This post is a not a so secret analogy for the AI Alignment problem. Via a fictional dialog, Eliezer explores and counters common questions to the Rocket Alignment Problem as approached by the Mathematics of Intentional Rocketry Institute. 

MIRI researchers will tell you they're worried that "right now, nobody can tell you how to point your rocket’s nose such that it goes to the moon, nor indeed any prespecified celestial destination."

Fabien Roger11hΩ4110
0
List sorting does not play well with few-shot mostly doesn't replicate with davinci-002. When using length-10 lists (it crushes length-5 no matter the prompt), I get: * 32-shot, no fancy prompt: ~25% * 0-shot, fancy python prompt: ~60%  * 0-shot, no fancy prompt: ~60% So few-shot hurts, but the fancy prompt does not seem to help. Code here. I'm interested if anyone knows another case where a fancy prompt increases performance more than few-shot prompting, where a fancy prompt is a prompt that does not contain information that a human would use to solve the task. This is because I'm looking for counterexamples to the following conjecture: "fine-tuning on k examples beats fancy prompting, even when fancy prompting beats k-shot prompting" (for a reasonable value of k, e.g. the number of examples it would take a human to understand what is going on).
dirk10h105
2
Sometimes a vague phrasing is not an inaccurate demarkation of a more precise concept, but an accurate demarkation of an imprecise concept
The cost of goods has the same units as the cost of shipping: $/kg. Referencing between them lets you understand how the economy works, e.g. why construction material sourcing and drink bottling has to be local, but oil tankers exist. * An iPhone costs $4,600/kg, about the same as SpaceX charges to launch it to orbit. [1] * Beef, copper, and off-season strawberries are $11/kg, about the same as a 75kg person taking a three-hour, 250km Uber ride costing $3/km. * Oranges and aluminum are $2-4/kg, about the same as flying them to Antarctica. [2] * Rice and crude oil are ~$0.60/kg, about the same as $0.72 for shipping it 5000km across the US via truck. [3,4] Palm oil, soybean oil, and steel are around this price range, with wheat being cheaper. [3] * Coal and iron ore are $0.10/kg, significantly more than the cost of shipping it around the entire world via smallish (Handysize) bulk carriers. Large bulk carriers are another 4x more efficient [6]. * Water is very cheap, with tap water $0.002/kg in NYC. But shipping via tanker is also very cheap, so you can ship it maybe 1000 km before equaling its cost. It's really impressive that for the price of a winter strawberry, we can ship a strawberry-sized lump of coal around the world 100-400 times. [1] iPhone is $4600/kg, large launches sell for $3500/kg, and rideshares for small satellites $6000/kg. Geostationary orbit is more expensive, so it's okay for them to cost more than an iPhone per kg, but Starlink wants to be cheaper. [2] https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/APU0000711415. Can't find numbers but Antarctica flights cost $1.05/kg in 1996. [3] https://www.bts.gov/content/average-freight-revenue-ton-mile [4] https://markets.businessinsider.com/commodities [5] https://www.statista.com/statistics/1232861/tap-water-prices-in-selected-us-cities/ [6] https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Total-unit-shipping-costs-for-dry-bulk-carrier-ships-per-tkm-EUR-tkm-in-2019_tbl3_351748799
Eric Neyman2d33-1
10
I think that people who work on AI alignment (including me) have generally not put enough thought into the question of whether a world where we build an aligned AI is better by their values than a world where we build an unaligned AI. I'd be interested in hearing people's answers to this question. Or, if you want more specific questions: * By your values, do you think a misaligned AI creates a world that "rounds to zero", or still has substantial positive value? * A common story for why aligned AI goes well goes something like: "If we (i.e. humanity) align AI, we can and will use it to figure out what we should use it for, and then we will use it in that way." To what extent is aligned AI going well contingent on something like this happening, and how likely do you think it is to happen? Why? * To what extent is your belief that aligned AI would go well contingent on some sort of assumption like: my idealized values are the same as the idealized values of the people or coalition who will control the aligned AI? * Do you care about AI welfare? Does your answer depend on whether the AI is aligned? If we built an aligned AI, how likely is it that we will create a world that treats AI welfare as important consideration? What if we build a misaligned AI? * Do you think that, to a first approximation, most of the possible value of the future happens in worlds that are optimized for something that resembles your current or idealized values? How bad is it to mostly sacrifice each of these? (What if the future world's values are similar to yours, but is only kinda effectual at pursuing them? What if the world is optimized for something that's only slightly correlated with your values?) How likely are these various options under an aligned AI future vs. an unaligned AI future?
My current main cruxes: 1. Will AI get takeover capability? When? 2. Single ASI or many AGIs? 3. Will we solve technical alignment? 4. Value alignment, intent alignment, or CEV? 5. Defense>offense or offense>defense? 6. Is a long-term pause achievable? If there is reasonable consensus on any one of those, I'd much appreciate to know about it. Else, I think these should be research priorities.

