232861/tap-water-prices-in-selected-us-cities/ [6] https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Total-unit-shipping-costs-for-dry-bulk-carrier-ships-per-tkm-EUR-tkm-in-2019_tbl3_351748799
Eric Neyman2d33-2
10
I think that people who work on AI alignment (including me) have generally not put enough thought into the question of whether a world where we build an aligned AI is better by their values than a world where we build an unaligned AI. I'd be interested in hearing people's answers to this question. Or, if you want more specific questions: * By your values, do you think a misaligned AI creates a world that "rounds to zero", or still has substantial positive value? * A common story for why aligned AI goes well goes something like: "If we (i.e. humanity) align AI, we can and will use it to figure out what we should use it for, and then we will use it in that way." To what extent is aligned AI going well contingent on something like this happening, and how likely do you think it is to happen? Why? * To what extent is your belief that aligned AI would go well contingent on some sort of assumption like: my idealized values are the same as the idealized values of the people or coalition who will control the aligned AI? * Do you care about AI welfare? Does your answer depend on whether the AI is aligned? If we built an aligned AI, how likely is it that we will create a world that treats AI welfare as important consideration? What if we build a misaligned AI? * Do you think that, to a first approximation, most of the possible value of the future happens in worlds that are optimized for something that resembles your current or idealized values? How bad is it to mostly sacrifice each of these? (What if the future world's values are similar to yours, but is only kinda effectual at pursuing them? What if the world is optimized for something that's only slightly correlated with your values?) How likely are these various options under an aligned AI future vs. an unaligned AI future?
Research Writing Workflow: First figure stuff out * Do research and first figure stuff out, until you feel like you are not confused anymore. * Explain it to a person, or a camera, or ideally to a person and a camera. * If there are any hiccups expand your understanding. * Ideally, as the last step, explain it to somebody whom you have not ever explained it to. * Only once you made a presentation without hiccups you are ready to write post. * If you have a recording this is useful as a starting point.

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Recent Discussion

The history of science has tons of examples of the same thing being discovered multiple time independently; wikipedia has a whole list of examples here. If your goal in studying the history of science is to extract the predictable/overdetermined component of humanity's trajectory, then it makes sense to focus on such examples.

But if your goal is to achieve high counterfactual impact in your own research, then you should probably draw inspiration from the opposite: "singular" discoveries, i.e. discoveries which nobody else was anywhere close to figuring out. After all, if someone else would have figured it out shortly after anyways, then the discovery probably wasn't very counterfactually impactful.

Alas, nobody seems to have made a list of highly counterfactual scientific discoveries, to complement wikipedia's list of multiple discoveries.

To...

A few adjacent thoughts:

  • Why is a programming language like Haskell that is extremely powerful in the sense that if your program compiles, it is the program that you want with a very high probability because most stupid mistakes are now compile errors?
  • Why is there basically no widely used homoiconic language, i.e. a language in which you can use the language itself to <reason about the language/manipulate the language>.

Here we have some technology that is basically ready to use (Haskell or Clojure), but people decide to mostly not use them. And w... (read more)

4Alexander Gietelink Oldenziel1h
I would not say that the central insight of SLT is about priors. Under weak conditions the prior is almost irrelevant. Indeed, the RLCT is independent of the prior under very weak nonvanishing conditions. The story that symmetries mean that the parameter-to-function map is not injective is true but already well-understood outside of SLT. It is a common misconception that this is what SLT amounts to. To be sure - generic symmetries are seen by the RLCT. But these are, in some sense, the uninteresting ones. The interesting thing is the local singular structure and its unfolding in phase transitions during training. The issue of the true distribution not being contained in the model is called 'unrealizability' in Bayesian statistics. It is dealt with in Watanabe's second 'green' book. Nonrealizability is key to the most important insight of SLT contained in the last sections of the second to last chapter of the green book: algorithmic development during training through phase transitions in the free energy. I don't have the time to recap this story here.
4Alexander Gietelink Oldenziel1h
All proofs are contained in the Watanabe's standard text, see here https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/algebraic-geometry-and-statistical-learning-theory/9C8FD1BDC817E2FC79117C7F41544A3A
6kave3h
I think it means the more specific "a discovery that if it counterfactually hadn't happened, wouldn't have happened for a long time". I think this is roughly the "counterfactual" in "counterfactual impact", but I agree not the more widespread one. It would be great to have a single word for this that was clearer.

