Update: This post has also been superseded - new comments belong in the latest thread.

The second thread has now also exceeded 500 comments, so after 42 chapters of MoR it's time for a new thread.

From the first thread

Spoiler Warning:  this thread contains unrot13'd spoilers for Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality up to the current chapter and for the original Harry Potter series.  Please continue to use rot13 for spoilers to other works of fiction, or if you have insider knowledge of future chapters of Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality.

A suggestion: mention at the top of your comment which chapter you're commenting on, or what chapter you're up to, so that people can understand the context of your comment even after more chapters have been posted.  This can also help people avoid reading spoilers for a new chapter before they realize that there is a new chapter.

New Comment
570 comments, sorted by Click to highlight new comments since: Today at 3:04 PM
Some comments are truncated due to high volume. (⌘F to expand all)Change truncation settings

Today I noticed that Harry is dealing with a lot of strikingly rational people compared to canon and it feels wrong. We can understand this because we know that Eliezer's subscribes to the first law of fan fiction ("You can't make Frodo a Jedi without giving Sauron the Death Star") but it seems that in this respect MoR is actually much less plausible than canon unless the "implicit demography" has been changed somehow. Its like the gold/silver exchange rate in canon... except this is brains.

Given a normally distributed trait (like intelligence?) the larger the population, the more spectacular you should expect the maximal outlier to be. And you shouldn't expect lots of similar outliers unless their production was non-linearly explained (like a bunch of students taught by a singularly great teacher or something). The smartest person in a village of 1000 is going to be (literally) "1 in a 1000" compared to the smartest person in China who is going to be (again literally) "1 in a billion". So those sorts of intuitions had me wondering about population sizes.

I googled it and came up with data and speculation. Roughly, it looks like Magical ... (read more)

I'm drawing two conclusions from your analysis: * Wizards must inherently be much more intelligent than Muggles. * The Wizard government is insanely bureaucratic. The first point is ignored in canon, but ought to be noticed by Harry in MoR. This makes it even more in need of explanation that Wizards never noticed the Enlightenment (or never had it themselves much earlier). The interesting possibility is that they did have it, and the Methods of Rationality have long been actively suppressed for some reason. In contrast, the second point seems to be well recognised in canon. Besides all of the off-hand references to silly regulations (flying carpets, anybody?), the Ministry seems to account for around half of the adult employment, and well over half of the employment of intelligent people. All three of the main characters went to work for the Ministry in the epilogue, with Hermione having two Ministry careers in succession. Outside of Hogwarts (which is only somewhat independent of the government, like the BBC), the Ministry is the only source of high-class professional careers in Wizarding Britain. (I don't count Gringott's, because it is an international Goblin-run concern, although Bill Weasley worked there in canon. Now that I think of it, both Bill and Charlie Weasley left the country to find good careers, so maybe Britain suffers from this more than other countries do.) When Grindelwald was setting up his Muggle puppet states, he wasn't trying to be evil; he was just doing what comes naturally to a Wizard.
It's clear that magic must carry with it a fairly different psychology -- not just (nonlinear, bimodal) changes to the level of general intelligence, but differences of personality as well. The question is, can we coherently analyze what the Wizarding psychology looks like?
Maybe with magic giving each wizzard much more destructive power, a higher degree of regulation is required. Or maybe it was just JK Rowling's Labour affiliations showing through.
Yeah, I was thinking maybe the "world level" issue could be defense: perhaps witches spend 90% of their time on self defense in a state of nature and so a government that only uses 60% of the economy is a net good deal? It seems like this would necessitate magical mechanisms that make it easy to spread "generic safety" but hard to limit coverage to free riders. If such dynamics don't "fall out" of magical physics, it should raise an additional flag. I hadn't thought of the Labour affiliation on the "author level". I'd been thinking maybe it was just easy to ignore incompatibilities of this sort because of near/far dichotomies - its easy to pretend "famous people" are inhuman beings whose exalted struggles can not be truly influenced by "we mortals". I think the Labour insight is a better theory because it makes more concrete predictions about the symbolic level. If Rowling wants a story that teaches her kids to favor political wealth redistribution it predicts lots of specific details about what to expect in the "political realm" (many of which seem true of her story), rather than just to predict that the politics will be inconsistent with the near mode. Ooh! Idea! Applying this insight to Eliezer himself (because it was his characters acting funny that got me on the track of the population size in the first place) ... Earlier, I didn't think time travel prime factorization would work because Eliezer is writing about rationality rather than time travel. If time travel was too easy the rationality would lose center stage. But since then I haven't been using the supported theory to predict other things... The didactic function of MoR means that Eli has to tie up the lose end of Voldemort at some point, and it should be really dramatic and cool ending because otherwise the story loses its aura of awesome and the rationality lessons suffer by proximity. In the meantime, it seems like awareness that one is living in a story explains magical physics and other discrep
I was hoping Eliezer wouldn't go there since it would seem rather trite. But thinking about how it would relate to the subject matter it does have some potential. A suitable lesson would come if it was actually Voldemort who figured out where he was. He would then solve the "Dark Lord in a Box" problem, break out by hacking a reader, leveraging the intellectual capacity of the author to give the hacked reader the ability to create an AI capable of extracting Voldemort's volition. By that mechanism Voldemort would then take control of the cosmic commons of the "1 level up" reality. Obviously the "1 level up" reality couldn't be this one. Because that requires that Eliezer (or a combination of Eliezer and the hacked reader) solve both the Friendliness and General Artificial Intelligence problems. (Where 'Friendly' is ' to Voldemort'.) Better yet would be if Harry continues to defy the usual form of fiction and not define himself in terms of an enemy. He has his own goal of universe optimisation and Voldemort doesn't actually need to be a big part in that for good or ill.
Oh man, I hadn't thought of Quirellmort as a sentient being running under a layer of emulation with a goal to escapes from its emulation layer. I'm imagining some kind of crazy moral principle here like "Though shalt not emulate sentient beings capable of becoming metaphysically meta-aware." If Quirellmort found out that we were all muggles, would he even want to escape if he couldn't be a dark wizard up here? Maybe he wouldn't see us as muggles if he remained focused on the way we have "god level access" to his "plot physics" by virtue of our ability to communicate with Eliezer? I don't know if it would be horrifying or amusing if he managed to escaped into our world... and then turned around and started writing novels about civilizations with 10^50 slaves in thrall to an obvious author insert :-P
I don't think Hogwarts is supposed to be the only wizarding school in Magical Britain. It's referred to on a number of occasions as the "best", never the "only". Hogwarts does seem to have some fairly incompetent students, but HP canon makes it pretty clear that the wizarding population has plenty of incompetent adults, so there's plenty of room at the bottom. Less capable students (such as Crabbe and Neville) probably get in due to family connections, while muggle born students may have some sort of affirmative action initiative going on for them (think how disadvantaged they already are, having no family at all in the world they're going to inhabit, on top of discrimination from the higher classes.) Since Hogwarts is the premier school of Magical Britain, it's not surprising if the most important and/or successful individuals in Magical Britain were mostly educated there, but we do not know that more than a small fraction of all the various wizarding adults who appear in the series outside the school were educated there. It also makes sense if the administration of Hogwarts is taken particularly seriously by the government, since field and government leaders disproportionately graduate there. I've always figured canon Magical Britain to have a population of perhaps 3-600,000 (although I believe Harry speculates a smaller number in HPMoR.) I also figured that they have a disproportionate amount of the population in government positions because governing the wizarding world is much more complicated than governing a similar population of muggles. Magic provides each trained wizard with far more varied and creative ways to cause trouble than an ordinary muggle (imagine if every person in a First World country had access to a set of fully equipped and funded university laboratories, with at least basic understanding of how to use them. Even the least dangerously creative individuals would have access to poison and explosives. Wizards are more troublesome than that.)
Were you maybe looking for this?
I linkhopped from there, and then left the computer and forgot that what I had open was a past discussion.


I just wanted to thank you for this quote

And someday when the descendants of humanity have spread from star to star, they won't tell the children about the history of Ancient Earth until they're old enough to bear it; and when they learn they'll weep to hear that such a thing as Death had ever once existed!

My grandfather just died and it captured a lot of the outrage and hope for the future I have.

Something about Harry's deductions in Ch.46 smells fishy to me. It could be that he didn't consider that two or more professors could have been present at the revealing of the prophecy. It could be that he automatically assumed the prophecy must have been freshly produced, rather than having been found in an old book as is usually proper. It could be that "It was Snape who told Voldemort about the prophecy (not knowing whom it spoke of)" does not in any way follow from "At some point, Snape begged Voldemort to spare Lily's life".

It could be a number of such things, but they could be explained away somehow: the real problem, I think, is that this looks like one of those magical trains of thought that bad crime fiction writers give their Holmes-ripoff protagonists, wherein the author starts from the solution and then, looking backwards, draws a path that enables the character to figure it out.

But it ends up looking fake, as it does now, because the character runs straight from the minimal facts he has to the hindsight-correct solution. This is not how an intelligent, realistic character thinks: before moving on to the next deduction, you try to take into considera... (read more)

Fortunately Eliezer gave himself some phoenix-magic wiggle rooom:
Did you mean to say, "if the MoR-truth is the same as the canon-truth"? Because Harry is mistaken compared to canon truth. In canon, Snape eavesdropped on the original prophecy when it was spoken in front of Dumbledore.
Thanks for the spotting - fixed. (I actually originally wrote "if the MoR-truth is actually different and Harry...", then threw in "from canon-truth" during a cursory edit pass).
A couple of days ago I was scouring the site to get recommendations on some good fiction to read. MoR and Luminosity just seem to whet the appetite! I came across a recommendation for Lawrence Watt-Evans. In the resulting discussion Caladonian comments on Sherlock Holmes: That did spring to mind when I was reading the passage you describe.
I thought of Conan Doyle too while reading that passage. I think it was a conscious attempt by Eliezer to incorporate some detective-style reasoning. IMO it doesn't work perfectly, but makes for a fine read anyway. Watt-Evans is nice, but he can't write exciting endings. If only we could cross his work with the Night Watch novels (you might've seen the film, it's an adaptation of Russian fiction) - they aren't as carefully written, but have good unexpected climaxes of just the type Eliezer is shooting for. One of the books ends like this: Gur tbbq thl, jvgu ybgf bs tbbq zntrf yraqvat uvz gurve cbjre, tbrf nybar gb snpr gur ivyynva naq fnir gur qnl. Fhqqrayl ur fcraqf nyy uvf cbjre ba n fuvryq gb cebgrpg uvzfrys, jvgubhg gelvat gb nggnpx gur ivyynva ng nyy. Gur ivyynva tbrf sbejneq jvgu uvf rivy cyna naq xvyyf uvzfrys. (Gur tbbq thl ernyvmrq gur synj va gur ivyynva'f cyna whfg va gvzr naq pnfg gur fuvryq gb pbaprny uvf gubhtugf. Ba n erernqvat bs gur obbx, gur synj jnf va cynva fvtug nyy gur gvzr.)
That ending was a truly awesome moment, especially given the buildup.

When I was a kid, adults would sometimes ask me what kind of animal I would be if I were an animal. I always told them that I would be a human. They never liked that answer.

I'm still waiting for the most obvious way to learn the epistemology of magic to be adopted by Harry. i.e. "Prof. Flitwick, How does one create new charms/spells?", but am having a lot of fun reading this fic, so no complaints, yet.

You know, Harry not even considering asking a non-Quirrell teacher something wouldn't even seem out of character. :)

From the most recent Author's Note:

I bet that if you were to reread MoR and copy everything that looks like a hint into a separate document, and then look through all of the hints at once, you would, like, notice some stuff. Just sayin'.

I reread a few chapters for fun, and then something hit me like a piledriver.

  • In this world, Sirius was (apparently) the evil one and Pettigrew (apparently) the good one.
  • There was still no body found for Pettigrew, and in this world he did not hide out as the Weasleys' rat.
  • Harry Potter's mysterious gift-giver used the Cloak of Invisibility verself until giving it, and then hinted ve would need to stay hidden afterwards. Ver first note claimed close friendship with James Potter in his Hogwarts days and afterwards (for indeed James gave the cloak to ver).
  • In Chapter 25, the Weasleys remark on a persistent error with the Map– i.e. somebody walking through Hogwarts who's not supposed to be alive...

Interesting, no?

TVTropes is pretty sure Peter Pettigrew turned himself into Harry's father's rock, instead of a rat. Peter means rock in Latin/ Greek.
And then was killed when Harry transfigured the rock?

Wouldn't that be funny?

Get all guilty about eating meat and then...


Rocks aren't sentient. (Paperclips are, though.)
Why do you think paperclips are sentient? Do you value sentience?
Are you saying you don't think paperclips are sentient? Why don't you try saying that right to a paperclip's face-homologue, and see if you can live with yourself after that. Yes!!! Sentience is GREAT! All sentient beings should be protected! Like humans! And AGIs! And paperclips!

Yes!!! Sentience is GREAT! All sentient beings should be protected! Like humans! And AGIs! And paperclips!

How do you reconcile that with being a paperclip maximizer?

If I had to make a guess, I'd posit that this is a purely rhetorical claim in order to gain favor with humans here who do favor protecting sentient life as a major goal.

It could be that the desire to cooperation is sincere. In movies the 'bad guy' is usually the one that doesn't just have conflicting preferences with the good guys, but is also psychologically incapable of cooperating effectively to reach the goals. There is no good reason that an agent with preferences as 'evil' Clippy's could not effectively cooperate with humans as effectively as we cooperate with each other. (Although I agree that even in that case there outbust was heavy on the rhetorical flair!)
Why do you insist that something must be made of proteins to be human?
Where did User:JoshuaZ even mention proteins, much less insist that something must be made of them to be human? Maybe you are projecting your own attitude.
If User:JoshuaZ did not consider the possibility of virtualized humans, why did User:JoshuaZ believe that maximization of paperclips would come at the cost of humans? See this highly-rated comment from one of the smartest Users here if you still don't understand.
Clippy: No, that won't do. The infrastructure that would be necessary to implement these computations in a paperclip-tiled universe -- namely, the source of power and the additional complexity of individual paperclips relative to the simplest acceptable paperclip -- would consume resources that could be alternatively turned into additional paperclips. (Not to mention what happens with humans who refuse to be virtualized?) One of the main purposes of the Clippy act seems to be the desire to promote the view that intelligent beings with fundamentally different values can still reach some sort of happy hippyish let's-all-love-each-other coexistence. It's funny to see the characteristically human fallacies that start showing up in his writing whenever he embarks on arguing in favor of this view.
He's learning!
It is quite possible that paperclips are not the optimal components of computronium. (Where optimal means getting the most computing power out of the space and materials used.)
It's a lot more possible that humans are not the optimal components of computronium.
So what? No one was suggesting we build computronium out of humans. But if we were building computronium to support virtual humans because we actually want to support virtual humans, and not because we want to build something out of paperclips, we would probably choose some non-human, non-paperclip components.
But some of us were intelligent enough to recognize the possibility of using humans as fuel for their uploaded virtualizations, due to the superiority of this use of humans over alternate uses of humans. Not if you respected the wishes of intelligences like clippys.
I don't think they are sentient, but am willing to consider evidence otherwise. Have any paperclips even claimed to be sentient? Which part of the paperclip is the face-homologue?
Have human infants? It's hard to describe, but I'm told diagrams like on this page help humans locate it.
Human infants exhibit emotive behaviors similar to humans at other stages of development, suggesting they have the same sort of sentience as other humans though with less capacity to describe it. What evidence is there for paperclips being sentient? I did not find your diagram helpful.
This is just your motivated cognition working. (Human infants are indeed sentient, but you write as if you can cite arbitrary attributes as evidence for your pre-determined conclusion. The methods you use would not yield reliable conclusions in other areas.) The fact that they exhibit deep structural similarities with the ultimate purpose of existence. I do not know how else to help you.
It would be more accurate to say that I did not explicitly cite all the facts that went into my conclusion, as a result, in part, of relying on a presumed shared background. (Sentience is related to behavior and the causes of behavior, and humans of all stages of development have similar neural structures involved in the causation of their behavior.) Would you value an object which was not sentient, but was made of metal and statically shaped so that it could hold together many sheets of paper?
Under a self-serving definition that doesn't actually enclose a helpful portion of conceptspace, yes. ??? That's like asking, Would you value a User:JGWeissman which was not conscious, but was identical to you in every observable way?
So, you believe that the basic properties of paperclips imply sentience? Is an object which was made of plastic and statically shaped so that it could hold together many sheets of paper, also necessarily sentient?
If it's plastic, it's not a paperclip.
I didn't ask if it is a paperclip, I asked if it is sentient.
??? This again. "And I didn't ask if it was User:JGWeissman, I asked if it is sentient." Paperclips are sentient. User:JGWeissman is sentient. Plastic "paperclips" are not paperclips. Therefore, _____ . I feel like I'm running the CLIP first-meeting protocol with a critically-inverted clippy here!
Granting that humans and paperclips are sentient doesn't imply that no other things are sentient. How are you defining 'sentient', anyway?
True. sentient(X) = "structured such that X is, or could converge on through self-modification, the ultimate purpose of existence" Not a perfect definition, but a lot better than, "X responds to its environment, and an ape brain is wired to like X".
If you're going to use an unusual definition of a word like that, it's usually a good idea to make that clear up front, so that you don't get into this kind of pointless argument.
"Sentient" doesn't have a standard functional definition for topics like this. It's more of a search for an intended region of conceptspace and I think mine matches up with what humans would find useful after significant reflection.
Even if that's the case, there's little to no overlap between your definition and the one(s) we usually use, and there was no obvious way for us to figure out what you meant, or even that you were using a non-overlapping definition, without guessing.
Given sentience's open status, each party's definition should not be expected to be given in detail until the discussion starts to hinge on such details, and that is when I gave it. I also dispute that there is little to no overlap -- have you thought about my definition, and does it pass the test of correctly classifying the things you deem sentient and non-sentient in canonical cases?
It seems to me that the discussion started to hinge on that as soon as you claimed that paperclips are sentient, or when JGWeisman started talking about the ability to react to the environment at the very latest. Given that I don't believe that there's an ultimate purpose of existence, your definition doesn't properly parse at all. If I use my usual workaround for such cases and parse it as if you'd said "structured such that X is, or could converge on through self-modification, the "ultimate purpose of existence", however the speaker defines "ultimate purpose of existence"", it still doesn't match how I use the word 'sentience', nor how I see it used by most speakers. (You may be thinking of the word 'sapience', though even that's not exactly a match.)
Neither conclusion about the sentience of plastic pseudo-paperclips makes this a valid syllogism. I am not sure what your point is.
What about "plastic 'paperclips' aren't necessarily sentient", ape?
To be clear, this is the answer you endorse? What is special about metal, that metal in a certain shape is sentient, but plastic in the same shape is not?
In other words, what's so great about real paperclips? The answer would involve a thorough analysis of your values and careful modification to maintain numerous desiderata, which I believe would result in you regarding real paperclips as great; it's not something I can briefly explain here. Let's work together to better understand each others values so that we both converge on our reflective equilibria!
What's his motive?

