This post is a not a so secret analogy for the AI Alignment problem. Via a fictional dialog, Eliezer explores and counters common questions to the Rocket Alignment Problem as approached by the Mathematics of Intentional Rocketry Institute. 

MIRI researchers will tell you they're worried that "right now, nobody can tell you how to point your rocket’s nose such that it goes to the moon, nor indeed any prespecified celestial destination."

dirk5h95
2
Sometimes a vague phrasing is not an inaccurate demarkation of a more precise concept, but an accurate demarkation of an imprecise concept
Thomas Kwa21h213
0
The cost of goods has the same units as the cost of shipping: $/kg. Referencing between them lets you understand how the economy works, e.g. why construction material sourcing and drink bottling has to be local, but oil tankers exist. * An iPhone costs $4,600/kg, about the same as SpaceX charges to launch it to orbit. [1] * Beef, copper, and off-season strawberries are $11/kg, about the same as a 75kg person taking a three-hour, 250km Uber ride costing $3/km. * Oranges and aluminum are $2-4/kg, about the same as flying them to Antarctica. [2] * Rice and crude oil are ~$0.60/kg, about the same as $0.72 for shipping it 5000km across the US via truck. [3,4] Palm oil, soybean oil, and steel are around this price range, with wheat being cheaper. [3] * Coal and iron ore are $0.10/kg, significantly more than the cost of shipping it around the entire world via smallish (Handysize) bulk carriers. Large bulk carriers are another 4x more efficient [6]. * Water is very cheap, with tap water $0.002/kg in NYC. But shipping via tanker is also very cheap, so you can ship it maybe 1000 km before equaling its cost. It's really impressive that for the price of a winter strawberry, we can ship a strawberry-sized lump of coal around the world 100-400 times. [1] iPhone is $4600/kg, large launches sell for $3500/kg, and rideshares for small satellites $6000/kg. Geostationary orbit is more expensive, so it's okay for them to cost more than an iPhone per kg, but Starlink wants to be cheaper. [2] https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/APU0000711415. Can't find numbers but Antarctica flights cost $1.05/kg in 1996. [3] https://www.bts.gov/content/average-freight-revenue-ton-mile [4] https://markets.businessinsider.com/commodities [5] https://www.statista.com/statistics/1232861/tap-water-prices-in-selected-us-cities/ [6] https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Total-unit-shipping-costs-for-dry-bulk-carrier-ships-per-tkm-EUR-tkm-in-2019_tbl3_351748799
My current main cruxes: 1. Will AI get takeover capability? When? 2. Single ASI or many AGIs? 3. Will we solve technical alignment? 4. Value alignment, intent alignment, or CEV? 5. Defense>offense or offense>defense? 6. Is a long-term pause achievable? If there is reasonable consensus on any one of those, I'd much appreciate to know about it. Else, I think these should be research priorities.
Fabien Roger6hΩ240
0
List sorting does not play well with few-shot mostly doesn't replicate with davinci-002. When using length-10 lists (it crushes length-5 no matter the prompt), I get: * 32-shot, no fancy prompt: ~25% * 0-shot, fancy python prompt: ~60%  * 0-shot, no fancy prompt: ~60% So few-shot hurts, but the fancy prompt does not seem to help. Code here. I'm interested if anyone knows another case where a fancy prompt increases performance more than few-shot prompting, where a fancy prompt is a prompt that does not contain information that a human would use to solve the task. This is because I'm looking for counterexamples to the following conjecture: "fine-tuning on k examples beats fancy prompting, even when fancy prompting beats k-shot prompting" (for a reasonable value of k, e.g. the number of examples it would take a human to understand what is going on).
Eric Neyman2d27-8
10
I think that people who work on AI alignment (including me) have generally not put enough thought into the question of whether a world where we build an aligned AI is better by their values than a world where we build an unaligned AI. I'd be interested in hearing people's answers to this question. Or, if you want more specific questions: * By your values, do you think a misaligned AI creates a world that "rounds to zero", or still has substantial positive value? * A common story for why aligned AI goes well goes something like: "If we (i.e. humanity) align AI, we can and will use it to figure out what we should use it for, and then we will use it in that way." To what extent is aligned AI going well contingent on something like this happening, and how likely do you think it is to happen? Why? * To what extent is your belief that aligned AI would go well contingent on some sort of assumption like: my idealized values are the same as the idealized values of the people or coalition who will control the aligned AI? * Do you care about AI welfare? Does your answer depend on whether the AI is aligned? If we built an aligned AI, how likely is it that we will create a world that treats AI welfare as important consideration? What if we build a misaligned AI? * Do you think that, to a first approximation, most of the possible value of the future happens in worlds that are optimized for something that resembles your current or idealized values? How bad is it to mostly sacrifice each of these? (What if the future world's values are similar to yours, but is only kinda effectual at pursuing them? What if the world is optimized for something that's only slightly correlated with your values?) How likely are these various options under an aligned AI future vs. an unaligned AI future?

