This post is a not a so secret analogy for the AI Alignment problem. Via a fictional dialog, Eliezer explores and counters common questions to the Rocket Alignment Problem as approached by the Mathematics of Intentional Rocketry Institute. 

MIRI researchers will tell you they're worried that "right now, nobody can tell you how to point your rocket’s nose such that it goes to the moon, nor indeed any prespecified celestial destination."

Fabien Roger1hΩ240
0
List sorting does not play well with few-shot mostly doesn't replicate with davinci-002. When using length-10 lists (it crushes length-5 no matter the prompt), I get: * 32-shot, no fancy prompt: ~25% * 0-shot, fancy python prompt: ~60%  * 0-shot, no fancy prompt: ~60% So few-shot hurts, but the fancy prompt does not seem to help. Code here. I'm interested if anyone knows another case where a fancy prompt increases performance more than few-shot prompting, where a fancy prompt is a prompt that does not contain information that a human would use to solve the task. This is because I'm looking for counterexamples to the following conjecture: "fine-tuning on k examples beats fancy prompting, even when fancy prompting beats k-shot prompting" (for a reasonable value of k, e.g. the number of examples it would take a human to understand what is going on).
Thomas Kwa16h183
0
The cost of goods has the same units as the cost of shipping: $/kg. Referencing between them lets you understand how the economy works, e.g. why construction material sourcing and drink bottling has to be local, but oil tankers exist. * An iPhone costs $4,600/kg, about the same as SpaceX charges to launch it to orbit. [1] * Beef, copper, and off-season strawberries are $11/kg, about the same as a 75kg person taking a three-hour, 250km Uber ride costing $3/km. * Oranges and aluminum are $2-4/kg, about the same as flying them to Antarctica. [2] * Rice and crude oil are ~$0.60/kg, about the same as $0.72 for shipping it 5000km across the US via truck. [3,4] Palm oil, soybean oil, and steel are around this price range, with wheat being cheaper. [3] * Coal and iron ore are $0.10/kg, significantly more than the cost of shipping it around the entire world via smallish (Handysize) bulk carriers. Large bulk carriers are another 4x more efficient [6]. * Water is very cheap, with tap water $0.002/kg in NYC. But shipping via tanker is also very cheap, so you can ship it maybe 1000 km before equaling its cost. It's really impressive that for the price of a winter strawberry, we can ship a strawberry-sized lump of coal around the world 100-400 times. [1] iPhone is $4600/kg, large launches sell for $3500/kg, and rideshares for small satellites $6000/kg. Geostationary orbit is more expensive, so it's okay for them to cost more than an iPhone per kg, but Starlink wants to be cheaper. [2] https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/APU0000711415. Can't find numbers but Antarctica flights cost $1.05/kg in 1996. [3] https://www.bts.gov/content/average-freight-revenue-ton-mile [4] https://markets.businessinsider.com/commodities [5] https://www.statista.com/statistics/1232861/tap-water-prices-in-selected-us-cities/ [6] https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Total-unit-shipping-costs-for-dry-bulk-carrier-ships-per-tkm-EUR-tkm-in-2019_tbl3_351748799
I think that people who work on AI alignment (including me) have generally not put enough thought into the question of whether a world where we build an aligned AI is better by their values than a world where we build an unaligned AI. I'd be interested in hearing people's answers to this question. Or, if you want more specific questions: * By your values, do you think a misaligned AI creates a world that "rounds to zero", or still has substantial positive value? * A common story for why aligned AI goes well goes something like: "If we (i.e. humanity) align AI, we can and will use it to figure out what we should use it for, and then we will use it in that way." To what extent is aligned AI going well contingent on something like this happening, and how likely do you think it is to happen? Why? * To what extent is your belief that aligned AI would go well contingent on some sort of assumption like: my idealized values are the same as the idealized values of the people or coalition who will control the aligned AI? * Do you care about AI welfare? Does your answer depend on whether the AI is aligned? If we built an aligned AI, how likely is it that we will create a world that treats AI welfare as important consideration? What if we build a misaligned AI? * Do you think that, to a first approximation, most of the possible value of the future happens in worlds that are optimized for something that resembles your current or idealized values? How bad is it to mostly sacrifice each of these? (What if the future world's values are similar to yours, but is only kinda effectual at pursuing them? What if the world is optimized for something that's only slightly correlated with your values?) How likely are these various options under an aligned AI future vs. an unaligned AI future?
dirk1h10
0
I'm against intuitive terminology [epistemic status: 60%] because it creates the illusion of transparency; opaque terms make it clear you're missing something, but if you already have an intuitive definition that differs from the author's it's easy to substitute yours in without realizing you've misunderstood.
My current main cruxes: 1. Will AI get takeover capability? When? 2. Single ASI or many AGIs? 3. Will we solve technical alignment? 4. Value alignment, intent alignment, or CEV? 5. Defense>offense or offense>defense? 6. Is a long-term pause achievable? If there is reasonable consensus on any one of those, I'd much appreciate to know about it. Else, I think these should be research priorities.