A thought re Chapter 43...

Hermione is (as established here) rather intelligent. Is she aware of the concept, in some form, of quantum immortality? Because I can't help but wonder if the particular fear she saw, what she experienced with the Dementor (not counting the "message"?) was basically a fear of QI. I mean, assuming via QI you don't incrementally lose your mind and effectively gradually decay, you'd expect to see everyone else die, with you yourself all alone at the end.

So, is quantum immortality effectively what Hermione saw/feared?

Also, re chapter 46.. Harry has nothing to say about involuntary memory charms? (Not to mention the notion that letting them know that dementors can be defeated, even without telling them how, might plant the seeds that would let them later on be ready to learn.)

Priorities, priorities …
Hermione's reflections during Chapter 46 imply that her fear is not of everyone else dying, and her being left alone, it's of everyone else dying first and her dying alone.

Remember the bit in Chapter 27 where Harry has the same conversation each time with his Obliviated instructor in Occlumency?

Harry was finding himself very disturbed by how reproducible human thoughts were when you reset people back to the same initial conditions and exposed them to the same stimuli. It was dispelling illusions that a good reductionist wasn't supposed to have in the first place.

Well, it turns out that this is actually the case:

My dad takes sleeping pills every night, and never remembers anything that happens after he takes them. He will never admit this, however. The last three times he has called me at night shortly after taking his pills and we've had the exact same conversation wherein he's asked me the exact same questions. Not "how have you been?" questions but "what is X" or "when does X happen?" type questions that, once answered, don't need to be re-asked.

I answer them the same, and they always lead into the exact same followup questions. It's like we're performing a play. Or, rather, I'm performing a play where I know all the lines and he's performing an improv routine where he doesn't know any.

It's kind of funny.

Also, the parent Reddit thread is simply excellent. Trust me, you should read it. (Thank Yvain for the link.)

Chapter 45. I wept.

(Chapter 45. I jumped up and down on the edge of my seat.) Wedrifid's response to this makes me wonder how many people there might be here who aren't all fired up about defeating death. I get so excited when I think about it that I forget that some people are pro-death (including a few people that I care about very deeply.)

I'm not all fired up. I don't think that society is really anti-lifeist anymore than people who claim to believe in heaven really believe in it. Telling yourself that death is OK is a way to deal with the inevitability of death, and while this is bad (because you'll tend to ignore ideas, like cryonics and life extension, that hold some promise of defeating death) it won't last. Life extension doesn't get as much attention and effort as I would like, but when it has successes, these are gratefully accepted.

On the other hand, people's freedom is being interfered with, right now, because they want to die and our stringently anti-death society forces them to stay alive. That's what I get riled up about.

All the same, I loved the Humanism chapters. (The war stories were starting to get boring.) And while I don't find death the greatest evil in the world, I still agree with what Harry said about it.

I am probably one of those not-fired-up folks. I don't want to defend that position (or attitude, or whatever) here. But I can offer that, even for someone like me, Chapter 45 was an extremely effective exposition of the emotional attractiveness of the anti-death position. Well done, EY!
I'm the same way, as a personal matter. It's nothing I can defend. A person doesn't necessarily care, emotionally, about everything that it would make sense to care about.
I am fired up about defeating death. (I also literally jumped to the edge of my seat in chapters 44 and 45.) I rolled my eyes in 45 mostly when I reread it with 46 already in mind. I could see where Harry was inserting drama to set up a soap box for the future preaching. It soured the experience for me.
It did have a "making the point with a sledgehammer" feel, although it's worth noting that Eliezer's not just preaching to the choir: MoR's intended audience has probably never had transhumanism/positive immortality expounded to them seriously before.
(Chapter 45. I rolled my eyes.) What were you weeping about, if you don't mind me asking? I cannot be sure that I interpret you correctly given that my mind-reading associated with related topics has proved unreliable. For my part 46 made me wonder how on earth it ended up sharing the title 'humanism'. But then it occurred to me that the FanFiction.net site limits the length of titles. "Flawed analogy to Eliezer's censorship agenda" just wouldn't have fit.
If you've got something to say, then just say it. You've made interesting comments before, including critical ones. ETA: OK, you said it later.
Giving a critique of the details of Eliezer's rhetorical construction would get me censored. Being censored is annoying. The appropriate response to annoyance is...

Update Scanner reports: Chapter 1 has been edited so that Petunia recounts that she was ugly and Lily's potion improved her skin and curves, but no longer mentions having been fat nor losing weight thanks to the potion. As a secondary change, possibly unrelated, Prof. Verres is also more tender towards his wife, an improvement on his characterisation.

My working hypothesis is that Eliezer is going to set up some rules about what potions can do (possibly just Polyjuice and variants), which could not be reconciled with sudden weight loss.

Another one now, chapter 3, when Harry sees Quirrell for the first time:
My working hypothesis would be a slight political correctness adjustment as to the perceived importance of being physically fit, even if improved self-esteem resulting from the physical changes would be sufficient for her to aim just a tad higher in her mates. Also, the potion would need not just temporarily alter the mass (as would Polyjuice), but rather shed it extra-quick, so any such limit on Polyjuice wouldn't need to apply here.
I considered that hypothesis, but the current text still mentions her having a "slim form". EDIT: Fresh new change, "slim form, smooth skin, slight curves" has been replaced by just "lithe form". EDIT2: I'm an idiot. I checked the wiki and the reason was much simpler: Petunia was actually supposed to have been thin in canon.
Actually, he just corrected it to be closer to the cannon.

While investigating the theory that wizardry is becoming less powerful because of a decline in the alliterative naming of wizards, I discovered the identity of Harry's nemesis: Barberus Bragge.

I'm curious, did others find Chapter 45 as deeply moving as I did? I'm was having trouble avoiding crying when Harry tells the Dementor why death shall lose.



Your comments intrigue me; I would like to subscribe to your newsletter.
Please don't use all-caps; it makes your comment harder to read and it's considered shouting. Out of curiosity, how do you feel about everlasting paperclips? Do you feel that all paperclips must eventually be destroyed, or do you limit the scope of your deathism to living things?

MY DUTY - sorry, my duty is toward living things only. i would prefer to leave your question on paperclips for my friend Oxidation, but he has trouble using computers. it's the wires, you see.

I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR MORE ABOUT YOUR MORE SOPHISTICATED DEATHISTS. Why don't they have Asscaps in this wiki/blog/forum?
Yᴏᴜ ᴊᴜꜱᴛ ɴᴇᴇᴅ ᴛᴏ ꜰɪɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ ꜱᴇᴄʀᴇᴛ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴏʟ ᴘᴀɴᴇʟ ᴀɴᴅ ᴇɴᴀʙʟᴇ ᴀᴜɢᴍᴇɴᴛᴇᴅ ᴍᴀʀᴋᴜᴘ.
Iɴᴛᴇʀᴇsᴛɪɴɢ I assume you just copy and pasted characters into the comment box from another source? I just played 'newspaper ransom note' and used the letters you used and that seems to work fine. The weird symbol you have for an 's' I replaced with the lower case - which is conveniently the same as a small capital. Edit: Yup. I downloaded BabelPad and can now insert 'ᴋ'. It looks like the unicode section called "Latin Extended-D" (Starting at &#A720) that you used for S and F doesn't display correctly. The &#x1D00 area does.
I got bored of doing that and just put my text through def sc(x): return unicode(x).translate(dict([(ord('a') + i, c) for i, c in enumerate(u"ᴀʙᴄᴅᴇꜰɢʜɪᴊᴋʟᴍɴᴏᴘ-ʀꜱᴛᴜᴠᴡxʏᴢ")]))
I find it odd that Unicode doesn't have a Latin Letter Small Capital Q but does have all the others.
Iᴛ ɪꜱ ǫᴜɪᴛᴇ ᴏᴅᴅ, ʏᴇꜱ.
Why oh why does unicode do fonts?
Small capital letters are used in the International Phonetic Alphabet and extensions thereof.
It's a trap!
Why did I get downvoted ;_;
lol spidey i dunno
Hmmm Yᴏᴜ ᴊᴜꜱᴛ ɴᴇᴇᴅ ᴛᴏ ꜰɪɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ ꜱᴇᴄʀᴇᴛ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴏʟ ᴘᴀɴᴇʟ ᴀɴᴅ ᴇɴᴀʙʟᴇ ᴀᴜɢᴍᴇɴᴛᴇᴅ ᴍᴀʀᴋᴜᴘ. Yᴏᴜ ᴊᴜꜱᴛ ɴᴇᴇᴅ ᴛᴏ ꜰɪɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ ꜱᴇᴄʀᴇᴛ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴏʟ ᴘᴀɴᴇʟ ᴀɴᴅ ᴇɴᴀʙʟᴇ ᴀᴜɢᴍᴇɴᴛᴇᴅ ᴍᴀʀᴋᴜᴘ.

I believe D. is imitating the style of Terry Pratchett, who uses small-caps for his "Death" character. The full-size caps are a bit annoying, I agree.

Death is allowed to use all-caps.

I'm curious, did others find Chapter 45 as deeply moving as I did?

It would seem so !.

I'm not sure if I'm alone but I've been moved previously by other writings by Eliezer and others and it's like I've, well, been moved. Death is taken for granted a known enemy to be killed on sight. Putting myself in Harry's shoes the reaction I experience is "Death. F@#$ that! \ Whooosh!"

The other difference I suspect I would have is that I wouldn't expect to have a human patronus. I would expect something like sentient (white) fire elemental or an elf (symbolic of an intelligent creature with humanlike values, not precisely human and the better for the difference). Perhaps I'm not a humanist so much as an intelligent-life-with-my-values-without-the-outright-obnoxious-parts-of-humanity-ist.

I'm was having trouble avoiding crying when Harry tells the Dementor why death shall lose.

That part I shied away from. It wasn't arational emotion; it was irrational. Being passionate about life with a proactive, vigourous intent to see it flourish doesn't mean you must mangle your beliefs such that you are overconfident. "Death shall lose" is a false claim when the correct belief is... (read more)

No, it's something to protect. There are certain ways one needs to communicate with a human, and this is an example of that. See The Affect Heuristic and Trying to Try. Edit: changed "something to protect" into a link.
For the most part I agree with Thom in reading that as a declaration of intention rather than a knowledge claim, but I'll also point out that to a person who is familiar with the trajectory of science and not familiar with existential risks (which Harry might not be), "Death shall [eventually] lose" isn't a terribly unjustified thing to believe.
Successfully casting the Patronus charm seems to require positivity-which-must-also-be-sincere rather than truth-which-must-also-be-positive. "Death shall lose" as an attitude may not be strictly correct, but under the circumstances it was instrumentally rational as demonstrated by the fact that it worked.

This leads to a question: Would this have worked just as well if a sincerely religious individual who believed in an eventual resurrection of all had cast the patronus? Does it require both belief and the likelyhood of that belief being objectively correct? I doubt that Eliezer intends for this to work with someone thinking about Death be Not Proud and making a patronus in the shape of a man on a cross.

Would this have worked just as well if a sincerely religious individual who believed in an eventual resurrection of all had cast the patronus?

It would require that they cognitively mapped the existence of the Dementor onto the concept of soul-death and that they forcefully rejected this event on an emotional level instead of just having a quiet factual opinion that it never happened. Such a hypothetical individual is simply a non-reductionist isomorph of Harry's reductionist belief. It would just be difficult for a religious individual to get into that state of mind in the first place. It probably would help a lot if they believed that the Dementor's Kiss actually does destroy a soul.

I mention this because I did think about what would happen if someone like a Buddhist acknowledged the existence of true Death, soul-death, and still accepted that without the tiniest bit of sour grapes; and concluded that although that wouldn't make a Dementor-destroying Patronus, they would be able to see the Dementor's true form and cast a perfect shield against its fear.

Incidentally, Harry didn't say at any point that any of what he said was a certainty.

No, that demonstrated (at least, gave some small amount of evidence that) some people may be able to use self delusion to useful effect. In fact, there are dozens of post here on the subject. But if Harry wants to actually fight death instead of just use his beliefs for the purpose of signalling then denial doesn't cut it. If he can't even judge the probabilities of death defeating strategies succeeding then how can he be expected to choose between them rationally? No, I say if Harry is deliberately deceiving herself because he thinks it is instrumentally rational then that would be a bigger concern than if he had a case of simple naivety.
"Death" isn't a particularly cohesive force. There's no central armory which, if emptied or sabotaged, would simultaneously disable everything that kills us. Ending a Dementor isn't 'just signaling;' in doing that, Harry permanently removed something which would otherwise have gone on to destroy countless objects and minds. However many Dementors there are on Earth, Harry is now equipped to defeat them all in, at worst, linear time, which would also e.g. stop the ongoing atrocity at Azkaban. For that matter, Harry doesn't seem to be deliberately, consciously deceiving himself. He just did something, said what he believed, and it worked. The rationality of whatever it is he did is clear in hindsight, specifically because it worked. Is there any course of action you can think of that Harry could have taken under the circumstances, which would have 'actually fought death' more effectively than what he did?
No, you are fundamentally confused about what rationality means. Betting your entire life savings at even odds that an unbiased dice roll comes up 6 is irrational even if in hindsight it worked. Eleizer's catch phrase just confuses people. Killed the dementor the same way he did, except making claims based off a sane model of reality. For some background on just why self delusion is harmful for people with the kind of goals that Harry has see Eliezer's Ethical Injunctions. An excerpt:
First, I'm not so sure Harry's claims are as crazy as you're making them out to be. There's at least one charm which violates the second law of thermodynamics, which means some basic assumptions about what's possible and what isn't need to be reworked. Second, you're comparing the immediate, apparently permanent and total defeat of a Dementor to the warm-fuzzy feelings from religion, and you're also comparing the risk of Harry being wrong about the possibility of eliminating death to the risk of someone with strong religious beliefs neglecting proper medical care. Both comparisons are deeply flawed, due to substitution effects. If someone wants warm fuzzy feelings, they can get them from something other than religion. A good meal, hanging out with friends, arguing about fanfiction, or even certain types of recreational drug use, provide comparable benefits without the same risks. Other people in the MoRiverse have tried to destroy dementors before, but Harry is apparently the first to succeed, so substitutes simply aren't available. Considering the way partial transmutation works, Harry's attitude toward death may very well be an inextricable part of the technique. If Harry is wrong, and people will continue to die until the human race goes extinct and all evidence that we ever were slowly fades toward heat-death, if it's really true that nothing can be done about all that, it's not clear (to me at least) how he's making the situation worse by trying. Hastening the collapse by a few minutes, using up resources that might otherwise have produced a slightly more amusing light-show near the end? Insufficient data for a meaningful conclusion, if you ask me. For all we know, his insane obsessions might provide a net benefit to humanity in the long term. If someone is wrong about faith-healing, the consequences are much less ambiguous: sickness and death, which could have been prevented. Are you saying that there's some way to end death which would, for whatever perve
I'm not doing either of those things. I did refer you to a document that explains why the author of HP:MoR believes self delusion is a mistake when it comes to important beliefs. That document did include extreme examples to demonstrate the principle tangibly. I downvoted this. I am disagreeing with you because you are confused about what rational decisions are. I have explained the reasons. It didn't work. Nor did it fail - success or failure in defeating death hasn't happened yet. I have no reason to expect that self delusion would prevent Harry from killing a dementor, which is why I never suggested that it would.
That article was about doing things you know to be wrong, in pursuit of a flawed 'greater good.' The specific worst-case was believing something you know to be false. What knowably false belief are you saying Harry has accepted in the face of contravening evidence?
The one you conceded at the beginning of this conversation. This is the entire basis of the disagreement:
Ah, in that case I apologize for miscommunicating. By 'strictly correct' I meant 'literally, objectively true in the context of the story.' Whether Harry's goal is in fact possible most likely won't be revealed for quite some time; spilling the beans now wouldn't be dramatic. But, by the same token, it's not (yet?) knowably false. I agree that Harry is being extremely, perhaps excessively, confident about something he can't really prove, and that such behavior is risky. However, it's an acceptable sort of risk, since he can always find contrary evidence later and change his mind, do something else with the rest of his life. The sort of risk entrepreneurs take. He hasn't hit any self-modifying point-of-no-return.
What's confusing in discussions such as this is the lack of a clear definition of self-deception. Minds are complex. They contain stuff other than conscious verbal beliefs, things like gut-level feelings (aliefs?), unconscious assumptions, imagery, emotions, desires. We absolutely suck at conveying mental phenomena other than explicit beliefs and attempts to do so result in silliness like "believe in yourself" or "just do it". This leads to two problems. First, it is not clear what you mean about self-deception. Trying to deliberately alter your beliefs is obviously bad. But what about controlling your attention? Do I self-decieve about something by refusing to look at it? What about influencing emotions through positive mental imagery? Or using a relaxation technique to calm myself down? The second problem is that when someone says "I will win" you can't be sure wheter he really means "I expressly believe that my success is certain" or maybe "I know of the possibility of failure but refuse to bring it to the forefront of awareness. I feel energized, motivated and determined to achieve my goal." The second option seems like a more reasonable interpretation, unless you already have reasons to suspect the speaker of being an idiot.
Which incorrect claim, specifically, is an example of what you talk about? Death will lose more or less inevitably, under the condition that civilization survives (and death has no say in whether it does).
p(death is defeated). Not p(death is defeated | civilization survives). Yes, more or less. The most obvious cases where it wouldn't are * If one of Robin's speculated Malthusian futures came to pass. Or * If someone goes and creates a dystopian singularity. (For example, if a well intentioned AI researcher implements CEV, gives humanity what it wishes for and it turns out that humans are coherently extrapolatably as silly as Dumbledore.)
In E's defence, the tradition of normative English grammar is that "shall" expresses a determination or volition, whereas "will" expresses a fact statement. vs
Actually, believe it or not, the tradition of "normative English grammar" (i.e. high-status language) is that what you what you wrote is correct for persons other than the first. For the first person (I/we), it's the reverse. I honestly don't know what the origin of this distinction is, unless it's the fact that British people seem to say "I shall" a lot.
Neither "shall" nor "will" originated as any sort of future marker. Originally "will" denoted intention, and "shall" denoted obligation. "He will do that" |-> "He intends to do that", "He shall do that" |-> "He is obligated to do that". The first-person/others asymmetry comes from what you can know about what you intend vs. what you can know about what others intend.
Fowler has a pretty thorough explanation of this history. It's a bit out of date, but that's OK; it's history. But also note, EY mostly wrote ‘will’ or ‘'ll’, not ‘shall’.
It was interesting to see confirmation of my silly theory in the first sentence:
Yes, I definitely get the impression from Fowler that, while he knows the correct high-status English usage and can explain how it came about and how to use, he also knows that it's a little silly. All the same, I do find ‘shall’ useful. As long as I remember not to use it when Fowler would use it as a simple future marker (‘will’ is the only simple future marker in my American dialect), I can use it to express determination. If people think that ‘shall’ and ‘will’ are interchangeable, then I can't do that; but as long as people know that ‘shall’ is something funny, then at least they can look up what I mean if they don't know. It would be much nicer if things worked the way that simplicio said. Once the last first-person-simple-future user of ‘shall’ dies, then it will be safe to implement this rule. (So please hold off on the Singularity until then.)
Grammar note: Actually, that's exactly what Harry should have said, which would not have been denial. According to Fowler, that sentence is not a statement of fact about the future, but a promise (in the "coloured-future" system). As others have said, in this sentence Harry is expressing his intention to defeat death. However, that's not a direct quotation, and Harry almost always used "will" instead of "shall". Of course, Fowler's advice is obsolete, and we now rarely use "shall" (even in England, and more so in other English-speaking countries). So it's possible that Harry still meant "shall", although that's not what he said.
So in that nomenclature Harry isn't in denial, he is just making promises he can't keep. ;)
Right. But still a promise that he intends to keep. (And who knows, the way the story is going, he just might keep it!) Although he didn't use that language, that is how I (ETA: initially) read it. So I would fault him for using imprecise language rather than for self-deception. But it's not clear what he meant; you may well be right.
Downvoted for reading in distinctions that aren't there. What Fowler may have thought is irrelevant, what matters is what was actually meant and how the words are actually used. "Will" and "shall" are interchangeable in almost all dialects of English, and in the few in which they aren't, the exact distinction is complicated.
The change since Fowler has been to use ‘will’ in place of ‘shall’, not the other way around. I have read more than Fowler on ‘will’ vs ‘shall’, but I've never read anything to suggest that any dialect uses ‘shall’ with the third person in a declarative statement to mean the simple future. This is all only a minor point, since Harry didn't say ‘shall’ and it's clear what wedifrid meant. But I hope that it gets downvoted for unimportance rather than incorrectness. Some time a character may say ‘shall’ for a good reason. ETA further clarification: My previous comment contains an element of saying that wedifrid used bad grammar. I stand by that, but I also accept the response (from your reply) that grammar usage varies and what wedifrid really meant is what matters. And that's why I wouldn't write a comment whose purpose was to say that wedifrid used bad grammar. But my real purpose was to point out how, with a certain interpretation, ‘will’ and ‘shall’ give different meanings, which are just the meanings that people are debating as to what Harry meant: a factual claim that is (I admit) unjustified, or a declaration of intent that is (I would argue) justified. And the second meaning could be what Harry meant, if he used bad (or at least unnecessarily ambiguous) grammar.
The problem is that this isn't a "change since Fowler", since it predates him by centuries. Also really we shouldn't speak of using either in place of the other, since after all the original meaning of both of them became replaced with the meaning of just being a future marker. (Also this isn't exactly "grammar". :P ) I should be clear - I didn't downvote it simply because it was wrong as such, I downvoted it for spreading confusion about language when there's already a lot of that. :P
This is not correct. For further discussion, I refer you to Fowler. I will write no more on the subject, since I think that it's getting pretty far off-topic.
Perhaps I'm not a humanist so much as an intelligent-life-with-my-values-without-the-outright-obnoxious-parts-of-humanity-ist. Edit: quote syntax anyone? I feel like embracing humanity, but actively striving to overcome the "outright obnoxious" parts like biases IS humanism. At least, moreso than just adopting an "I love humanity unconditionally" attitude. I think harry's patronus, as eliezer's own would likely be, represents not just simple anthropocentrism, but the hope for a better future for humanity without losing those "my-values" that make us distinctively human. Having a patronus that takes the shape of an intelligent life form with your values and no obnoxiousness is just representing abstractly that hope for the future of humanity. I think the underlying values are one in the same. And the difference in shape does not correspond to a difference in concept.
From: Comment formatting
Use a > before the paragraph.
"Death. F@#$ that! \ Whooosh!" yes. F@#$ that!
Not really -- I found it long-winded, even though (perhaps because) I already agree with the content.
Yes. That was one of the most beautiful scenes in all of fiction.
Yes. That part made me simultaneously tingly and teary.
I came here to post almost exactly that. Additionally, it inspired me to make another donation to the SENS Foundation.
Yes, I did. Further, the Humanism sub-arc contained some of the best chapters, overall. I hadn't yet become bored with the chapters about armies, but it seemed a noticeable dip in interestingness.

