This post is a not a so secret analogy for the AI Alignment problem. Via a fictional dialog, Eliezer explores and counters common questions to the Rocket Alignment Problem as approached by the Mathematics of Intentional Rocketry Institute. 

MIRI researchers will tell you they're worried that "right now, nobody can tell you how to point your rocket’s nose such that it goes to the moon, nor indeed any prespecified celestial destination."

Thomas Kwa14h183
0
The cost of goods has the same units as the cost of shipping: $/kg. Referencing between them lets you understand how the economy works, e.g. why construction material sourcing and drink bottling has to be local, but oil tankers exist. * An iPhone costs $4,600/kg, about the same as SpaceX charges to launch it to orbit. [1] * Beef, copper, and off-season strawberries are $11/kg, about the same as a 75kg person taking a three-hour, 250km Uber ride costing $3/km. * Oranges and aluminum are $2-4/kg, about the same as flying them to Antarctica. [2] * Rice and crude oil are ~$0.60/kg, about the same as $0.72 for shipping it 5000km across the US via truck. [3,4] Palm oil, soybean oil, and steel are around this price range, with wheat being cheaper. [3] * Coal and iron ore are $0.10/kg, significantly more than the cost of shipping it around the entire world via smallish (Handysize) bulk carriers. Large bulk carriers are another 4x more efficient [6]. * Water is very cheap, with tap water $0.002/kg in NYC. But shipping via tanker is also very cheap, so you can ship it maybe 1000 km before equaling its cost. It's really impressive that for the price of a winter strawberry, we can ship a strawberry-sized lump of coal around the world 100-400 times. [1] iPhone is $4600/kg, large launches sell for $3500/kg, and rideshares for small satellites $6000/kg. Geostationary orbit is more expensive, so it's okay for them to cost more than an iPhone per kg, but Starlink wants to be cheaper. [2] https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/APU0000711415. Can't find numbers but Antarctica flights cost $1.05/kg in 1996. [3] https://www.bts.gov/content/average-freight-revenue-ton-mile [4] https://markets.businessinsider.com/commodities [5] https://www.statista.com/statistics/1232861/tap-water-prices-in-selected-us-cities/ [6] https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Total-unit-shipping-costs-for-dry-bulk-carrier-ships-per-tkm-EUR-tkm-in-2019_tbl3_351748799
I think that people who work on AI alignment (including me) have generally not put enough thought into the question of whether a world where we build an aligned AI is better by their values than a world where we build an unaligned AI. I'd be interested in hearing people's answers to this question. Or, if you want more specific questions: * By your values, do you think a misaligned AI creates a world that "rounds to zero", or still has substantial positive value? * A common story for why aligned AI goes well goes something like: "If we (i.e. humanity) align AI, we can and will use it to figure out what we should use it for, and then we will use it in that way." To what extent is aligned AI going well contingent on something like this happening, and how likely do you think it is to happen? Why? * To what extent is your belief that aligned AI would go well contingent on some sort of assumption like: my idealized values are the same as the idealized values of the people or coalition who will control the aligned AI? * Do you care about AI welfare? Does your answer depend on whether the AI is aligned? If we built an aligned AI, how likely is it that we will create a world that treats AI welfare as important consideration? What if we build a misaligned AI? * Do you think that, to a first approximation, most of the possible value of the future happens in worlds that are optimized for something that resembles your current or idealized values? How bad is it to mostly sacrifice each of these? (What if the future world's values are similar to yours, but is only kinda effectual at pursuing them? What if the world is optimized for something that's only slightly correlated with your values?) How likely are these various options under an aligned AI future vs. an unaligned AI future?
dirk35m10
1
Classic type of argument-gone-wrong (also IMO a way autistic 'hyperliteralism' or 'over-concreteness' can look in practice, though I expect that isn't always what's behind it): Ashton makes a meta-level point X based on Birch's meta point Y about object-level subject matter Z. Ashton thinks the topic of conversation is Y and Z is only relevant as the jumping-off point that sparked it, while Birch wanted to discuss Z and sees X as only relevant insofar as it pertains to Z. Birch explains that X is incorrect with respect to Z; Ashton, frustrated, reiterates that Y is incorrect with respect to X. This can proceed for quite some time with each feeling as though the other has dragged a sensible discussion onto their irrelevant pet issue; Ashton sees Birch's continual returns to Z as a gotcha distracting from the meta-level topic XY, whilst Birch in turn sees Ashton's focus on the meta-level point as sophistry to avoid addressing the object-level topic YZ. It feels almost exactly the same to be on either side of this, so misunderstandings like this are difficult to detect or resolve while involved in one.
American Philosophical Association (APA) announces two $10,000 AI2050 Prizes for philosophical work related to AI, with June 23, 2024 deadline: https://dailynous.com/2024/04/25/apa-creates-new-prizes-for-philosophical-research-on-ai/ https://www.apaonline.org/page/ai2050 https://ai2050.schmidtsciences.org/hard-problems/
I wish there were an option in the settings to opt out of seeing the LessWrong reacts. I personally find them quite distracting, and I'd like to be able to hover over text or highlight it without having to see the inline annotations. 