OC ACXLW Sat April 27 Argumentation and College Admissions

Hello Folks! We are excited to announce the 63rd Orange County ACX/LW meetup, happening this Saturday and most Saturdays after that.

Host: Michael Michalchik Email: michaelmichalchik@gmail.com (For questions or requests) Location: 1970 Port Laurent Place (949) 375-2045 Date: Saturday, April 27 2024 Time 2 pm

Conversation Starters:

  1. You Can Make an Argument for Anything by Nathan J. Robinson: This article argues that it is easy to create superficially convincing arguments for almost any position, no matter how heinous or false. The author suggests that the prevalence of these arguments can make it difficult for the truth to compete in the "marketplace of ideas."

Text link: https://www.currentaffairs.org/2018/11/you-can-make-an-argument-for-anything

Questions for discussion: a) The article suggests that people often do not investigate arguments very closely, and are...

For the last month, @RobertM and I have been exploring the possible use of recommender systems on LessWrong. Today we launched our first site-wide experiment in that direction. 

Behold, a tab with recommendations!

(In the course of our efforts, we also hit upon a frontpage refactor that we reckon is pretty good: tabs instead of a clutter of different sections. For now, only for logged-in users. Logged-out users see the "Latest" tab, which is the same-as-usual list of posts.)

Why algorithmic recommendations?

A core value of LessWrong is to be timeless and not news-driven. However, the central algorithm by which attention allocation happens on the site is the Hacker News algorithm[1], which basically only shows you things that were posted recently, and creates a strong incentive for discussion to always be...

Disappointing to see this is the approach y'all are taking to making ai tools for the site, but I guess it does make sense that you'd want to outsource it. I'd strongly appreciate a way to opt out of having my data sent off-site for this or any future reason.

2Tamsin Leake2h
I would feel better about this if there was a high-infosec platform on which to discuss what is probably the most important topic in history (AI alignment). But noted.
2Ruby2h
Over the years the idea of a closed forum for more sensitive discussion has been raised, but never seemed to quite make sense. Significant issues included: - It seems really hard or impossible to make it secure from nation state attacks - It seems that members would likely leak stuff (even if it's via their own devices not being adequately secure or what) I'm thinking you can get some degree of inconvenience (and therefore delay), but hard to have large shared infrastructure that's that secure from attack.
2Ruby2h
I'd be interested in a comparison with the Latest tab.

TL;DR All GPT-3 models were decommissioned by OpenAI in early January. I present some examples of ongoing interpretability research which would benefit from the organisation rethinking this decision and providing some kind of ongoing research access. This also serves as a review of work I did in 2023 and how it progressed from the original ' SolidGoldMagikarp' discovery just over a year ago into much stranger territory.

Introduction

Some months ago, when OpenAI announced that the decommissioning of all GPT-3 models was to occur on 2024-01-04, I decided I would take some time in the days before that to revisit some of my "glitch token" work from earlier in 2023 and deal with any loose ends that would otherwise become impossible to tie up after that date.

This abrupt termination...

2eukaryote13h
Killer exploration into new avenues of digital mysticism. I have no idea how to assess it but I really enjoyed reading it.

Thanks!

cubefox16m10

I agree. This is unfortunately often done in various fields of research where familiar terms are reused as technical terms.

For example, in ordinary language "organic" means "of biological origin", while in chemistry "organic" describes a type of carbon compound. Those two definitions mostly coincide on Earth (most such compounds are of biological origin), but when astronomers announce they have found "organic" material on an asteroid this leads to confusion.

2Viliam3h
Specific examples would be nice. Not sure if I understand correctly, but I imagine something like this: You always choose A over B. You have been doing it for such long time that you forgot why. Without reflecting about this directly, it just seems like there probably is a rational reason or something. But recently, either accidentally or by experiment, you chose B... and realized that experiencing B (or expecting to experience B) creates unpleasant emotions. So now you know that the emotions were the real cause of choosing A over B all that time. (This is probably wrong, but hey, people say that the best way to elicit answer is to provide a wrong one.)
1cubefox4h
Yeah. It's possible to give quite accurate definitions of some vague concepts, because the words used in such definitions also express vague concepts. E.g. "cygnet" - "a young swan".
1dkornai5h
I would say that if a concept is imprecise, more words [but good and precise words] have to be dedicated to faithfully representing the diffuse nature of the topic. If this larger faithful representation is compressed down to fewer words, that can lead to vague phrasing. I would therefore often view vauge phrasing as a compression artefact, rather than a necessary outcome of translating certain types of concepts to words. 