These chapters (43-46) seem to have several pieces of evidence for the "Harrymort" theory. Quirrell's reaction suggests that he recognizes the particular ideas that Harry had, which in turn suggests they're where he hid his horcruxes. That those locations also seemed obvious to Harry could be simply because they are obvious, and Voldemort used them for that same reason, but it could also indicate Harry somehow "remembering" them. That Voldemort might not have actually attempted to kill Harry after having killed Lily also suggests something may have been up there, though Voldemort may have been simply lying. And we also now have a bit of evidence that Harry's "dark side" may actually be real.

I'm still trying to figure out what happened at Godric's Hollow.

Voldemort went in there with the intention to kill Harry (evidence: the prophecy, his seeming willingness to let Lily escape). Lily asked him to spare Harry's life in exchange for her own. It would seem that Voldemort accepted this offer in some way: he verbally agreed to the bargain, he killed Lily despite a previous intention to spare her, and Harry ended up surviving the encounter. But why would Voldemort do that when he could as easily have killed both, when he wanted Harry dead for prophecy-related reasons, and when he wanted Lily alive for Snape's sake?


  1. Voldy had always planned to save Harry's life for his own purposes - maybe he interpreted the prophecy as meaning this would be the boy into whom he could upload his personality. He only came to Godric's Hollow to cast the personality-transfer spell onto Harry and maybe get rid of the parents. He accepted Lily's offer because it amused him to have Lily sacrifice her life when he wasn't going to kill Harry anyway.

  2. Voldy came to kill Harry, and never gave up on that intention. He pretended to accept Lily's bargain because he was Evil, and pretending to ac

... (read more)
In canon, the explanation is that sacrificing your life in order to save someone else has actual magical force (the events of book 7, in which this effect works for Harry even though he did not actually die, imply that this effect is tied up with a person's intent to sacrifice their life, rather than their actual death). Thus, if a wizard knowingly and willingly sacrifices their life to save that of another, that other person gains a measure of magical defense, which was the reason that Voldemort's first attempt to kill Harry rebounded. I'm not sure how or whether this will be changed in MoR; if you use the intention interpretation, then it doesn't seem to horribly contradict any of the established contra-canon facts.
I agree that the intention interpretation seems to be the correct one, based on canon. But that just makes all the more incredible that nobody has discovered this before, that Harry should be the first person in known history to survive the Killing Curse. So, it would be nice if MoR made this more sensible, especially if it could do so without contradicting the rules as they are played out in canon.

These chapters (43-46) seem to have several pieces of evidence for the "Harrymort" theory.

I just thought of another from an earlier chapter.


Equal, as in mathematical equality.

Also, from Ch. 45: "A strange word kept echoing in his mind." Probably 'horcrux'. [ETA: gjm's right. Missed that.]

I thought the strange word was "riddle".

Harry glanced in the Dementor's direction. The word echoed in his mind again. All right, Harry thought to himself, if the Dementor is a riddle, what is the answer?

Oh. I get it now. *foreheadsmack*
Not that that doesn't equally support the Harrymort theory.
If anything, that supports their theory.
Somewhat later in HPMOR, Dumbledore does (obliquely) indicate that Voldemort = Tom Riddle. (Or at least he indicates that he believes this. There's enough identity-confusion in HPMOR that I don't think we can be entirely certain that he's right.)
While I agree that this might be the case, there is a logical defense for the case where Harry is non-Voldemort. Consider, if you were Voldemort hiding horcruxes. Where would you put them? Now if you are not very smart, you would probably put up some protections, and you will expect the hero to try to break them. If you were smarter, there would be some feints and double feints and deceptions involved in the process. But if you were very smart, you would go for the hardest locations, as Harry named. These might represent a kind of "fixed point" of hiding places: You know the hero will find out, but its not like you could do any better. The perfectly-logical-Quirrell knows that Harry will figure it out, but nonetheless, he has no better option! Any other choices would only make the quest easier, not harder. Now since Harry is brilliant, he figures this out independently. Because with the above fixed-point theorem that these 5 locations are the hardest possible even assuming common knowledge of the theorem and the 5 locations among your foes, then every sufficiently smart thinker will come to the exact same conclusions independently, which in this case are Voldemort and Harry. (Personally I disagree with the locations as Harry says them: There is one better: Randomize everything that Harry said. Of the 5 hardest options, make a probability distribution over them [weighted by difficulty: I would expect the space version to be weighted higher as it seems harder to find things in space than say the earth version of digging a hole a kilometer under the ground of which there are a much smaller number of hiding spots.] Then, randomize each version so that the launch trajectory (in the space case) or the burial site (in the earth case) is selected randomly. Finally, build a machine that will do the randomized selection and auto-launch independently, so that you yourself are unaware of the selected locations. Even obliviation seems weak: perhaps there are ways to be unobli
6Eliezer Yudkowsky13y
If a horcrux of Type 1 is found, that greatly increases the chance another horcrux of Type 1 is findable. You actually do want to use as many different modes as possible, not randomize across modes, because the probabilities are not independent.
Speaking of horcrux types, will you give us some hints as to just what effect such devices have in the MoR universe? ie. Backup copies, respawn points, part-of-your-intellectual-capacity, etc. Can a voyager horcrux allow you to recover from a 'death' back on earth despite being a gazilion miles away?
I second this. We have to know the rules if it's going to be important later on (else it's an Ass Pull), and I rather suspect that it will be important in the finale.
Which raises the question: is Harry going to "win" (defeat QM/bring about the Magical Singularity/generally wrap up the plot) in one year, or seven, or some other number? And is Eliezer going to keep writing that far?
No way is it going to be one year, way too many plot threads. Take Bacon's diary, it's not going to become relevant until Harry has the chance to start to read it, which he currently thinks requires learning Latin first.
I don't see that as a Chekhov's Gun, just a sweet quest item. (Note that it hasn't been mentioned again.) Chekhov's Gun for this story would be James Potter's rock.
It has been mentioned again in chapter 37. I'm pretty sure it will come up again, at least in passing, but probably more than just that.
Yeah, having Bacon's Diary equipped gives Harry a totally sweet +1 to all his attacks. And it doesn't even use up a weapon slot!
Wow. I've totally missed that as potential grounds for a subplot. I just considered it 'scenery' in the early chapters.
I wished he'd hurry up and read it; I want to know what it says!
So, I don't so much mean one year vs. 7+ of in-universe time; I mean one JKR book-length vs. 7+ JKR book-lengths worth of writing. (I.e., is Eliezer shooting for 75kword, 1.1Mword, or something else.) Should have been more clear about that.
Eliezer is already way over 1 book length (265k words, more than even Order of the Phoenix), I don't see him finishing the story short of at least 600k words, probably considerably more.
I feel like the story is more than halfway done already, although I'd be pleasantly surprised to be wrong.
Even so, I would think that having all of them off planet Earth would be preferable to some on it and some off. Inside the Sun, inside some of the ice-moons of the gas giants, and on various random trajectories out of the solar system (not strapped to a probe whose telemetry we know very well, for goodness' sake) would seem to be optimal. Of course this all depends on Voldy's actual ability to put them there. Then there's the whole issue of traps/alarms. Trapping is probably not worthwhile if you're hiding in highly-inaccessible places, since if your enemy can get there she's pretty powerful already, and the traps could easily draw attention. (On the other hand, if you have something as crazy as the Big Bowl o' Poison one, where the enemy somehow is forced to injure himself to get the horcrux, with absolutely no way around it, then it could be worthwhile.) (Silent) alarms, on the other hand, seem absolutely essential: you must know if one of your horcruces has been touched, let alone destroyed, so you can take appropriate steps.
Well, both goals should factor into your decision. The probability of hiding your (n)th Horcrux in Type 1 should be (much) less than the probability of hiding your (n-1)th Horcrux there, but you still want to inject a bit of randomness into how many Horcruxes go where...otherwise a devoted pursuer might be able to deduce the general location of your one remaining Horcrux after deactivating your first six, thereby saving a crucial few weeks and thwarting you once and for all.

The Wizards can create dimensionally orthogonal pockets of spacetime (for their bags of holding, mokeskin pouches, and TARDIS trunks). If a Horcrux simply has to be hidden where no one can get at it, and doesn't have to maintain a signaling link to the "rest" of the maker's "soul," perhaps Voldy could have made some dimensionally transcendent space (like a BoH or the Mirror of Erised), put a Horcrux in, then destroyed the connecting interface with our reality. Basically, a magical corollary of multiverse cosmology, where the Horcrux is placed in a new "pocket universe" that is then separated from ours so that it cannot be reached even in principle.

I would guess from MoR canon that relativity-compliant signaling is not necessary for a Horcrux to work, since light-lag between Earth and the Pioneer Horcrux would already be significant.

would guess from MoR canon that relativity-compliant signaling is not necessary for a Horcrux to work

Horcruces: the ultimate "spooky action at a distance"!

I can easily imagine that, if the Pioneer Horcrux is the last undestroyed Horcrux and Voldemort is killed, there will be a significant delay until Voldemort gets a ghostly form, while the signal of his death travels to Pioneer and back. On the other hand, the Pioneer Horcrux may be constantly sending out signals reminding magical reality to give Voldemort a ghostly form if he is ever killed, in which case there will be no delay (unless Pioneer falls into a Black Hole). Of course, the other possibility is that Voldemort's ghostly form will appear on Pioneer itself, but presumably he thought of that and ruled it out before making the Horcrux.
Chapter 20:
You're right! Voldemort should be destroying all of his other Horcruxes (made in weaker moments), then committing suicide. When he discovers, after his suicide is irreversible but before he actually dies in this form, that Harry is an accidental Horcrux who must (or so it seems) also be killed before Voldemort's ghostly form can appear on Pioneer, drama ensues.
I fail to see how life in deep space + life on earth < life in deep space, especially considering that V. is super against dying.
It depends on how things work, of course, but the danger is that he will be stuck in an incorporeal form on Earth forever. When canon!Voldemort is flitting about in Books 1–4, possessing Quirrel's head, drinking unicorn blood, a little baby cuddled in Wormtail's arms, it's not clear that he's in a form that can be killed at all, but it's not a form that he appreciates either. So it may be that the only way to sail the stars on Pioneer is to get a body to be killed in (and I don't know whether MoR!Quirrel's will do or he needs to be resurrected as at the end of canon Book 4) AND have no closer Horcruxes to reappear near. But if he has things under good control, then you are right. He can have fun on Earth, using his terrestrial Horcruxes at need, then only go to Pioneer at the end, when life on Earth loses its charm (or when his plans on Earth are complete). As long as he knows that he can create the conditions for resurrection on Pioneer when he wants them, then you are right.
Or he thought of that and eagerly anticipates it as the end of his struggle.
Or he thought of that and reluctantly accepts it as a second-worst scenario that is better than a final, mortal death. In JKR-canon, Horcruxes don't just send a signal to regenerate soul bits, they are fractions of a soul...if I were an evil Dark Lord in MoR-canon-world, I might accept a fractured existence in deep space, but I would not accept a fractured exsistence in a pocket universe that contained nothing else and was a priori inaccessible to my familiar world(s), even given that I hate and fear death, anticipate a triumphant galactic civilization, etc. Being alone and mostly dead in an empty vacuum for eternity really sucks.
Well, given enough time you might be able to make new pocket universes and give them life or the like. And if things get bad you can always destroy the Horcrux yourself.
Oh, c'mon, that's just reckless. In JKR-canon, Voldemort emerges from his first pseudo-death as a fragment of his former self, dependent on familiar landscapes and pre-existing allies/victims as he tries to regain enough life force just to remember who he is. Conjecturing that (a) creating life-filled pocket universes is possible, (b) you will have the tools/resources with which to do so in a hard vacuum, (c) the part of you that survives your body's death will have enough of the right kind of magical power to do so, AND (d) the capacity to spontaneously re-generate your psychological infrastructure without external stimuli after suffering a death of unknown type and origin is just begging for Occam to come up and slit your throat. Remember that if you're wrong about any of these conjectures, you are moderately likely to spend eternity in semi-conscious isolation from literally everything. Claiming that you could destroy the Horcrux yourself doesn't buy you a whole lot of leverage; the whole plot of Books 6 and 7 in JKR-canon is that destroying a Horcrux generally takes an epic-level artifact, a character with a pure heart and a focused mind, AND a whole lot of effort. These are not tools that you have access to when you're a pseudo-murdered villain floating around in an empty pocket universe.
Points in paragraphs 1 and 2 are valid. Three is wrong. I'm not sure where you are getting the idea that psychological properties were not fully functioning. Moreover,according to book 7, regret and remorse of the creator of a Horcrux will destroy it. If you are stuck in that state for a few hundred years in that state, likely the Horcrux will be destroyed by you simply being terribly regretful about the situation.
I suppose the regret is a decent way out, although I would guess that you would need to experience true contrition over the murder or over the atrociousness of splitting your soul, rather than the mere attrition of noticing that you didn't like the consequences. At least, if you wanted to destroy the Horcrux using merely the touchy-feely power of love. There might be a way to magically enhance the power of attrition, but, again, it probably requires raw materials or living things or a wand or focused discipline, none of which are especially likely to be available. There is a scene somewhere in Book 1 where Voldemort complains about his loss of psychological identity as he lusts after the unicorn blood or the Sorcerer's Stone or something like that. I forget if he was manipulating Quirrell or just boasting about how far he had risen or how desperate he was not to return to that state. Unfortunately, I can't find the exact quote because JKR has totally blocked GoogleBooks search, my book is elsewhere, and there are limits to my Potter-nerddom. Also,
Agree with most of your analysis although confused about what your point about the book 2. Since the diary wasn't the primary consciousness it doesn't seem relevant.
At this point I am far enough out of my depth that I will have to wait until I can get my hands on the books again. I suddenly regret donating books 2-7 to the library. This is almost certainly irrational. :-(
I would normally suggest throwing the horcrux across a horizon (black hole or outside the future light cone). But in a world with time travel and apparition that doesn't seem quite so safe. I would weight the distribution more in the direction of space, leaving the 'air' ones out altogether. If possible I would make the acceleration factor on the space bound item vary based on quantum effects at regular intervals, leaving it thoroughly distributed across an ever expanding part of the universe. It matters somewhat just what the device being hidden is made of and whether it can, say, resist insane tidal forces, supernovae and the like. The flying item may need to be programmed to avoid such things or perhaps dive right in, depending on the specifics. The other thing to consider is that obscurity isn't the only way to make something inaccessible. Even if the direction is guessable, spending sufficient effort in making the item accelerate into space could make it extremely hard to find. If you can charm the item to accelerate at 10g away from the earth forever and also manage to prevent anyone from chasing after it for 10 years then you have made your horcrux damn hard to catch. Before I did any of these things, well, at least before I did it with the >=3rd horcruxes I would thoroughly research just how the horcruxes manage to make you unkillable. I would need to confirm that wherever I hid a horcrux enabled the horcrux to do its thing in a way that is useful. ie. I don't want to respawn inside black holes, outside the light cone of everything I hold dear or even inside any volcanoes.
Canonically, IIRC, obliviation can be broken by sufficient torture.
Canonically? Where? The only thing resembling actual "unobliviating" that I can think of is Lockheart apparently slowly slightly recovering from his memory charm blowing up in his face via the broken wand. And that was after several years of ongoing treatment at St. Mungo's.
4Eliezer Yudkowsky13y
Goblet of Fire, Bertha. We could possibly assume that her Obliviation was intended to be of the undoable sort to begin with, like what canon!Hermione did to her parents (so Bertha could still work on her job while she was at work, or regain the memories after the Tournament).
Huh. I had no memory of that (appropriately enough. :P) *goes to look that up* Huh. Although according to this, she did suffer permanent brain damage from the memory charm itself, so not exactly what I'd call reversible, but yeah, point to gwern and you.
Bertha Jorkins. After she found out that the Crouch family was keeping Barty Crouch Jr. imprisoned in their house, Crouch Sr. put a Memory Charm on her strong enough to cause her permanent brain damage and forgetfulness. But Voldemort was able to break through it with torture.
Yeah, as I replied to Eliezer, I had no memory of that, appropriately enough. :P