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Crosspost from my blog.  

If you spend a lot of time in the blogosphere, you’ll find a great deal of people expressing contrarian views. If you hang out in the circles that I do, you’ll probably have heard of Yudkowsky say that dieting doesn’t really work, Guzey say that sleep is overrated, Hanson argue that medicine doesn’t improve health, various people argue for the lab leak, others argue for hereditarianism, Caplan argue that mental illness is mostly just aberrant preferences and education doesn’t work, and various other people expressing contrarian views. Often, very smart people—like Robin Hanson—will write long posts defending these views, other people will have criticisms, and it will all be such a tangled mess that you don’t really know what to think about them.

For...

3Viliam1h
I guess in the average case, the contrarian's conclusion is wrong, but it is also a reminder that the mainstream case is not communicated clearly, and often exaggerated or supported by invalid arguments. For example: * it's not that "dieting doesn't work", but that people naively assume that dieting is simple and effective ("if you just stop eating chocolate and start exercising for one hour every day, you will certainly lose weight", haha nope), even when the actual weight-loss research shows otherwise; * it's not that "medicine doesn't improve health", but while some parts of medicine are very useful, other parts may be neutral or even harmful, and we often see that throwing more money at medicine does not actually improve the outcomes; * it's not that "education doesn't work", but if you filter your students by intelligence and hard work, of course they will have better outcomes in life regardless of how good is your teaching, so the impact of education is probably vastly overestimated, and this also explains why so many pedagogical experiments succeed at a pilot project (when you try them with a small group of smart and motivated students) and then fail in mainstream education (when you try the same thing with average or below-average students); * it's not that "opening the borders completely is a good idea", but a lot of potential value is lost by closing the borders for people who are neither fanatics nor criminals and could easily integrate to the new society. There is also an opposite bad extreme to contrarians, the various "I fucking love science... although I do not understand it... but I enjoy attacking people on social networks who seem to disagree with the scientific consensus as I understand it" people. The ones who are sure that the professor or the doctor is always right, and that the latest educational fad is always correct.
4Templarrr2h
There are 2 topics mixed here. 1. Existence of the contrarians. 2. Side effects of their existence. My own opinion on 1 is that they are necessary in moderation. They are doing the "exploration" part in the "exploration-exploitation dilemma". By the very fact of their existence they allow the society in general to check alternatives and find more optimal solutions to the problems comparing to already known "best practices". It's important to remember that almost everything that we know now started from some contrarian - once it was a well established truth that Monarchy is the best way to rule the people and democrats were dangerous radicals. On the 2 - it is indeed a problem that contrarian opinions are more interesting on average, but the solution lies not in somehow making them less attractive - but by making more interesting and attractive conformist materials. That's why it is paramount to have highly professional science educators and communicators, not just academics. My own favorites are vlogbrothers (John and Hank Green) in particular and their team in Complexly in general.
2gjm2h
Please don't write comments all in boldface. It feels like you're trying to get people to pay more attention to your comment than to others, and it actually makes your comment a little harder to read as well as making the whole thread uglier.

Noted, thanks.