My credence: 33% confidence in the claim that the growth in the number of GPUs used for training SOTA AI will slow down significantly directly after GPT-5. It is not higher because of (1) decentralized training is possible, and (2) GPT-5 may be able to increase hardware efficiency significantly, (3) GPT-5 may be smaller than assumed in this post, (4) race dynamics.

TLDR: Because of a bottleneck in energy access to data centers and the need to build OOM larger data centers.

Update: See Vladimir_Nesov's comment below for why this claim is likely wrong, since decentralized training seems to be solved. 

The reasoning behind the claim:

...
6Chris_Leong2h
Only 33% confidence? It seems strange to state X will happen if your odds are < 50%
4Maxime Riché1h
The title is clearly an overstatement. It expresses more that I updated in that direction, than that I am confident in it.  Also, since learning from other comments that decentralized learning is likely solved, I am now even less confident in the claim, like only 15% chance that it will happen in the strong form stated in the post. Maybe I should edit the post to make it even more clear that the claim is retracted.
38Vladimir_Nesov4h
Distributed training seems close enough to being a solved problem that a project costing north of a billion dollars might get it working on schedule. It's easier to stay within a single datacenter, and so far it wasn't necessary to do more than that, so distributed training not being routinely used yet is hardly evidence that it's very hard to implement. There's also this snippet in the Gemini report: I think the crux for feasibility of further scaling (beyond $10-$50 billion) is whether systems with currently-reasonable cost keep getting sufficiently more useful, for example enable economically valuable agentic behavior, things like preparing pull requests based on feature/bug discussion on an issue tracker, or fixing failing builds. Meaningful help with research is a crux for reaching TAI and ASI, but it doesn't seem necessary for enabling existence of a $2 trillion AI company.

Thank for the great comment!

Do we know if distributed training is expected to scale well to GPT-6 size models (100 trillions parameters) trained over like 20 data centers? How does the communication cost scale with the size of the model and the number of data centers? Linearly on both?

After reading for 3 min this:
Google Cloud demonstrates the world’s largest distributed training job for large language models across 50000+ TPU v5e chips (Google November 2023). It seems that scaling is working efficiently at least up to 50k GPUs (GPT-6 would be like 2.5... (read more)

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Concerns over AI safety and calls for government control over the technology are highly correlated but they should not be.

There are two major forms of AI risk: misuse and misalignment. Misuse risks come from humans using AIs as tools in dangerous ways. Misalignment risks arise if AIs take their own actions at the expense of human interests.

Governments are poor stewards for both types of risk. Misuse regulation is like the regulation of any other technology. There are reasonable rules that the government might set, but omission bias and incentives to protect small but well organized groups at the expense of everyone else will lead to lots of costly ones too. Misalignment regulation is not in the Overton window for any government. Governments do not have strong incentives...

I don't think staging a civil war is generally a good way of saving lives. Moreover, ordinary aging has about a 100% chance of "killing literally everyone" prematurely, so it's unclear to me what moral distinction you're trying to make in your comment. It's possible you think that:

  1. Death from aging is not as bad as death from AI because aging is natural whereas AI is artificial
  2. Death from aging is not as bad as death from AI because human civilization would continue if everyone dies from aging, whereas it would not continue if AI kills everyone

In the case of... (read more)