Does anyone else find the HP idea of sorting children into different houses at age 11 abusive and detrimental? The houses aren't arbitrary labels; they're supposed to define your character. No real person fits into any one of those houses. Sorting students restricts their growth and causes them to develop into a House stereotype. And it's the main cause of tension, hatred, and eventually war, in their world.

Does anyone else find the HP idea of sorting children into different houses at age 11 abusive and detrimental?

My first, knee-jerk reaction to your suggestion was, "yeah!" Then I thought about it for a second and realized just how nice it might've been at that age to be given:

  1. an identity to be proud of, based on something I was being acknowledged to be good at, and

  2. a peer group of (literally) like-minded individuals with whom to share a common goal (winning the cup), camaraderie, and mentorship.

(As an interesting counterpoint, I actually did participate briefly in a house system around the age of 12 or so, but the houses were assigned randomly, and IIRC the point system was purely athletic, so I didn't give a damn about it.)

Does anyone else find the HP idea of sorting children into different houses at age 11 abusive and detrimental?

Quite the reverse. The worst thing about our education systems is that they force a bunch of Hufflepuffs and Ravenclaws to put up with years upon years of abuse by Slytherins and Griffyndors in an environment that they have no opportunity to escape from. I would absolutely love, even now, to have a sorting hat that can essentially weed out @5@#%s pre-emptively.

It is cruel and abusive to force people in an environment where they can not choose the peers they are willing to have in their immediate proximity. At least a sorting hat would help minimise the damage. "Us" vs "Them" is far, far better than "cruelest most powerful political animal vs most socially vulnerable".

That would make more more sense if they sent those different types to different schools after sorting. At Hogwarts, they force a bunch of Hufflepuffs and Ravenclaws to put up with years upon years of abuse by Slytherins and Griffyndors in an environment that they have no opportunity to escape from.
They can go to their own Houses, and do not have all of their classes together. The canon books, and MoR, spend considerable time focusing on inter-house interaction because that's where the interest lies, but a Hufflepuff who wanted to avoid bullies of other houses could likely do so at least 90% of the time.

And as well as the reduction of social abuse via the reduced time spent with jackasses it can be a whole lot easier to tolerate social aggression if it comes from outside what you identify as the most local social hierarchy. If a Hufflepuff is insulted by Draco it may be a minor nuisance but if it was a high status Hufflepuff like Neville bullying them it would probably seriously damage their mental health over time.

As explained in some of the other comments, there are some good points about it, but it's got some major flaws. One thing I really don't like is that the teachers are House-identified. They're players in the game, and it's OK for them to arbitrarily punish kids from other Houses and show favoritism to their own. That's like making coaches the referees. Hmmm, maybe that's why the House Cup ends up getting decided by something as random as "Who can catch the golden mosquito first?"

An idea I had: Sort kids into the House that's their greatest weakness/what they're least like/the element they need most to improve. So the Hat would be like, "Well, Draco Malfoy, hrmmmnnnn...better be: HUFFLEPUFF!" "Harry Potter...unfamiliar to the Wizarding World, as like to eat an Exploding Snap as play it properly. If I don't do something you might just cast some random curse labeled 'For an Enemy' on somebody without figuring out what it does first...better be: RAVENCLAW!" "Neville Longbottom...you could go faaaarrrrr, in Slytherin." "Not Slytherin! Anything but Slytherin!" "Ooooh, a wise guy, eh? GRIFFINDOR!"

In each House, kids ... (read more)

It's inevitable when you recruit all your teachers from the school alumni, which itself is more or less inevitable when you're the only school in the nation. I suppose you could rule that upon taking the job each teacher gets assigned to a new House at random other than the one they were students in (note that this would be a purely informal role, except for the four Heads), but I doubt it would be very effective and not counterproductive.
That wouldn't work at all. Slytherin wouldn't be Slytherin without any Slytherin kids there. Maybe it could be made to work with a lot of additional adjustments, but the result probably wouldn't be much like the house system you describe.
You don't think you could take a bunch of young humans and mould them into selfish, Machiavellian, politically minded, corruptible schemers? Of all the houses I suggest Slytherin is the most natural! Making Slytherins into Hufflepuffs, now that would be a challenge.
You could - "with a lot of additional adjustments". You would to have to actually work at turning them into Slytherins, and doubly so if there are no natural Slytherins there at all to lead the way. And probably not everyone anyway.
My claim is that most humans outside of fairy tales already are Slytherins.
2Eliezer Yudkowsky13y
And Gryffindors, Hufflepuffs, and Ravenclaws.
I seem to have a somewhat more cynical outlook. Judging real humans by the criteria of the sorting hat would result in far more Slytherins than members for the other houses.
Even if you take 'em when they're kids?
If that were so it would defeat the whole point of placing anyone in Slytherin to become one. And my point would still hold for the other houses.
Yes, more or less. Unless there is some reason you want people to become better Slytherin.
What makes the Houses have their particular character? the diktats of the Head? that 7th-year students remember what they were taught about the House the last time, they were Sorted into it, 3 years ago, and try to teach the others? I like the idea of putting people into Houses that they have the most to learn from, but then I think that you have to keep the House assignments permanent, or else lose the House characters entirely. (Not that that would necessarily be a bad thing ….)

It might be worth disentangling the effects of Sorting (possibly bad, should probably be moderated by mixed-House projects) and the effects of the House points system (entirely bad as far as I can tell).

The house point system might not be completely bad. It might encourage competitively minded people to work more if they might be lazy otherwise. Empirically in the real world this sometimes works. For a few years (not sure if still active), Yale and Harvard students had competitions about which could reduce energy per a capita more. When I went to highschool there was a fundraiser for raising money for foodbanks and each class competed to see which could raise more. There was also a "neutral box" for people who wanted to give but didn't compete. By the end of the fundraiser the neutral box would generally have about an order of magnitude less money in it than the the grade box with the lowest amount.

Well, specialisation has benefits, and since the sorting is done by magic most people should end up happy where they are put. It's not like they get different curricula or anything.
How did you choose your prior for anything done by magic to be done correctly? :) Ending up happy doesn't feel like a good goal. Maybe I'm being irrational. But it reminds me of the characters in Brave New World who said, "It's Good to be a Gamma!"
But it really is best (sub-Gamma) to be Gamma. The people in Brave New World really are happy and content.
Yes, I know. That's why I said what I said. (E.g., your observation is taking the dialogue back one step, not forward.)
Erm. Not really. It really is best (sub-Gamma) to be Gamma. It is not best to be Gamma. We don't want to self modify to be super-happies, even knowing that we will reflectively endorse the change having become super-happies. The people in Brave New World are honest about their class being correct in a way that normal people aren't being honest when they say it's best to go to their school or root for their sports team or like their sort of art. That's what I'm pointing out - the next step is to realize that the reply to a Gamma telling us it's best to be them is "so what?". We don't have Gamma values so the fact they're human shaped shouldn't inform out values.
The original context was Oscar saying that the sorting hat will make people happy. I commented that maybe happiness isn't the right goal - not a very helpful comment, frankly; Oscar's comment was a fine contribution, whereas mine is tangential, nit-picking, and sounds like a criticism. If being happy were your only goal, you might very well say, "Make me a Gamma!" "We don't want to self modify to be super-happies" implies that being happy is not our only goal, which is the point I was (pedantically) making. So I think you're agreeing with me more than you're disagreeing with me. You're bringing in more subtleties to the issue.
I believe Lucas was trying for the "morality as a 2-place function" notation as in this post, but using different notation made this more confusing.
Tradition. I can imagine that sorting students into universities or groups on Meyer-Biggs indicators or learning types could lead to some good things. Also it could be that the founders of Hogwarts wanted to make sure that their society is made up of 4 main character and culture lines, which all work well together in the end. When putting teams together for real world projects i enjoyed having all kinds of characters working on their respective area of interest.
What does Slytherin contribute? The Slytherin attributes are negative-sum. Whatever positive value they have is negated by the presence of opposing Slytherins; and they generate huge negative externalities.

Surely you're overlooking Slytherin's positive qualities as defined by MoR. Slytherin are focused on manipulating people, concerned with power, and quite cunning. If you want to keep fooling the muggles, have good PR guys, and keep alive the dangerous, secret lore that other houses would consider too evil (so we can use it to fight aliens), you need Slytherin.

It's the only house that has consistently churned out people who actively work at defeating death!

JKR did, grudgingly, show us a positive-sum Slytherin, which is to say a pre-Riddle Slytherin; his name was Horace Slughorn. Warning; essays on that site are addictive, and they will make you hate Deathly Hallows even more than you already ought to.
I'm not sure that it's so much what Slytherin contributes as how best to deal with the Slythery people in society. Best to put them in school to keep an eye on them, then to put them in their own House to keep them from bothering the others. Even if you would prefer to be rid of them entirely (as Rowling, at least, might be), that's not possible.
JK mentioned how Slytherin is not just the house of evil people, but that each evil person came out of Slytherin. I do not remember what other positions Slytherins have in Canon but we can surely come up with reasons to have such a house. First it helps students to reach their full potential (at least in the theory that fiction is), second it provides a training ground to have people for the more dirty needs of society like leading in a war. Was there ever a mention which house Dumbledore went too? Third it provides society with some training for how to deal with evil people. If there are none left society gets overrun by an outside force. Fourth there is the value of not having the Slytherins poisoning other houses. Having a house of Bullies would be a nice add to the real world (till your research shows that a strong hierarchy forms in every social group.) Fifth it gives you someone to contrast yourself against. Sixth if Slytherins are more adventurous, prone to doing dangerous things that they are also the inventors of new things. A healthy society needs some innovators, some bureaucrats, some workers, some people to provide Emotional support, some teachers and so on. I remember reading some reasons for the House of Slytherin in Canon, but memory evades me.

each evil person came out of Slytherin

Wormtail was Sorted into Gryffindor and turned out to be a bad dude. This seems to have more to do with Rowling's desire to have him plausibly be a Marauder, than anything related to any aspect of his revealed personality. She's very prone to that - the same rationale was likely behind making canon!Hermione a Gryffindor.

Dumbledore? Gryffindor, I'm afraid; it's mentioned by Hermione on the train ride of the first book. He seems like so much more of a Slytherin, doesn't he?
He was a Gryffindor, o' course, since that was the standard Hero House in canon.

The new chapter is spectacular fiction, but I'm not sure it's true that bigots are necessarily low-grade people, though it's possible that they are, on the average. Is there research available?

Henry Ford and Richard Wagner had notable accomplishments, and were also energetic anti-Semites.

Portraying bigotry as low-status is tactically useful, both in the story and in the real world, but has an interesting blow-back-- it means that pointing out someone else's bigotry becomes a threat to lower their status. (This didn't come up in the story because Draco hasn't been in those discussions.)

In the real world, people of all sorts of status levels are active bigots-- that's why prejudicial laws can be passed and enforced.

This doesn't deny the idea that bigoted groups will tend to drive away lively-minded and benevolent people, but there's a difference between a trend and an absolute.

I'm not sure it's true that bigots are necessarily low-grade people

I read the chapter much more narrowly as saying that racist people are low-status. Racism is now reviled in Britain (or at least the U.S., and I'll guess also Britain) to such a degree that anybody openly espousing racist views (at least based on skin colour rather than, say, immigration status) is automatically looked down upon. Other forms of bigotry don't usually have this effect, nor did racism until fairly recently.

However, we are looking more at racism in the 1940s (at least by the standards of the U.S.) than the 1990s. Judging from To Kill a Mockingbird (which is the only documentary evidence that I have onhand, sorry), extreme overt racism along the lines of using words like ‘Nigger’ (analogue of ‘Mudblood') was still looked down upon and associated (rightly or wrongly) with low class. But that's just because moderate and subtle racism was the norm. This is how it works in the Wizarding world too.

In ch47, Harry's list of conditions for his agreement with Draco is broken: he has forgotten an extremely obvious condition. Namely, that Dumbledore did it deliberately. This doesn't seem like a very likely oversight for MoR!Harry; I wonder whether it's deliberate on Eliezer's part.

I wonder whether it's deliberate on Eliezer's part.

I now imagine that it is. Here is my scenario, with so much detail that its probability is extremely small, so that it cannot be a spoiler:

Dumbledore, being cleverer than in canon, discovered the existence of the diary Horcrux. After diligently searching for basilisk venom and researching any other safer means of destroying a Horcrux, he realised that he would have to use Fiendfyre. He broke into Malfoy Manor but found it more difficult than he expected and was badly weakened when he found the diary, so he was unable to overcome additional protective enchantments on the diary itself and remove it. Having good reason to believe that the manor was empty, however, he used Fiendfyre right there and then used his last strength to escape. As it turns out, Narcissa was home, and her valiant efforts saved the manor from destruction but cost her her own life.

Later, Dumbledore spoke to Lucius to apologise. While he did not dare to explain why he had started Fiendfyre in the Malfoys' home, he told Lucius that he never intended to kill anybody and only reluctantly cast the spell that would have destroyed the house. He also told Luciu... (read more)

It would be very interesting to watch Harry try and convince a very smart and angry Draco to let him out of his promise, in such a situation.
It seems likely that he would give it at least some weight. The justification reasoning even crossed his mind when considering the possibility that Dumbledore set Voldemort on him and his parents.
Wow, I hadn't even thought of fiendfyre and the diary. Awesome hypothesis.
For Harry, is morality about intentions or consequences? Maybe he doesn't care whether Dumbledore did it deliberately; if anybody is so careless as to do such a thing accidentally, then they're an enemy.
It's hard to tell. Harry's morality seems to be somewhat ad-hoc in nature. For example, he declares that sometimes killing is necessary but torture can never be, which rules out being purely consequentialist but is hardly typical of deontological ethical frameworks either (but fairly normal for standard human thinking). Even so it would surprise me if Harry didn't distinguish at least partially on intent. Completely not caring about intent, well, just "doesn't seem like his style". I observe, for example, that Harry judges Dumbledore for sharing gossip to Severus with the intent of setting Voldemort after Harry's family. When looking at raw causal interactions there are no doubt countless trivial actions that have the consequence of really bad things happening. Yet Harry singles Dumbledore's (alleged) conniving out purely based on the fact that he intended it to lead to particular a chain of events.
If you don't take that statement to have the force of logic behind it, there's no conflict with consequentialism. It could be that Harry believes that there is no benefit to come from torture, while there are obvious benefits to come from removing a dangerous person from the world.
I gave Harry the benefit of the doubt on that one by inferring that he is slightly idealistic rather than blatantly stupid. ie. A general ethical ruling against torture is reasonable while believing that there are no possible instances in which torture could provide net consequentialist benefits would be insane even for Harry.
Possible Mindkilling Warning. While this is certainly true, human biases mean that those with the power to torture will self-justify its use far more than is optimal. When promulgating a rule for when torture is acceptable, "never" really does seem the best choice. Yeah, "Promoting less than maximally accurate beliefs is an act of sabotage. Don't do it to anyone unless you'd also slash their tires.". I think slashing the tires of torturers is more than justified.
Cute, but you're actually slashing the metaphorical tires of the non-torturers while the torturer's tires are (evidently) slash resistant.
That is an important omission - I'm not sure what Harry should do under those circumstances.