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The history of science has tons of examples of the same thing being discovered multiple time independently; wikipedia has a whole list of examples here. If your goal in studying the history of science is to extract the predictable/overdetermined component of humanity's trajectory, then it makes sense to focus on such examples.

But if your goal is to achieve high counterfactual impact in your own research, then you should probably draw inspiration from the opposite: "singular" discoveries, i.e. discoveries which nobody else was anywhere close to figuring out. After all, if someone else would have figured it out shortly after anyways, then the discovery probably wasn't very counterfactually impactful.

Alas, nobody seems to have made a list of highly counterfactual scientific discoveries, to complement wikipedia's list of multiple discoveries.

To...

kave11m20

Maybe "counterfactually robust" is an OK phrase?

1Johannes C. Mayer3h
A few adjacent thoughts: * Why is a programming language like Haskell that is extremely powerful in the sense that if your program compiles, it is the program that you want with a very high probability because most stupid mistakes are now compile errors? * Why is there basically no widely used homoiconic language, i.e. a language in which you can use the language itself to <reason about the language/manipulate the language>. Here we have some technology that is basically ready to use (Haskell or Clojure), but people decide to mostly not use them. And with people, I mean professional programmers and companions who make software. * Why did nobody invent Rust earlier, by which I mean a system-level programming language that prevents you from making really dumb mistakes that can be machine-checked if you make them? * Why did it take like 40 years to get a latex replacement, even though latex is terrible in very obvious ways? These things have in common that there is a big engineering challenge. It feels like maybe this explains it, together with that people who would benefit from these technologies where in the position that the cost of creating them would have exceeded the benefit that they would expect from them. For Haskell and Clojure we can also consider this point. Certainly, these two technologies have their flaws and could be improved. But then again we would have a massive engineering challenge.
4Alexander Gietelink Oldenziel4h
I would not say that the central insight of SLT is about priors. Under weak conditions the prior is almost irrelevant. Indeed, the RLCT is independent of the prior under very weak nonvanishing conditions. The story that symmetries mean that the parameter-to-function map is not injective is true but already well-understood outside of SLT. It is a common misconception that this is what SLT amounts to. To be sure - generic symmetries are seen by the RLCT. But these are, in some sense, the uninteresting ones. The interesting thing is the local singular structure and its unfolding in phase transitions during training. The issue of the true distribution not being contained in the model is called 'unrealizability' in Bayesian statistics. It is dealt with in Watanabe's second 'green' book. Nonrealizability is key to the most important insight of SLT contained in the last sections of the second to last chapter of the green book: algorithmic development during training through phase transitions in the free energy. I don't have the time to recap this story here.
3mattmacdermott3h
Lucius-Alexander SLT dialogue?

(Half-baked work-in-progress. There might be a “version 2” of this post at some point, with fewer mistakes, and more neuroscience details, and nice illustrations and pedagogy etc. But it’s fun to chat and see if anyone has thoughts.)

1. Background

There’s a neuroscience problem that’s had me stumped since almost the very beginning of when I became interested in neuroscience at all (as a lens into AGI safety) back in 2019. But I think I might finally have “a foot in the door” towards a solution!