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TL;DR:

  • Options traders think it's extremely unlikely that the stock market will appreciate more than 30 or 40 percent over the next two to three years, as it did over the last year. So they will sell you the option to buy current indexes for 30 or 40% above their currently traded value for very cheap.
  • But slow takeoff, or expectations of one, would almost certainly cause the stock market to rise dramatically. Like many people here, I think institutional market makers are basically not pricing this in, and gravely underestimating volatility as a result, especially for large indexes like VTI which have never moved more than 50% in a single year.
  • To take advantage of this, instead of buying individual tech stocks, I allocate a sizable chunk of my
...
devansh10m10

Does buying shorter-term OTM derivatives each year not work here?

Viliam14m20

Specific examples would be nice. Not sure if I understand correctly, but I imagine something like this:

You always choose A over B. You have been doing it for such long time that you forgot why. Without reflecting about this directly, it just seems like there probably is a rational reason or something. But recently, either accidentally or by experiment, you chose B... and realized that experiencing B (or expecting to experience B) creates unpleasant emotions. So now you know that the emotions were the real cause of choosing A over B all that time.

(This is p... (read more)

9dirk5h
Sometimes a vague phrasing is not an inaccurate demarkation of a more precise concept, but an accurate demarkation of an imprecise concept
1cubefox1h
Yeah. It's possible to give quite accurate definitions of some vague concepts, because the words used in such definitions also express vague concepts. E.g. "cygnet" - "a young swan".
1dkornai3h
I would say that if a concept is imprecise, more words [but good and precise words] have to be dedicated to faithfully representing the diffuse nature of the topic. If this larger faithful representation is compressed down to fewer words, that can lead to vague phrasing. I would therefore often view vauge phrasing as a compression artefact, rather than a necessary outcome of translating certain types of concepts to words. 

About a year ago I decided to try using one of those apps where you tie your goals to some kind of financial penalty. The specific one I tried is Forfeit, which I liked the look of because it’s relatively simple, you set single tasks which you have to verify you have completed with a photo.

I’m generally pretty sceptical of productivity systems, tools for thought, mindset shifts, life hacks and so on. But this one I have found to be really shockingly effective, it has been about the biggest positive change to my life that I can remember. I feel like the category of things which benefit from careful planning and execution over time has completely opened up to me, whereas previously things like this would be largely down to the...

2Elizabeth23m
I don't think the original comment was a troll, but I also don't think it was a helpful contribution on this post. OP specifically framed the post as their own experience, not a universal cure. Comments explaining why it won't work for a specific person aren't relevant.
kave17m20

I like comments about other users' experiences for similar reasons why I like OP. I think maybe the ideal such comment would identify itself more clearly as an experience report, but I'd rather have the report than not.

1Martin Randall5h
I know a child who often has this reaction to negative consequences, natural or imposed. I'd welcome discussion on what works well for that mindset. I don't have any insight, it's not how my mind works. It seems like very very small consequences can help a bit. Also trying to address the anxiety with OTC supplements like Magnesium Glycinate and lavender oil.
5Fer32dwt34r3dfsz17h
Can you provide any further detail here, i.e. be more specific on origin-stratified-retention rates? (I would appreciate this, even if this might require some additional effort searching)

We are trying our best to honor mana donations!