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Epistemic – this post is more suitable for LW as it was 10 years ago

 

Thought experiment with curing a disease by forgetting

Imagine I have a bad but rare disease X. I may try to escape it in the following way:

1. I enter the blank state of mind and forget that I had X.

2. Now I in some sense merge with a very large number of my (semi)copies in parallel worlds who do the same. I will be in the same state of mind as other my copies, some of them have disease X, but most don’t.  

3. Now I can use self-sampling assumption for observer-moments (Strong SSA) and think that I am randomly selected from all these exactly the same observer-moments. 

4. Based on this, the chances that my next observer-moment after...

True. But for that you need there to exist another mind almost identical to yours except for that one thing. 

In the question "how much of my memories can I delete while retaining my thread of subjective experience?" I don't expect there to be an objective answer. 

About a year ago I decided to try using one of those apps where you tie your goals to some kind of financial penalty. The specific one I tried is Forfeit, which I liked the look of because it’s relatively simple, you set single tasks which you have to verify you have completed with a photo.

I’m generally pretty sceptical of productivity systems, tools for thought, mindset shifts, life hacks and so on. But this one I have found to be really shockingly effective, it has been about the biggest positive change to my life that I can remember. I feel like the category of things which benefit from careful planning and execution over time has completely opened up to me, whereas previously things like this would be largely down to the...

I know a child who often has this reaction to negative consequences, natural or imposed. I'd welcome discussion on what works well for that mindset. I don't have any insight, it's not how my mind works.

It seems like very very small consequences can help a bit. Also trying to address the anxiety with OTC supplements like Magnesium Glycinate and lavender oil.

2Fer32dwt34r3dfsz12h
Can you provide any further detail here, i.e. be more specific on origin-stratified-retention rates? (I would appreciate this, even if this might require some additional effort searching)
3CronoDAS14h
My depression is currently well-controlled at the moment, and I actually have found various methods to help me get things done, since I don't respond well to the simplest versions of carrot-and-stick methods. The most pleasant is finding someone else to do it with me (or at least act involved while I do the actual work). On the other hand, there have been times when procrastinating actually gives me a thrill, like I'm getting away with something. Mediocre video games become much more appealing when I have work to avoid.

My current main cruxes:

  1. Will AI get takeover capability? When?
  2. Single ASI or many AGIs?
  3. Will we solve technical alignment?
  4. Value alignment, intent alignment, or CEV?
  5. Defense>offense or offense>defense?
  6. Is a long-term pause achievable?

If there is reasonable consensus on any one of those, I'd much appreciate to know about it. Else, I think these should be research priorities.

In short: Training runs of large Machine Learning systems are likely to last less than 14-15 months. This is because longer runs will be outcompeted by runs that start later and therefore use better hardware and better algorithms. [Edited 2022/09/22 to fix an error in the hardware improvements + rising investments calculation]

ScenarioLongest training run
Hardware improvements3.55 years
Hardware improvements + Software improvements1.22 years
Hardware improvements + Rising investments9.12 months
Hardware improvements + Rising investments + Software improvements2.52 months

Larger compute budgets and a better understanding of how to effectively use compute (through, for example, using scaling laws) are two major driving forces of progress in recent Machine Learning.

There are many ways to increase your effective compute budget: better hardware, rising investments in AI R&D and improvements in algorithmic efficiency. In this article...

1Maxime Riché1h
  Why is g_I here 3.84, while above it is 1.03?

This is actually corrected on the Epoch website but not here (https://epochai.org/blog/the-longest-training-run)

Post for a somewhat more general audience than the modal LessWrong reader, but gets at my actual thoughts on the topic.

In 2018 OpenAI defeated the world champions of Dota 2, a major esports game. This was hot on the heels of DeepMind’s AlphaGo performance against Lee Sedol in 2016, achieving superhuman Go performance way before anyone thought that might happen. AI benchmarks were being cleared at a pace which felt breathtaking at the time, papers were proudly published, and ML tools like Tensorflow (released in 2015) were coming online. To people already interested in AI, it was an exciting era. To everyone else, the world was unchanged.