What is this problem? As described in my post Symbol Grounding and Human Social Instincts, I believe the following:

...
6interstice3h
Tangentially related: some advanced meditators report that their sense that perception has a center vanishes at a certain point along the meditative path, and this is associated with a reduction in suffering.
3Carl Feynman4h
You write: …But I think people can be afraid of heights without past experience of falling… I have seen it claimed that crawling-age babies are afraid of heights, in that they will not crawl from a solid floor to a glass platform over a yawning gulf.  And they’ve never fallen into a yawning gulf.  At that age, probably all the heights they’ve fallen from have been harmless, since the typical baby is both bouncy and close to the ground.
2Steven Byrnes4h
If I’m looking up at the clouds, or at a distant mountain range, then everything is far away (the ground could be cut off from my field-of-view)—but it doesn’t trigger the sensations of fear-of-heights, right? Also, I think blind people can be scared of heights? Another possible fear-of-heights story just occurred to me—I added to the post in a footnote, along with why I don’t believe it.

The vestibular system can detect whether you look up or down. It could be that the reflex triggers when you a) look down (vestibular system) and b) have a visual parallax that indicates depth (visual system).

Should be easy to test by closing one eye. Alternatively, it is the degree of accommodation of the lens. That should be testable by looking down with a lens that forces accommodation on short distances.

The negative should also be testable by asking congenitally blind people about their experience with this feeling of dizziness close to a rim.

Concerns over AI safety and calls for government control over the technology are highly correlated but they should not be.

There are two major forms of AI risk: misuse and misalignment. Misuse risks come from humans using AIs as tools in dangerous ways. Misalignment risks arise if AIs take their own actions at the expense of human interests.

Governments are poor stewards for both types of risk. Misuse regulation is like the regulation of any other technology. There are reasonable rules that the government might set, but omission bias and incentives to protect small but well organized groups at the expense of everyone else will lead to lots of costly ones too. Misalignment regulation is not in the Overton window for any government. Governments do not have strong incentives...

2Daniel Kokotajlo1h
OK, thanks for clarifying. Personally I think a 1-year pause right around the time of AGI would give us something like 50% of the benefits of a 10-year pause. That's just an initial guess, not super stable. And quantitatively I think it would improve overall chances of AGI going well by double-digit percentage points at least. Such that it makes sense to do a 1-year pause even for the sake of an elderly relative avoiding death from cancer, not to mention all the younger people alive today.

And quantitatively I think it would improve overall chances of AGI going well by double-digit percentage points at least.

Makes sense. By comparison, my own unconditional estimate of p(doom) is not much higher than 10%, and so it's hard on my view for any intervention to have a double-digit percentage point effect.

The crude mortality rate before the pandemic was about 0.7%. If we use that number to estimate the direct cost of a 1-year pause, then this is the bar that we'd need to clear for a pause to be justified. I find it plausible that this bar could be ... (read more)

5Matthew Barnett3h
I don't think staging a civil war is generally a good way of saving lives. Moreover, ordinary aging has about a 100% chance of "killing literally everyone" prematurely, so it's unclear to me what moral distinction you're trying to make in your comment. It's possible you think that: 1. Death from aging is not as bad as death from AI because aging is natural whereas AI is artificial 2. Death from aging is not as bad as death from AI because human civilization would continue if everyone dies from aging, whereas it would not continue if AI kills everyone In the case of (1) I'm not sure I share the intuition. Being forced to die from old age seems, if anything, worse than being forced to die from AI, since it is long and drawn-out, and presumably more painful than death from AI. You might also think about this dilemma in terms of act vs. omission, but I am not convinced there's a clear asymmetry here. In the case of (2), whether AI takeover is worse depends on how bad you think an "AI civilization" would be in the absence of humans. I recently wrote a post about some reasons to think that it wouldn't be much worse than a human civilization. In any case, I think this is simply a comparison between "everyone literally dies" vs. "everyone might literally die but in a different way". So I don't think it's clear that pushing for one over the other makes someone a "Dark Lord", in the morally relevant sense, compared to the alternative.
3Rudi C4h
AGI might increase the risk of totalitarianism. OTOH, a shift in the attack-defense balance could potentially boost the veto power of individuals, so it might also work as a deterrent or a force for anarchy. This is not the crux of my argument, however. The current regulatory Overton window seems to heavily favor a selective pause of AGI, such that centralized powers will continue ahead, even if slower due to their inherent inefficiencies. Nuclear development provides further historical evidence for this. Closed AGI development will almost surely lead to a dystopic totalitarian regime. The track record of Lesswrong is not rosy here; the "Pivotal Act" still seems to be in popular favor, and OpenAI has significantly accelerated closed AGI development while lobbying to close off open research and pioneering the new "AI Safety" that has been nothing but censorship and double-think as of 2024.