Comments cover up to Chapter 46. UN-ROT13'd SPOILERS.

Love the new chapters! Harry's takedown of the Dementor was epic! Yes, I know, that term has been devalued by inflation quite a bit, but in this case its original value and meaning hold. A very nice and emotionally powerful summation of Singularitarian values in Harry's buildup. Also, I didn't stop and try to guess what Harry's Patronus would be, but "the rational animal" is the perfect choice!

One little quibble though. When Dumb-ledore and Harry were trying to guess why Quirrell might want to bring a Dementor to Hogwarts, Dumbles never bothers to mention, "Well, Quirrell did challenge me to a bet, that if any of the First Year students could produce a corporeal Patronus, that I'd let him teach the Killing Curse to anyone who was interested." Naaawwwww, there couldn't possibly be some ulterior motive to Quirrell's desire to teach Dark Magic to the kiddies, could there? Surely not!

And isn't this supposed to be an "Unforgivable" curse, as in, "life in Azkaban" or "the Dementor's Kiss" for using it? Given the existence of such a law in Wizarding society, it doesn't mak... (read more)

I never really understood the claim that there's no defense against Avada Kedavra. Sure, there's no direct countercurse, but you can dodge it or levitate an object between yourself and the curse (Dumbledore levitated a statue in front of Harry to protect him from the curse in Book 5). Both of these responses can be trained to the point of instinct, and voila, you have a defense. Wait, the fact that the second strategy works is inconsistent. If the Killing Curse can be blocked by inanimate objects, why is it that clothing doesn't block it?
I forget if this happens in the book, but in the movies the curse damages obects badly when it hits them. So clothing may just be too thin and weak to absorb it.
Maybe it's like a liquid, and can get through cloth but not an entire sofa or wall.
That makes sense!
There is something all too appropriate about comparing AK to a gun. That 'unforgivable' label always seemed utterly arbitrary. Yes, torture, coercion and killing tend to be nasty things to do but there are far more ways to go about doing it than those three spells. Effective use of winguardium leviosa could kill dozens of people at once, for example. And combining healing magic with a sharp stick over a period of a month is probably worse than crucio for a couple of seconds. Then there's the old 'sleep/stab' combination that makes 'sleep' the most feared spell of all in certain magical worlds. That seems to be the big distinguishing feature. Teaching 12 year olds something that Dumbledore himself could not protect anyone against seems like it may have downsides. I've always taken the position that stigmatising AK was arbitrary and pointless but I've never quite taken that position all the way to teaching junior grades how to use it. Surely it is something that should at least have the limitations that are in place for apparition? (Even if that just means removing the limits RE: apparition!)
One justification I liked was that AK, being "fueled by hatred", can only be cast by those who are already beyond the Moral Horizon. So it's not the murder itself that's so terrible, it's that fulfilling the prerequisites for using AK means that you are a dangerous sociopath who cannot be safely let loose in the wizarding world. Unfortunately this doesn't cover Crucio and Imperius, which IIRC are even used by some "good guys" in canon. But I'm sure you could come up with some other fan-wank to explain them.
I like that justification too, in as much as it is the best of the possible 'fan-wank'. Even so I suspect that Lily could have pulled off an AK if she had more of a chance. She had huge reserves of magical talent and a hell of a lot of hatred. Yet she still wouldn't be a dangerous sociopath. In fact, the scariest thing about sociopaths is that they don't even need to have overwhelming hatred to do brutally nasty things. The fact that most people need to be overwhelmed by emotion before they violate mores is what distinguishes them from sociopaths.
Oh yes, I was talking about canon; IIRC Lily Potter, or any non-Death Eater, doesn't attempt AK there, does she? The wiki doesn't say so, at least.
Not that I recall. Mad Eye AKed a spider but technically that was a death eater impersonating Mad Eye. (Although nobody, not even Dumbledore, seemed to blink when Mad-Eye was AKing arachnids. That suggests that people within canon!verse do not all believe that casting AK means you are actually evil.)
Fake!Mad-Eye also told the class that actually casting the Killing Curse was extremely difficult and that none of them would be able to do it.
That kind of claim was usually the prompt for Harry or Hermione to pull it off a couple of chapters later. ;)
Or squishing spiders requires less evil than squishing people.
I drew the analogy that it's like the term "deadly weapon". Fists can be deadly, but they are not called deadly weapons. Hitting someone in the head with your fist is not guaranteed to kill them. Likewise you can drop a shipping container on someone -- and I'm sure this would earn you a life sentence -- but Winguardium Leviosa is not itself a deadly (Unforgivable) spell, as an arbitrary cast of the spell is not guaranteed to kill. It's still a bit arbitrary. To my knowledge, using a love potion is not Unforgivable -- though it's clearly magical coercion and serves only such a purpose as that.
Mad-Eye/Crouch demonstrated Avada Kedavra on a spider in Book 4, and nobody had a problem with that (besides some of the students, who were appropriately shocked). I assumed that this is how Quirrelmort will teach it here.
Incidentally, he also (next chapter) demonstrated Imperio on students, teaching them to overcome it. He got (or so he claimed) permission from Dumbledore for this, although I don't know why Dumbledore had the authority to give such permission. He also gave them the opportunity to leave first, but taunted them so that they wouldn't.
Here I was thinking he would students with detention run back and forth across the quidditch pitch, like those ducks in the side show shooting ranges. Put them way over the other side of the field to give them a fighting chance. It should only be the slow and uncoordinated ones that can't dodge in time... what use would Quirrelmort have for dead weight like that?

I appreciate that Eliezer tries to explain the Death-Eater point of view - they're heroes in their own minds; and they're the only ones trying to solve a terrible problem that the "good guys" are ignoring. He also points out flaws in eg Dumbledore (though that may be dumbing down the character). Overall, his treatment of the conflict is more balanced and nuanced than Rowling's. More the kind of thing that I think I like (though I could be deceiving myself).

But if the book had been written that way, could it have been a bestseller? Is stupid moral oversimplification necessary in a mass-market bestseller? E.g., Tolkien, Narnia, Star Wars.

I'm trying to think of mass-appeal war stories with a balanced or ambiguous or at least non-stupid treatment of good/bad, but the ones I come up with are not exactly blockbusters: Gormenghast, Ender's Game, Grendel, The "Good War".

Some blockbuster movies qualify: Saving Private Ryan, High Noon, Blade Runner, Watchmen, The Searchers, Rashomon, Apocalypse Now, Unforgiven. Odd that movies, which are thought of by intellectuals as more lowbrow than books, may be more successful at communicating non-stupid ideas.

Is stupid moral oversimplification necessary in a mass-market bestseller? E.g., Tolkien, Narnia, Star Wars.

Gregory Maguire, the author of Wicked and other books, achieved considerable success turning the morally simplistic world of Oz into something more complex. The Broadway musical was also very popular as such things go. Not quite on the same level of success as your examples, but it shows there’s some market for it. (Maguire also wrote similar retellings of Snow White and Cinderella, which I think sold pretty well, although not as well as Wicked.)

Edited to add: Although if you're only asking about "war stories" strictly defined, it may not be a good example.

Gregory Maguire, the author of Wicked and other books, achieved considerable success turning the morally simplistic world of Oz into something more complex.

If the Wizard of Oz had been written that way to start with, could it have achieved its popularity? The fact that so many people know about Oz definitely helps anybody who wants to sell a deconstruction of it.

Good point. Wicked also is an imperfect example because it was written for adults, unlike the examples in the grandparent. I wonder if there's something different about the way (most) authors write books for children and (some) authors write books for adults - HP, Narnia, Star Wars, and Oz all had young audiences in mind. Most of the more morally complex movies mentioned in the grandparent were for adults. Do any of Stephen King's bestsellers have moral complexity? I also wonder if those writing and creating works for children (if they do gravitate towards moral simplicity) have the correct understanding of what their audience wants? Of course, HP and Star Wars certainly broke out well beyond children, so maybe a lot of adults want moral simplicity too.
Speaking of media for children, I once read that the MPAA will not certify a film as "G" if it contains if it contains morally ambiguous characters, regardless of the sex, violence, language or drugs. Unfortunately I cannot find an internet citation for this (beyond the talk of "mature themes").
I read an essay by Stephen King where he claimed that his writing was basically socially conservative and morally simplistic - there's always evil in his worlds, but it's always an invader from the outside that must be repelled.
That seems like a major oversimplification. A whole bunch of exceptions spring immediately to mind, such as pretty much all the Bachman Books (where the villain is often society itself or the masses thereof), and short stories like Dolan's Cadillac (where it's not really clear who's the bigger villain). And what about Firestarter? Even in books like The Stand or Needful Things, where the evil really is a non-human invader from the outside, it gets big chunks of its power from individuals' failings of character.
The "Save the Cat" series of books on screenwriting says that's an essential part of such movies - that the monster only gets to invade because someone's moral failing lets it in. I'm not fond of their attitude - that there are only about a dozen possible plots for movies - but there certainly are a lot of movies that conform to them.
But McGuire's works work because they are deconstructions; he is a fanfic writer, albeit working in the mainstream business model. What the world needs are financially successful original stories, and indeed children's stories, with grey morality.
Neil Gaiman's The Graveyard Book, leans grey. The villain is unambiguously The Bad Guy, but the protagonist is decidedly unsaintly, as is his mentor. So that's one.
Thanks; I like Gaiman but didn't know about that, so now I can read it!
I have to disagree. The ‘morally grey’ approach can be interesting if the author is writing a story of ideas – exploring unconventional morality, novel social forms, etc – but very few authors have the ability to do that. Usually they’re writing a simple plot-driven story of romance and tribal conflict, which requires obstacles (for the romance) and enemies (for the tribal conflict). In this type of story trying to introduce sympathy for the villains just ruins the reader’s enjoyment to no purpose. Besides which, morally grey stories have been in fashion for the last twenty years, and anyone who considers themselves a serious author has already taken at least one shot at it. Most genres are inundated with the stuff, some to the point where it’s hard to find anything else. The last thing we need is even more of it.
This is probably just a matter of taste, but I get enough simplified morality from people who believe that it applies in real life; I don't want it any more in stories, even simple plot-driven ones. Not children's literature. The children of today are the closed-minded partisans of tomorrow.
How would people characterize A Wrinkle in Time? It’s been ages since I’ve read it, but it’s another indisputably (?) classic children’s book. IT and a lot of the good/evil shadow imagery seem somewhat morally simplistic in my memory, but I seem to recall other moral complexity, e.g., with the Mrs. Ws. I’m also having trouble characterizing Charlie and the Chocolate Factory in terms of moral complexity, but it also doesn't fit in with the other examples in that it lacks a high-stakes struggle. Alice in Wonderland is the other major children's classic fantasy I can think of, but I can't recall what, if any, type of morality it presented.
Good question. As I recall, I found the first half much more interesting than the last half. In retrospect, I think that one reason was that the Ws required thought to understand but It did not. (But I don't recall thinking this at the time, so take that with a grain of salt.) The morality in these is farcical, so it's easier to be grey, or just meaningless. (In Tim Burton's recent adaptation of Alice, which has a coherent plot unlike the original, the morality was very black and white.) Now I remember the famous debate in The Horn Book Magazine about the morality in Charlie. I found most of that debate pointless because Charlie's morality is farcical, so why would you expect it to make sense? (Well, the debate wasn't only about morality.) And that reminds me of Ursula Le Guin (who took the anti-Charlie position in the first April 1973 Letter to the Editor at the above link); she wrote the children's fantasy trilogy Earthsea. This has a fairly grey morality, especially the middle book, which is told from the perspective of an antagonist (at first) of the trilogy's main protagonist. Years later, Le Guin wrote a sequel trilogy, which (while earning a mixed reaction from the fans) addressed some of the problems that she saw in the original trilogy; it was even greyer, but it was not marketed to children anymore. In any case, Earthsea is not a counterexample to ewbrownv's claims, because the story does explore ‘unconventional morality, novel social forms, etc’ (and does it well, IMO). Ob MoR: Earthsea has an anti-lifeist moral, but because it is grey, it treats the lifeist position with some respect; the villains are more misguided than evil, and you can sympathise with them. Lifeists still won't be happy with it, especially in the sequels, where gur urebrf qrfgebl gur nsgreyvsr (although once you get to that point, this is pretty well justified). But at least the lifeist position is not dismissed out of hand.
Are you asking for children's literature, or YA? There are quite a few YA, morally grey, literature available; not incredibly popular, but existing. I would argue that it's difficult to really develop grey morality in a 'child''s worldview, since what a child is is more difficult to define. That said, I would say The Demon's Lexicon, by Sarah Rees Brennan, is quite morally in the grey area; the protagonists are really not very 'good', nor are they very 'evil' as in the case of an anti-hero. ...I believe that it would also be wise to introduce grey morality age-appropriately - because if someone is young enough, they might go off humanizing the villains, and humanizing a villain that would predate on someone that young would not be wise.
The younger the better, I suppose. Although library and bookseller classifications have to draw the line somewhere, there's really a continuum of target audience ages. Anything that is widely read by children should count, regardless of how it's classified (although how it's classified may give a reasonable estimate of whether children read it, in the absence of real data). Eliezer has referred to HP as ‘for children’ when explaining some of the changes that MoR (which is not for children) has to the background universe. But HP is often classified as YA. I would not want to be picky. That's an interesting argument. I definitely believe that children must learn that villains are humans too by the time they are old enough to commit acts of revenge that can cause significant harm. So certainly tweens (who will soon be old enough to join gangs, plan for future careers, etc) should read about humanized villains, while still reading about heroes who resist them. But very young children may need to classify people strictly into good and evil to successfully avoid harmful people. That's an uncomfortable idea to me, but I don't know enough about child psychology to rationally evaluate it.
Any sufficiently high-stakes conflict presented with moral overtones should do. That reminds me that I really, really liked John Gardner's Grendel (Beowulf from Grendel's view). But it wasn't very commercially successful.
His Dark Materials is a possible counterexample.
I haven't read past the first book; but in the first book, the bad guys are really obscenely bad. Calling God a bad guy doesn't make it morally ambiguous, if God is really bad in the story.
Well, there's a reason I named the trilogy rather than the first book.
Perhaps I'll read the next book, then!
I strongly recommend His Dark Materials for relaxation reading. Book 1 was meh, but book 2 is good and book 3 is beautiful. It's lightly peppered with good rationality. Will in particular thinks pretty clearly.
Yes, they're bad, but they have justifications for why they're doing everything. (They're horribly mistaken about the consequences of what they're trying to do, but most of them honestly believe in their cause.) And you get to hear their explanations first, before Lord Asriel gets to speak - and when Lyra finally meets up with him at the end of the first book, the first thing he does is pretty horrible.
I would say The Silmarillion is not very morally simplistic. Specifically I would call it Black and Gray morality [TVTropes], because I can't think of a single non-God major character who's totally good. (Maybe Luthien?)
Good point, I think - like most people, I never finished The Silmarillion. But I don't think that's evidence for non-simplistic popular fiction - it wasn't very popular even when riding on the huge success of Tolkien's other work.
The saga of A Song of Ice and Fire has sold around 7 million copies (Wikipedia) and it's extremely far away from Manichean morality. I would estimate that no more than five percent of the text involves truly heroic or truly depraved characters. Sven Hassel's best-selling books can also be a good example. We must, however, distinguish between works that derive their nuanced morality from an attempt to be faithful to reality, and those that donate nuanced morality to a fictional setting.
If we go back in time, we find emphasis on heroism more than good vs. evil. E.g., the Iliad.
In Avatar: The Last Airbender, the original bad guys become good guys, and there is an effort (well, a couple of lines in one episode) to understand the worse bad guys. The bad bad guys are definitely bad, but really only a couple of characters (and their nameless goons) are like that. And there is at least some mention of "wouldn't it be great if we could get Germany running again? Whoops!" Rather than simply saying they're evil for evil's sake.
It is if you are writing children's stories!
Is this a teddy-bear effect? Weird possibly NSFW ads on website; critical part quoted: There was a famous children's story author who wrote 2 books. The first was from the POV of a kid continually being bothered by a bully. The second was the same story, from the POV of the bully. But I never read them. Wish I could remember the titles or author name.
I read those, about 30 years ago. I don't remember the titles or author, but I do remember being surprised by the bully's POV and feeling empathy for him.
The His Dark Materials trilogy portrays the viewpoint of the villains before it shows what the heroes' side believes in.

Not directly related to MoR, but whatever. I recently joined a massive HP roleplay forum and what i noticed among the players was a huge deal of optimisation by proxy. Basically the general sentiment is that being sorted into one house means that you have no traits from the others. This makes some sense, because a wizard employer will probably look at the candidates' house affiliation first. I'll need to reread some of the books, to check if it's canon, but in the fans' minds at least, all of Magical Britain is aligning itself to an arbitrary division. It's a bit disturbing, really.

I was in a White Wolf MUSH some while ago, and it was the same story. The stereotypes helped bad roleplayers be not awful, but hindered really good roleplay.

Chp 47 Author's Notes

Is the hint in chp 45 the Dementor saying to Quirrell "that it knew me, and that it would hunt me down someday, wherever I tried to hide"? I'd assumed that was related to Voldemort cheating death, but I haven't read all the books so I don't know if it's suggesting anything non-canon or just more evidence for Q=V.

I thought that the strange word that echoed through Harry's mind could be somehow related to this completely mysterious fragment of text found at the beginning of chapter 1: Not that I think this would explain anything.
Chapter 20: Chapter 43: There are blind spots in Harry's mind, and in 20 he doesn't even seem to notice it.
Doesn't the Interdict of Merlin imply that either blind spots are easily magically manufactured or that everyone has them?
Add to that spells like the Fidelius, and.. yes. They're easily manufactured.
Oh yes, and also all the places hidden from Muggles. Can't believe I forgot about those. The Interdict is specifically Eliezer's, though.
Didn't think of that; I haven't reread the chapter mentioning the Interdict since I noticed the line.
It might, if the word is Riddle.
Another notable thing from chp 45 was Fawkes's role in getting Harry to take another shot at the Dementor - perhaps a phoenix is something like an anti-Dementor (peace of mind, rebirth, etc.)?
What was Professor McGonagall busy doing, maybe?
I thought that was (probably) rather straightforward; providing extra guard for the Philosopher's Stone, the theft of which was (probably) what Dumbledore earlier suspected the Dementor plot to be a distraction from.