If you are inactive you have until the rest of the year to donate at the old rate. If you want to donate all your investments without having to sell each individually, we are offering you a loan to do that.

We removed the charity cap of $10k donations per month, which is going beyond what we previous communicated.

2Nathan Young2h
Austin said they have $1.5 million in the bank, vs $1.2 million mana issued. The only outflows right now are to the charity programme which even with a lot of outflows is only at $200k. they also recently raised at a $40 million valuation. I am confused by running out of money. They have a large user base that wants to bet and will do so at larger amounts if given the opportunity. I'm not so convinced that there is some tiny timeline here. But if there is, then say so "we know that we often talked about mana being eventually worth $100 mana per dollar, but we printed too much and we're sorry. Here are some reasons we won't devalue in the future.."
1James Grugett27m
If we could push a button to raise at a reasonable valuation, we would do that and back the mana supply at the old rate. But it's not that easy. Raising takes time and is uncertain. Carson's prior is right that VC backed companies can quickly die if they have no growth -- it can be very difficult to raise in that environment.
2Nathan Young2h
Austin took his salary in mana as an often referred to incentive for him to want mana to become valuable, presumably at that rate. I recall comments like 'we pay 250 in referrals mana per user because we reckon we'd pay about $2.50' likewise in the in person mana auction. I'm not saying it was an explicit contract, but there were norms.

N.B. This is a chapter in a planned book about epistemology. Chapters are not necessarily released in order. If you read this, the most helpful comments would be on things you found confusing, things you felt were missing, threads that were hard to follow or seemed irrelevant, and otherwise mid to high level feedback about the content. When I publish I'll have an editor help me clean up the text further.

In the previous three chapters we broke apart our notions of truth and knowledge by uncovering the fundamental uncertainty contained within them. We then built back up a new understanding of how we're able to know the truth that accounts for our limited access to certainty. And while it's nice to have this better understanding, you might...

Author's note: This chapter took a really long time to write. Unlike previous chapters in the book, this one covers a lot more stuff in less detail, but I still needed to get the details right, so it took a long time to both figure out what I really wanted to say and to make sure I wasn't saying things that I wouldn't upon reflection regret having said because they were based on facts that I don't believe or I had simply gotten wrong.

It's likely still not the best version of this chapter it could be, but at this point I think I've made all the key points I wanted to make here, so I'm publishing the draft now and expect this one to need a lot of love from an editor later on.

The history of science has tons of examples of the same thing being discovered multiple time independently; wikipedia has a whole list of examples here. If your goal in studying the history of science is to extract the predictable/overdetermined component of humanity's trajectory, then it makes sense to focus on such examples.

But if your goal is to achieve high counterfactual impact in your own research, then you should probably draw inspiration from the opposite: "singular" discoveries, i.e. discoveries which nobody else was anywhere close to figuring out. After all, if someone else would have figured it out shortly after anyways, then the discovery probably wasn't very counterfactually impactful.

Alas, nobody seems to have made a list of highly counterfactual scientific discoveries, to complement wikipedia's list of multiple discoveries.

To...

kave26m20

What you probably mean is "completely unexpected", "surprising" or something similar

I think it means the more specific "a discovery that if it counterfactually hadn't happened, wouldn't have happened for a long time". I think this is roughly the "counterfactual" in "counterfactual impact", but I agree not the more widespread one.

It would be great to have a single word for this that was clearer.

5ChristianKl5h
Counterfactual means, that if something would not have happened something else would have happened. It's a key concept in Judea Pearl's work on causality. 
3Lukas_Gloor6h
In some of his books on evolution, Dawkins also said very similar things when commenting on Darwin vs Wallace, basically saying that there's no comparison, Darwin had a better grasp of things, justified it better and more extensively, didn't have muddled thinking about mechanisms, etc.
1francis kafka4h
I mean to some extent, Dawkins isn't a historian of science, presentism, yadda yadda but from what I've seen he's right here. Not that Wallace is somehow worse, given that of all the people out there he was certainly closer than the rest. That's about it
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1Bogdan Ionut Cirstea8h
Hey Jacques, sure, I'd be happy to chat!  
1Bogdan Ionut Cirstea8h
Yeah, I'm unsure if I can tell any 'pivotal story' very easily (e.g. I'd still be pretty skeptical of enumerative interp even with GPT-5-MAIA). But I do think, intuitively, GPT-5-MAIA might e.g. make 'catching AIs red-handed' using methods like in this comment significantly easier/cheaper/more scalable. 
2ryan_greenblatt2h
Noteably, the mainline approach for catching doesn't involve any internals usage at all, let alone labeling a bunch of things. I agree that this model might help in performing various input/output experiments to determine what made a model do a given suspicious action.