TL;DR: In this post, I distinguish between two related concepts in neural network interpretability: polysemanticity and superposition. Neuron polysemanticity is the observed phenomena that many neurons seem to fire (have large, positive activations) on multiple unrelated concepts. Superposition is a specific explanation for neuron (or attention head) polysemanticity, where a neural network represents more sparse features than there are neurons (or number of/dimension of attention heads) in near-orthogonal directions. I provide three ways neurons/attention heads can be polysemantic without superposition: non--neuron aligned orthogonal features, non-linear feature representations, and compositional representation without features. I conclude by listing a few reasons why it might be important to distinguish the two concepts.

Epistemic status: I wrote this “quickly” in about 12 hours, as otherwise it wouldn’t have come out at all. Think of...

TL;DR

Tacit knowledge is extremely valuable. Unfortunately, developing tacit knowledge is usually bottlenecked by apprentice-master relationships. Tacit Knowledge Videos could widen this bottleneck. This post is a Schelling point for aggregating these videos—aiming to be The Best Textbooks on Every Subject for Tacit Knowledge Videos. Scroll down to the list if that's what you're here for. Post videos that highlight tacit knowledge in the comments and I’ll add them to the post. Experts in the videos include Stephen Wolfram, Holden Karnofsky, Andy Matuschak, Jonathan Blow, Tyler Cowen, George Hotz, and others. 

What are Tacit Knowledge Videos?

Samo Burja claims YouTube has opened the gates for a revolution in tacit knowledge transfer. Burja defines tacit knowledge as follows:

Tacit knowledge is knowledge that can’t properly be transmitted via verbal or written instruction, like the ability to create

...

Thanks! Added.

1Parker Conley41m
Thanks! Added.
1Parker Conley1h
Thanks for the Git recommendation; added!
1Parker Conley1h
Update: added the disclaimer.

This is a linkpost for On Duct Tape and Fence Posts.

Eliezer writes about fence post security. When people think to themselves "in the current system, what's the weakest point?", and then dedicate their resources to shoring up the defenses at that point, not realizing that after the first small improvement in that area, there's likely now a new weakest point somewhere else.

 

Fence post security happens preemptively, when the designers of the system fixate on the most salient aspect(s) and don't consider the rest of the system. But this sort of fixation can also happen in retrospect, in which case it manifest a little differently but has similarly deleterious effects.

Consider a car that starts shaking whenever it's driven. It's uncomfortable, so the owner gets a pillow to put...

Checking a number's precision correctly is quite trivial, and there were one-line fixes I could have applied that would make the function work properly on all numbers, not just some of them.

I'm really curious about what such fixes look like. In my experience, those edge cases tend to come about when there is some set of mutually incompatible desired properties of a system, the the mutual incompatibility isn't obvious. For example

  1. We want to use standard IEEE754 floating point numbers to store our data
  2. If two numbers are not equal to each other, they sh
... (read more)
1keltan1h
Wow, I kinda already knew this. But it had never been said so clearly and brought to the front of my mind in this way. It perfectly describes the strategies YouTube has used through its various apocalypses.
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In the late 19th century, two researchers meet to discuss their differing views on the existential risk posed by future Uncontrollable Super-Powerful Explosives.

  • Catastrophist: I predict that one day, not too far in the future, we will find a way to unlock a qualitatively new kind of explosive power. This explosive will represent a fundamental break with what has come before. It will be so much more powerful than any other explosive that whoever gets to this technology first might be in a position to gain a DSA over any opposition. Also, the governance and military strategies that we were using to prevent wars or win them will be fundamentally unable to control this new technology, so we'll have to reinvent everything on the fly or die in
...
4Sammy Martin2h
In the late 1940s and early 1950s nuclear weapons did not provide an overwhelming advantage against conventional forces. Being able to drop dozens of ~kiloton range fission bombs in eastern European battlefields would have been devastating but not enough by itself to win a war. Only when you got to hundreds of silo launched ICBMs with hydrogen bombs could you have gotten a true decisive strategic advantage

Perhaps. I don't know much about the yields and so forth at the time, nor about the specific plans if any that were made for nuclear combat.