I have the answer, people. Have no fear.

Quirrel isn't evil. Evil people like Voldermort only exist in stories. It's just that Eliezer built an FAI, and as a reward got a chance to pretend to be Raistlin.

Hermione is going to found SPEW, and then, to save the house-elves from having to work all the time, will create an Auto-Geomancic Incantation, or AGI, to do the housework. It will recursively self-enmagic and optimise for the first item on it's to-do list: get more paperclips.

The world will end, and the moral is that everything can be destroyed very quickly by things you weren't expecting, because you're not in a story.

I know this to be true for a fact, because Eliezer laughed when I suggested it.

Also, in the real world acausal trade is magic, so in the Potterverse, magic is just acausal trade.

It struck me as odd that Harry was repulsed by the idea of the Sorting Hat losing consciousness, then regaining consciousness (or being "reborn" as a somewhat different entity) repeatedly. Seemed a lot like falling asleep and waking up.

I would have thought that the additional creation of more consciousness, which seemed to be enjoying itself or at least not suffering, would just be added utility to the universe. Then I remembered that Eliezer is an average utilitarian. Which raises the question: Would an average utilitarian average together u... (read more)

"Odd" or "typical of the kind of superficial moral reasoning Harry usually employs but essentially completely arbitrary"?
I wasn't modeling Harry, so just odd.

Here's my Slytherin theory.

Almost all Death-Eaters were Slytherin for the same reason why almost all Mussolini supporters were Italians. People from different houses just tend to stay together, especially when organizing a major conspiracy. If Dark Lord was a Hufflepuff, most Death Eaters would be Hufflepuffs. Dark Wizardry is no more inherent character of Slytherins than fascism is of Italians.

Seriously? But, but... Hufflepuffs would suck at being Dark Lords. There are important traits that Slytherins have that Hufflepuffs just tend not to have.

If one Hufflepuff happened to have them, imagine the loyal, hardworking, tight-knit followers, diligently working to acquire the traits deemed necessary...

Dark Marks would barely even be necessary! I wonder how difficult it would be to game or work around the house selection system somehow. Can the sorting hat see through mind control spells?
All you have to do is think really hard that you can't stand any other house, will not find your fellows there, will not reach your full potential...
Or, and this is where the real threat of Hufflepuffs comes in, you really just want to help help people but are rather confused about how to go about doing so. (Unless the confusion is on the part of those who are using the label 'Dark' and you really are helping them.) Altruists are scary. Hard to control.

"For the greater good!"

I could imagine a Hufflepuff developing some spell to merge or link minds so the group can be even more cohesive and cooperative. A Hufflepuff Borganism could be pretty freakin' scary. "We are One. We are Together. We are Loyal. You should join Us. Yes, yes, you really, really should. What's that? Oh. You just don't know what's best for you. Let Us help you."

Anyone who tries to manipulate Sorting Hat at age of 11 would automatically and deservingly be sent straight into Slytherin.
Do you think it is possible for the Sorting Hat to see through powerful mind control spells? Modified memories, obliviation, imperius, etc. Better yet, polyjuice. Send some other kid in that looks like you and is willing to go along with your plan out of loyalty. Just brainstorming here. It's quite possible that the Hat would yell out "Well, this guy is going to Hufflepuff but wedrifid is going to Ravenclaw!" Which reminds me, the hat works by piggybacking of the intelligence of the wearer. So I would pick the dumbest Hufflepuff friend that I could find!
It was made by founders of Hogwarts. Possibly Dark Lord or Dumbledore could cast a spell like that, but few 11 year olds or their parents.
I wonder how much consideration the founders put in to the effects of non-magical chemical interventions. On the day before the sorting I could conceive and then carry out the following plan: * Pack a lunch packed lunch which includes a beverage dosed with MDMA. * Ensure that I will eat this food in preference to purchasing off the trolley. Either by writing a note or by giving my parents instructions to remind me quite seriously. * Drug myself with an amnesiatic cocktail and so forget the plan. MDMA would likely be sufficient to influence the sorting. Especially if combined with extensive psychotherapy over several months. Since you have allowed influence by the parents there is even more scope for influencing the sorting by non magical means. Chemical and psychological interventions can make a huge and somewhat reversible influence on psychological traits. There may be similar non magical ways to enhance a polyjuice based plan. Legal name changes. Chemically enhanced hazing to convince the volunteer that their actual name is wedrifid, etc. Wizards are notoriously narrow minded when considering non-magical loopholes, especially in the MoR!reality. Bypassing the hat as an eleven year old may be difficult without assistance but should definitely be possible with parental assistance. As an extreme measure: * At age 10 backup all your memories. * Have the parents introduce retrogade amnesia and solid brainwashing over months or a year. * Restore the memories at the Christmas holidays and work hard to reverse all changes. This should be possible because magical intervention can be used in the healing process without the hat interfering. Apart from healing spells things up to and including self cast imperius can be used.
But what would be the point? Has the Sorting Hat ever placed anyone in a House they very strongly didn't want to be placed? It assigned Harry to Gryffindor not Slytherin because Harry was strongly against the idea of joining Slytherin. I'd guess with strict system like that, most people get pre-conceptions about which house they belong to long before sorting, so Hat's job is usually very easy.
It quite probably has, and would. The hat isn't complying here just noting that wanting desperately not to be Slytherin is evidence that you are not most suited to being a Slytherin. Me wanting desperately to be a Hufflepuff because it gives me access to a whole lot of Hufflepuffs to be my loyal minions might not be quite so persuasive.
Well, Hermione's sorting is another example of Hat taking person's preferences into account. Is there any good counter-example? I'd expect people to develop serious plans of taking over the world at some age older than 11, but feel free to write fanfic to the contrary. But if you believed strongly in value of loyalty, that might be enough. Hermione, Neville, and Peter Pettigrew all seem to have been sorted based on their value system more than on their actual traits - otherwise their sorting makes little sense.

I'd expect people to develop serious plans of taking over the world at some age older than 11

Erm, not taking over the world per se, but I was certainly thinking in long-range terms. If you look at my grade school graduation yearbook (age 12), my ambition is listed as building the first faster-than-light starship. Ah, the innocence of youth, before I got ambitious, and before I understood the local nature of causality.

Incidentally, that's when I stopped talking about taking over the world, and also turned my attention to FTL. Public goal: Deduce the principles necessary for interstellar travel. Secret ambition: Control and drive all advanced research and current deployment of technology for transporting person, parcel and bit, then manipulate world leaders into disarmament. Ah the lonely megalomania of youth, back before I got ambitious, back when I thought I had to do everything myself.
To be honest I've been running with the "their sorting makes little sense" theory. :)
All three were sorted into houses they new people in. This seems to have persuaded that hat a little in canon. I would think it is likely that the hat would sort people into a house they want to be in. Also, at age 11, many people haven't fully developed, and putting them in a house is likely to cause them to be more like that house; there's no reason for the hat to be overly picky about putting people where they belong. The actions of a ten-year-old aren't great predictors of future personality. Although thinking about it, the actions I remember taking as a ten-year-old seem pretty consistent with you I am today, but I would guess that I am an outlier in this regard. Anyway I don't see any reason to believe that the hat has EVER put someone in a house they didn't want to be in, and I feel like taw is making stronger points despite the upvotes not agreeing with me.
Couldn't a Slytherinny parent who wants their child to become powerful coach their child into wanting to be in some House other than Slytherin? Say, MoR!Lucius, coaching his son in all the ways of seizing power, but telling him awful, awful stories of what it was like to be a Slytherin. "No, no my boy, you do not want to be in that House, whatever you do!" Then, Draco under that Hat goes, "No! No! Not Slytherin! Anything but Slytherin!" And thus, ends up somewhere else. Thus positioned, he does not automatically have to wear a suspicion-generating Slytherin badge, and he gets to be the wolf among the sheep (if he ends up in Hufflepuff or Gryffindor, where there's no Harry and Hermione to match him). Being Slytherin is like being a Ferengi. People already expect you to scheme against them, so their guard is up. But a Hufflepuff or Gryffindor (especially Gryffindor!) MoR!Draco would start out with powerful advantages in his quest for world domination. Since "rule the world" and "save the world" aren't really that far apart, he probably would have ended up in Gryffindor. If you want to rule the world, presumably you think you've got a better way to run it than the way it's being run. Some would-be rulers might just want the wealth and being able to boss other people around, but it's easier to get that as a cult leader and not have to have responsibility for administering the global economy. If you want to save the world, you could be defending the status quo (keeping that other guy from conquering the world), or you could see some threat (climate change, death) that isn't being dealt with appropriately, and you have a better way. In either case, you are tacitly assuming that you have a pretty good idea what's best for the world, and act to see that things go your way. Though I'm over-simplifying a bit here, I think there is an element of "who's writing the history?" to whether one's a "Gryffindor" or a "Slytherin." Andrew Jackson: Gryffindor? Slytherin? What about C
You aren't. Most people overestimate the amount that people's personalities are likely to or able to change.
Any chance we could get anecdotal evidence about this? Or better yet studies about it? How much have you changed since you were 10? ETA: I google'd it and came up with this but neither I nor my university seems to have a subscription to peek inside.
Without trying to be rude I would actually prefer you just didn't believe me right now. It is a field of enquiry that I haven't researched in a while and it would take me a long time to dig up the resources that I once found convincing. I seem to recall being surprised by identical-twins-raised-apart studies that focussed on the "big five" traits. I'm taller and my philosophy has changed (I was raised by religious believers). My interaction with that philosophy and personality is more or less the same (but matured and far more effectively applied.) It is not something I have read but my university seems to have access. If you are particularly curious you could message me with an email address.
Official house traits: * Hufflepuff - Loyalty, Dedication and Hard Work * Gryffindor - Bravery and Chivalry * Ravenclaw - Intelligence and Wit * Slytherin - Ambition, Cunning and Resourcefulness It seems to me Hufflepuffs are most likely to turn Magical Britain into well-meant but ruthlessly-run authoritarian state, with disastrous consequences for all. Slytherins would probably turn against each other before achieving anything if one of them wasn't so much more powerful than anyone else.
Ambition, Cunning and Resourcefulness certainly don't rule out the possibility of solving cooperation problems. Even Draco with the lessons Harry has taught him would be sufficient for him to take over the world rather effectively if Harry was out of the way.
World used to be filled with revolutionary movements, and very few managed to grow past Dunbar's number or so before falling apart by everyone trying to out-politic everyone else. Only very few that were extraordinarily loyal like Bolsheviks won. The primary difference between Bolsheviks and everyone else was their strong belief in strict loyalty to the party, whose decisions were to be absolutely binding upon all members. Even after they started killing each other, very few defected the Party to join some other group. Compare it with far more typical Slytherining in Kyrgystan where people keep joining, defecting, and plotting everyone against everyone else.
Most of the Trotskyist groups from the 1930s to the 1960s also adopted democratic centralism, but they infamously split all the time. Of course, Trotskyists are selected (amongst Leninists) as those willing to defect from the majority.
Trotsky was a total Slytherin, just see how many times he switched sides even before the revolution.
These are good points. Yet I also suggest that monarchies, any kind of feudalism and for that matter republics, religions and democracies are maintained by Slytherins. In the case of monarchies and feudalism in particular all changes in power are more or less the outcome of Slytherin machinations.
Feudalism feels more like Gryffindor to me. It was more about personal authority than about cunning. Not to mention he was the one with the sword.
There's also the power behind the throne. Cardinal Richelieu was definitely a Slytherin. (Well, the character in Dumas was; I don't know so much about the real person.) How about the Vedic castes of India? Brāhmaṇa = Ravenclaw, Kṣatriya = Gryffindor, Vaiśya (later Śūdra) = Hufflepuff. Nobody admits to being a Slytherin, which is suspicious, don't you think?
I would have said Śūdra = Hufflepuff, Vaiśya = Slytherin. Vaiśya are the "merchant" caste, which plays rather nicely into a number of negative stereotypes, including the fat-cat capitalist robber-baron and the Evil Corporation.
Yeah, I thought of that, but I didn't think that it fit very well. So I went back to the original caste system, before Śūdra existed. I agree that when Śūdra came around, it replaced Vaiśya as Hufflepuff; I just don't feel that the newer Vaiśya fits any house. And still later, Dalit = House-Elf? The pre-Śūdra caste system also corresponds the the Three Estates of pre-Revolutionary France: First = Brāhmaṇa, Second = Kṣatriya, Third = Vaiśya. But again, the Third Estate later consisted (and had for centuries by the time of the Revolution) of both merchants and laborers. If you want to split those, you get a very good correspondence between Hindu castes and the European classes that allegedly inspired the 14th-century playing card suits that we still use: Hearts = Brāhmaṇa, Spades = Kṣatriya, Diamonds = Vaiśya, Clubs = Śūdra. So by composing these relationships, we get a correspondence between playing cards and Hogwarts houses! (if we accept Vaiśya = Slytherin). There exists a set of Harry Potter playing cards by Bicycle which almost agrees, but they swap Slytherin and Hufflepuff (pic).
Interesting. I think that swap can be traced to Rowling, who upset the traditional progression from noble to base by putting Slytherin at the bottom.
Well yes he was. But he never organized a circle of Slytherins to permanently take over France. And don't forget how unsuccessful were Machiavelli - model of everything that is Slytherin. Brits were playing Indians against each other extremely successfully. They took over India before anybody even noticed.
That's a much later time period than Vedic society, but I like it all the same.
I didn't realize we cared about such minor issues in a thread that involved analogies between Hogwarts houses and Communist revolutionary factions ;-)
Personal authority is something that takes rather a lot of cunning to acquire and maintain. A Gryffindor may be claim a territory here or there but his children either adopt a Slytherin mindset their power dwindles or is usurped.
Slytherins by definition lack necessary bravery to keep getting into all fights that maintaining a position within feudal system requires. As long as acquiring power requires personally charging into an enemy army, Gryffindors will hold most of it. Fellow Gryffindors will be easily impressed by someone who does so without a second thought. Slytherins won't last long. To someone who actually values their life and comfort like all Slytherins do, this is very expensive kind of signaling.
I don't agree on this one. Slytherins will do what they need to do to get power. There is also quite a difference between creating, maintaining and enforcing an image of personal bravery and being personally brave. Those who maintain the greatest image of personal bravery will be those that are best at choosing to personally engage in the elements of a battle that pose little risk to themselves and who proficient at arranging the demise of anyone who doubts their courage. It isn't hard to choose the bravest rivals and ensure they are put in the most dangerous situations. As I understand it that was standard practice for dealing with rivals without damaging morale. Gryffindors will be in the upper echelons in such a system but they will rarely if ever be at the top.

I don't agree on this one. Slytherins will do what they need to do to get power.

To get power for themselves, not for other Slytherins, in practice leading to a lot of mutual undermining. A Slytherin has as much chance of out-braving a Gryffindor, out-smarting a Ravenclaw, or out-hardworking a Hufflepuff as any of them out-cunning a Slytherin. It might happen occasionally, but as easily either way.

I'd even say all this taking over the world business was very un-Slytherin. The First Wizarding War was an open Gryffindor style confrontation, and in spite of having the most powerful wizard on their side, Death Eaters were remarkably unsuccessful. As soon as Voldemort was gone, his decades of effort fell apart almost instantaneously. Death Eaters were just ridiculously unsuccessful.

Just compare Voldemort with Horace Slughorn (or MoR's Lucius Malfoy, but I don't think original Lucius Malfoy were as successful as in MoR). Slughorn was a good wizard, but nowhere near Voldemort's level.

Voldemort treated people as disposable pawns, beating them into submission if they resisted, and had no qualms about disposing of even his loyal servants if it suited him. It was parasitic and abusive rela... (read more)

According to canon, once you gain an horcrux you turn into an easily recognisable monster. Depending on the exact effects (which aren't detailed) it may be that you have no way to re-enter society and thus no third option between living as a total hermit or as a lord of terror. So, if your three options are: (A) achieve immortality, spend eternity hiding from the world; (B) achieve immortality, try to take over the world; (C) live in comfort and respect for less than 200 years; you could argue that A is better than B, but C is pretty clearly worse than A and B. Although it may be pointed out that there's little reason not to wait until you're, say, 150 or so before trying that Horcrux thing. Of course, there's (D) get hold of a Philosopher's Stone and pull a Flamel by achieving society-approved immortality, but that might just be the single greatest plot hole in canon HP. Speaking of which, the Stone was mentioned in passing during one of the early chapters of MoR, albeit only for its alchemical powers, so I'm curious to see if/how Eliezer handles its existence as a life-prolonger.
It isn't clear from canon if a single horcrux turns one into an easily recognizable monster. We know that Voldemort looked like a monster after he had 1) made multiple horcruxes 2) was killed and then came back using dark magic. In fact, we know that when he was Tom Riddle he had already made a horcrux when at Hogwarts and he still looked like a normal human until at least the end of his time at Hogwarts.
Ok, then scratch everything, he's an idiot.
Even if it resulted in severe disfiguration, very few people know anything about horcruxes, so you can make up some believable cover story.
If the plot hole to which you're referring is that canon!Voldemort could have used his extreme skill to get the Philosopher's Stone, instead of going for Horcruxes, the idea that I always got was that the Philosopher's Stone extended life, by preventing aging, but Horcruxes prevented death, by tethering the user's soul after their body died. If someone had killed Nicolas Flamel while he was regularly using the Elixir of Life, I don't believe it would have helped him. Canon never says how Horcruxes deal with death by old age, but if it worked the way Voldemort's death worked, then a person who died of old age would get a ghost-form that could then in principle be reincarnated as Voldemort was. (Which is another highly evil piece of magic. What is it about life-extension that people think is evil?) It's never mentioned whether Voldemort's new body would ever die of old age.
Strong in the force he is, but not that strong?
Extreme Lifeism is an unusual belief, most people don't think tiny chance at immortality is worth big risk of throwing your life away. I doubt anyone thinks so even here, regardless of what people say. If they did, they'd be donating at least half their income to SENS.

If snakes are sentient, they can't work as Patronus 1.0.

If. I don't think they are; it would have been obvious to some scientist at one point or another, not to mention anyone who lives in close contact with them.

It seems more plausible to me that their apparent intelligence is another product of magic; that when you're talking to a snake, you're actually talking to a magic-induced AI of some kind that will, if you asked it to do something, control the snake afterwards to suit your purposes.