Now Saturday Night Live sketches use sober discussions of AI risk as the backdrop for their actual jokes, there are hundreds...

The reason why EY&co were relatively optimistic (p(doom) ~ 50%) before AlphaGo was their assumption "to build intelligence, you need some kind of insight in theory of intelligence". They didn't expect that you can just take sufficiently large approximator, pour data inside, get intelligent behavior and have no idea about why you get intelligent behavior.

3avturchin2h
LLMs now can also self-play in adversarial word games and it increases their performance https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.10642 
1zeshen3h
I agree with RL agents being misaligned by default, even more so for the non-imitation-learned ones. I mean, even LLMs trained on human-generated data are misaligned by default, regardless of what definition of 'alignment' is being used. But even with misalignment by default, I'm just less convinced that their capabilities would grow fast enough to be able to cause an existential catastrophe in the near-term, if we use LLM capability improvement trends as a reference. 
5Wei Dai3h
If something is both a vanguard and limited, then it seemingly can't stay a vanguard for long. I see a few different scenarios going forward: 1. We pause AI development while LLMs are still the vanguard. 2. The data limitation is overcome with something like IDA or Debate. 3. LLMs are overtaken by another AI technology, perhaps based on RL. In terms of relative safety, it's probably 1 > 2 > 3. Given that 2 might not happen in time, might not be safe if it does, or might still be ultimately outcompeted by something else like RL, I'm not getting very optimistic about AI safety just yet.
This is a linkpost for https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.16014

Authors: Senthooran Rajamanoharan*, Arthur Conmy*, Lewis Smith, Tom Lieberum, Vikrant Varma, János Kramár, Rohin Shah, Neel Nanda

A new paper from the Google DeepMind mech interp team: Improving Dictionary Learning with Gated Sparse Autoencoders! 

Gated SAEs are a new Sparse Autoencoder architecture that seems to be a significant Pareto-improvement over normal SAEs, verified on models up to Gemma 7B. They are now our team's preferred way to train sparse autoencoders, and we'd love to see them adopted by the community! (Or to be convinced that it would be a bad idea for them to be adopted by the community!)

They achieve similar reconstruction with about half as many firing features, and while being either comparably or more interpretable (confidence interval for the increase is 0%-13%).

See Sen's Twitter summary, my Twitter summary, and the paper!

UPDATE: we've corrected equations 9 and 10 in the paper (screenshot of the draft below) and also added a footnote that hopefully helps clarify the derivation. I've also attached a revised figure 6, showing that this doesn't change the overall story (for the mathematical reasons I mentioned in my previous comment). These will go up on arXiv, along with some other minor changes (like remembering to mention SAEs' widths), likely some point next week. Thanks again Sam for pointing this out!

Updated equations (draft):

Updated figure 6 (shrinkage comparison for GE... (read more)

1Dan Braun5h
This is neat, nice work! I'm finding it quite hard to get a sense at what the actual Loss Recovered numbers you report are, and to compare them concretely to other work. If possible, it'd be very helpful if you shared: 1. What the zero ablations CE scores are for each model and SAE position. (I assume it's much worse for the MLP and attention outputs than the residual stream?) 2. What the baseline CE scores are for each model.
2Rohin Shah7h
This suggestion seems less expressive than (but similar in spirit to) the "rescale & shift" baseline we compare to in Figure 9. The rescale & shift baseline is sufficient to resolve shrinkage, but it doesn't capture all the benefits of Gated SAEs. The core point is that L1 regularization adds lots of biases, of which shrinkage is just one example, so you want to localize the effect of L1 as much as possible. In our setup L1 applies to ReLU(πgate(x)), so you might think of πgate as "tainted", and want to use it as little as possible. The only thing you really need L1 for is to deter the model from setting too many features active, i.e. you need it to apply to one bit per feature (whether that feature is on / off). The Heaviside step function makes sure we are extracting just that one bit, and relying on fmag for everything else.
4Neel Nanda11h
Re dictionary width, 2**17 (~131K) for most Gated SAEs, 3*(2**16) for baseline SAEs, except for the (Pythia-2.8B, Residual Stream) sites we used 2**15 for Gated and 3*(2**14) for baseline since early runs of these had lots of feature death. (This'll be added to the paper soon, sorry!). I'll leave the other Qs for my co-authors
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The history of science has tons of examples of the same thing being discovered multiple time independently; wikipedia has a whole list of examples here. If your goal in studying the history of science is to extract the predictable/overdetermined component of humanity's trajectory, then it makes sense to focus on such examples.