American Philosophical Association (APA) announces two $10,000 AI2050 Prizes for philosophical work related to AI, with June 23, 2024 deadline: https://dailynous.com/2024/04/25/apa-creates-new-prizes-for-philosophical-research-on-ai/

https://www.apaonline.org/page/ai2050

https://ai2050.schmidtsciences.org/hard-problems/

The history of science has tons of examples of the same thing being discovered multiple time independently; wikipedia has a whole list of examples here. If your goal in studying the history of science is to extract the predictable/overdetermined component of humanity's trajectory, then it makes sense to focus on such examples.

But if your goal is to achieve high counterfactual impact in your own research, then you should probably draw inspiration from the opposite: "singular" discoveries, i.e. discoveries which nobody else was anywhere close to figuring out. After all, if someone else would have figured it out shortly after anyways, then the discovery probably wasn't very counterfactually impactful.

Alas, nobody seems to have made a list of highly counterfactual scientific discoveries, to complement wikipedia's list of multiple discoveries.

To...

dr_s9m20

Well, it's hard to tell because most other civilizations at the required level of wealth to discover this (by which I mean both sailing and surplus enough to have people who worry about the shape of the Earth at all) could one way or another have learned it via osmosis from Greece. If you only have essentially two examples, how do you tell whether it was the one who discovered it who was unusually observant rather than the one who didn't who was unusually blind? But it's an interesting question, it might indeed be a relatively accidental thing which for so... (read more)

1francis kafka1h
Bowler's comment on Wallace is that his theory was not worked out to the extent that Darwin's was, and besides I recall that he was a theistic evolutionist. Even with Wallace, there was still a plethora of non-Darwinian evolutionary theories before and after Darwin, and without the force of Darwin's version, it's not likely or necessary that Darwinism wins out.    Also  And he points out that minus Darwin, nobody would have paid as much attention to Wallace.  Bowler also points out that Wallace didn't really form the connection between both natural and artificial selection. 
3kromem10h
Though the Greeks actually credited the idea to an even earlier Phonecian, Mochus of Sidon. Through when it comes to antiquity credit isn't really "first to publish" as much as "first of the last to pass the survivorship filter."
3Lucius Bushnaq13h
Clarification: The 'derivation' for how the RLCT predicts generalization error IIRC goes through the same flavour of argument as the one the derivation of the vanilla Bayesian Information Criterion uses. I don't like this derivation very much. See e.g. this one on Wikipedia.  So what it's actually showing is just that: 1. If you've got a class of different hypotheses M, containing many individual hypotheses {θ1,θ2,…θN} . 2. And you've got a prior ahead of time that says the chance any one of the hypotheses in M is true is some number p(M)<1., let's say it's p(M)=0.8 as an example. 3. And you distribute this total probability p(M)=0.8 around the different hypotheses in an even-ish way, so p(θi,M)∝1N, roughly. 4. And then you encounter a bunch of data X (the training data) and find that only one or a tiny handful of hypotheses in M fit that data, so p(X|θi,M)≠0 for basically only one hypotheses θi... 5. Then your posterior probability p(M|X)=p(X|M)0.80.8p(X|M)+0.2p(X|¬M) that the hypothesis θi is correct will probably be tiny, scaling with 1N. If we spread your prior p(M)=0.8 over lots of hypotheses, there isn't a whole lot of prior to go around for any single hypothesis. So if you then encounter data that discredits all hypotheses in M except one, that tiny bit of spread-out prior for that one hypothesis will make up a tiny fraction of the posterior, unless p(X|¬M) is really small, i.e. no hypothesis outside the set M can explain the data either. So if our hypotheses correspond to different function fits (one for each parameter configuration, meaning we'd have 232k hypotheses if our function fits used k 32-bit floating point numbers), the chance we put on any one of the function fits being correct will be tiny. So having more parameters is bad, because the way we picked our prior means our belief in any one hypothesis goes to zero as N goes to infinity. So the Wikipedia derivation for the original vanilla posterior of model selection is telling us that havin
1dirk35m
Classic type of argument-gone-wrong (also IMO a way autistic 'hyperliteralism' or 'over-concreteness' can look in practice, though I expect that isn't always what's behind it): Ashton makes a meta-level point X based on Birch's meta point Y about object-level subject matter Z. Ashton thinks the topic of conversation is Y and Z is only relevant as the jumping-off point that sparked it, while Birch wanted to discuss Z and sees X as only relevant insofar as it pertains to Z. Birch explains that X is incorrect with respect to Z; Ashton, frustrated, reiterates that Y is incorrect with respect to X. This can proceed for quite some time with each feeling as though the other has dragged a sensible discussion onto their irrelevant pet issue; Ashton sees Birch's continual returns to Z as a gotcha distracting from the meta-level topic XY, whilst Birch in turn sees Ashton's focus on the meta-level point as sophistry to avoid addressing the object-level topic YZ. It feels almost exactly the same to be on either side of this, so misunderstandings like this are difficult to detect or resolve while involved in one.
dirk10m10