The laws of physics here are already AI-complete, so it doesn't seem like a large leap to me.

Actually, I'm pretty sure snakes are sentient. They're not sapient, though, as far as we can tell.

(Yes, I'm aware that the error is in the original text.)

Please don't allow arguments about definitions be presented as arguments about substance, as objecting to something previously said. Distinguish them by making it clear that your observation is on a separate and unrelated topic of English language, and thus doesn't constitute an irrational argument.

Sorry, I thought it would be obvious enough what I was objecting to.
It is, I just think it's a healthy debiasing style to keep the intentions explicit.
Upvoted. This should be on the advice-to-new-users page, if it isn't already.
I have seen so many people use them interchangeably, and I think I've even seen dictionaries disagree about which is which, that I've pretty much given up on the words 'sentient' and 'sapient'.
Even though people use the words inconsistently, those people who distinguish them at all do so consistently, and you can use cognates to remember which is which: ‘sense’ = ‘feel’, so ‘sentient’ = ‘feeling’; ‘Homo sapiens’ = ‘wise man’, so ‘sapient’ = ‘thinking’ (more literally ‘discerning’ in the Latin). I usually take it for granted that snakes are sentient but not sapient, although I don't really know enough about snakes to be sure of either. But there's another idea, neither of which these words quite captures, that seems to be what really matters to Harry: self-awareness (‘anything that lives and thinks and knows itself’). A snake may sense its prey, but does it sense itself? It may discern that its prey is food, but does it discern that its self is a self?

Possibly the important thing is whether Draco thinks of them as being sentient (sapient) as he's casting the charm.

Yes, I originally thought of it as the most plausible explanation. But then, Harry's remark must also make Draco's Patronus ineffective, just as explanation of Patronus 2.0 would, which very likely isn't the case.
It might yet make it ineffective, but only if Draco grasps the implications. Harry might begin the next chapter by deciding to shut up and not explain to Draco why it matters to him that snakes have a language. (It obviously doesn't matter to Draco, who I don't think has fully accepted that Muggles are sapient, despite their obvious language.)
Perhaps they're just not conscious of mortality?
Wouldn't that be convenient? What's special about mortality making it a plausible gap in the mind?

You know what? A WIZARD DID IT.

Giant cheesecake fallacy!
It actually makes quite a bit of sense to be unaware / indifferent to death for a family of species that do not take care of their offspring (with a few exceptions, eg. pythons, which might also never appear as Patroni).
Personal survival is a basic drive in any case, and being aware of something doesn't require caring about it, only the potential for instrumental worth.
...Unless there's something very weird about their psychology. Which, given that they're snakes, seems entirely plausible.
Never mind the snakes, what about the birds?
Unless I'm missing something from not having finished 47 yet, a snake patronus isn't an actual snake.

I think that Harry is too dismissive of ‘souls’. He didn't think that magic existed, but it did, and if the people who deal with magic also claim to deal with souls, then there might be something to that. The idea that every human has a soul that goes to an afterlife may be silly (and even Wizards don't act as if they really believe that), but when talking about ghosts, Horcruxes, or the Dementor's Kiss, there might be something real that Wizards mean by ‘soul’, and Harry should investigate that possibility.

If wizards has some type of magically generated "soul", this would be grounds to treat non-wizards as a soul-less subclass. This doesn't seem to be the direction MOR is going.
Only assuming that this magically generated "soul" has functions or qualities that affect a being's moral worth. It's easy to assume it does because of the usual connotations of "soul", but if this sort of soul (whatever it does) is something that Muggles are able to do without, then we can't jump to that conclusion.
From Harry's perspective, it would more be an explanation of why Wizards treat Muggles as a subhuman class than an argument to actually so treat them. After all, Harry cared about people (including, by default, Muggles) before he learnt about souls (or other forms of magic) at all, and what Wizards call ‘soul’ may end up having very little to do with what Muggles call ‘soul’. (All of this predicated on the assumption that Wizards actually mean something by that word, which Harry is so far not crediting, since Muggles don't.) Also, it may yet be true that everybody (even Muggles) has a soul, although it would probably be simpler if only Wizards do.

And it was time and past time to ask Draco Malfoy what the other side of that war had to say about the character of Albus Percival Wulfric Brian Dumbledore.

I love the recent (Humanism-era) take on Dumbledore. It's about time MoR stopped portraying him as a fool and showed his real scheming, ruthless side. Portraying Dumbledore as weak or foolish doesn't appeal. But seeing him as a scary, morally ambiguous, overwhelmingly powerful wizard who saved the world from Voldemort with gossip is a development I like. That's a guy who can really bite the bullet (in this case regarding his implications of prophecies) and then shut up and multiply.

I'd never thought about it this way before but that makes it seem really awesome.

Stylistic note to Eliezer: you frame 98% of your dialogue with "X said" or "said X". This is usually inconspicuous when there is action or reflection to break it up, but in chapters like 47-48 that are full of back-and-forth it can suddenly jump to your notice - and once it does you cannot stop looking at it. More attentive/pedantic readers than myself may well have caught on it earlier.

I would encourage you to mix it up a little with the dozens of options available : blurted, replied, retorted, acknowledged, asked, mused, told [him/her... (read more)

Reminds me of Tom Swifties. For instance:

Harry placed the hat on his head, as he'd done during the sorting ceremony. "You should remember our earlier conversation," Harry reminded the Sorting Hat.

Heh, took me a bit to get that one (for those as dense as me, the pun is in "reminded").

"Upvoting both joke and explanation", he remarked.
Err... didn't Harry/Eliezer have some arbitrary ethical problem with creating temporary conscious beings like that? If I recall, he made dramatic oaths about not doing it again and probably swore people to secrecy on the subject.
Yeah, it's just a joke (more specifically, a pun (more specifically, a Tom Swifty)).
Comment on material of instantiation orthogonal to joke concept.

Well then, I'd be happy to correct you.

It's fairly common writing advice that you should do your best not to use any other verb than 'said' to carry on a conversation.

To put it simply, most people simply ignore the repetitive nature of 'he said', 'she said'. Therefore, conversation flows fairly smoothly and naturally. Constantly injecting synonyms for 'he said', 'she said' is a sign of a new writer.

Naturally this doesn't mean "never ever use anything else besides 'said' to mark the dialogue". However, the alternatives should be used only in places where they fit exceptionally well and not just for variety's sake.

Disclaimer: This should not be taken as a definitive opinion on the subject since there are writers out there who will agree with you. I'd say, however, that the consensus is on the side of "use said as much as possible".

I agree with the first, but not the last. There is also the option of dropping "he verbed" entirely.

There is also the option of dropping "he verbed" entirely.

This can cause problems. Sometimes when I read a lengthy dialogue in this style, I read a line which seems to me much less likely to by said by character whose turn it is to speak, and I have to go back to the last anchor point where it was made explicit who was talking, and carefully keep track of it. In some cases, after doing this, I have wondered if the author lost track.

Being clearly understood is more important that avoiding the appearance of redundancy.

In some case, I have confirmed that the author must have lost track, and have had to make a guess as to where the mistake is.
5Eliezer Yudkowsky13y
I confirm that Grautry's answer is the conventional one, and that I often worry that I am overusing adverbs or verbs that are not simply "said", which is what we are told to worry about.
Yeah, after seeing this responses I did a bit of looking around and I acknowledge that it is apparently quite frowned upon, at least in English prose (to the point of having a name: "said-bookisms"). No matter how many compared examples I read, after trying hard to "blank" my mind beforehand, I still find myself liking the "exorted/rebuffed/pressed/" version over the "said/said/said" more, so I'm probably just a statistical anomaly.
Another way to check would be to see whether there are well-loved stories which engage in said-bookism. The idea that authors ought eschew synonyms for "said" might merely be a theory which works fairly well, but doesn't reliably cover the range of what people like in their fiction.
That comment was based on CS Lewis' An Experiment in Criticism-- the argument is that any fiction which attracts devoted rereading has something going for it, and it's better to evaluate fiction by the sort of reading it gets rather than evaluating readers by whether they like the right fiction. This was published in 1961-- I think the idea of dethroning official lists of Great Books was more revolutionary then. See also his High and Low Brows, which argues that the only reliable difference between high and low status art is that high status art is more difficult to appreciate, with the clinching argument being the likes of Shakespeare, Dickens, and Mozart becoming high status as they become less accessible. He further argues that both high and low status art have good and bad features and should be evaluated by the same standards.
I'll support grautry position too. The content of the dialogue itself should indicate a musing, a question, a counter, an apology, a suggestion, an urging -- using the superfluous words "mused", "asked', "questioned", "countered", "apologized", "suggested", "urged" is very very clumsy. And some of your other suggested words like "stated" instead of "said", and "retorted" instead of "replied" don't even seem to be trying to indicate anything other than the desire to use a synonym. In which case the story is no longer about communicating anything, or depicting a scene, but instead a game of how much of a thesaurus you can use. This is the sort of suggestion that I've seen the fanfiction.net forums actually give out to writers -- new writers actually go there and say "I want more synonyms for the word 'said'"! And the people there instead of saying "No, you don't, you need less synonyms", actually do offer suggestions for more synonyms. It's just horrid horrid advice.
Disagree. "Said" is punctuation, easily ignored. Anything else will only pull me out of the dialogue.
I think JK Rowling was famous for this as well.

From Chapter 45.

"I don't really know how to say thank you graciously," Harry said quietly, "any more than I know how to apologize. All I can say that if you're wondering whether it was the right thing to do, it was."

The boy and the girl gazed into each other's eyes.

"Sorry," Harry said. "About what happens next. If there's anything I can do -"

"No," Hermione said back. "There isn't. It's all right, though." Then she turned from Harry and walked away, toward the path that led back to the gates of H

... (read more)

Aftermath, Daphne Greengrass in chp 46 starts to show what's next. The story of their kiss spreads unstoppably, Hermione's life as she knew it is over, her attempt to define her public identity separate from Harry has failed...

Hmm? This seemed pretty obvious. It connects with what Hermione worried about her life being over. The point is that what happens next is that everyone knows she really likes HJPEV. Given the standard attitude of kids in that age range what happens next is likely going to be lots of silly mockery.
Ok, that is somewhat reasonable. But ... I would have thought that, even to children, Hermione's willingness to kiss Harry would be something like a willingness to apply CPR. It is something anyone would do for a fellow human, let alone a friend. It is Harry's response to the kiss that provides evidence. Evidence of Harry's feelings for Hermione, rather than Hermione's feelings for Harry.
The standard narrative is that such things work through The Power Of True Love, so it's not at all surprising that the other kids will assume that that's what happened. Seen through that lens, the fact that Hermione tried it at all implies that she loves him (otherwise she wouldn't've expected it to work, and wouldn't've tried it, per the standard narrative, which to the best of my knowledge doesn't allow for people trying it just in case) and the fact that it did work implies that it's reciprocated. We know better - in fact, Eliezer's account seems to imply that a kiss from anyone would have worked, as Harry doesn't seem particularly aware of who's kissing him; it's just that Hermione is the only one who knew that that particular thing would get a strong, automatic emotional reaction from him - but the other kids don't know that, and I don't expect them to be particularly open to alternative explanations, either.

Maybe Hermione should've gotten Neville to do it.

It would've gotten rid of all the readers who were halfway out the door because of Sirius/Pettigrew.

Maybe Hermione should've gotten Neville to do it.

No, give the quibbler something real to write about - fetch for Draco!

I don't get the impression that a kiss from anyone would have worked, not naming 'a person' was just building suspense! His instinctive reaction is then "I told you, no kissing!" The relevant belief for Hermione to have as I see it is he loves her. Hermione knows enough about the way dementors and patronuses work to realise that his emotions are what matter. Whether she is feeling it too, so to speak, is irrelevant. Although of course we know she is. :)

I have a question about TDT's application in 33 of HP:MoR.

I didn't say you should just automatically cooperate. Not on a true Prisoner's Dilemma like this one. What I said was that when you choose, you shouldn't think like you're choosing for just yourself, or like you're choosing for everyone. You should think like you're choosing for all the people who are similar enough to you that they'll probably do the same thing you do for the same reasons.

Should businessmen collude on one-shot pricing? The decision theory I learned in school says "Never!,&... (read more)

good TDT summary

Well, not really good. Merely best.

*cough* They certainly would be!
3Eliezer Yudkowsky13y
All they need to do is find someone who can help enforce the decision, or make it matter reputationally to friends, or iterate it, and they don't need to worry about whether they're doing the same thing for the same reasons.
I think we should be charitable (make the interpretation that makes the question most sensible or interesting), and assume b1shop is assuming those conditions don't apply.
What about new entrants?
Yes. If the expect to be using the same decision algorithm, they will maximize their personal profits if they both set the price that gives the greatest total return.
I don't understand TDT, and the people who write about it are very smart; but that passage made it sound like sympathetic magic. You're not choosing for all the people who are similar to you. You can argue that doing so leads to better outcomes in PDs - but then you're really just arguing for cooperation, not choosing the decision theory that maximizes your utility. "All the people who are similar enough to you that they'll probably do the same thing you do for the same reasons" just means "All the other cooperators". So saying "I implement timeless decision theory" seems to be a way to clothe saying "I cooperate on PD" in bogus Bayesian respectability.

That's because the passage isn't actually about TDT; Eliezer is trying to avoid throwing anachronisms into a story set in the 1990s. It's instead about the closest thing that existed at the time, Hofstadter's idea of superrationality, which does (IMO) suffer from the flaw you posit.

"I always cooperate", "I always cooperate with agents I know will cooperate with me", and "I always cooperate with agents I know will cooperate with me iff I cooperate" are all separate decision making processes. Depending on who they're playing the PD with, they can make different decisions.
When I said "I cooperate on PD", I didn't mean to lump all those together. It's shorthand for those who cooperate in the way resulting from TDT. My point is that TDT itself, as described in that one sentence from the Harry Potter story, is no different from saying "People should cooperate because then they will all get better payoffs" (although in a more specific way).
OK, this is off-topic, but why do people stop there? Why not ‘I always cooperate with agents I know will cooperate with me iff I cooperate iff they cooperate’, and so on? These are not equivalent. Incidentally, in classical logic, I cooperate iff (you cooperate iff (I cooperate iff you cooperate)) is always true. (But we don't really have that here, because the modal operator ‘I know’ interferes.)
It isn't necessary to stop there, and you can follow that chain pretty much infinitely. I think TDT jumps to the end of that regression by cooperating iff you and I are both implementations of the same abstract computation.
Yeah, but each stage is rather different from the one before; at no stage would you actually cooperate with yourself, since those ‘iff’s are so strict. But if this (which I've seen here before) is not supposed to be what TDT really says, but just some handwaving to give the idea, then that's all right.
TDT hasn't been published in anything resembling a finished form, and I'm a curious amateur when it comes to decision theory, at best. I imagine there's more to it, but I can't really speculate about what it might be.
People stop there because going further starts hurting instead of helping. The PD payoff matrix implies that I want to avoid cooperating if I can, but it's more important that I get you to cooperate, even if in order to do that, I have to cooperate. Adding more restrictions on your reasons for cooperating can't make the outcome better for me, I only care that you do it.
Going one step further doesn't (generally) add restrictions; it just changes them. Consider: 1. I will cooperate if I know anything. 2. I will cooperate if I know that you will cooperate. 3. I will cooperate if I know that you will cooperate iff I cooperate. 4. I will cooperate if I know that you will cooperate iff I cooperate iff you cooperate. 5. I will cooperate if I know that you will cooperate iff I cooperate iff you cooperate iff I cooperate. 6. … Using classical logic after the modal operator, these reduce to: 1. I will cooperate if I know anything. 2. I will cooperate if I know that you will cooperate. 3. I will cooperate if I know that we will perform the same action. 4. I will cooperate if I know that I will cooperate. 5. I will cooperate if I know anything. 6. … (repeats) Actually, now that I write it out like this, I can see why one would choose (3)! It's important that there's an ‘if I know that’ instead of an ‘iff’, which I've seen before. But the version above is how I parsed WrongBot's statement, so hopefully WrongBot quoted it correctly. (The search function is not helping me find an original.)
It's pretty clear that if your opponent in a symmetric game with the same information is running the exact same deterministic algorithm as you with the exact same computational resources, you'll have to make the same move. This essentially "vanishes" the off-diagonal boxes. The TDT proponents want to take advantage of this to have a "better, more winning" decision theory, which would give both of them the (C, C) payoff rather than (D, D) even in a one shot prisoner's dilemma.. Grafting this on by itself currently buys little, as there is never this degree of symmetry. Now, suppose we are playing a symmetric game and 90% confident that we are playing a clone with the exact same computational resources, and 10% confident that we're playing some one random (and that if we're playing a clone that it's 90% confident that we're a clone that's 90% confident that ...) What do we do in this case? I claim that in this case we can still take advantage of this, as long as the probability is high enough relative to the utility losses. We need to do both the calculations for "they act independently" (Assume they choose the Nash equilibrium, if we don't know anything else about their decision-making) and "they act the same" (diagonal) and merge them. The proper thing as always, is choosing based on the expected utility, which is just the probability weighted utility for each choice. For the standard prisoner's dilemma, where (C, C) = (3, 3), (C, D) = (0, 5), (D, C) = (5, 0), and (D, D) = 1. We can see that no matter what your opponent chooses, it's better to Defect than cooperate, so the Nash equilibrium is the pure strategy D. If, on the other hand, your opponent is a computational clone, you choosing to Cooperate gets you the (C,C) box, not the (C, D) box. So, we have 0.9 3 + 0.1 0 = 2.7 for Cooperate, and 0.9 1 + 0.1 1 = 1for Defect. Cooperation is the better choice, and remains so up until p < 1/3. I also claim this is pretty much the limit of what we can do. If the algori
Why do we assume that?
In order to figure out our best move, we need to something about how the other person will move. It's generally a good idea to assume your opponent is indeed rational and utility maximizing. The Nash equilibrium strategy is the one that is stable such that neither side can do better by switching, which gives it a great deal of stablity. As such, it's often a good model for what people will do. In this case, the full machinery isn't necessary. Defect strictly dominates Cooperate in every choice, so barring special considerations like TDT, it's what anyone with a modicum of sense will do.
Is this a fact? Where can I read about the evidence for this?