But if your goal is to achieve high counterfactual impact in your own research, then you should probably draw inspiration from the opposite: "singular" discoveries, i.e. discoveries which nobody else was anywhere close to figuring out. After all, if someone else would have figured it out shortly after anyways, then the discovery probably wasn't very counterfactually impactful.

Alas, nobody seems to have made a list of highly counterfactual scientific discoveries, to complement wikipedia's list of multiple discoveries.

To...

2dr_s2h
Well, it's hard to tell because most other civilizations at the required level of wealth to discover this (by which I mean both sailing and surplus enough to have people who worry about the shape of the Earth at all) could one way or another have learned it via osmosis from Greece. If you only have essentially two examples, how do you tell whether it was the one who discovered it who was unusually observant rather than the one who didn't who was unusually blind? But it's an interesting question, it might indeed be a relatively accidental thing which for some reason was accepted sooner than you would have expected (after all, sails disappearing could be explained by an Earth that's merely dome-shaped; the strongest evidence for a completely spherical shape was probably the fact that lunar eclipses feature always a perfect disc shaped shadow, and even that requires interpreting eclipses correctly, and having enough of them in the first place).
3francis kafka3h
Bowler's comment on Wallace is that his theory was not worked out to the extent that Darwin's was, and besides I recall that he was a theistic evolutionist. Even with Wallace, there was still a plethora of non-Darwinian evolutionary theories before and after Darwin, and without the force of Darwin's version, it's not likely or necessary that Darwinism wins out.    Also  And he points out that minus Darwin, nobody would have paid as much attention to Wallace.  Bowler also points out that Wallace didn't really form the connection between both natural and artificial selection. 

In some of his books on evolution, Dawkins also said very similar things when commenting on Darwin vs Wallace, basically saying that there's no comparison, Darwin had a better grasp of things, justified it better and more extensively, didn't have muddled thinking about mechanisms, etc.

3kromem12h
Though the Greeks actually credited the idea to an even earlier Phonecian, Mochus of Sidon. Through when it comes to antiquity credit isn't really "first to publish" as much as "first of the last to pass the survivorship filter."

List sorting does not play well with few-shot mostly doesn't replicate with davinci-002.

When using length-10 lists (it crushes length-5 no matter the prompt), I get:

  • 32-shot, no fancy prompt: ~25%
  • 0-shot, fancy python prompt: ~60% 
  • 0-shot, no fancy prompt: ~60%

So few-shot hurts, but the fancy prompt does not seem to help. Code here.

I'm interested if anyone knows another case where a fancy prompt increases performance more than few-shot prompting, where a fancy prompt is a prompt that does not contain information that a human would use to solve the task. ... (read more)

dirk1h10

I'm against intuitive terminology [epistemic status: 60%] because it creates the illusion of transparency; opaque terms make it clear you're missing something, but if you already have an intuitive definition that differs from the author's it's easy to substitute yours in without realizing you've misunderstood.

1dirk1h
I'm not alexithymic; I directly experience my emotions and have, additionally, introspective access to my preferences. However, some things manifest directly as preferences which I have been shocked to realize in my old age, were in fact emotions all along. (In rare cases these are stronger than the ones directly-felt even, despite reliably seeming on initial inspection to be simply neutral metadata).
1dirk2h
Classic type of argument-gone-wrong (also IMO a way autistic 'hyperliteralism' or 'over-concreteness' can look in practice, though I expect that isn't always what's behind it): Ashton makes a meta-level point X based on Birch's meta point Y about object-level subject matter Z. Ashton thinks the topic of conversation is Y and Z is only relevant as the jumping-off point that sparked it, while Birch wanted to discuss Z and sees X as only relevant insofar as it pertains to Z. Birch explains that X is incorrect with respect to Z; Ashton, frustrated, reiterates that Y is incorrect with respect to X. This can proceed for quite some time with each feeling as though the other has dragged a sensible discussion onto their irrelevant pet issue; Ashton sees Birch's continual returns to Z as a gotcha distracting from the meta-level topic XY, whilst Birch in turn sees Ashton's focus on the meta-level point as sophistry to avoid addressing the object-level topic YZ. It feels almost exactly the same to be on either side of this, so misunderstandings like this are difficult to detect or resolve while involved in one.
1dirk2h
Meta/object level is one possible mixup but it doesn't need to be that. Alternative example, is/ought: Cedar objects to thing Y. Dusk explains that it happens because Z. Cedar reiterates that it shouldn't happen, Dusk clarifies that in fact it is the natural outcome of Z, and we're off once more.

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