Meta/object level is one possible mixup but it doesn't need to be that. Alternative example, is/ought: Cedar objects to thing Y. Dusk explains that it happens because Z. Cedar reiterates that it shouldn't happen, Dusk clarifies that in fact it is the natural outcome of Z, and we're off once more.

3MichaelDickens10h
Have there been any great discoveries made by someone who wasn't particularly smart? This seems worth knowing if you're considering pursuing a career with a low chance of high impact. Is there any hope for relatively ordinary people (like the average LW reader) to make great discoveries?
niplav18m20

My best guess is that people in these categories were ones that were high in some other trait, e.g. patience, which allowed them to collect datasets or make careful experiments for quite a while, thus enabling others to make great discoveries.

I'm thinking for example of Tycho Brahe, who is best known for 15 years of careful astronomical observation & data collection. Similar for Gregor Mendel's 7-year-long experiments on peas. Same for Dmitry Belayev and fox domestication. Of course I don't know their cognitive scores, but those don't seem like a bott... (read more)

2Gunnar_Zarncke3h
I asked ChatGPT  and it's difficult to get examples out of it. Even with additional drilling down and accusing it of being not inclusive of people with cognitive impairments, most of its examples are either pretty smart anyway, savants or only from poor backgrounds. The only ones I could verify that fit are: * Richard Jones accidentally created the Slinky * Frank Epperson, as a child, Epperson invented the popsicle * George Crum inadvertently invented potato chips I asked ChatGPT (in a separate chat) to estimate the IQ of all the inventors is listed and it is clearly biased to estimate them high, precisely because of their inventions. It is difficult to estimate the IQ of people retroactively. There is also selection and availability bias.
1Quinn16h
I eventually decided that human chauvinism approximately works most of the time because good successor criteria are very brittle. I'd prefer to avoid lock-in to my or anyone's values at t=2024, but such a lock-in might be "good enough" if I'm threatened with what I think are the counterfactual alternatives. If I did not think good successor criteria were very brittle, I'd accept something adjacent to E/Acc that focuses on designing minds which prosper more effectively than human minds. (the current comment will not address defining prosperity at different timesteps). In other words, I can't beat the old fragility of value stuff (but I haven't tried in a while). I wrote down my full thoughts on good successor criteria in 2021 https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/c4B45PGxCgY7CEMXr/what-am-i-fighting-for AI welfare: matters, but when I started reading lesswrong I literally thought that disenfranching them from the definition of prosperity was equivalent to subjecting them to suffering, and I don't think this anymore.
1mesaoptimizer3h
e/acc is not a coherent philosophy and treating it as one means you are fighting shadows. Landian accelerationism at least is somewhat coherent. "e/acc" is a bundle of memes that support the self-interest of the people supporting and propagating it, both financially (VC money, dreams of making it big) and socially (the non-Beff e/acc vibe is one of optimism and hope and to do things -- to engage with the object level -- instead of just trying to steer social reality). A more charitable interpretation is that the philosophical roots of "e/acc" are founded upon a frustration with how bad things are, and a desire to improve things by yourself. This is a sentiment I share and empathize with. I find the term "techno-optimism" to be a more accurate description of the latter, and perhaps "Beff Jezos philosophy" a more accurate description of what you have in your mind. And "e/acc" to mainly describe the community and its coordinated movements at steering the world towards outcomes that the people within the community perceive as benefiting them.
12ryan_greenblatt18h
I think misaligned AI is probably somewhat worse than no earth originating space faring civilization because of the potential for aliens, but also that misaligned AI control is considerably better than no one ever heavily utilizing inter-galactic resources. Perhaps half of the value of misaligned AI control is from acausal trade and half from the AI itself being valuable. You might be interested in When is unaligned AI morally valuable? by Paul. One key consideration here is that the relevant comparison is: * Human control (or successors picked by human control) * AI(s) that succeeds at acquiring most power (presumably seriously misaligned with their creators) Conditioning on the AI succeeding at acquiring power changes my views of what their plausible values are (for instance, humans seem to have failed at instilling preferences/values which avoid seizing control). Hmm, I guess I think that some fraction of resources under human control will (in expectation) be utilized according to the results of a careful reflection progress with an altruistic bent. I think resources which are used in mechanisms other than this take a steep discount in my lights (there is still some value from acausal trade with other entities which did do this reflection-type process and probably a bit of value from relatively-unoptimized-goodness (in my lights)). I overall expect that a high fraction (>50%?) of inter-galactic computational resources will be spent on the outputs of this sort of process (conditional on human control) because: * It's relatively natural for humans to reflect and grow smarter. * Humans who don't reflect in this sort of way probably don't care about spending vast amounts of inter-galactic resources. * Among very wealthy humans, a reasonable fraction of their resources are spent on altruism and the rest is often spent on positional goods that seem unlikely to consume vast quantities of inter-galactic resources. Probably not the same, but if I didn't thi
Wei Dai42m20