I don't have any direct citations to current social science, no, but I'll tell a plausible story, and give some indirect citations.

Often? Yes. Always or near always? No. It depends crucially on the complexity of the game, the familiarity of the person playing the game, and the intelligence of the people playing.

Most people playing a game iteratively update their strategies with each game, learning both which moves of theirs worked better, and what their opponents are likely to do.

If both sides constantly do these updates, they are driven towards a Nash equilibrium. (It might be better to say they are driven away from anything that is not a Nash equilibrium.) The definition of a Nash equilibrium is a combination of strategies where neither side can do better by unilaterally altering their own move. If one side can do better by altering their own move, and realizes it, they will.

Complexity makes it harder for people to explore the space and find the Nash equilibrium. The more familiar with the game, the more likely you are to have found that neighborhood and play near it.

The smarter you are the faster this happens -- you can essentially model your opponent to figure out what... (read more)

Thanks; upvoted.
Why? I'm not just asking rhetorical questions - your opponent may be non-rational in one of a trillion of very realistic, very common ways: maybe he'll cooperate because of his personal moral/religious views, maybe he'll defect because he doesn't want to think of himself as a 'sucker'. Or maybe he is rational but has made a mistake somewhere along the way of his musings on PD. If all your formulation says is that you're playing against "someone random", at a minimum this means a randomly chosen human, most of which have a terribly flawed rational process. At a maximum it means any randomly-chosen or randomly-generated entity capable of picking an option - you could be playing against Eliza or Paul the Octopus for all you know. Also, if you are going to assume that he is rational and not mistaken, why assume that he is just rational enough to do the obvious, zero-depth payoff analysis, but not rational enough to have a model any more sophisticated than that? (indeed, why should TDT be discarded as a "special consideration"?)
This is a fair point. For games people are not familiar with, have not played to death, this is absolutely true. For the games people have played a lot of, (or have had their genes and memes evolved under and contributing towards their moves), anything but what the Nash equilibria does must get outcompeted. Playing poker against a novice, there should be options much better than Nash. Against a pro? Not so much. Against a hustler (who isn't actually cheating)? Well, they're optimized to take advantage of novices, by leading them into bigger bets, so you can probably take advantage of this by not scaring them off by playing too well too soon. These are, of course, part of the utility function -- and if you don't know that modeling is a bitch. Most people do not play by reasoning it out to any great depth at a conscious level. They play by gut instinct, set by genes (and memes) and shapened by experience. For games where the genes are relevant, this is going to push towards Nash. Experience is also going to push towards Nash.
I think we're returning to an argument I've had before, on free will. Yes, if you are running a deterministic algorithm, this is true. But the assumption that you are running a deterministic algorithm violates one of the prerequisite assumptions needed to even have this conversation: That you can choose an algorithm. The way you're describing TDT, it seems to assume that an agent doesn't actually have a choice at the time of choosing an action. An agent can make a precommitment, and that may be a good strategy. But only as dictated by game theory. Assuming that the agent does not make a choice during the game is not even game theory.
You are under the annoyingly common misconception that choice between A and B means that whether A or B is chosen is indeterminate (i. e. either incoherent free will magic or identifying yourself more strongly with your randomness source than your fixed qualities). What it actually means is that whether A or B is chosen depends on your preferences and your decision making process.
All right; I stated that incorrectly. We can regard the actions of deterministic agents as "choices"; we do it all the time in game theory. What I was trying to get at is not the choice of A or B, but the choice to use TDT. It sounds to me like TDT is not addressing the question, "How do I convince an agent to adopt TDT?" It assumes that you're designing agents, and you design them to implement TDT, so that they can get better results on PD when there are many of them. But then it's not fundamentally different from designing agents with a utility function that includes benefits to other agents. In other words, it's smuggling in an ethical judgement, disguising it as a mathematical truth. If you're a human, why would you adopt TDT? The reason must be one that is not an answer to "why would you cooperate?", nor to "why would you tell people you have adopted TDT?" You might be able to prove that utility functions and decision theories are equivalent; meaning that any change to a utility function could alternatively be implemented as a change to the decision theory, and vice-versa. Thus, asking someone to change a decision theory may be nonsensical. So, maybe the answer I'm looking for is that TDT is not a thing meant to be offered to humans; it's a more-parsimonious way than ethics of arriving at cooperation on PD. That would be acceptable. But to really be useful, TDT must be an evolutionarily-stable decision theory. I'm skeptical of that. The "ethics" approach lets evolution pick and choose only those values that help the agent. The TDT approach is not so flexible; it may force the agent to cooperate in situations where it is not beneficial to the agent.
It's true that people just "make decisions", and don't have access to their source code. They can, however lift decisions to the conscious level and decide to follow an algorithm. Do you have any problem with economists convincing people that it's in their best interest to figure out what the Nash equilibrium is and play that? They are arguing for an algorithm, and people can indeed decide to "follow the algorithm" rather than "just picking their gut choice", can't they? At least, when they have explicit payoffs available, etc. Really, TDT is just one specific example that if you know your opponents decision procedure, you can do better than not knowing[1]. In a one-shot PD against an unknown, the best I can do really is defensively playing Defect. This is true even if I know what move he'll make. On the other hand, If I don't know his move, but know that he will make the same move as I, whether because he's copying me, or we're both "implementing the same algorithm", we can effectively together force "cooperate". Now, "implementing the same algorithm" is actually a somewhat vague idea. I listed several ways that even computer implementations couldn't guarantee enough symmetry. People are far worse, of course. A conscious decision to do what the algorithm says will often have people backing out because it's saying to do something crazy. We can't implement TDT, only approximate it. Are the approximations good enough to be useful? I find that idea implausible. I wouldn't because IMHO, it won't ever be useful to me. I can't trust that the situations are actually symmetric enough. To uploads? Maybe. To AIs who can examine and certify each others source code? Quite possibly. EDITTED: [1]: Okay, it's a bit more than that, it matters not just when playing clones, but also when you need to know how future versions of you will behave in "omega" situations. I also don't expect to need to deal with that, though I am a one-boxer.
The same as any other choice: Assuming that you are calculating whether you prefer to adopt TDT and preferring to adopt TDT results in you adopting TDT you have the choice to adopt TDT. I certainly don't believe that. (I'm making the simplifying assumption of consequentialism rather than some other value system tortured into being represented as an utility function.) The utility function is what assigns utilities to various possible states of the world (in the widest possible sense), the decision theories differ in how they link the possible choices to the possible states of the world, not in the utilities of those states. An agent chooses to change decision theories if their preference, calculated according to their current utility function and decision theory, is to change their decision theory and this results in them changing their decision theory. I'm not sure in how far that applies to humans. For them it may be more like realizing that TDT is a closer approximation of how their decision making process actually functions given the correct input, and that in as far as their decision making was previously approximated by another decision theory it was distorted by an oversimplified understanding of the world.
At least Eliezer's interest in this, as I understand it, is partly motivated by his work on artificial intelligence. An AI with write-access to its own code can choose algorithms (even if it is deterministic). I don't know how much this applies to us (although if you can brainwash or hypnotise yourself, it's not irrelevant), but it applies to them.

"Dumbledore said he did it, he told Father it was a warning!

A warning about what? Sure, evil Dumbledore sounds cool... but what's Dumbledore getting out of this apart from an infuriated nemesis?

An infuriated nemesis who now knows that Dumbledore is not only able but willing to hurt their family members... such as, say, their young only son who might just be the first student in 50+ years to have a terrible accident in Hogwarts. Though I remember from canon that Lucius wanted to send Draco to Durmstrang instead, so he wouldn't be under Dumbledore's authority, and it was just Narcissa who vetoed the idea.
I was going to suggest that MoR!Lucius positioned Draco to be able to gain influence with the Boy-who-Lived, but then I remembered that he was willing to drop all his other plans against Draco getting hurt. ...unless that's just what he wants us to believe.
3Eliezer Yudkowsky13y
Well, there's a fact I did not know. Then again this Lucius is more competent anyway. Shrugs.
Easily fixable the first time Durmstrang gets mentioned in MoR in the presence of a Malfoy.
How about this? In addition to being restricted to Pure-Bloods, Durmstrang has another distinction: its culture is absolutely Quidditch-mad. (Victor Krum is merely the most spectacular of its sports programme's many successes.) To the canon!Malfoys, this would only add to its attractions, but the more intelligent MoR!Malfoys realise that Quidditch is an asinine game. While association with the popular sport could be beneficial, it simply is not worth the drain on mind and spirit.
How does this distinguish it from Hogwarts, again? It seems to me that the best explanation is pretty simple - Hogwarts is just the best, by a large margin, with the possible exception of Defense against (using) the Dark Arts, where Hogwarts is usually handicapped by its horrible professors. Since Draco already learns combat spells from tutors, this seems like a pretty small price to pay. Also, given that the Malfoys are playing for power in Magical Britain it makes sense to have been educated there, both not to seem an elitist foreigner-lover and to better understand how British wizards think. Not to mention the fact that Slytherin is at Hogwarts.
How much respect does Lucious have for the Slytherin house? It is, as Harry points out, rather lame currently. Has Malfoy Snr. notice this?
Draco seems to spend a lot of time complimenting Slytherin in his thoughts. Also, there's something of a family tradition.
Just a matter of degree. Hogwarts never produced an 18-year-old Seeker for a national team.
making it all the more odd that MoR!Draco went to Hogwarts
Yeah, I'm aware of that (hence my use of "and" and "just" rather than "but" and "").
Sorry, I missed the ‘just’.

MoR is now the ninth Google autocomplete result for "methods" (screenshot).

Just came up 5th for me.
Still 9th for me. You might be getting targeted results due to being logged in.
It also depends whether or not you have pressed space. "methods" is apparently different to "methods ". Go figure.

Well, it has now become abundantly clear that the major departure from canon is going to be in attitude toward death. Ravenclaw rationality in place of Griffindor bravery is only one aspect of the central thematic difference.

I just happened upon a link from Robin's "Overcoming Bias" blog to this article asking "Do protagonists of great novels have children?". It occurs to me to ask whether anti-death activists have children. Is it the case that the kinds of people who sign up for cryonics don't tend to want children? Does having a ch... (read more)

The technical term for "anti-death enthusiasts" is Methusalites. Sex and death. It reminds me of the maintenance/reproduction axis. Transforming reproductive resources into maintenance resources is widely thought to be responsible for the life-extending effects of calorie restriction.
You mean r selection vs K selection? That wasn't what I had in mind, but you are right: natural selection does tend to play off one against the other. And a member of H.sap. does sometime find verself in one situation or the other, so it is natural that our psyche's would be comfortable with either approach, depending on circumstances.
The r/K thing is a teensy bit different. That is more to do with offspring quality - with many vs few offspring. The idea (from dietary energy restriction) is that organisms face resource-investment tradeoffs between self-maintenance and reproduction - and that circumstances and diet can affect where that tradeoff is made. If there isn't enough dietary energy to support reproduction, what resources are available are devoted to maintenance - so the organism can live to reproduce another day. It is a bit like K-selection taken to an extreme where no babies are produced at all - and all resources get invested in personal survival. I have a page all about this general topic: http://cr.timtyler.org/why/
I'd be surprised if there's any correlation. At least as a matter of anecdote I haven't noticed any such correlation. IIRC from Eliezer's descriptions the groups of people when he went to a cryonics meeting for young people resembled close to a representative sample of the population.
Also 25% of the people there were, iirc, children of cronicysts. That number goes up when you count parents. And we're talking about an age group and demographic that isn't having a lot of kids anyway.
6Eliezer Yudkowsky13y
Eh? No, there were just a few kids, like 2 or 3.

Chapters 43-46 of MoR are up. Go read them!

The most recent author's notes will be added to the archive shortly. I'm also pondering adding the fanart, as well, but it occurs to me that I should probably get permission from the artists before doing so, and I don't like contacting people I don't know. Therefore, I'll leave it to you all: If anyone else would like to see the fanart archived with the authors' notes (perhaps in a different folder, perhaps in the same note as the relevant chapter's author's notes - suggestions welcome), get permission for that to be done and I'll go ahead and do it.

The fan art isn't going away, so it's not vital if you don't archive it. If ff.net doesn't let Eliezer keep an archive of Author's Notes, maybe he should put them in the fan art folder? (I also am grateful that you are archiving the ANs.)
I'm not particularly interested in the fan-art, especially since it's often not quite canon; but I don't mind if it does end up getting included, so consider this a neutral vote. On the other side, I am very appreciative of having the Author's Notes preserved in some form. This update was not the first one where the AN were about as interesting as the fic itself.

I have been entirely staying away from HP:MoR, but given some of the recent discussions, I thought I'd share a story idea, "Yowie Potter and the Methods of Pickup-Artistry".

Yowie is a young female genius and manga fan who lives alone in a forest with her robotic creations. But one day her cyborg scouts, who function as her roaming eyes and ears - one should imagine birds and cute forest animals fitted out with sensors - run across a cottage inhabited entirely by high-IQ male nerds, cut off from the outside world somehow. Along with science and f... (read more)

I don't get it. Can someone explain this to someone who isn't familiar with what "pickup artistry" has to do with HP: MOR?
Nothing directly. Just to some of the distracting references to PUA in the thread.
It sounds interesting enough in this branch too. :) Mind you I think I was one of the nerds I'd be rather adamant that I wasn't to be involved in any practice of "kino escalation"!
An aside on 'kino escalation'... The term seems to have been invented by a 'pickup artist' (probably Mystery) because they didn't bother to look up the standard term for communication with touch: haptic communication or 'haptics.' In the seduction community, 'kino' is short for 'kinesthetics', but unfortunately for the pickup community, kinesthetics is the study of the inner awareness of movement (similar to proprioception), not the study of communication with touch.
Another aside: does anyone else find a lot of the picture choices on wikipedia bizarre and/or disturbing? Both of the ones on the haptic communication article are pretty strong examples.
Bizarre certainly.
"As an aside" re: Mystery -- I admit to being fascinated with his contribution to a Neil Strauss seminar. (It distills Mystery's theories as found in his own book and in Strauss' bestseller.) Mystery's a skilled didactitian although I remember that when I watched the video a second time a couple of his points did lose a bit of their persuasiveness. The PU literature also shows how deeply Evolutionary Psychology has penetrated the popular consciousness, albeit with at least some degree of -- pun intended in this case -- vulgarizations. For those of you who are interested, the video I'm referring to can be found at YouTube with the following search: "Mystery Neil's Annihilation Method DVD".
What a hideous sounding name, at least in the context of doing it to another person. One would hope that if the mistaken word use was not adopted that they just minted a new one for themselves! The nature of what caused the original error may perhaps be better traced to the concept of kinesthetic learning. While still obviously mistaken in the way it has been adopted, the 'learning styles' categorization is more accessible to popular culture and also doesn't imply inner awareness of the process.
Unfortunately for you, this sounds like the sort of fiction where Yowie Potter would make certain such things happened.
and... seriously? There are girls that go around reading and writing male homo-erotic stories? Here I was thinking only guys did that (or the analogous) sort of thing to a significant degree. How narrow minded of me.

Text-based erotic stories in general are mostly the province of girls. Yaoi stories are a subset of that, still largely by and for women. (Of course there's also manga and whatnot; I have less explanation for that.)

The link Khafra gave me the impression that Yaoi was often graphical too (compared to anime or manga). Does the same trend apply to those works? (Or, perhaps, are the wikipedia authors just biassed towards graphical media?)
The word "yaoi" is extracted from Japanese; I don't find it surprising that it would retain a connection to the Japanese story form.
Yes they do.
Not going to happen. I can be confident in this because the very nature of "kino escalation" is that it involves implied consent and implicit or explicit participation by the other party. Without this it is called 'molestation' or 'sexual assault'. I don't especially mind people writing fiction about me being sexually assaulted. For that matter I don't particularly care if people write fiction in which wedrifid is participating in homo-erotic kino escalation. I just don't identify the latter fictional character as 'me'.
But the former (the one being sexually assaulted) you do? and still don't mind it? Interesting …
I should be clear that I consider it a fictional me, as distinct from a fictional some other guy. I can certainly understand why some people will be hurt or even traumatised by such things. I just don't see any reason why I must be. I could instead just be flattered that some girl is including me in her erotic fantasies. So it is a crazy girl and homo-erotic fantasies but there is still no harm that is done to me. Everything that we choose to be care deeply about gives another vulnerability that can be exploited. Choosing to care about fiction that other people write about you seems silly to me - it is completely and utterly out of your control and is essentially a property of them and not you. Not having that vulnerability means that you are immune to torture simulators without even relying on any acausal decision theory.
OK, I undestand (I think). As long as the fictional person has the same character as you, then you can identify yourself with them, but if they have a different character (as they must have to engage in homo-erotic kino escalation) then you don't identify yourself with them. But either way, you don't mind that people write stories about them, since they're fictional.
Got it!
0Eliezer Yudkowsky13y
It's probably already been done.

Father had told Draco that to fathom a strange plot, one technique was to look at what ended up happening, assume it was the intended result, and ask who benefited.

I take it the Malfoy house is just a stand-in for Hanson?

This particular advice is Older Than Feudalism. The Romans asked ‘Cui bono?’ (Wikipedia).

I don't think it is. This is just good sense. If Malfoy House and Lucius in particular is meant to be Hanson or just Hansonian, they are a spectacular failure.
I'm not sure it's "just good sense." For example, some people see the school system failing at all its stated goals and assume the school system is broken, and they can point to institutional reasons why it's terrible. Hanson assumes it is optimized to serve other, implicit goals. I'm not convinced either viewpoint is necessarily true.
I'm not saying that assuming efficiency and looking at actual accomplishment is a wrong paradigm, or that Hanson doesn't use this paradigm frequently. What I'm saying is that 'Hansonism' involves all sorts of skeptical/cynical/outside-view approaches, and Lucius and Draco, as presented, fail almost every metric - they are obviously biased, in self-serving ways, they make and track no predictions, they do privilege their ethical views ... etc. etc. etc. (A thorough read of OB will turn up dozens of techniques and views and criteria which the House of Malfoy miserably fails.) If anything, the single most Hansonian character in MoR is Harry and Draco becomes Hansonian only insofar as he is becoming more like Harry.
Surely the most Hansonian character is the (as yet unknown) wizard who created house elves? Or possibly the elves themselves. If Dobby starts running a prediction market in the Hogwarts kitchens, I called it first :)