But I'd speculate that dozens of kiloton range fission bombs would have enabled the US and allies to win a war against the USSR. Perhaps by destroying dozens of cities, perhaps by preventing concentrations of defensive force sufficient to stop an armored thrust.

Crosspost from my blog.  

If you spend a lot of time in the blogosphere, you’ll find a great deal of people expressing contrarian views. If you hang out in the circles that I do, you’ll probably have heard of Yudkowsky say that dieting doesn’t really work, Guzey say that sleep is overrated, Hanson argue that medicine doesn’t improve health, various people argue for the lab leak, others argue for hereditarianism, Caplan argue that mental illness is mostly just aberrant preferences and education doesn’t work, and various other people expressing contrarian views. Often, very smart people—like Robin Hanson—will write long posts defending these views, other people will have criticisms, and it will all be such a tangled mess that you don’t really know what to think about them.

For...

Nice contrarian view on the popular contrarians - and in yours I have at least 75% faith :) :

Ironically, if your elaborations are arguably themselves a bit broad brushed, as @Viliam points out, this could in an odd way also be seen as underlining your core take away: even here, where publication bias (or reading-bias induced publication-bias) is decried, maybe a hint of the bias has already sneaked in again.

2niplav10h
It seems like you're spanning up three different categories of thinkers: Academics, public intellectuals, and "obsessive autists". Notice that the examples you give overlap in those categories: Hanson and Caplan are academics (professors!), while the Natália Mendonça is not an academic, but is approaching being a public intellectual by now(?). Similarly, Scott Alexander strikes me as being in the "public intellectual" bucket much more than any other bucket. So your conclusion, as far as I read the article, should be "read obsessive autists" instead of "read obsessive autists that support the mainstream view". This is my current best guess—"obsessive autists" are usually not under much strong pressure to say politically palatable things, very unlike professors.
2ChristianKl12h
What makes you believe that Substack is to blame and not him unpublishing it?
7ChristianKl12h
He explicitly says that the people who argue that there's no gap are mistaken to argue that. He argues for the gap being small, not nonexistent. He does not use the term "near zero" himself. 

If we achieve AGI-level performance using an LLM-like approach, the training hardware will be capable of running ~1,000,000s concurrent instances of the model.

Definitions

Although there is some debate about the definition of compute overhang, I believe that the AI Impacts definition matches the original use, and I prefer it: "enough computing hardware to run many powerful AI systems already exists by the time the software to run such systems is developed".  A large compute overhang leads to additional risk due to faster takeoff.

I use the types of superintelligence defined in Bostrom's Superintelligence book (summary here).

I use the definition of AGI in this Metaculus question. The adversarial Turing test portion of the definition is not very relevant to this post.

Thesis

Due to practical reasons, the compute requirements for training LLMs...

2faul_sname1h
I think this only holds if fine tunes are composable, which as far as I can tell they aren't (fine tuning on one task subtly degrades performance on a bunch of other tasks, which isn't a big deal if you fine tune a little for performance on a few tasks but does mean you probably can't take a million independently-fine-tuned models and merge them into a single super model of the same size with the same performance on all million tasks). Also there are sometimes mornings where I can't understand code I wrote the previous night when I had all of the necessary context fresh to me, despite being the same person. I expect that LLMs will exhibit the same behavior of some things being hard to understand when examined out of the context which generated them. That's not to say a worldin which there are a billion copies of GPT-5 running concurrently will have no major changes, but I don't think a single coherent ASI falls out of that world.
1snewman2h
Nit: you mixed up 30 and 40 here (should both be 30 or both be 40). If you train a model with 10x as many parameters, but use the same training data, then it will cost 10x as much to train and 10x as much to operate, so the ratios will hold. In practice, I believe it is universal to use more training data when training larger models? Implying that the ratio would actually increase (which further supports your thesis). On the other hand, the world already contains over 8 billion human intelligences. So I think you are assuming that a few million AGIs, possibly running at several times human speed (and able to work 24/7, exchange information electronically, etc.), will be able to significantly "outcompete" (in some fashion) 8 billion humans? This seems worth further exploration / justification.

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