Noteably, the mainline approach for catching doesn't involve any internals usage at all, let alone labeling a bunch of things.

This was indeed my impression (except for potentially using steering vectors, which I think are mentioned in one of the sections in 'Catching AIs red-handed'), but I think not using any internals might be overconservative / might increase the monitoring / safety tax too much (I think this is probably true more broadly of the current control agenda framing).

Concerns over AI safety and calls for government control over the technology are highly correlated but they should not be.

There are two major forms of AI risk: misuse and misalignment. Misuse risks come from humans using AIs as tools in dangerous ways. Misalignment risks arise if AIs take their own actions at the expense of human interests.

Governments are poor stewards for both types of risk. Misuse regulation is like the regulation of any other technology. There are reasonable rules that the government might set, but omission bias and incentives to protect small but well organized groups at the expense of everyone else will lead to lots of costly ones too. Misalignment regulation is not in the Overton window for any government. Governments do not have strong incentives...

1quetzal_rainbow3h
May I strongly recommend that you try to become a Dark Lord instead?  I mean, literally. Stage some small bloody civil war with expected body count of several millions, become dictator, provide everyone free insurance coverage for cryonics, it will be sure more ethical than 10% of chance of killing literally everyone from the perspective of most of ethical systems I know.
2Daniel Kokotajlo4h
Big +1 to that. Part of why I support (some kinds of) AI regulation is that I think they'll reduce the risk of totalitarianism, not increase it.
2Daniel Kokotajlo4h
So, it sounds like you'd be in favor of a 1-year pause or slowdown then, but not a 10-year? (Also, I object to your side-swipe at longtermism. Longtermism according to wikipedia is "Longtermism is the ethical view that positively influencing the long-term future is a key moral priority of our time." "A key moral priority" doesn't mean "the only thing that has substantial moral value." If you had instead dunked on classic utilitarianism, I would have agreed.)

So, it sounds like you'd be in favor of a 1-year pause or slowdown then, but not a 10-year?

That depends on the benefits that we get from a 1-year pause. I'd be open to the policy, but I'm not currently convinced that the benefits would be large enough to justify the costs.

Also, I object to your side-swipe at longtermism

I didn't side-swipe at longtermism, or try to dunk on it. I think longtermism is a decent philosophy, and I consider myself a longtermist in the dictionary sense as you quoted. I was simply talking about people who aren't "fully committed" to the (strong) version of the philosophy.

I’m pretty new here so apologies if this is a stupid question or if it has been covered before. I couldn’t find anything on this topic so thought I’d ask the question before writing a full post on the idea.

If we believe that discomfort can be quantified and ‘stacked’ (e.g. X people with specks of dust in their eye = 1 death), is there any reason why this has to scale linearly from all perspectives?

What if the total can be less than the sum of its parts depending on the observer?

Picture a dynamic logarithmic scale of discomfort stacking with a ‘hard cap’ where every new instance contributes less and less to the total to the point of flatlining on a graph.

Each discrete level of discomfort has a...

Picture a dynamic logarithmic scale of discomfort stacking with a ‘hard cap’ where every new instance contributes less and less to the total to the point of flatlining on a graph.

Reality is structured such that there tend to be an endless number of (typically very complicated) ways of increasing a probability by a tiny amount. The problem with putting a hard cap on the desirability of some need or want is that the agent will completely disregard that need or want to affect the probability of a need or want that is not capped (e.g., the need to avoid people's being tortured) even if that effect is extremely small.

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