3Rudi C1h
AGI might increase the risk of totalitarianism. OTOH, a shift in the attack-defense balance could potentially boost the veto power of individuals, so it might also work as a deterrent or a force for anarchy. This is not the crux of my argument, however. The current regulatory Overton window seems to heavily favor a selective pause of AGI, such that centralized powers will continue ahead, even if slower due to their inherent inefficiencies. Nuclear development provides further historical evidence for this. Closed AGI development will almost surely lead to a dystopic totalitarian regime. The track record of Lesswrong is not rosy here; the "Pivotal Act" still seems to be in popular favor, and OpenAI has significantly accelerated closed AGI development while lobbying to close off open research and pioneering the new "AI Safety" that has been nothing but censorship and double-think as of 2024.
2Matthew Barnett3h
That depends on the benefits that we get from a 1-year pause. I'd be open to the policy, but I'm not currently convinced that the benefits would be large enough to justify the costs. I didn't side-swipe at longtermism, or try to dunk on it. I think longtermism is a decent philosophy, and I consider myself a longtermist in the dictionary sense as you quoted. I was simply talking about people who aren't "fully committed" to the (strong) version of the philosophy.
4Daniel Kokotajlo6h
Big +1 to that. Part of why I support (some kinds of) AI regulation is that I think they'll reduce the risk of totalitarianism, not increase it.

(Half-baked work-in-progress. There might be a “version 2” of this post at some point, with fewer mistakes, and more neuroscience details, and nice illustrations and pedagogy etc. But it’s fun to chat and see if anyone has thoughts.)

1. Background

There’s a neuroscience problem that’s had me stumped since almost the very beginning of when I became interested in neuroscience at all (as a lens into AGI safety) back in 2019. But I think I might finally have “a foot in the door” towards a solution!

What is this problem? As described in my post Symbol Grounding and Human Social Instincts, I believe the following:

...

Tangentially related: some advanced meditators report that their sense that perception has a center vanishes at a certain point along the meditative path, and this is associated with a reduction in suffering.

3Carl Feynman32m
You write: …But I think people can be afraid of heights without past experience of falling… I have seen it claimed that crawling-age babies are afraid of heights, in that they will not crawl from a solid floor to a glass platform over a yawning gulf.  And they’ve never fallen into a yawning gulf.  At that age, probably all the heights they’ve fallen from have been harmless, since the typical baby is both bouncy and close to the ground.
2Steven Byrnes1h
If I’m looking up at the clouds, or at a distant mountain range, then everything is far away (the ground could be cut off from my field-of-view)—but it doesn’t trigger the sensations of fear-of-heights, right? Also, I think blind people can be scared of heights? Another possible fear-of-heights story just occurred to me—I added to the post in a footnote, along with why I don’t believe it.
8Carl Feynman2h
We've learned a lot about the visual system by looking at ways to force it to wrong conclusions, which we call optical illusions or visual art.  Can we do a similar thing for this postulated social cognition system?  For example, how do actors get us to have social feelings toward people who don't really exist?  And what rules do movie directors follow to keep us from getting confused by cuts from one camera angle to another?

Research Writing Workflow: First figure stuff out

  • Do research and first figure stuff out, until you feel like you are not confused anymore.
  • Explain it to a person, or a camera, or ideally to a person and a camera.
    • If there are any hiccups expand your understanding.
    • Ideally, as the last step, explain it to somebody whom you have not ever explained it to.
  • Only once you made a presentation without hiccups you are ready to write post.
    • If you have a recording this is useful as a starting point.
2Carl Feynman7h
I would highly recommend getting someone else to debug your subconscious for you.  At least it worked for me.  I don’t think it would be possible for me to have debugged myself.   My first therapist was highly directive.  He’d say stuff like “Try noticing when you think X, and asking yourself what happened immediately before that.  Report back next week.” And listing agenda items and drawing diagrams on a whiteboard.  As an engineer, I loved it.  My second therapist was more in the “providing supportive comments while I talk about my life” school.  I don’t think that helped much, at least subjectively from the inside. Here‘s a possibly instructive anecdote about my first therapist.  Near the end of a session, I feel like my mind has been stretched in some heretofore-unknown direction.  It’s a sensation I’ve never had before.  So I say, “Wow, my mind feels like it’s been stretched in some heretofore-unknown direction.  How do you do that?”  He says, “Do you want me to explain?”  And I say, “Does it still work if I know what you’re doing?”  And he says, “Possibly not, but it’s important you feel I’m trustworthy, so I’ll explain if you want.”  So I say “Why mess with success?  Keep doing the thing. I trust you.”  That’s an example of a debugging procedure you can’t do to yourself.

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