Perhaps half of the value of misaligned AI control is from acausal trade and half from the AI itself being valuable.

Why do you think these values are positive? I've been pointing out, and I see that Daniel Kokotajlo also pointed out in 2018 that these values could well be negative. I'm very uncertain but my own best guess is that the expected value of misaligned AI controlling the universe is negative, in part because I put some weight on suffering-focused ethics.

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This is a linkpost for https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.02390

This is a linkpost for our paper Explaining grokking through circuit efficiency, which provides a general theory explaining when and why grokking (aka delayed generalisation) occurs, and makes several interesting and novel predictions which we experimentally confirm (introduction copied below). You might also enjoy our explainer on X/Twitter.

Abstract

One of the most surprising puzzles in neural network generalisation is grokking: a network with perfect training accuracy but poor generalisation will, upon further training, transition to perfect generalisation. We propose that grokking occurs when the task admits a generalising solution and a memorising solution, where the generalising solution is slower to learn but more efficient, producing larger logits with the same parameter norm. We hypothesise that memorising circuits become more inefficient with larger training datasets while generalising circuits do...

LawrenceC1hΩ220

My speculation for Omni-Grok in particular is that in settings like MNIST you already have two of the ingredients for grokking (that there are both memorising and generalising solutions, and that the generalising solution is more efficient), and then having large parameter norms at initialisation provides the third ingredient (generalising solutions are learned more slowly), for some reason I still don't know.

Higher weight norm means lower effective learning rate with Adam, no? In that paper they used a constant learning rate across weight norms, but Adam ... (read more)

2NicholasKees3h
I wish there were an option in the settings to opt out of seeing the LessWrong reacts. I personally find them quite distracting, and I'd like to be able to hover over text or highlight it without having to see the inline annotations. 

If you use ublock (or adblock, or adguard, or anything else that uses EasyList syntax), you can add a custom rule

lesswrong.com##.NamesAttachedReactionsCommentBottom-footerReactionsRow
lesswrong.com##.InlineReactHoverableHighlight-highlight:remove-class(InlineReactHoverableHighlight-highlight)

which will remove the reaction section underneath comments and the highlights corresponding to those reactions.

The former of these you can also do through the element picker.

1mesaoptimizer3h
I use GreaterWrong as my front-end to interface with LessWrong, AlignmentForum, and the EA Forum. It is significantly less distracting and also doesn't make my ~decade old laptop scream in agony when multiple LW tabs are open on my browser.

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